Dramatic responses to humanitarian crises-on the far side of the world as well as at home-punctuated 2005 for the U.S. Navy, even as it continued to work through requirements to set Sea Power 21 in motion and carry out a broad array of missions and tasks to support the Global War on Terrorism. The Navy provided vital support to U.S. and multinational coalition forces on the ground in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines, and other hot spots worldwide, including the launch of carrier-based strikes against insurgents and remnants of al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Navy support to specialoperations teams included training FiIipino forces for enhanced security in the southern islands and civil action in Sirawi, where more than 1,000 patients received medical and dental care. These and other activities around the world underscored the valuable peacetime humanitarian relief and crisis-response-in addition to warfighting-roles of America's Navy.
In mid-year, the Navy witnessed a change in command at the top of the uniformed hierarchy, a year earlier than planned, which to some signaled changes in philosophy and approaches to solving the myriad "opportunities" confronting the service. Where Admiral Vern Clark, as Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), had put in place several special studies groups and even more numerous "task forces" to address daunting problems and needs, the new CNO, Admiral Mike Mullen, quickly narrowed his initial focus to just seven areas for special, intense efforts to undergird his three priorities: sustain combat readiness; build a fleet for the future; and develop 21st-century leaders.
In one critical area-shipbuilding-the new CNO immediately put in place a study to determine the number and mix of ships needed in the future. Where Admiral Clark had envisioned from 260 to 325 ships-the ultimate number depending on several other initiatives and enhancements-by early December Admiral MuIlen had in hand the outline of a plan to build a fleet of some 313 warships that would sustain critical elements-but certainly not all-of the nation's ship-design, -engineering, and -construction industrial base while meeting operational requirements at home and abroad. But, at a cost some estimated would top $20 billion per year, the Navy's future fleet looked to be a glass half-full, especially in light of yawning federal budget deficits and record-high national debt. Indeed, the title of his 2006 CNO Guidance, "Meeting the Challenge of a New Era," pretty much summarized the way ahead for the Navy.
Humanitarian Ops Overseas
As 2005 dawned, reports of widespread devastation from a massive earthquake near Indonesia the day after Christmas were becoming clear if utterly incomprehensible: hundreds of thousands of people killed or missing; many hundreds of thousands more without food, potable water, and shelter; and a broad swath of total destruction along the Indian Ocean littoral. Immediately in the tsunami's wake, the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) carrier strike group and the USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6) expeditionary strike group diverted from ongoing commitments and raced to the region, the vanguard of Operation Unified Assistance, arriving in the devastated area of Sumatra on 4 January.
Captain J. Scott Jones, Bonhomme Richard's commanding officer, recounted how helicopters began flying nearly 'round-the-clock relief missions, delivering food, water, and medical supplies to; thousands of survivors, almost as soon, as the ships got within range. "We take ashore what they need, when they need' it," Captain Scott said at the time, noting, also that Navy construction battalions-7 Seabees-and Coalition forces were helping the Indonesian government reestablish infrastructure and critical civic functions. "This proves not just the combat power, but also the humanitarian power of our ships."
About a week after the tsunami struck, the Military Sealift Command's hospital ship USNS Mercy (T-AH-19) departed her; San Diego homeport and arrived in-theater on 3 February, ready to provide aid on the devastated island of Sumatra.
When the ship finally departed for home two months later, the ship's doctors, nurses, dentists, and staff had:
* Evaluated 9,200 patients during visits ashore.
* Conducted 285 surgical procedures, with some 200 in Mercy's operating spaces.
* Cared for 178 patients on board. Ran 4,253 lab procedures.
* Conducted 1,764 radiological procedures.
* Issued 4,813 prescriptions.
* Saw 700 patients for dental needs and pulled 1,300 teeth.
* Conducted 4,000 eye exams and provided new pairs of glasses.
Mercy's medical staff also worked with some 100 volunteers from Project HOPE and U.S. Public Health Service staff, concentrating their efforts in a badly damaged hospital in Banda Aceh; as many as two-thirds of the hospital staff were killed by the torrent, and the first floor was covered in nearly a foot of sand and debris. In addition, nurses went ashore to conduct classes in patient care, and sailors from Pearl Harbor's Navy Environmental Preventive Medicine Unit Six worked to improve sanitation and eliminate mosquito breeding grounds to prevent malaria and other mosquito-borne diseases.
