Enlisted Essay Contest First Place Winner, Sponsored by a grant from Booz Allen Hamilton
The Air Force has became enamored with near real-time intelligence, losing the big picture. Perhaps it is time to change the way it looks at future threats.
When the Berlin Wall came crashing down in 1989, the traditional role of the national intelligence community fell with it. Gone were the days of the single analytical focus-the Soviet Union. In the years that followed, the nation's intelligence services stumbled through redefining their roles. At the same time the Department of Defense was reshaping its Cold War forces to meet threats yet to be realized. The 1991 Persian Gulf War showcased the effectiveness of air power and thrust Air Force intelligence specialties into the spotlight. Suddenly, many enlisted airmen were at the forefront of combat air power. This appeared to be a windfall for Air Force enlisted intelligence professionals. Beneath that shiny Air Force-blue surface, however, is the specter of reaction to the reshaping of the force after the Cold War.
Intelligence or Targeting
It is difficult to argue against the successes of the Gulf War. Air power was the deciding factor, and the Air Force wanted to ensure its newfound dominance well into the future. Shortly after the war, many in top Air Force leadership positions realized that targeting was key to dropping more smart bombs. With not enough targeteers, the Air Force merged the targeting career field with intelligence operations. This seriously affected the intelligence aspect. The numbers looked promising on paper; everyone was a targeteer. In reality, few in the new hybrid career field had targeting experience beyond the week or so of instruction at technical training school. To the operator in the field, this mattered little. The mindset was that everyone in intelligence was a targeteer and vice versa. To the operator, the problem was solved; there were now plenty of Air Force targeteers.
The merger of two completely different skills caused significant problems. The enlisted members were responsible for carrying the burden of the operational decision and making it work. Despite best efforts, the merger led to the misuse of highly trained talent. Enlisted members who had spent a career in analysis found themselves struggling with targeteer skill sets, while career targeteers feverishly tried to perform analyses and present briefings. Analytical ability waned as the focus of intelligence shifted. The merger of targeteers and intelligence operations was part of a larger mentality drift. The force became fixated on near-real-time intelligence and time-sensitive targeting. This called on intelligence to produce short-term analyses for eager operators. The live video feed that needed little input from intelligence analysts became the new face of intelligence. Targeting also switched focus as Air Force leaders now wanted to know how to put bombs on target rather than "why is that a target?" These factors eroded the analytical ability of Air Force intelligence professionals at both the enlisted and officer levels.
The Effects
As this mentality took hold, many of the top intelligence positions were either downgraded to the colonel level or given to rated officers. The Air Force has more general officers in finance and personnel careers than in intelligence, and the three top intelligence positions are held by pilots, not intelligence officers.1 No one disputes that these officers are good leaders; the question is whether they know how to set up the intelligence force for the future. Unfortunately, from the enlisted point of view, the answer seems to be a resounding "No." Much of the fallout from lack of direction is visible in the merged career field's unofficial motto: Jack of all trades, master of none. Should such individuals be making life or death decisions? Imagine the crew chief career field merged into one force. Crew chiefs would be expected to work on any aircraft in the inventory. They may know the basics of all the aircraft but there would be few experts. This obviously poses a flight safety risk, so it is not done. The intelligence career was merged into that one giant career field with few experts.
The Air Force is risking lives of aircrews and operators every time it relies on less-than-adequate analysis from a non-expert. The intelligence professionals, many of whom are enlisted, are asked to "know the basics of their area of responsibility." There are virtually no area or country experts within the Air Force. It appears that those who buck the system to become experts are punished. If an individual stays in one area of responsibility too long, he or she can virtually count on not making the senior NCO ranks. The Air Force, in its pursuit of career-broadening experiences for its personnel, expects both enlisted and officers to have held a variety of jobs at several different bases around the world. This, too, has a profound effect on intelligence's analytical ability. Just as an airman is gaining experience to begin forming insightful analyses, the Air Force moves that individual to a new base, which often requires an entirely new skill set. This diminishes the expertise Air Force intelligence professionals are required to provide.
