The tactics of a legendary late 19th- and early 20th-century Russian admiral can shape our Navy's transformation in the 21st century.
In late February 1904, shortly after the first shots of the 20th century's first major maritime conflict-the Russo-Japanese War-were fired, the Imperial Russian Navy turned to Vice Admiral Stepan Osipovich Makarov as the commander it believed most capable of reversing its misfortunes against Japan. It is hard to imagine a better choice. Amid that era's rapid pace of scientific advancement. Makarov's intellectual curiosity drove his quest to refine Russian fleet tactics through his relentless experimentation with naval technologies. His thorough study of military history, combined with the keen understanding of human psychology he gained during years of combat leadership, made him a dynamic tactician capable of rallying his countrymen and achieving victories despite improbable odds.
Makarov's lasting fame stems from his 1898 study. Discussion of Questions in Naval Tactics, which became Russia's first modern reference on naval theory and operations. So great was its impact that during the Cold War it provided a foundation on which the Soviet Navy and its clients based their doctrine for fighting Western fleets. His ideas on naval combat, specifically his tactics for countering numerically or technologically superior adversaries in the littoral, should be of vital interest to us today. In the context of how emerging sea denial threats are a focus of the U.S. Navy's quest for transformation, Makarov lets us view the contemporary battlespace from an anti-access navy's historical perspective.
Initiative as a Weapon
Makarov felt there should only be one decisionmaking consideration in the minds of those affiliated with the armed services: "Every military man, and those connected with them, in order not to forget why he exists, would do well to have in front of himself a plaque: 'Remember War!'"1 Constant wartime preparedness was Makarov's passion, and anything not supporting this was nnimportant to him.
Born in 1848, Makarov joined the Imperial Navy as a means to elevate himself within society. His era was one of great strategic contradiction within Russia. Despite increasing conflict with the other great powers throughout the 19th century, the czars consistently disregarded naval readiness.: Frustrated by the fleet's condition. Makarov used his ships to conduct some of the first Russian analyses of tactical maneuverability, the linkages between ship design and damage control, fuel efficiency, and weapon performance under varying environmental conditions in hopes of improving Russia's naval capabilities through educating its officer corps. Considering land warfare's traditionally dominant role in Russian military thinking. Discussion of Questions in Naval Tactics proved more than just a handbook for lighting ships. Makarov highlighted the strategic and tactical similarities and differences between land and naval combat for an audience that largely never realized there were any. Moreover, he subtly outlined the benefits of seapower to a state.
Makarov strongly believed that poor naval readiness harmed Russia's strategic position and overall national strength. He understood that a fleet-in-being waiting out a war in port and not challenging a superior adversary equated to national suicide, whereas tactical stalemates or defeats in battle could yield strategic victories for a state if the inferior navy inflicted unacceptable costs on its adversary.
Makarov considered British Vice Admiral Lord Horatio Nelson the model naval commander, consistently praising Nelson's tactics and leadership philosophies as the ideal. Like Nelson, Makurov understood from personal experience that victory ashore depends upon achieving sea control or sea denial as circumstances dictate and that the side that seizes the initiative and best employs offensive tactics holds an overwhelming advantage in capital-intensive naval combat. These concepts also apply to joint campaigns on inland seas and waterways.