By mid-March, the Navy had delivered more than 4 million pounds of aid to tsunami survivors in the region-about 150.000 pounds a day-and in so doing helped dispel stereotypes among Muslim populations that the United States held nothing but disdain and loathing for them.
In May, at a conference held in advance of the 2005 Cobra Gold multinational exercise, naval officers from the United States. Thailand, Singapore. Japan and several other Pacific Rim states assessed the lessons learned from the tsunami. One of the critical needs the attendees underscored was for better communication across cultures and commands to improve not only the substance of relief delivered but also to significantly reduce response time. According to some participants, the U.S. Navy needed to learn to work more closely with non-governmental organizations and build more enduring "unofficial" relationships among the various first-responder agencies throughout the region.
And at Home
Those lessons clearly helped shape the Navy's response to a natural disaster three months later, when Hurricanes Katrina and Rita ravaged the Gulf of Mexico from Louisiana to Florida. Broad components of local, state, and federal communication systems were totally destroyed, frustrating first-responders, relief workers, and victims alike. Despite billions of dollars spent in reaction to the 9/11 tragedy four years earlier, some earmarked to upgrade and interconnect local-to-federal communications networks, the system simply could not meet burgeoning needs at a critical time. "The devastation was so complete, so comprehensive," Admiral Timothy Keating. Commander, U.S. Northern Command, commented in a published interview, "that we couldn't figure out how bad it was. ... On Tim Keating's list of things we need to work and to analyze very carefully, communications is at the top of that list."
The Navy worked closely with the Coast Guard. National Guard, and Reserve personnel; federal, state, and local officials: and private disaster-relief agencies in marshalling several ships off the Gulf Coast and up the Mississippi River. They sent search-and-rescue teams ashore, fed, treated and sheltered survivors, and served as critical command-control-communications nodes. "The Navy's on station," said Rear Admiral Reuben Bookert, commander. Amphibious Group Two. on board Iwo Jima (LHD-7). his base of operations at New Orleans. "Our priorities are saving lives. And. we're providing logistic support and technical support to people in the region."
The Navy Joint Task Force Gulf Coast was a key element of Department of Defense support to the beleaguered Federal Emergency Management Agency and regional and local authorities. Among the flotilla of U.S. Navy ships was the highspeed vessel Sn-ift (HSV-2). built by Incat Tasmania Pty Ltd.. of Hobart, Australia, and leased to the Navy in 2003. Swift's role in the recovery effort was to help resupply other Navy ships in the Gulf Coast area. Rear Admiral Deborah A. Loewer, commander, Mine Warfare Command, noted during an October 2005 meeting. "Swift was employed as a shuttle ship to replenish larger, deeper-draft combat logistics ships that did not have the capability to get into certain areas." Admiral Loewer noted.
"Swift's high speed and greater payload made it extraordinarily responsive, compared to other ships," she underscored. As of early 2006. Swift was still headquartered at Naval Station Ingleside, Texas, as an interim replacement for the Navy's mine countermeasures command and support ship. USS Inchon (MCS-12), which retired in 2002. As one element of the 2005 Base Closure and Realignment process, the Navy was directed to move Mine Warfare Command headquarters to San Diego, California, a serious blow to the Texas congressional delegation.
Potentially even more controversial was a Navy proposal, launched in late fall within the Fleet Forces Command, to disestablish the Mine Warfare Command altogether and align and merge its staff with the Fleet Antisubmarine Warfare Command to stand up a new Fleet Antisubmarine and Mine Warfare Command-a move that generated intense interest and a "go-slow" recommendation from the U.S. mine warfare community.
Having Swift on hand after Rita as a shuttle-ship allowed USNS Arctic (T-AOE-8) to remain on station, providing supplies to the other ships supporting the hurricane relief, including USS Bataan (LHD-5), Iwo Jima (LHD-7), Shreveport (LPD-12), Tortuga (LSD-26), and Grapple (ARS-53). The Navy also deployed eight surface mine countermeasures (MCM) ships-including USS Avenger (MCM-I), Pioneer (MCM-9), and Gladiator (MCM 11)-eight MH-53E airborne MCM helicopters from Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadrons 14 (HM-14) and 15 (HM-15), an unmanned underwater vehicle platoon from Naval Special Clearance Team One, and support and battle staffs from the Mine Warfare Command. Using mine countermeasure ships and multimission helicopters, the Navy hunted for debris and underwater obstacles in the waters off Louisiana to ensure safe and clear passage of commercial and military shipping, particularly those in the vicinity of the Louisiana Offshore oil Port, other offshore oil platforms, and in safety fairways and channels-a highly innovative use of warfighter skills.
