In 2002, U.S. aircraft dropped thermobaric bombs on al Qaeda and Taliban forces in Gardez, Afghanistan. Unlike blast and fragmentation munitions, these bombs created a pressure pulse that could kill deep inside winding caves. The technology was fielded in 60 days, but made possible by research begun in naval laboratories in the 1960s.1 U.S. forces long have had technological superiority that was based on research and development begun 20 to 30 years before. It's not a spigot that can be turned off and on, and there are no substitutes for defense laboratories that produce military-unique technologies. However, the nation and its defense are headed for a "perfect storm" that threatens this technological superiority—and avoiding it means making changes now.
Accept No Substitutes
The U.S. forces' technological superiority is widely accepted. Assessing Operation Iraqi Freedom, Russian Major General G. A. Berezkin said, "never before has such a large number of various state-of-the-art arms and military equipment been used so intensively and simultaneously in the course of a single military campaign." Another Russian general stated, "there can be no doubt about the enormous technological superiority of the American military."2 While technology is the focal point, its foundation is decades of research and development (R&D). This work was and continues to be the responsibility of thousands of scientists and engineers in defense labs. Out of the Office of Naval Research alone ". . . flowed ideas that literally changed the world," wrote naval historian Michael T. Isenberg. They led to the laser, submarine-launched ballistic missile, tilt-rotor aircraft, deep-sea exploration, and the Ni1000 computer chip developed in 1992 by Intel Corporation—just to mention a few.3
The R&D centers are irreplaceable. They have taken risks that a profit-oriented industry would not have, such as early space exploration, and delivered great rewards. It's estimated that society has experienced a 423 percent rate of return on fiber optic R&D—a Naval Research Laboratory project for more than two decades.4 And these labs also have provided the lowest costs, stated a White House report in 1994. That same year, the Naval Research Lab put into lunar orbit the satellite Clementine, built in less than half the time and one-fifth the cost of similar space probes. More recently, the Naval Undersea Warfare Center's research resulted in the development of a quieter torpedo, while saving more than $1.5 million in development costs.5 Additionally, defense R&D centers have long maintained technologies until needed, quickly responded to emerging threats, and made the services smart buyers, as seven studies from 1979 to 2001 have stated.6 These organizations of some of the best and brightest technical talent in the country will be needed even more in the future. Consider the following assessment of science and technology's impact on the future of naval warfare:
certain cutting-edge technologies likely to be applied first to naval warfare . . .
high-tech arms will make direct attacks on naval battlefields possible from
outer space, remote altitudes and remote land bases . . .superconduction
technology will bring superconductor ships to the naval order of battle, enabling
ships to travel faster without noise . . .submarines will be able to go faster and
deeper, with the seabed being the ideal place to build military bases.
That was written by Chinese officers at the Navy Research Institute in Beijing.7
Storm Warnings on the Yardarm
While our technological superiority is accepted today, it cannot be assumed in the future. America's scientific community faces what Shirley Ann Jackson, President of Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, calls "the perfect storm," a "convergence of societal forces—demographic, educational, cultural, economic, and global," that threaten America's technological prowess. "We must assure that the current cohort of scientists and engineers are not only being replaced in sufficient numbers, but are increasing," says Jackson. That is not happening, she adds. Fewer American students are studying science. Surveys also show eighth graders are at or below international averages in science and mathematics, and high school seniors are near the bottom. And, while the United States has benefited from foreign scientists coming here, visa applications have declined since 9/11, and global economic forces are allowing foreign scientists to work in their home countries.8 That's not isolated opinion. "If action is not taken now to change these trends, we could reach 2020 and find that the ability of U.S. research and education institutions to regenerate has been damaged and that their preeminence has been lost to other areas of the world," stated the National Science Board in a January 2004 report.9
America's scientific position is jeopardized not only by evolving weakness at home, but also by growing strength abroad, according to the 2005 National Academies report, Rising Above The Gathering Storm. European Union leaders are urging member nations to spend 3 percent of gross domestic product on R&D by 2010, while U.S. R&D was 2.72 percent in 2000. It is obvious where other nations are placing their emphasis, not strictly from a military standpoint, but from an economic perspective as well. While this storm is coming, defense R&D centers have their own perfect storm of events brewing. Today, they are in disrepair and need immediate attention, reported a study led by the Naval Research Advisory Committee for the Department of Defense.10 It's a condition that leaves the centers ill-prepared for what is to come and threatens to disrupt the R&D pipeline for tomorrow's technology.