Even if a weaker fleet was on the strategic defensive, Makarov believed it must attack in order to blunt its adversary's offensive-an active defense. He noted that defenders could achieve favorably disproportionate strategic and tactical results by forcing reactions from their aggressors, thus potentially shifting the initiative to the defenders' favor:
Fighting is obligatory only when we are called upon to hinder the antagonist in doing that which he deems his duty. Let us suppose that a cruiser of a nation possessing an extensive commerce meets a cruiser under orders to destroy commerce. It is obligatory upon the former to fight, even if he is weaker than his antagonist and has hut little hope for success. Nevertheless, he will he able to weaken his antagonist to some extent and hinder him from further destructive activity.3
Makarov disagreed with the opinion that ships' combat priority was the collective protection of one another as opposed to pressing a coordinated attack forward and accepting the inherent risks:
If ships only busy themselves about supporting one another in battle, the enemy who is in no wise hindered will invariably win. The principle of mutual support may be remembered by seamen as far as it relates to the simultaneous attack of an adversary. The best aid to our own side is prompt attack upon our opponents.4
He derided the French commander at Trafalgar. Vice Admiral Pierre-Charles Villeneuve. whose fleet instructions prior to the battle primarily focused on how his ships should aid comrades most imperiled by enemy fire. Conversely. Makarov applauded Nelson's direction that his ships to seek out Villeneuve's force and capitalize on emerging opportunities despite the tactical risks. Although Villeneuve enjoyed an advantage in both firepower and position. Makarov praised Nelson for ensuring his force was better combat-conditioned. Makarov noted that this readiness bred confidence and boldness, the prerequisites for stealing the initiative from a dominant battle force. In Makarov's eyes, the fact that Nelson's actions resulted in decisive victory only underscored their virtue.
The tactical and strategic value of seizing the initiative, along with the impression of tactical inferiority relative to Western navies, later shaped Admiral Sergey Gorshkov's establishment of the Soviet Navy's doctrinal "struggle for the first salvo" and its corresponding offensive tactics. Indeed, this remains true regarding any of the U.S. Navy's potential adversaries both now and in the near future. We find that many access-denial navies are acquiring primarily offensive weapons such as antiship cruise missiles, mines, and torpedoes, as well as advanced information-warfare capabilities, fielding them on the simplest effective platforms. Contrary to Western trends, they are not acquiring large arsenals of advanced shipboard defenses, such as area air defense systems, instead generally opting for the minimum necessary point defenses. As Makarov noted, the advantages that offensive tactics can provide to inferior forces clearly are not lost on these navies.
Notably, Makarov cautioned about obsession with blindly attacking first: "the best way to lose a battle is tiring without aiming."5 This remains especially relevant today. Makarov meant this literally, as in firing the unguided weapons of his time at maximum range or in low visibility such that the probability of a hit was unfavorable in terms of ordnance expended. Although contemporary guided weapons can now hit a single ship within a crowded littoral environment or strike targets ashore with pinpoint accuracy, we are wise to remember that these increased capabilities generally come at the expense of larger weapon inventories.
With potential state and non-state adversaries increasingly blending into their environments both physically and electromagnetically. we are dependent on timely, accurate scouting or intelligence, and proper interpretation of this data by commanders to ensure the targets we aim at are the correct ones. Fortunately, our potential adversaries are similarly burdened in targeting our distributed forces in open waters, regardless of whether they field improvised explosive devices or antiship missiles. The exception to this for us. of course, is in the littoral.
Balancing the Fleet
Makarov held a key role in introducing the first Russian torpedo boats, forefathers of contemporary littoral fast-attack combatants. Makarov's torpedo boats, so effective in stealing the initiative from heavier Ottoman forces in 1877. operated under coordinated squadron tactics. Contrary to the French Jeune École of his time, however. Makarov did not advocate a predominantly light fleet of such vessels and in fact valued a balanced fleet much as we do. He assessed the qualities and tactics of heavy ironclads and cruisers as well as those of torpedo boats in Discussion, addressing how their combat actions could be best harmonized. He felt that each type of warship had many purposes and roles for which it was ideally suited, and the combined capabilities of each type greatly enhanced operational flexibility in fleet actions and campaigns.