Other areas of Navy support were also surprising. Naval special-warfare teams, for example, led an entire task group to carry out rescue efforts. These included combatant-craft crewmen using special operations craft-riverine, specially designed craft for "brown-water" combat operations, going house-to-house along flooded areas, searching for survivors accessible only by boat.
During one of several tours to the devastated region, President George W. Bush committed to rebuilding the Gulf Coast, a promise that could require some $200 billion or more to keep. Already, cost estimates to repair the levee system alone have more than doubled, and more funding will likely be needed.
In addition, the cost to repair damage done by Katrina and Rita to the Navy's shipbuilding programs could reach $3 billion, if not more. A 21 September memo from then-Assistant secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition) John Young "urgently" requested $2.74 billion to be provided from supplemental appropriations bills. Congress had already approved more than $60 million for hurricane-related disaster relief efforts and tax breaks for storm-damaged businesses. "The Navy's shipbuilding plans and requirements dictate the need to restore and maintain the shipbuilding capability represented by the work force and shipyards debilitated by Katrina," Young wrote in the memo. The Navy, he said, runs a "significant risk of substantial future cost increases" it could ill afford if shipyard employees seek work elsewhere because of a slow recovery. "The Navy must act quickly to employ the trained work force and to restore the Gulf Coast shipbuilding capability," Young added. "Acting now on this long-term view will limit the schedule slips" on ships now under construction and on future shipbuilding plans.
At year's end, officials at three yards on the Mississippi Gulf Coast reported business remained brisk, but attracting skilled workers was a real problem. Both VT Halter Marine and Signal International in Pascagoula had large project backlogs, and both were almost fully recovered from Katrina's storm surge on Bayou Casotte. And work was resuming on Navy warships at Northrop Grumman Ship System's Ingalls Operations, which was inundated by a 25-foot storm surge. Halter Marine Chief Executive Officer Butch King said, however, he was "uncomfortable with the skilled labor situation. We're just about 20% short in labor. We currently have 530 employees and by end of next March, I'd like to have 800. That's about 270 folks I'd like to hire."
And Overseas Again
On 8 October, an earthquake devastated a remote, mountainous region of Pakistan, leaving more than 20,000 dead and 2.5 million homeless. Once again, the Navy was in the van of an international relief effort, and command-and-control elements came ashore in Pakistan to offer assistance. Rear Admiral Michael LeFever, commander, Expeditionary Strike Group One, headed up a humanitarian relief center established in Islamabad. Headquartered on the amphibious assault ship USS Tarawa (LHA-I), the group arrived in theater after completing Operation Bright Star 2005 in Egypt. Troops and aircraft from the strike group and other sources within Naval Forces Central Command were immediately made available to complement Army and Air Force aircraft flown into Pakistan to deliver food, water, supplies, and cold-weather tents, vital for survival as winter had already been felt.
Two weeks later, in what could be a harbinger of Admiral Mullen's call for a 1,000-ship international naval force, American and French sailors worked together in Bahrain to get basic supplies and protection against the weather to Pakistani earthquake victims as quickly as possible. The French supply ship FS Var, the flagship for commander, Task Force 150, a multinational Coalition that usually operates in the Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, and the North Arabian Sea, made available more than two tons of food and other supplies. From Var, the food went to USS Cleveland (LPD-7) for transport to Pakistan.
"Things are being put together very rapidly from a variety of organizations," Captain Michael B. Chase, commanding officer of Cleveland, noted in a published report. "We're expecting to bring aboard a full load, primarily of food this time and also some smaller equipment. Humanitarian supplies are very important in a natural disaster, and with winter coming soon, many people are without homes, without food."
"The people of Pakistan are our . friends," he said. "We're grateful for their friendship. We're grateful for their unwavering support of the war on terrorism. And we're happy to be able to help them by carrying large amounts of food and equipment from the French and the combined effort of several nations."
Spotlight on the Marines and Army-For Now
Regarding the Global War on Terrorism, which cost American taxpayers some $7 billion per month last year in addition to a near-constant increase in dead and wounded, "the spotlight's shining on the Army and the Marine Corps," then-CNO Admiral Clark said during a 2005 interview, "and that's exactly the way it should be. We have large numbers of soldiers and Marines on the line every day, facing the enemy, and some of them giving the ultimate sacrifice. The focus of the Navy's work has been to support that effort."
