Three schools of thought have emerged from the recent Revolt of the Generals. The one that wins out will shape the future of the military long after the current administration is gone.
The recent Revolt of the Generals purports to be about Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's leadership-whether he ignored military advice, is abusive as a boss, or has failed as a wartime leader. Because of their connection to electoral politics, these criticisms receive a great deal of attention in a country sharply divided along partisan lines and approaching congressional elections. But this perspective misses the revolt's long-term significance. Sooner or later, Secretary Rumsfeld will be gone. Then the military must face the underlying issues behind the revolt-what went wrong in Iraq, what the U.S. military should look like in the future, and what can be done better next time.
Answering these questions has produced an intellectual civil war in the military that will outlast Secretary Rumsfeld's tenure in office. From this war, three schools of thought have arisen with different diagnoses of the problem and, as a result, different prescriptions about what to do differently in the future.
The Angry Generals School
The angry generals, retired officers who have spoken out publicly, place responsibility for failures in Iraq on the civilian leadership, principally the secretary of Defense.1 Their focus is not so much a specific alternative program, but the managerial style of the secretary. What unites them is their anger at Secretary Rumsfeld. Thus, retired Army Major General John Batiste writes, "The current secretary of defense is dismissive, contemptuous and arrogant. . . . We need a fresh start in the Pentagon."2 Similarly, retired Army Major General John Riggs complains, "The civilian leadership . . . should take sound military advice. The atmosphere of, not micromanagement but nanomanagement, [must] stop."3 The generals all demand that the secretary resign. Although they imply criticism of military officers who developed the war plans and conducted operations, none has called for any to resign.
Their anger shapes their recommendations for the future. These generals are resolved to speak up more forcefully next time. Retired Marine lieutenant General Gregory Newbold, for example, writes, "I now regret that I did not more openly challenge [the civilian leadership]. . . . It is time for senior military leaders to discard caution in expressing their views."4 Retired Army Major General Charles Swannack echoes this: "We need senior military leaders who . . . , when the time comes, . . . call it like it is."5
The generals reject the notion that the military itself made serious errors. And none is willing to criticize military leaders-even now-retired Army General Tommy Franks, who was and remains an enthusiastic supporter of the war plans for Iraq.
These retired officers thus lean toward what military affairs scholar Eliot Cohen calls the "normal" school of civil-military relations. That is, politicians assign the mission, and military officers decide how it will be executed. Each stays within his own field of expertise.6 Because this concept clearly separates the civilian from the military arenas, it is attractive to military officers who feel that unqualified civilians have unwisely impinged on military prerogatives.
Underlying these generals' anger is a debate about strategy. Many argue that the war on terrorism is basically a ground-force war and that Secretary Rumsfeld has failed to recognize this. During the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDK), he considered cutting the size of the Army. He increased its size for the war, but not permanently. The current plan is for both the Army and Marine Corps to return to their original size after the conflict in Iraq subsides. The generals consider this a strategic blunder. As General Riggs writes, "One could read the President's national security strategy and see that our ground forces, especially the Army, were in the Global War on Terrorism for the long haul. [But] we were not adequately sized to stay in the conflict."
Finally, the generals reject Secretary Rumsfeld's concept of transformation. Articulated in QDR 2001, this concept embraced advanced technologies and new operational concepts. The generals question whether the fundamentals of warfare have really changed. Retired Army Major General Paul Eaton sums this up: "Mr. Rumsfeld has put . . . unrealistic confidence in technology to replace manpower."7 Retired Marine General Anthony Zinni criticizes the application of these transformational principles to the Iraq war plans, saying that doing so "threw away ten years worth of planning."8 The new plan emphasized speed and firepower, whereas the older plan incorporated larger forces and a more traditional campaign concept. Thus the generals' criticism of the war plan is not just an operational criticism, but a strategic one as well.