SOS
"The DoD should be more ruthless about cutting defense laboratories," stated one critic in the 1990s.11 And, ruthlessly they were cut. Naval R&D centers are representative of what happened. "The Navy has reached a point where . . . its institutional capacity in science is now in peril," wrote Dr. James Colvard in Proceedings in 2002.12 In 1991, the naval R&D community—encompassing the Naval Research Lab and technical centers for surface, undersea, air, and space warfare—had a civilian workforce totaling 68,236, of which 25,891 were scientists and engineers. By 2004, as the result of mandated cuts and hiring freezes, the workforce had fallen to 38,767, including 20,795 scientists and engineers—a total loss of 43 percent and a 20 percent loss in scientists and engineers.13 The workforce shrank, but the workload didn't. Cuts in the naval R&D community's business funding initially mirrored workforce cuts, but by 2002 it exceeded 1991 levels in inflation-adjusted dollars and continued to climb.14 Today, the workforce is stretched too thinly across the board.
The community has fewer personnel to help the Navy be a smart buyer at a time when it is being inundated with technologies, all vying for attention and dollars. This duty shouldn't be outsourced, either. "The Navy can never contract out its ability to understand military problems in technical terms, know who has the potential to solve those problems, and be able to verify a correct solution," states Dr. Colvard.15 Some who have overly outsourced paid dearly. The loss of valuable expertise also gives cause for concern about continuity. There aren't enough young scientists and engineers to replace those retiring. Today, more than half of R&D scientists and engineers are on the far side of 40. Their average age was 42.2 years in 2003, up from 38.2 in 1991.16
Additionally, the community's R&D centers are harvesting more than sowing. They work more with existing than advanced technologies as a result of reduced research budgets. In 1992, the centers received 45 percent of the Department of the Navy's science and technology dollars. By 2004, this percentage had been more than halved.17 This decline in forward-looking science and technology has serious implications. It occurs at a time when industry is doing less long-term research. Thus, there is less likelihood of technological breakthroughs—and greater possibility of technological surprise by some who may not be our friends. All this portends serious consequences for a technology-based service that seeks a Fleet of increasing technology. The nation and the balance of defense share the same boat.
Man the Labs
After Sputnik and the Soviet launch of cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin, President John F. Kennedy laid out plans for putting a man on the moon within ten years—a decision that "demands a major national commitment of science and technical manpower, material and facilities." He further stated he was "transmitting to the Congress a new Manpower Development and Training program, to train several hundred thousand workers . . . "18
A similar call to science and engineering is needed today. Within the Navy, the N-STAR—Naval Research—Science & Technology for America's Readiness—initiative represents an answer to the call. Its mission is to strengthen the naval research enterprise for the challenges ahead. It is an example for other organizations to consider. This initiative will help develop 4,000 PhDs in science and engineering at naval R&D centers over the next 10 to 15 years to replace those soon retiring and address existing workforce-workload disparities. They also are needed to address science and technology demands, which are growing, as indicated by the National Science Board.19
N-STAR consists of several programs. The Military Technology Officer Program provides fellowships to former naval officers pursing science and engineering degrees, in return for service in the civilian workforce. Its goal is to place former warfighters alongside technologists in the lab. Another program, National Science Foundation-Navy Civilian Service, provides scholarships to top science and engineering students doing research for the naval R&D community in return for service after graduation.
Additionally, the initiative seeks to bring the new scientists and engineers on in time to be mentored by their elders. A physicist just out of school won't know how to best assess materials for a submarine's sail array until after association with people and institutions devoted to such technical aspects of warfighting. The transfer of intergenerational knowledge is particularly important to institutions such as the DoD, where science and technology adaptation and incorporation are what gives new and game-changing military capabilities.