"But, you're right," he admitted, "it's not widely known that we've got several thousand sailors in Iraq and Afghanistan, and our other operations throughout the world seemed routine. For example, our SEALs are all over Iraq and Afghanistan, and we also are providing people in combat service support and EOD [explosive ordnance disposal] roles to support the Army. We are operating Army equipment because there have been insufficient Army troops to handle the rotations. And of course, we provide all the medical care for the Marines. We have somewhere around a thousand of the Navy's medical people in there."
Admiral Clark subsequently stood up a special-focus 30-day "Task Force GWOT" to determine what capabilities the Navy required to conduct global operations against terrorists and to relieve some of the burdens now shouldered by soldiers and Marines. U.S. ground forces undertook most of the missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and one of Admiral dark's legacies was to ensure that the Navy could provide regional combatant commanders a host of new and improved capabilities tailored to worldwide anti-terrorism needs.
For example, in light of the sinister and deadly threat from improvised explosive devices (IEDs), a growing number of the Navy's EOD experts were detailed to Army and Marine units in Iraq to help neutralize the improvised devices and other unexploded ordnance that littered the landscape. Navy divers usually specialize in rendering explosive hazards safe at sea, in ports, and along coastal areas, although they clearly have special-forces-like capabilities for all operational environments. In 2005, many deployed deep inside Iraq and Afghanistan, where U.S. military forces contended with about 30 roadside bombs a week, double the number of a year earlier. The number of Iraqi IEDs that have been rendered safe since March 2003 total more than 30,000; many more unfortunately took their toll of innocent victims in an increasing spiral of violence trending toward civil war. "The Army and Marines just don't have enough [explosive-disposal] teams," explained lieutenant Steve Gilbert, officer in charge of the Navy's EOD Mobile Unit 2, Detachment 20, in a published interview. "So they sent out a request for forces, and the Navy had the personnel to support them."
Likewise, Navy SEALs and Army special-forces teams have trained and advised Iraqi special-operations forces since 2003, according to the U.S. Special Operations Command's 2006 Posture Statement. One focus last year was on building a brigade headquarters and ultimately to ensure a stand-along Iraqi capability for counterterrorist operations. In one operation, the statement notes, special-forces soldiers and SEALs advised some 900 Iraqi special-operations troops conducting night reconnaissance missions and raids, including heliborne and ground-assault operations that resulted in hundreds of insurgents captured or killed.
"This is all about recognizing the need to properly align the forces we already have. It's also about recognizing capabilities we will need in the future for 'Phase Zero,' shaping operations of war on terrorism, and how we redistribute current force capabilities to do things to take the stress off Marines and [the] Army," commented Deputy Chief of Staff for Operational Readiness and Training, Fleet Forces Command, Rear Admiral Don Bullard, in a published article. Selected to head the new Naval Expeditionary Combat Command, which will focus on riverine and port-security operations and coastal warfare, Admiral Bullard noted that the effort will require new technologies, systems, and platforms, some already in use by other services, while others will have to come through research-and-development channels.
"We are starting the process of defining the mission requirement in the riverine," Admiral Bullard explained. "Once we define that requirement of maritime security operations in the inland waterways, [then we'll define] what's the proper craft. We are just beginning that process."
The Navy will start with the current special-operations craft it has in its inventory-including a request for the Coast Guard to return the Cyclone (PC-1) craft on loan to support homeland maritime security needs-and then make a transition to new technologies and platforms once the service defines what the real needs are. A notional riverine squadron is about 220 sailors and 20 boats, but at year's end the Navy was still working through whether that is the right size. For example, the Navy was also looking at a battalion-size force for the Navy Expeditionary Combat Battalion concept-roughly 600 to 700 sailors.
The process will take several months, with plans to link directly with the Coast Guard-the lead U.S. governmental agency for maritime homeland security-under the revitalized USN-USCG National Fleet Policy. "It's about getting the final concept of operations for this riverine force that will determine the equipment we need," Admiral Bullard added. The Navy will establish three new riverine squadrons: one active-duty unit will be formed first in mid-2007, and two Reserve squadrons will take shape in late 2007 and 2008.