The Transformation School
The transformation school believes that the nature of warfare has changed fundamentally and that the U.S. military needs to align itself with these changes. Secretary Rumsfeld implemented transformation in the QDR Report 2001, the administration's first formal policy statement.9
But this was not a trendy concept forced on a skeptical military by enthusiastic civilians. Then-Admiral William Owens, when he was Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, popularized the concept during the 1990s. He forecast that the "hoary dictums" of Clausewitzian friction and the fog of war are or soon would be things of the past and held out the prospect of using long-range precision firepower, targeted by accurate and comprehensive intelligence, to accomplish what previously had required massed armies.10
Admiral Owens was not alone. Service concept papers and professional journals in the 1990s developed similar theories. Today, joint and service doctrine are full of transformational concepts, most of which predate the arrival of Mr. Rumsfeld as secretary of Defense.11
These transformational principles were expressed in the military operations planned by General Franks, commander of Central Command, during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and the major combat operations of Operation Iraqi Freedom. In preparing for the latter, for example, he rejected the existing plan-"Desert Storm II" he called it-because it was "stale, conventional, and predictable."12 Instead, he proposed a new plan based on transformational principles, "a campaign like no other," as he described it. "Our military forces would break the will of the Iraqi army, and we would do it with unprecedented speed. The size of our attack was less important than the speed and flexibility of its maneuver. . . . Air and ground operations-preceded by extensive special operations work-would be virtually simultaneous. This was a revolutionary concept, way outside the box."
In developing this transformational plan, General Franks described a close, sometimes tense, but generally successful relationship with Secretary Rumsfeld. He feels none of the antagonism the angry generals do. Indeed, General Franks' greatest anger was directed at the service chiefs.13 He regarded their arguments for emphasizing air, naval, or ground forces as parochial advocacy that detracted from producing a coherent plan. As a result, General Franks cut the service chiefs out of the planning process to the maximum extent he could. (As commander of Central Command, General Norman Schwarzkopf did the same during Operation Desert Storm, and for the same reasons.)14
Not surprisingly, for the transformational school the lessons learned from the conflict parallel their views on warfighting and organizational transformation. A report produced by a combat assessment team attached to Central Command headquarters during the current war articulated this perspective.15
* More jointness. General Franks saw Operation Iraqi Freedom as a leap forward in jointness compared with the "deconflicted" service plans of Desert Storm, but there was still too much separation in doctrine, equipment, and attitude.
* More speed. Speed meant surprise and the dislocation of the enemy. Speed had always been valued at the tactical level; now it was valued at the strategic level.
* More precision. The operation had employed more precision weaponry than had any previous conflict, but collateral damage still occurred, weather limited usage of many munitions, and some communities, such as artillery, still relied on massed fires.
* More and better intelligence. Precision weapons are useless without a target, but the ability to strike targets outran the ability to find targets. Further, the greatest tactical failures were intelligence failures-for example, not knowing the location of the enemy leadership, and surprise at the widespread activity of the Fedayeen.
* More adaptability. No one had foreseen the possibility of a conflict in Afghanistan or the circumstances of the conflict in Iraq. The inference, therefore, was that future conflicts would occur in unpredictable ways and in unpredictable locations. The old planning processes that produced detailed plans over a multi-year period would not suffice. Inevitably, this adaptive planning would be influenced by both civilian and military leaders since both political and military events would be unfolding simultaneously. Developing a plan would therefore be a negotiation.
* More special operations forces (SOF). SOF combined all the transformational attributes into a single force. Special operations offered the possibility of large gains with little political or military exposure, a perennial attraction to senior leaders.16 SOF was, therefore, the perfect force for a war on terrorism.
The Defense Department's most senior military officers have endorsed this view, though many would now add some additional lessons, such as faster revival of the economy and early suppression of any insurgent activity. Many of these officers also feel personally responsible for the planning and execution of operations in Iraq and continue to believe that the decisions made in planning the war were generally the right ones.
The Introspective School
The introspective school sees the problems in Iraq as being primarily of the military's own making; that is, the military, despite its prewar rhetoric, was poorly prepared in training, doctrine, and equipment to fight an insurgency.
This school rejects the notion that the military was never designed for nation building and counterinsurgency operations. Instead, its adherents point to service doctrine, especially from the Army and Marine Corps, that highlights service capabilities in these areas. For example, the Army Transformation Plan of 2001 repeatedly describes the Army as a "full spectrum force . . . dominant at every point on the spectrum of operations." Similarly, for a decade the Marine Corps has cited its capabilities in nowretired General Charles Krulak's "three-block war."
In the view of the introspectionists. the fundamental problem is that the U.S. military has focused almost exclusively on combat between the conventional forces of nation states. When the Cold War ended, the NATO central front was replaced by two major theater wars-Korea and Iraq. Thus, through the 1990s, ground-force training at the major training centers emphasized firepower. maneuver, and tactical synchronization. Civilians were virtually nonexistent. This occurred despite growing evidence that small wars such as Bosnia, Kosovo, and Somalia would dominate future operations.