Enlisted Charter
Unfortunately, this operational short-term approach toward intelligence seems not to be confined to the Air Force. It is affecting the entire intelligence community. The events of 11 September 2001 proved that to be true. While it is unknown whether or not better analysis would have prevented 9/11, it is safe to say that America's leaders would have been much better prepared for such an attack with that analysis. It was not hard for a career analyst to predict that Osama bin Laden would strike the United States. He is one of the few enemies who have detailed who and what they wish to attack and why. Yet, it was a surprise to this country's leadership and an embarrassment for the intelligence community. The 9/11 Commission made some good changes, but the short-term mentality still exists. For intelligence to become more effective, the attitude must change. Certainly the short term needs to be analyzed, but long-range predictive analysis is the only way to adequately prepare and posture our forces to meet future threats.
The future holds many unknowns for the Air Force. It is part of the enlisted intelligence person's charter to help Air Force leaders make informed decisions on future force posture. Unfortunately, the current trend within the intelligence community makes those decisions harder. Intelligence professionals lack the expertise to make informed analysis, which generates benign predictions or analysis that states the obvious. Often, the long-range predictions are borrowed from national-level agencies such as the CIA or FBI. While these agencies often provide excellent insight into a potential future threat, they are seldom produced with the Air Force's best interests in mind. It would behoove the Air Force to start paying more attention to long-range predictive analysis as well as creating a cadre of experts. Without taking those steps, the Air Force will have an intelligence disaster on its hands. It will have the wrong equipment at the wrong time for the fight, working in a reactionary mode. In a world of asymmetric threats, being a reactionary force is exactly what the enemy wants.
At first glance, it appears that enlisted intelligence professionals can do little to change the current predicament. The enlisted members, however, have the ability to be a force for change within the intelligence community. It starts with attitude. There are two ways of working: maintain the status quo or improve the product or process. For intelligence to make the impact it needs, change must occur. Fortunately, enlisted personnel are in the best position to enact changes that could reshape the face of the intelligence community.
Reversing the Trend
Training is the key to reversing the trend. The enlisted intelligence professional has many opportunities to receive and improve training. At the technical school level the Air Force provides little-if any-analysis training. Intelligence personnel have to fight for additional training. Fortunately, many training resources are available at, among others, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Joint Special Operations University.
Usually getting a commander to agree to training is not a hard sell. There is a catch, however, in that many commanders want a return on their investment. This is where enlisted expertise comes in. If you are fortunate enough to pick up a training class, the onus is on you to show the value of that training.
Enlisted members have traditionally been good at training each other. The enlisted forces of all services are regarded as technical experts, so training others is natural for them. Use that tradition to multiply the training effect. Train others in the shop, and use that training through production.
Offer in-depth analysis of the assigned area of responsibility or mission to the commander. Look beyond the next 24 hours and offer predictions on the unit's focus five to ten years from now. By performing long-range predictive analysis, commanders and officers will see its benefits. They will learn what to expect and can begin to make informed decisions concerning how to posture the unit for future operations. In short, the value of intelligence just went up. Additionally, commanders and other decision makers will begin to realize that intelligence is not intuitive and will likely push for more training for their units.
The merger of the two career fields induced poor choices in personnel use. The enlisted force can reverse this. The Air Force intelligence career field is among the top five most critically manned. Intelligence professionals at most units have a host of additional duties, ranging from safety monitor to security manager; all impede intelligence efforts. While the duties are important, intelligence personnel should not be assigned to them while in a critically-manned status.
Change Through Action
The addition of these duties to intelligence units usually stems from a lack of understanding by commanders on what intelligence can provide. This is where senior NCOs step in. With their guidance and leadership skills, it is their duty to ensure intelligence personnel are used for intelligence purposes. This begins with detailing what intelligence can provide to the unit and what the unit will lose if personnel are distracted. Follow-up is necessary to prove to the commander that intelligence is as valuable as advertised. If carried out in this manner, the leadership will begin to understand the unique abilities of intelligence work and learn to appreciate both short- and long-term analysis.
Bringing about change is never an easy task. At a time when accurate intelligence is vital to the national security, analysis skills within the world's premier Air Force are eroding. Enlisted intelligence professionals have long recognized the dangers of the current trend within their career field. It is up to enlisted members to train, equip, and employ a force that can avoid the impending train wreck. Acquiring and implementing training and getting the most out of a critically manned career field are tasks that can only be completed with enlisted help. The time to act is now, the threats have already taken aim, and only a well-tuned intelligence force can root them out before they pull the trigger.
Technical Sergeant Shibilski, who holds a bachelor's degree in Intelligence Studies from American Military University, is an 11-year Air Force veteran assigned to Air Force Special Operations.