In late 2005, Admiral Mullen and Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Thomas H. Collins agreed on an update-the third iteration-of the National Fleet Policy Statement first signed in September 1998 by then-CNO Admiral Jay Johnston and then-Commandant Admiral James M. Loy. As outlined in the Navy/Coast Guard 2006 National Fleet publication, "Two Vital Services . . . ." the National Fleet is based on a common vision for maritime security at home and overseas and is shaped by more than 200 years of collaboration and cooperation. The President's 2005 National Strategy for Maritime security states: "Security of the maritime domain can be accomplished only by seamlessly employing all instruments of national power in a fully coordinated manner." Thus, the two Sea Services have pledged "to work together to plan, acquire and maintain forces that support and complement each service's roles and missions." Key areas of coordination and integration include:
* Research and development
* Acquisition of ships, boats, aircraft, and command-and-control facilities
* Information systems
* Planning of personnel and assets
* Concepts of operations, intelligence, logistics, training, exercises, and deployments.
The Naval Expeditionary Combat Command should likewise join the service's mine warfare forces to avoid inefficient redundancies in critical warfighting competencies. In that regard, the lessons learned from Task Force 116 (River Patrol Force) and Task Force 117 (Riverine Assault Force) operations during the Vietnam War should be embraced. Indications are that U.S. riverine operations in Iraqi waterways have not yet encountered any mine-like improvised explosive devices, but the potential for them as well as modern mines to frustrate riverine strategies and operations must be a component of command planning.
Submarine Disaster
On 8 January, USS San Francisco (SSN-711), an improved Los Angeles (SSN-688I)-class nuclear-powered attack submarine, struck a seamount about 350 miles south of its honieport of Apra, Guam, killing one sailor and injuring 23 others. En route to Brisbane, Australia, the sub was cruising at flank speed-more than 30 knots-some 525 feet below the surface when she smashed into an undersea mountain that was not on its charts, according to initial Navy reports.
The sailor killed in the collision was Machinist's Mate 2nd Class Joseph A. Ashley. 24, of Akron, Ohio. He was thrown forward and hit his head on a metal pump, knocking him unconscious and injuring him gravely. Despite the best efforts of the crew, he later died. Another 23 men were injured sufficiently to be taken off the stricken submarine, transferred in mid-ocean to USS City of Corpus Christi (SSN-705), USS Houston (SSN-713), and the submarine tender USS Frank Cable (AS-40), also homeported in Guam. Damage to the 24-year-old sub was estimated at nearly S90 million. On 17 August, San Francisco departed Guam for a surface transit across the Pacific for permanent repairs at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard in Washington state.
Following an initial inquiry. Commander. U.S. Seventh Fleet, Vice Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert relieved the sub's commanding officer. Commander Kevin Mooney. and assigned him to unspecified duties pending further review. Commander Mooney later announced his retirement.
The head-on collision destroyed the sub's sonar dome and peeled back part of the outer hull. Her inner hull, which protects living and working spaces, held firm, preventing a possible higher-magnitude disaster. The effort to keep the submarine afloat was initially "very touch-and-go," according to one Navy officer, and only the valiant work of her crew kept her afloat. The nuclear reactor was not damaged. With uncontrolled flooding in her forward ballast tanks, San Francisco had to run a low-pressure air pump for 30 hours straight to maintain buoyancy on her trip home, an extraordinary feat, considering the pump is rated for intermittent use only. In addition, the submarine ran her diesel engines, channeling the exhaust into the forward ballast tanks in an effort to force out more of the water and make the boat more buoyant.
The location if not the existence of the seamount was a source of immediate controversy, with only one chart of the area on board San Francisco indicating a muddy brownish area near the point of the collision. Navy officials explained that navigational charts are prepared from both government and commercial soundings. many dating back centuries. Given the vastness of the oceans, there could still be areas that have never been properly charted or where seismic activity has altered geophysical characteristics.
"We know more about the backside of the moon than we do about the bottom of the ocean." said retired Navy Captain James Patton. president of Submarine Tactics and Technology in North Stonington, Connecticut, in a published interview. The area in which San Francisco was traveling, the Caroline Islands chain, is one of the worst, with dozens of islands rising out of the water and many more uncharted seamounts between them. "It's just bad water," Captain Patton acknowledged.
"The initial reports are that they were using the proper charts, and they were where they were supposed to be and at the depth they were supposed to be," remarked a retired Navy officer who was briefed on the accident.