An article by British General Nigel Aylwin-Foster in the U.S. Army's Military Review captures these concerns.17 His argument can be summarized simply: the U.S. military is too "kinetic." He recognizes the U.S. military's great strengths in patriotism, determination, and commitment to duty, but lays out what he considers equally great weaknesses that have prolonged the conflict:
* The U.S. military was focused on offensive action to the neglect of and detriment to winning over the population.
* The U.S. military was insensitive to cultural nuances and thereby alienated many civilians.
* A strong sense of moral authority distorted judgment by legitimizing the widespread use of violence against the population.
The root causes were a focus on conventional conflicts, diminished professionalism from officer losses in the 1990s, and an institutional inability to adapt.
These British criticisms have resonated in the U.S. military. The Army Chief of Staff reportedly distributed the Aylwin-Foster article widely. Recently. Army lieutenant General Peter W. Chiarelli, commander of the Multi-National Corps in Iraq, sent his top commanders a variety of similar British articles, all criticizing U.S. forces for "unnecessary levels of rough behavior."18 Although these criticisms were aimed at the Army, similar ones have been made about all services, especially regarding the focus on conventional conflict to the detriment of other capabilities.
These criticisms are not limited to articles by outsiders. Internal military reports, the military professional journals (including Proceedings), and books by military authors are full of tactical, operational, and strategic criticisms of military performance.
For example, Marine Colonel Thomas Hammes (in The Sling and the Stone) used the construct of "fourth-generation warfare" to argue that the U.S. military has overemphasized technology and underemphasized cultural and social capabilities. "We must reorganize to fight the enemy as he is rather than remain organized to fight the enemy of the past."19
Army Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl argues that the U.S. military in Iraq has focused too much on llrepower and maneuver rather than develop broad economic, social, and political strategies. He further argues (in Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife) that this is the same mistake the U.S. military made in Vietnam, despite the efforts of civilians to change it.20
Major Josiah Wilson III. an official Army historian, wrote an immediate postwar report that acknowledged errors at the political level but focused its toughest criticisms on the military and its senior commanders. First, military planners failed to translate their doctrine into an effective stabilization (Phase IV) plan. They considered this phase to be "someone else's mission." Then, military planners failed to adapt, allowing the insurgency to build and not publishing a formal plan until November 2003. He rated the military's overall performance as "mediocre."21
The implication of this school of argument is that the strategic, operational, and tactical problems in Iraq will not go away when a particular secretary of defense leaves. Instead, the military must make fundamental changes in the way it organizes, trains, and operates. Many changes are. indeed, being implemented. The key question is how deep the changes go. The U.S. military implemented many such changes during the Vietnam War, but reverted to its traditional focus on conventional conflicts as soon as that war ended. By the time of operations in Iraq, a generation after Vietnam, the counterinsurgency expertise was gone, and all the lessons had to be relearned at great cost in blood, time, and treasure.
Whither the Military Establishment?
Discussions about schools of thought and intellectual civil wars give the impression of academic arguments without much effect in the real world, that these are the concerns of conference attendees, not warfighters. But key strategic questions are in play, and the answers that emerge will profoundly shape the military establishment long after the current leadership, military and civilian, is gone.
What is the role of mass in future operations? The transformers believe that mass is counterproductive, because it reduces speed, surprise, and agility. They therefore look for ways to reduce mass by employing special operations forces, precision munitions, advanced intelligence, and reconnaissance. The introspectives would also question the role of mass, but for a different reason. They worry that U.S. operations are too kinetic and that additional mass, particularly additional combat forces, would feed this tendency. In contrast, the angry generals argue that mass is needed to physically occupy ground and control population. Further, they argue that warfighting concepts that seek to reduce mass through superior technology and battlefield awareness are doomed because of the inherentlv uncertain nature of warfare.
Is the current balance of ground, air, and maritime capabilities right? The angry generals argue that ground forces need more resources and a more central role in military strategy. The introspectives believe size is not the issue, structure is. Spending more money on the existing, and wrong, capabilities would not only be a waste but would be counterproductive. The transformers focus on technology, which tends to be found in the more capital-intensive services such as the Air Force and Navy.