For major engagements, he advocated combining heavier and lighter warships in one force and coordinating their operations, observing that torpedo boats "may be employed to weaken the enemy's squadron before we engage the latter with our artillery" and that only torpedo boats could effectively defend the heavier combatants from enemy torpedo boat attack.6 He acknowledged that "many of the torpedo boats would be destroyed" in an unconcealed charge on the enemy line, "but the result still might be the actual weakening of the enemy squadron" for the cruisers to then eliminate.7
Makarov's observations foreshadow development of torpedo boat destroyers. Destroyers soon absorbed torpedo boats' offensive roles, perfectly exemplified by Captain Arleigh Burke and Commander Frederick Moosbrugger's antiship tactics during late 1943 in the Solomon Islands campaign. Destroyers were completely able to counter similarly capable light warships in squadron actions, and tightly complemented capital ships during fleet surface actions such as in the Surigao Strait and the legendary defense of Task Unit 77.4.3-Taffy 3-off Samar. Corvettes and frigates assume these roles in Western fleets today, whereas access-denial navies do the same by fielding numerous disproportionately armed, expendable fast-attack craft in true Makarovian fashion.
Anatomy of an Asymmetric Attack
Optimized for covert approach during situations of reduced visibility, Makarov's torpedo boat squadrons thrived during operations independent from the main fleet. He praised these tactics as ideal for weaker fleets:
Torpedo attack closely resembles guerrilla warfare, and therefore well suits the disposition of the Russian seaman. We may not possess the powers of systemization that characterize other western nations, hut when war begins, the Russian knows that lack of organization may be replaced by personal initiative in the commanders. This is a quality which is priceless in a torpedo attack.8
Makarov foresaw employment of emissions control and expendable countertargeting decoys, calling for torpedo boats' silent, dark approach and "throwing overboard floats with lights upon them for the purpose of drawing off the enemy's fire" during the attack. He understood the value of saturation attacks in which numerous fast attackers overpower the defenses of their targets-a staple of asymmetric tactics. He noted that in overwhelming the limits of his targets' sensing abilities, the gunners on the enemy's ships "will be in no calm frame of mind; but even if they are calm, night firing upon torpedo boats cannot be a success, for only a few of the boats can be lit by searchlights, while the others must remain in darkness."
Most importantly, wrote Makarov, "when the attack has once been begun it must not he interrupted, no difference what happens;" the torpedo boats should then brazenly endeavor to "get somewhat nearer than is deemed necessary for the attack;" and "this position must be maintained until all torpedoes are fired from the loaded tubes." He sincerely believed that weapons not fired once within effective range were essentially wasted. He knew the advantages of multiaxis attacks, noting that in an encircled enemy formation "each inaccurate shot of the enemy will miss its mark, but some of our misses will strike other ships of the enemy: besides this, the enemy's ships being close together will interfere with one another."9 This. too. became a Soviet Navy tactical aspiration. It remains the preferred attack of an anti-access force, best executed in confined waters or maritime chokepoints.
Makarov agreed with Nelson that the most effective form of naval command and control centered on command by negation-tactical initiative delegated to subordinate commanders-which he viewed as critical to the success of his offensive tactics. He believed that the initiative was too precious for a naval commander visually removed from the tactical situation to hold all the reins of control, and that such command stilled a force's morale, tactical creativity, and ability to seize opportunities of short duration.10 This was one area in which Soviet doctrine did not flow from Makarov's theory, as their command and control architectures in practice reflected the Soviet system's inability to tolerate such action by lower commanders without ceding the system's overall legitimacy. It is debatable whether contemporary authoritarian regimes can likewise tolerate such decentralized decision-making, but we can never assume that capable commanders such as Makarov do not exist within these fleets and that they will not assert themselves in combat should the occasion arise.