Commander, Submarine Force Pacific, Rear Admiral Paul Sullivan ordered two separate investigations into the accident. He appointed Captain Cecil Haney. who commanded Submarine Squadron One in Pearl Harbor, to conduct a thorough investigation of the accident to determine whether it could have been avoided. Captain Sullivan also directed the Naval Submarine Training Center Pacific to convene a Mishap Investigation Board to conduct a separate inquiry into whether the submarine force needs to change any of its operating procedures or equipment to prevent something similar from happening in the future.
On 25 March, the Navy recognized those who played key roles in treating injured crew members and in the successful effort to get San Francisco safely back to Guam. Lieutenant, junior grade, Craig Litty and Hospital Corpsman 1st Class (SS) James Akin received the Meritorious Service Medal for administering emergency triage to 70 injured crew members and organizing the crew's mess into a makeshift emergency trauma center. Akin also was commended for his assessment of injuries and recommendations for which injuries most required transfer off the sub, which "enabled the ship to adopt the correct posture with respect to operational risk management," according to the citation.
Nine members of the sub's emergency medical assistance team received the Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal: Culinary Specialist 2nd Class (SS) Jeremy Key, Culinary Specialist 2nd Class (SS) David Miller, Electronics Technician 2nd Class (SS) Scott Pierce, Electronics Technician 1st Class (SS) Bryan Powell, and Yeoman 2nd Class (SS) Carnell Smoot. In addition to assisting the injured immediately after the collision, all helped rig and hoist the most seriously injured sailor, Ashley, in "extremely heavy weather conditions."
Three crew members-Sonar Technician (Submarine) 1st Class (SS) Christopher Baumhoff, Machinist's Mate 2nd Class (SS) Gilbert Daigle, and lieutenant Jeff McDonald-played key roles in the planning and execution of the at-sea rig-and-hoist operation. The Navy recognized Senior Chief Machinist's Mate (SS) Danny Hager for helping direct the sub's control party to stabilize the damaged sub on the surface and, despite a painful injury, designing a temporary oxygen system from the sub's oxygen banks to help treat injured shipmates. Four other sailors received the Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal, and five others were presented a letter of commendation from Submarine Group Seven.
On 9 May, the Commander Pacific Fleet released a final report that cited failures of command leadership and the actions of the sub's navigation team as the sole cause of San Francisco's collision. Five weeks earlier, the submarine's executive officer, navigator, assistant navigator, and three petty officers had been punished during nonjudicial hearings that held each at least partially responsible for the incident. The investigating officer and three admirals who reviewed the report concluded that then-San Francisco commanding officer Commander Mooney and his navigation team failed to develop and execute a safe voyage plan, then failed to exercise enough caution while transiting through a region dotted with steep undersea volcanoes.
In his endorsement of the report, Seventh Fleet Commander Admiral Greenert noted that the sea mount was not on the primary chart being used at the time of the mishap and that "opportunities exist for systemic improvement in functional (formal and on-the-job training) and administrative (directives and inspections) areas." That said, he also found the sub had other charts on board that indicated a sea mount within 2.87 miles of the sub's "intended track" and that those charts were not properly reviewed during the planning process.
Indeed, the seamount's exact location was known, but not to the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the U.S. organization that produces all U.S. military charts and maps. It was indicated on a 1999 Landsat 7 satellite image, indicating a likely undersea mountain rising to within 100 feet of the surface, according to the U.S. Geological Survey's National Center for Earth Resource Observation and Science.
"I find it difficult to conclude absolutely that grounding could have been avoided," Admiral Greenert wrote. "It is absolutely clear to me, however, that if command leadership and the navigation team followed basic specified procedures and exercised prudent navigation practices, they would have been aware of imminent navigation hazards and therefore [been] compelled to operate the ship more prudently. . . . At a minimum, the grounding would not have been as severe. . . . Although the grounding incident compelled me to punish [Mooney] and remove him from command, in my opinion it does not negate 19 years of exemplary service," the admiral emphasized. "Prior to the grounding incident, USS San Francisco demonstrated a trend of continuing improvement and compiled an impressive record of achievement under his leadership."
Commander Mooney later met with Joseph Ashley's father, and together they visited the sailor's grave in West Virginia. "He took full responsibility, and with tears in eyes, he asked me to forgive him," Mr. Ashley said in a published interview. "And I know Joey and him were very close."
