Inside the Resistance: The Iraqi Insurgency and the Future of the Middle East
Zaki Chehab. New York: Nation Books, 2005. 368 pp. Index. $26.00.
Reviewed by David J. Danelo
For those who can tolerate the occasional anti-Israel polemic or other fitful diatribes, Inside the Resistance by Lebanese journalist Zaki Chehab merits a close look. Buried beneath the screed is some interesting stuff.
Chehab's book offers something only a handful of western journalists (Anthony Shadid, Patrick Graham) have attempted to produce: an insider's look at the insurgency. The veteran journalist has some background with the topic: he had interviewed the father of one of the 9/11 hijackers-who had not known his son was a radical-before the attacks and followed up with him after the tragedy. This provides a poignant prologue to Chehab's illustrations of the violence that permeates Iraq.
In chapter two, Chehab speaks with dozens of insurgents, including members of Ansar Al Islam and Zarqawi's Al Tawhid wa Al Jihad, creating the finest unclassified description of foreign fighters in Iraq to date. Tucked inside the chapter, amidst an interview with one of Zarqawi's lieutenants, is testimony that-if properly presented to the American people in the fall of 2002-could have created a much different public perception of the rationale and justification for the Iraq war. According to interviews with militants in both Fallujah and Ramadi, the Zarqawi network imported their agenda of terror into Iraq shortly after the post-9/11 American attack into Afghanistan.
In the fall of 2001, Zarqawi-on the run from American forces-allegedly fled to Iran, where he came under pressure from authorities. Without contacting Saddam Hussein, Zarqawi found refuge in a remote area of the Iraqi Kurdish mountains. In exchange for not disturbing the sanctity of Kurdistan, according to Chehab, Zarqawi was permitted to establish a hideout.
Additionally, the men in Zarqawi's network told Chehab that they had established a safe route through Iran that could be used to smuggle equipment and personnel from Afghanistan. By the fall of 2002, the al Qaeda Underground Railroad was running full steam-from Afghanistan, through Iran, and into a secret location in northern Iraq. This location, according to Chehab, was supposedly only dozens of miles from the CIA hideouts that reporter Bob Woodward described in his 2004 book Plan of Attack.
Although the rest of the book is filled with questionable invective-a chapter about Abu Ghraib alleges that the U.S. Army not only tortured, but also systematically raped female prisoners-Inside the Resistance offers an insightful perspective. Chehab represents himself as an open-minded defender of liberal values and western freedoms. In other words, whatever his politics, Chehab is exactly the kind of Arab heart and mind that American forces in the Middle East are trying to win. And keep.
In the end, Chehab does not suggest any solution for the violence. Rather, he expects instability to remain the status quo as long as Americans occupy Iraq. As Inside the Resistance tells it, the enemy expects the U.S. to be in Iraq for "at least five more years," if not longer. According to Chehab's sources, the unpleasant truth is that these men, who claim to be holy warriors, are stockpiling in their lairs in Syria and Iran, preparing to fight us in Mesopotamia "as long as we remain on their land."
Mr. Danelo, a 1998 Naval Academy graduate and former Marine Corps captain and infantry officer, served with the I MEF Headquarters Group at Camp Fallujah from February to September 2004. Stackpole Books will publish his first book, BLOOD STRIPES: The Grunt's View of the War in Iraq, a nonfiction account of NCOs in combat, in May 2006.
The Admirals' Advantage: U.S. Navy Operational Intelligence in World War II and the Cold War
Christopher Ford and David Rosenberg. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005. 264 pp. $37.50.
Reviewed by Rear Admiral Thomas W. Evans, U.S. Navy (Retired)
The most astonishing revelation in this book is the fascinating discussion of the hitherto unknown U.S. intelligence community's deep penetration of the Soviet high command and naval hierarchy. The penetration was achieved through extremely sensitive signal and human intelligence means that are so highly classified they have yet to be revealed. This stunning success provided national and naval defense policy officials with the concrete proof they needed to persuade themselves and their colleagues that they really did have it right.
The ensuing campaign to persuade the highest-ranking national leaders that these analyses and conclusions were credible was extremely difficult, to say the least. Were it not for the aggressive and potentially risky initiative of the legendary naval intelligence visionary Richard Haver, former Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence, and his dedicated colleagues, it might never have happened. This extraordinary crusade is convincingly documented in the narrative.
One of the major components of any successful prosecution of war has always been the role that military intelligence plays in the conflict and the degree of its effectiveness and fulfillment. The Admirals' Advantage provides a remarkable insight into the chronicles of U.S. Navy operational intelligence (OPINTEL), and the impact it had on the ultimate victory of the United States and its allies over the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact partners during the Cold War. This milestone work constitutes a major addition to the military record of this most dangerous period in world history, and should be included in the libraries of all military academies and institutions of higher learning.
In an interview, Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks, former Director of Naval Intelligence, provided testimony to the importance of this work: "This is a fascinating study that proves the old adage of 'truth being stranger than fiction.' The part about the late 1970s and early 1980s is a high point in naval intelligence that represents the single greatest contribution since the breaking of the Japanese code in WWII. . . ."