What attracts scientists and engineers, though, is research. "Exciting work and a promising future are required to attract and retain employees," stated a Department of Energy white paper. "Basic sciences and exploratory research and development . . . keep the Labs at the forefront of cutting-edge technology and thereby reenergize their workforce."20 Research budgets need to be increased for this reason, as well as to pursue long-term solutions. There also needs to be a better balance between defense's organic labs and those in commercial industry. President Dwight D. Eisenhower's comments still ring true: "In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex."21 We need our labs to help us be smart buyers.
But, strengthening R&D is not enough. "When you meet with Chinese politicians, they are all scientists and engineers," said Bill Gates. "You can have a numeric discussion."22 Similarly, we need officers who are scientifically adept. Today, with technology and weapons inextricably linked, officers with credibility in science and warfighting can bridge the two. The United States needs military officers, and a sufficient number of them, who can understand the latest advances in science and help apply them to military problems. After World War II, nuclear propulsion's potential was foreseen by Bureau of Ships head, Rear Admiral Edward Cochrane, who had an advanced degree in naval architecture from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and his deputy, Rear Admiral Earle Mills, who had one in naval engineering from Columbia University.23 Today, we need officers who can foresee advanced superconducting's potential for ship propulsion and design.
Technically competent officers are also needed to oversee technology's transition from the lab to warfighters, ensuring it gets to them in useful form. This means scrutinizing designs and asking tough questions. Consider the A-12 debacle, in which contractors eventually revealed that the aircraft faced serious design problems, cost overruns, and delays.24 The demand for such officers is increasing, but technical competence within the military is eroding. "The rate of technological change substantially increases the need for officers with a strong undergraduate foundation in science, engineering, mathematics, and technology," reported the Naval Studies Board. However in the Navy, the percentage of unrestricted line officers entering the service with such degrees declined from 47.9 percent in 1990 to 30.9 percent in 2000.25
The same study also recommended, "Emphasize education for officers as an essential part of career development, especially education in science and engineering." But, this trend is negative, too. In 1993, the Naval Postgraduate School produced a high of 449 Navy graduates with advanced technical degrees, but by 2004 that number dropped to 243. Consider also that of the 42,225 Navy officers—not including medical officers—only 119 or .28 percent have PhDs. The U.S. military needs a new generation of officers who are recognized as technically competent. It means recruiting people to the academies and the ROTC program who are interested in science and engineering backgrounds. Also, career tracks should be established for officers pursing advanced degrees, to include PhDs, in science and engineering. Additionally, more military officers should be working at our R&D centers, doing technical jobs. Assigning junior officers there makes sense because they are not as far removed from academics as more senior officers.
General Quarters
Superior technologies have been the tools capturing the world's attention as they buttress American fortitude in battle. But those tools have been fashioned by less visible and under-appreciated scientists and engineers. Now, American military technology faces a crisis, "and this quiet crisis involves the steady erosion of America's scientific and engineering base," writes Tom Friedman in The World is Flat.26 This crisis also comes when technological demands are increasing amid rising challenges. It is time to rally to the aid of science, and equally important, to the scientific and engineering community within the naval research enterprise.
Mr. Kavetsky was the founding director of the Naval Research: Science and Technology for America's Readiness program. Mr. McCook is a midshipman at the U.S. Naval Academy.
1. RAdm Jay M. Cohen, Chief of Naval Research, statement before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, House Armed Services Committee, Concerning Defense Science and Technology Policy and Programs for Fiscal Year 2004, 27 March 2003. back to article
2. Attributed to Russian MGen G. A. Berezkin and General of the Army M. L. Gareyev by FBIS, "Russian Academy of Military Sciences Analysis of War in Iraq," translation from CEP20030911000356 Moscow Voyennaya Mysl in Russian 11 Jul 03 pp. 58-78, p. 5. back to article
3. Michael T. Isenberg, Shield of the Republic: The United States Navy in an Era of Cold War and Violent Peace, 1945-1962, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993) p. 297, and Office of Naval Research, The 50th Anniversary of ONR, http://www.onr.navy.mil/about/history/, pp. 6, 17, 21, and 32.