And Disaster Averted
On 5 August, commanders of the Russian Navy asked the U.S. Pacific Fleet to help rescue the seven-member crew of a mini-submarine stuck at a depth of about 200 meters in Russia's Pacific waters off the Kamchatka peninsula. "The issue is currently being worked on and the negotiations between the U.S. and Russian Pacific Fleet commanders are to begin soon," a spokesman for the Russian Navy announced. Ten Russian rescue ships waited as experts assessed the best way of releasing the 43-foot-long Friz (Prize), which can dive to depths of about 3,000 feet.
"The situation is unusual, but one should not over-dramatize it," Pacific Fleet spokesman Alexander Kosolapov told Russian television. Similar vessels were used in the failed operation to rescue the nuclear-powered Russian submarine Kursk, which sank with her 118-men crew in the Arctic Barents Sea in August 2000. Eager to avoid a replay of the Kursk tragedy, Russia quickly requested international help in this incident. Several countries responded, including Great Britain. Japan, and the United States.
Priz ran into trouble a day earlier during a military exercise and could not return to the surface after her propeller became entangled in fishing nets. The nets wrapped around the propeller, and the prop also caught in the nets' anchor wires and cables linked to a seabed acoustic-listening array. Russian news agencies quoted officials as saying the PHz was too deep to allow the crew to leave the vessel.
Stuck in the cold submersible for three days, the Friz's was rescued early Sunday. 7 August, after a remote-controlled British "Scorpio" underwater remotely operated vehicle (ROV) cut through cables and fishing nets that had ensnared the mini-sub. The British ROV was the first foreign underwater vehicle to reach the scene. It freed the mini-sub just as a ship with two U.S. Navy "Super Scorpios" on board was about to set out from the Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky harbor, according to Garth Sinclair, a U.S. Navy chief hospital corpsman. who was among 30 U.S. sailors sent from North Island Naval Air Station in Coronado, San Diego, to help in the mission.
Published reports had Corpsman Sinclair explaining that four members of the American team had gone ahead of the Super Scorpios and were on hand to assist the operation using the British vehicle. Three of the U.S. Navy divers involved in the rescue effort provided crucial help for the British underwater robot in slicing through fishing nets and debris entangling the submarine. "I'm ecstatic that we were able to participate and help out," Sinclair said; he was also on board the Russian vessel, on standby to treat the Russian submariners, who had confronted temperatures as low as 43°.
Defense Minister Sergei B. Ivanov, sent by Russian President Vladimir V. Putin to supervise the rescue operation from a navy ship, praised the international cooperation, saying, "We have seen in deeds, not in words, what the brotherhood of the sea means."
This was also the first time that the International Submarine Escape and Rescue Liaison Office in Norfolk-an agency of NATO-came to the aid of a downed sub. The office maintains a Web site where countries with sub-rescue expertise and equipment can come together to coordinate efforts in an emergency. lieutenant Commander Jensin Sommer, spokeswoman for U.S. submarine forces, said in a published report. Online since June 2005, the office brings together nearly 40 countries, with more than a half-dozen sending equipment and people to help save the Priz.
The Legacy of Admiral Clark
On 22 July. Admiral Mullen relieved Admiral Clark, becoming the 28th Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral Clark, who had a near-unprecedented five-year run as CNO (only Admiral Arleigh Burke in the late 1950s/early 1960s served a longer term as the Navy's uniformed leader), retired after 37 years of service, leaving in place a Sea Power 21 legacy that will continue to provide a baseline for the Navy of the 21st century. Praising Clark during the ceremony. secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said. "He's taken on the right fights and been willing to do so." Secretary Rumsfeld also recognized Admiral Clark's "vision and his courage in fashioning and transforming a service steeped in over two centuries of tradition. No easy task. ... He leaves a stronger, more capable Navy, to the great benefit of the United States."
Admiral Clark is credited with turning around Navy recruitment and retention, ending crew shortages on deploying ships, improving the combat readiness of the Navy's ships and aircraft, and initiating a series of tradition-breaking changes in the way the Navy functions, including:
* Task Force EXCEL, which revolutionized Navy training and education
* "Optimal manning" and "human systems integration" mandates to ensure the Navy takes the human being into account, up front, in the design, engineering, and operation of advanced technologies, systems, and platforms, so designs call for no more and no fewer people than are needed to ensure mission success at lowest possible total ownership costs
* The "sea'swap" initiative that replaced entire crews while a ship remained deployed overseas
* An innovative "fleet response plan" and "presence with a purpose" philosophy, replacing a Cold-War tradition going back to the late 1940s of fixed, six-month deployments to predictable world regions separated by long periods of low readiness with the requirement to maintain high readiness for unscheduled surge deployments to areas in which naval forces were needed, especially in the Global War On Terrorism
* Task Force Total Force, which sought revolutionary approaches to the Navy's human capital to guarantee the right sailors with the right skills are available for the right jobs at the right time.