Are current operations too joint or not joint enough? The transformers believe the nation needs to take the next step in jointness by creating new, joint organizations outside existing service stovepipes. The angry generals believe the military services still have a central role to play.
What is the role of military advice, especially for leaders outside the operational chain of command? The angry generals urge military officers, inside and outside the chain of command, to become more outspoken about their views, whether it concerns combat operations, budget levels, acquisition programs, or personnel policies. If they prevail, civilians can expect to face much sharper questioning-and even public opposition-when they disagree with military leaders. In contrast, the transformers and introspectionists would accept a large role for civilians, even in operational planning, because of its ad hoc and government-wide nature in the post-Cold War world.
The military's problem is deciding what to do for the long-term future, and this requires a focus on issues, not personalities and politics. Professional journals are well positioned to sustain such a debate, and it is incumbent on military professionals to engage in a battle of ideas. Indeed, in the last decade the debate has been rich on one of these issues-the role of advanced technologies and "net centric" warfare. That debate needs to be widened.
1 At this writing there are seven angry generals have spoken out; all retired and all from the Army and Marine Corps: MajGen John Batiste (USA, Ret), MajGen Paul Eaton (USA, Ret), LGen Gregory Newbold (USMC, Ret), MajGen Charles Swannack, Jr (USA, Ret), MajGen John Riggs (USA, Ret), Gen Anthony Zinni (USMC, Ret), and LtGen Paul Van Riper (USMC, Ret). see MajGen Paul Eaton, "A Top-Down Review for the Pentagon," New York Times, 19 March 2006.
2 MajGen John Batiste, "A Case For Accountability", Washington Post, 19 April 2006, 17.
3 MajGen John Riggs, Interview on National Public Radio, "All Things Considered," 24 January 2006.
4 LtGen Greg Newbold, USMC (Ret), Why Iraq Was a Mistake", Time, 17 April 2006, 42-43.
5 CNN Transcript, "Another general joins ranks opposing Rumsfeld", Friday, 14 April 2006.
6 Eliot Cohen, Supreme Command (New York: Free Press, 2002), "Normal theory" defined, 1-14.
7 MajGen Paul Eaton, "A Top Down Review for the Pentagon", New York Times, March 19, 2006.
8 Gen Tony Zinni, The Battle for Peace (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) 27.
9 Quadrennial Defense Review Report - 2001, Department of Defense, September 30, 2001, especially chapter V, "Creating the US Military of the 21" Century."
10 Described, for example, in Adm William Owens with Ed Offley, Lifting the Fog of War (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2000).
11 For example, Joint Vision 2020, published by the Joint Staff in 2000 contains many "transformational" elements but does not go as far as Admiral Owens.
12 Gen Tommy Franks, American Soldier, (New York: Regan Books, 2004), 331, 367, 368
13 Ibid., 277.
14 Gen Norman H. Schwarzkopf, It Doesn ? Take A Hew (New York: Bantam Books, 1992).
15 B Gen Robert Cone led a combat assessment team from Joint Forces Command and the Institute for Defense Analysis. See Inside the Pentagon, 21 Oct. 2003, and 1 May 2003.
16 See Eliot Cohen, Politicians and Commandos: Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies (Harvard University: Center for International Affairs, 1978).
17 Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster, "Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations", Military Review, November-December 2005
18 Thom Shanker, New York Times. "US Changes Guidelines for Troops to Lessen Everyday Tensions with Iraqi Civilians", 2 May 2006.
19 Col Thomas Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21" Century (Osceola, WI: Zenith Press, 2004) 272.
20 LtCol John Nagl, Eliot Cohen, LtCol Conrad Crane, LtCol Jan Horvath, "Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency" Military Review, and LtCol John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002).
21 Maj Josiah Wilson III, Report of Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group. For example, Tom Ricks, "Army Historian Cites Lack of Postwar Plan," Washington Post, 24 December 2004, and Conference Summary, "U.S. Military Operations In Iraq: Planning, Combat, and Occupation," School of Advanced International Studies, Washington DC, 2 November 2005.
Colonel Cancian, a frequent contributor to Proceedings, served 33 years on active duty and in the Marine Corps Reserve. He has recently been recalled to active duty and is deploying to Iraq for his second tour. In civilian life, he works in the Pentagon.