back to article
4. Naval Space, NAVEDTRA 14168A, nonresident training course, pp. 1-5 to 1-7; Economic Report of the President, Transmitted to the Congress February 1995, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1995), p. 122; and Don J. DeYoung, "The Silence of the Labs," Defense Horizons, January 2003, p. 2. back to article
5. White House Report 94: OSD Interagency Review of Federal Labs for NSTC/PRD#1 of 12 Sep 94; DeYoung, "Silence," Defense Horizons, p. 2; and Slide, "TORPEDO PROPULSION UPGRADE BENEFIT to COST STUDY* RESULTS: DEVELOPMENT+ACQUISITION+OWNERSHIP." back to article
6. These studies are: White House Report 79: Federal Coordinating Council for Science, Engineering and Technology Report "Application of OMB Circular A-76 to R&D: An R&D Management Approach" of 31 Oct 79; Perry Report: USD (R&E) Report " Required In-House Capabilities for DoD RDT&E" of 1 Oct 80; NAVMAT Report: "Mission Review Panel Report" of 13 Dec 82; Adolph Commission: Federal Advisory Commission Report on "Consolidation and Conversion of Defense R&D Labs" of 30 Sep 91; White House Report 94: OSD Interagency Review of Federal Labs for NSTC/PRD#1 of 12 Sep 94; NLCCE BRIEF TO ASN (RDA)-1995; Civilian Workforce 2020 "Strategies for Modernizing Human Resources Management in the Department of the Navy, 2001. back to article
7. Naval Cpt Shen Zhongchang, LCdr Zhang Haiyang, Lt Zhou Xinsheng, "21st Century Naval Warfare," as attributed by Michael Pillsbury, editor, Chinese Views of Future Warfare (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1998). pp. 262-265. back to article
8. Dr. Shirley Ann Jackson, "The Perfect Storm: A Weather Forecast," speech to American Association for the Advancement of Science Annual Meeting, Seattle, Washington, 14 February 2004. back to article
9. National Science Board, A Companion to Science and Engineering Indicators 2004: An Emerging and Critical Problem of the Science and Engineering Labor Force, January 2004, http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/nsb0407/start.htm. back to article
10. James E. Colvard, "Why Navy Laboratories," undated. back to article
11. Robert A. Kavetsky, Michael L. Marshall, and Davinder K. Anand. From Science to Seapower: A Roadmap for S&T Revitalization (College Park, MD: CALCE EPSC Press, 2006) p. 13. back to article
12. James E. Colvard, "Closing the Science-Sailor Gap," Proceedings, June 2003, p. 76. back to article
13. Kavetsky, From Science to Seapower, p. 13. back to article
14. Ibid., p.14 back to article
15. Colvard. "Why Navy Laboratories." back to article
16. Ibid., p. 18. back to article
17. Ibid., p. 25. back to article
18. Thomas L. Friedman. The World is Flat (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005) p. 279. back to article
19. National Science Board, An Emerging and Critical Problem of the Science and Engineering Labor Force: A Companion to Science and Engineering Indicators, 2004, http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/nsb0407/. back to article
20. Kavetsky, From Science to Seapower, p. 20. back to article
21. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Farewell Radio and Television Address to the American People, 17 January 1961, http://www.eisenhower.utexas.edu/farewell.htm. back to article
22. Friedman, The World is Flat, p. 281. back to article
23. Michael T. Isenberg. Shield of the Republic: The United States Navy in an Era of Cold War and Violent Peace, 1945-1962 (New York: St. Martin Press, 1993) p. 379. back to article
24. J. Douglas Beason, DOD Science and Technology: Strategy for the Post-Cold War Era (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1997) p.119; and Federation of American Scientists, "The A-12 Avenger," http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/a-12.htm. back to article
25. Naval Studies Board, Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-2035:Becoming a 21st-Century Force; and Naval Postgraduate School slide, "ENS URL Under Grad Degrees." back to article
26. Friedman, The World is Flat, p. 253. back to article