The authors, both intelligence officers in the U.S. Navy Reserve, are very qualified for the daunting task they have undertaken. lieutenant Commander Ford, a Rhodes scholar, currently serves as the Deputy Assistant secretary of State for Verification and Compliance. Prior to this he was general counsel to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Captain Rosenberg is a senior professor at the U.S. Naval War College. He originated and directed the Director of Naval Intelligence Lessons Learned Project from 1994-2004 and currently commands the largest unit in the Navy Reserve Intelligence Command.
This comprehensive and meticulously researched study is the result of the Operational Intelligence Lessons-Learned Symposium conducted at the National Maritime Intelligence Training Center in September 1998. The principal players in this forum were senior military and civilian intelligence leaders who were charged with examining the evolution of naval intelligence as it emerged from the extraordinary successes of World War II to the present day. Major additional inputs to the project were extensive classified oral interviews with an impressive array of senior figures in the operational and intelligence communities both within and beyond the Navy.
The book opens with an informative review of the maturing of the Navy OPINTEL system, a definition pointedly stressed in the text to emphasize the sophistication and complexity of the network that evolved into the ocean-blanketing consolidated operation of the Cold War. This is followed by a highly intriguing discussion of the evolution of Soviet maritime warfare goals that led to the development of its homeland-defense "bastions" strategy.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s it became increasingly apparent to senior Navy and intelligence leaders that the Soviet Union had no intention of pursuing a war in the Atlantic and Pacific to mimic the German and Japanese strategies of World War II. What evolved in the 1980s as a result was the United States Maritime Strategy. This outlined U.S. intentions to take the war from the outset into the home waters of the Soviet Union and attack its ballistic-missile submarine force, which constituted the critical nuclear warfare ballistic missile restrike reserve force protected by naval air and surface forces.
The authors conclude the volume with a valuable analysis of the lessons learned from the experiences of the Cold War campaign and their expectations for the volatile contemporary experience of the Global War on Terrorism and the future. Obviously the fundamental principles and keys to success for the national OPINTEL system remain the same and should promise continued success.
The Admirals' Advantage is dedicated to the eight U.S. Navy intelligence professionals who gave their lives in the tragic attack on the Pentagon on 11 September 2001.
Admiral Evans is a 1959 graduate of Rice University and was commissioned through the NROTC Program. He commanded USS Batfish (SSN-681) and served in several major leadership positions in the Naval Sea Systems Command including Deputy Commander (Submarines). He serves on the Board of Directors of the Naval Historical Foundation.
The Cold War: A Military History
Robert Cowley, ed. New York: Random House. 2005. 478 pp. $27.95.
Reviewed by Andrew G. Wilson
Editor Robert Cowley has brought forth yet another first-rate collection of essays that illustrate the collective ups, downs, tragedies, and close-run episodes of the Cold War, both in military and intelligence terms.
From the post-war intelligence game in Salzburg, the escape of the HMS Amethyst from China, Dien Bien Phu, to the little-known war scare of 1983, Cowley pulls together some of the finest writers and historians to discuss the relevance of these important episodes and conflicts. David McCullough, Dennis Showalter, Douglas Porch, Williamson Murray, John Prados, Stephen E. Ambrose, and Ronald H. Spector are among the authors whose exceptional work is featured.
Following a discussion by Harris Greene of the early military espionage tryst between the Soviets and Americans in post-World War II Austria (including a note about the Soviets' frequent use of Persian rugs during kidnappings), we move to an outstanding essay by Porch regarding one of the French campaigns in Vietnam-Calamity on the R.C. 4-that would ultimately lead to the showdown at Dien Bien Phu. The essay wonderfully illustrates the incredibly painful, frightening, logistically driven, and poignant nature of the conflict between the Viet Minh and the French military in the highlands of Vietnam. The story is made even more tragic because, as Porch points out, the battle proved that North Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap was more than capable of destroying a large European force in a set-piece battle-a lesson clearly forgotten or overlooked by the time the French began fortifying their positions at Dien Bien Phu.
Murray's riveting essay on the fall of Dien Bien Phu reveals many of the reasons why the French war in Vietnam was such a dismal failure from the start. Combined, these two essays have more significance because they clearly reveal lessons that were simply ignored or not grasped by the U.S. military, which would soon replace the French in the fight against communist North Vietnam.
One of the more fascinating essays-and unfamiliar episodes of the Cold War-concerns the aborted U.S. plans for the invasion of Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. As told by Dino A. Brugioni, this episode was an impressive example of efficient and rapid U.S. military mobilization, and thankfully, demobilization. However, despite humorous aspects of the story, including the beach landing exercise carried out at a very crowded Hollywood Beach, Florida, the costs of this invasion had it taken place could have been devastating. Brugioni explains that historians now know that the Soviet forces garrisoned on the island in support of the Cubans had multiple short-range tactical nuclear missiles at their disposal, and the effect of such weapons either on a beach or detonated above a group of invasion vessels would likely have been catastrophic.