Boldness and creativity fueled Makarov's combat successes. His torpedo boat tactics, combined with some of the first Russian attempts to incorporate local tides and bottom topography in minelaying. proved devastating to the Ottomans and later gave his superiors hope that he could prevail against Japan.11 Active defense strategy employing the above is a hallmark of access-denial navies both past and present. Makarov firmly believed that victory at sea, whether for offensive or defensive strategic or tactical aims. was impossible without seeking out the enemy's forces. As he put it, "a good gun causes victory, while the armor is capable only of postponing defeat."12
Guideposts for Transformation
On 31 March 1904, barely a month after assuming command of the debilitated First Pacific Ocean Squadron, Makarov perished when his flagship struck a Japanese mine outside Port Arthur. The surge in readiness during his brief tenure electrified his men, preserved a stalemate for several months, and inspired other Russian commanders, but was not enough to forestall Japan's ultimate victory." Worse, his loss deprived the Russian Navy of its strongest advocate.
Today's U.S. Navy understands that transformation is necessary for meeting Future threats. Makarov assures us that extensive capabilities-bused experimentation and analysis initiated both on the deekplate level and by naval aeademia is critical towards discovering the most effective combinations of systems and tactics for our continued maritime dominance. Additionally, our investments in developing networked unmanned sensing and shooting vehicles for distributed operations as well as a class of numerous littoral-optimized warships provides the Fleet with significant increases in flexibility and capability, and is supportable by both Makarov's theories and experiences. Warship size, he believed, has less of a role in determining victory than overwhelming offensive capability and the willingness to boldly employ it.
Discussion reaffirms that the tactics and goals of effective access-denial forces have changed little over the last century. They remain based in active defense doctrine, seeking quick hit-and-run strikes that steal the initiative from their adversary, weaken his resolve, and degrade his projection of power ashore. They strongly believe their defeat is probable if they permit their adversary to maintain the initiative uncontested. Makarov implies that we must never assume that geographic, environmental, technological, or other similar variables make attack unlikely at any given time, whether the foe is a navy or a non-state actor. As difficult as these conditions may he for the attackers, they are the kind of circumstances that Nelson and Makarov seized upon knowing that their adversaries had likely lowered their guard.
We must avoid mirror-imaging how we expect access-denial adversaries to respond to our capabilities. Under an active defense strategy, it is improbable that they will spend capital fielding defensive weapon capabilities to counter us. Rather, they will seek their own offensive, asymmetrical antiplatform and electromagnetic/network attack capabilities for saturating us early in a campaign, thus potentially gaining quick strategic victories and eroding our will with the goal of keeping their adventures' spoils at an acceptable cost. This is the classic calculation of the weak.
Above all, Makarov believed, the human variable can trump the technological. Despite net-centricity's advances in improving battle-force coordination, he strongly cautions us on allowing technology to remove too much tactical decisionmaking authority from on-scene commanders. Audacious, innovative, inspirational leaders paired with crews extensively trained and conditioned tor combat's destructive uncertainties are a constant, historically decisive factor in battle. Makarov told us to "remember war." We are wise to remember Makarov.
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References
1 S. O. Makarov, Discussion of Questions in Naval Tactics (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990), pp. xxiii-xxiv. Capt Robert B. Bathurst, USN (Ret), author of the introduction to this edition of Discussion, derived this quote from S. N. Semanov, Admiral Makarov (Moscow, Russia: Prosveshchenie, 1971) p. 17.
2 Ibid., pp. xxvi-xxix.
3 Ibid., p. 223.
4 Ibid., p. 33.
5 Ibid., p. 223.
6 Ibid., pp. 262-263.
7 Ibid., p. 263.
8 Ibid., p. 267.
9 Ibid., pp. 261, 273, and 275.
10 Ibid., pp. 73-74, 244.
11 Ibid., p. xx.
12 Ibid., p. 289.
13 Milan L. Hauner. "Stalin's Big Fleet Program," U.S. Naval War College Review, Spring 2004, p. 92. Of note, Makarov would have decidedly approved Capt Nikolai O. Von Essen's minelaying strategy for potential conflict with Germany a decade later.
A former junior Surface Warfare Officer, Mr. Solomon recently left active duty and is now an employee of Systems Planning and Analysis, Inc. (SPA) in Arlington, Virginia.