Marines Need Irregular Warfare Forces

Marine Corps Essay Contest Winner

As the Department of Defense (DoD) prosecutes the war on terrorism, the U.S. Marine Corps finds itself nice again at a crossroad. Will the Corps continue to provide this nation with a second land army capable of fighting major combat operations? Or will the Corps do what it has done so successfully in the past, discerning the shape of future warfare well in advance and reorganizing its forces accordingly? The answer to this question may bear on the very existence of the service 20 or 30 years from now.

The Marine Corps enjoys its reputation as one of the world's finest fighting organizations precisely because it has historically adapted to changing world situations anil re-examined its warfighting mechanisms when those situations warranted it. This period in the Corps' history should be no different, and making the changes that will provide enhanced capabilities to the joint community must be a top priority among its leadership.

At the Forefront of a New Capability

The Marine Corps prides itself on having led the way in the development of amphibious doctrine, vertical envelopment, and in the counter-insurgency concepts that support the war this nation is engaged in lotlay. Now is the time to take the lead again and develop and institutionalize an irregular warfare (IW) capability that will provide the regional combatant commanders (RCC) with a distinctive means to engage partner nations and shape U.S. engagement with them.

Many of today's expert defense thinkers disagree on the nature of future conflict and who will emerge as our greatest threat. Differing views are not unreasonable, considering the growth of China, the budding economic power that is the European Union, and the ongoing war against Islamic extremists. Unable to know who the enemy will be. secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has called for a capabilities-based force for the 21st century, prepared for all manner of conflict against numerous potential foes. This course is prudent, and despite resistance by the services, change toward such a force has taken place and will continue to occur into the immediate future.

Follow the QDR

The roadmap secretary Rumsfeld is following to best prepare the force is the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). It emphasizes that building a strong irregular warfare capability is critical to DoD plans for both fighting the current war and preparing for future conflicts. Naturally, most in the security establishment look to special operations forces to provide this enhanced capability.

The Secretary of Defense himself has indicated that he is an admirer of the special operations community. The superb job these forces did in Afghanistan during the opening phases of the war there, and their continuing efforts in Iraq and elsewhere in the war on terrorism have been cause for celebration and should he the subject of study for many years to come. Special operations forces and the capabilities they contribute figure to be prominent in the future.

These significant successes, coupled with the proposed way ahead found in the QDR, should lead the national security establishment to ask how we as a nation can capitalize on the irregular warfare capabilities inherent to special-operations forces. And more important, how can DoD build more forces with the requisite IW capabilities?

This requirement provides the Marine Corps a golden opportunity to once again revitalize and reinvent itself as the premier IW force among the services. The Corps is uniquely positioned within DoD as the only service that is sufficiently flexible bureaucratically. operationally savvy, and that has a training system in place to support the type of change being proposed.

No Other Service Ready for Irregular Warfare

For some time, the U.S. Navy has been engaged in a discussion about its future. The staff in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the numbered Fleet commanders disagree over how to build an operating concept for the Navy. This bureaucratic struggle has hogged down the service and threatens needed naval reform.

The U.S. Air Force has been hijacked by the F-22 Raptor. On its sleek, radar-invisible wings rests the future of that service. It is such a large program and has consumed so much time and effort that it is no wonder the Air Force's contribution to the current war has been limited.

The U.S. Army is the greatest land force in the world. The combat power it brings to bear against the enemy is truly remarkable, and the country is fortunate to have this stout force on its side. But the Army finds itself in the midst of a reorganization to create more combat brigades. That is, the Army is systematically creating more conventional warfighting power. That is its niche, and it has no requirement to change.

The Marine Corps, on the other-hand, should embrace change. The Corps organizes itself into Marine Air-Ground Task Forces ( MAGTFs). The largest of these is the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). As demonstrated during both Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom, the MEF is a very powerful force capable of adapting quickly to the situation on the ground. It has proved equally adept at major combat operations and security and stability operations. But using the Marine Corps as a second major ground force, with the Army being the primary force, is a duplicate capability that, in this era of tightening budgets, this nation simply cannot afford.