Today, as our government is focused on the arenas of war and counter-terrorism, in Iraq, Afghanistan, and southwest Asia in particular, the chapters highlight themes and arguments that are hauntingly similar to our current national debates. For example, whether one agrees with our current position in Iraq or not, one cannot help but ponder General Douglas MacArthur's statement regarding Korea during the Cold War -"Nothing is gained by military occupation. All occupations are failures."
Given the relatively limited understanding of the Cold War by many Americans, this work will serve nicely to introduce some of the themes of the period to the general reader. In addition, Cowley's work will remind those already familiar with the various episodes and conflicts comprising the Cold War that it was not really all that "cold," nor should its various lessons be forgotten.
Mr. Wilson is a Ph.D. student in history at George Washington University and an operations specialist with the U.S. Naval Criminal Investigative Service.
The Cambodian Campaign: The 1970 Offensive and America's Vietnam War
John M. Shaw. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2005. 222 pp; Illus. Maps. $34.95
Reviewed by Quang X. Pham
In 1985, former President Richard Nixon called the Cambodia incursion "the most successful military operation of the Vietnam War." Tell that to the veterans of the Ia Drang Valley, Khe Sanh, and Hue City. So why haven't we heard more about this offensive? According to historian John M. Shaw, who taught in the history departments at West Point and the U.S. Air Force Academy, the decision to invade Cambodia decidedly stirred the antiwar movement and galvanized Congress. Its military lessons were lost.
Shaw's detailed battle review-down to the brigade level-revisits that controversial combined allied operation with user-friendly maps, figures, and tables conveniently accompanying his military narrative. Without a glossary, however, readers who are unfamiliar with Vietnam-era acronyms will be at a loss.
Cambodia has always lurked in Vietnam's shadow as an often-ignored side-show. Its capital, Phnom Penh, collapsed just two weeks before the fall of Saigon. Two million Cambodians perished in Pol Pot's killing fields. During the last election cycle, Senator John Kerry's recollection of his wandering into that country caused a fierce firestorm among his shipmates and further confused the public.
President Nixon secretly bombed Cambodia just weeks after taking office in 1969 because the North Vietnamese had been using its territory and Laos as border sanctuaries to move supplies to its troops. Following a coup, Hanoi's troops nearly overthrew the new Lon Nol government. Most important, its border was just 65 miles from Saigon, which had been attacked by the Vietcong during the Tet Offensive a year earlier. A major communist assault launched from Cambodia remained a possibility.
Amassing dozens of interviews with former American officers to augment findings from numerous archives, Shaw masterfully weaves the planning, the long-awaited 60-day operation, and its aftermath into a cohesive package. The incursion into Cambodia by nearly 50,000 soldiers of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) was the first test of Vietnamization. Militarily, it was a chance for the South Vietnamese to prove themselves in battle, and it turned out to be a major triumph.
Once inside Cambodia, the South Vietnamese faced intense battles, supported by U.S. and Vietnamese Air Force tactical aircraft and helicopters. ARVN forces were also assigned to help Cambodian soldiers fight North Vietnamese Army and Vietcong troops. Large enemy weapon caches were found and destroyed.
Shaw also looks at the soldiers by comparing the backgrounds of young ARVN leaders to their American counterparts, the former much weaker administratively because they were "shortchanged in their formal professional military education and staff time at higher levels." Corruption, inept leadership, and poor pay plagued the ARVN.
As do a number of American historians, Shaw harshly criticizes the South Vietnamese leadership and society in general. "They were neither as unified nor as zealous as their counterparts to the north." Yet he believes that the successful Cambodian invasion saved American and South Vietnamese lives. More important, it bought time for the pacification program championed by General Creighton Abrams Jr., the U.S. commander in Vietnam. He concludes that President Nixon chose the best course of action at the time.
Army General Brace Palmer, however, countered after the war that "Cambodia eventually resulted in a drastic diminution in the U.S. military advisory effort and military aid for South Vietnam ... the most damaging blow of all for Saigon."
As the war in Iraq slips into its fourth year, lessons from Vietnam spring up in debates across the nation. Iraqization rings familiar to Vietnamization. The generals in Iraq are reportedly reading A Better War by Lewis Sorley, a comprehensive look at the American military's final years in Vietnam. Abrams' "clear and hold" approach as opposed to General William Westmoreland's "search and destroy" has become a popular slogan even with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.
Our leaders in Washington and Baghdad should add The Cambodian Campaign to their reading lists. One can hardly imagine a scarier scenario than that of U.S. and Iraqi troops taking the fight to Iran or Syria.
Mr. Pham, a former Marine aviator, is an entrepreneur and author of A Sense of Duty: My Father, My American Journey (Ballantine Books, 2005). His late father, a U.S.-trained South Vietnamese pilot, survived more than 12 years in postwar re-education camps. (See Books of Interest.)