Where Irregular Warfare Forces Should Go

The Corps maintains three warfighting MEFs, but no requirement exists for three forces focused primarily on fighting major combat operations. Headquarters Marine Corps should establish III MEF, stationed on Okinawa, as the Irregular Warfare force and direct II MEF, headquartered at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, to designate one Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) as an Irregular Warfare brigade.

Irregular warfare exercises could be modeled along the lines of Southern Command's UNITAS. the Pacific Command's Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT), European Command's West African Training Cruise (WATC), or the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP). Obviously, that is for the regional combatant commander to decide. What is most critical is that he has this tool available to engage the multitude of countries in his area of operations. The Marine Corps should be the service that embraces this role and provides the regional combatant commander with the tools he needs to fight the war on terrorism before the shooting begins.

Where Training Should Focus

All education and training for these forces would be focused on building an irregular warfare capability. It is true that some of these capabilities are traditionally missions conducted primarily by the special operations community. Not any longer. Now. the established irregular warfare force and brigade would embark on a course that will build the expertise to conduct foreign internal defense operations, psychological operations, civil affairs, and humanitarian anil civic action operations, among others.

Both III MEF and the IW MEB would still be able to aggregate and fight when and if called on to do so. But there should he no doubt about the Marine Corps' commitment to being the force of choice when a regional combatant commander needs an irregular warfare capability.

The remainder of the Corps' operating forces would continue to carry on as usual, remaining the world's foremost amphihious force. In addition, it will still source Marine Expeditionary Units, though perhaps not at the current strength of seven. Finally, the ability to Held a MFF (Reinforced) for major combat operations would not change.

Much if not most of the Marine Corps will find fault with this plan. Marines are proud of their history and likely would not advocate what they would surely see as a drastic departure from their illustrious past.

Not a Radical Change

It is significant to note, however, that this proposal is not a radical change from the course the Corps finds itself on right now. In fact, all of the artillery community has been directed to train to conduct civil affairs operations. In addition, each of the exercises listed previously are good examples of Marine forces engaging in theater security cooperation and to a certain extent, in foreign internal defense operations.

The creation of these two irregular warfare forces within the Marine Corps would simply streamline the forces involved by focusing certain units on irregular warfare while permitting the rest of the operating forces to maintain their locus on major combat operations. If you were assigned to a certain unit, you would have no doubt what your primary mission would he. The capabilities of the IW units would clearly reside in these two commands and not be spread across the operating forces.

In addition, with the flexible air-ground task force structure in place in support of the irregular warfare mission, the requisite aviation and combat service support would continue to be a natural part of conducting operations as a Marine. Finally, education and training for irregular warfare would be focused on the Marines in the aforementioned commands.

Advantages of Embracing Irregular Warfare

Increasing the forces available to conduct irregular warfare-type missions and enhancing the capabilities of all the services to fight the war on terrorism are goals of the Secretary of Defense. And while there are likely to be many different ways to achieve these goals, this particular idea should be an attractive possibility for several reasons.

First, the Marine Corps has always been regarded as one of this nation's elite fighting units. The ethos of the Marine Corps is very similar to that of the special operations community. Years of traveling light, constant deployments to austere environments, training hard, and forging young men into steely eyed killers have been hallmarks of serving in the Marine Corps. Adapting to a new mission. likely to be carried out in the far corners of the globe, is a perfect lit for the Corps.

Second, the Marines' organization is attractive to regional combatant commanders. Having a ground, aviation, and combat service support element inherent underneath the same command, with the same missions, is a big plus when it comes to selecting the force of choice for a particular operation. Moreover, living and working together, as the elements of a MAGTF do. builds camaraderie and allows everyone to already be on the same team, rather than having to fashion new teams for every irregular warfare-type of operation.

Finally, once again the Marine Corps, unique among the services, finds itself with an opportunity to lead the way forward as America prosecutes the war on terrorism. It can certainly choose to stay the course it is on now. That is the easy way. But the secretary of Defense, the QDR. and current world events make it clear that DoD needs an enhanced irregular warfare capability within its armed services. This idea is a measured, informed proposal that streamlines many of the efforts the Corps is already undertaking, while institutionalizing a change in thought within the Corps. Marines have always prided themselves at being the best at what they do. Only through forcing this change in thought will the Corps rise to the level of being the force of choice for the regional combatant commander in need of an irregular warfare capability.