Although the Navy had become more efficient and more combat ready during the previous five years, it also had become smaller under Admiral Clark, with the fleet shrinking to the lowest numbers since just before World War I. From the Cold War fleet of some 589 ships in mid1985, the Navy in mid-2005 numbered about 283 ships, each of significantly greater capability than their predecessors, although, as Lenin admonished, quantity has a quality all its own. Looking to a fleet comprising revolutionary missiontailored littoral combat ships (LCS), next-generation multi-mission destroyers (DD[X]), a farther-future anti-cruise/ballistic-missile guided-missile cruiser (CG[X]), and a revolutionary nuclear-powered aircraft (CNV-21)-in addition to upgrades and modifications to legacy warships and submarines-Admiral Clark's assessments showed as many as 325 ships would be needed to meet the peacetime, crisisresponse, and wartime needs of the Navy.
In addition, Admiral Clark understood the value of the Navy's close coordination with all elements of America's sea services, especially the U.S. Coast Guard. Embracing the notion-and the joint USN-USCG policy-of a National Fleet in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States and the president's declaration of an unrelenting Global War on Terrorism, Admiral Clark often stated that, "in maritime homeland security the Coast Guard is the supported service and the Navy the supporting service, while in homeland defense and global military operations the Navy is the supported service and the Coast Guard, the supporting service." In that way, the conjoined Navy and Coast Guard forces would be of much greater significance and capability than the mere sum of their individual parts.
How Many, and What Kind?
Calling on his fellow sailors and pledging himself to live by three watchwordsListen, Learn, and Lead-Admiral MuIlen said at the July change of command that he was "humble" at the thought of replacing "a visionary like Vern Clark" and facing the three challenges the Navy faces: "to sustain our high level of readiness to enhance our ability to respond; to build a fleet for the future; and to develop a work force for the 21st century." While all three are daunting, clearly modernizing and growing the force to meet global needs during a period of increasingly tight fiscal resources-a reduction of some $7 billion in the Defense budget for fiscal year 2007 planning and another $52 billion across the future years defense plan-present tough hurdles to overcome.
Last year, the Navy requested funding for just four new ships in the fiscal year ending 30 September 2006, half as many as were requested in fiscal year 2005, at a cost of $8.8 billion. If extended over time, a four-ship-per-year rate would support a fleet of only 120 or so ships. In numerous published interviews since July, Admiral Mullen has been adamant: a funding pace of only four ships annually would be far too few to provide for the Navy of the future, if it is to have the capabilities it requires both for the "long war" against terror and to dissuade peer competitor nations from even attempting to take on U.S. forces in battle.
"Four ships in the '06 budget is as low as we've been, and I'm not anxious to stay there," he said. "It's not just about numbers of ships, it's about operational capabilities, it's about capabilities for the joint force, and it's about capabilities that can match up well with the future with respect to the Global War on Terror, as well as to the contractor base." And it is about a stable plan and program that will decrease uncertainties in the industrial base, which currently make it impossible for shipbuilders and their supporting industries to plan their investments and use of shipyard capacity and workforce deployment. "If I change my plan year to year," Admiral Mullen acknowledged, "it makes it very difficult to plan for investments." Instead, a predictable, smooth, and sure shipbuilding plan is key to "stabilizing the shipbuilding" industrial base.
The new CNO almost immediately put into motion a study of near- and far-term future shipbuilding programs and an assessment of the number and mixes of warships needed. The result was displayed in the Navy's "Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2007." The report recognized that "(b)ecause of the complex configuration and size of naval vessels, design time can range from two to five years and construction time can range from two to seven years and acquisition costs can be substantial. Naval vessels are procured in relatively low rates and a naval vessel's estimated service life is comparatively long: 25 years for smaller ships and up to 45-50 years for ballistic-missile submarines and nuclear-powered aircraft carriers." That said, several critical factors are influencing the future composition of the Navy. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review outlined four priorities-defeat terrorist extremists, defend the homeland in depth, shape the choices of countries at strategic crossroads, and prevent hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring or using weapons of mass destruction. Along with those mandates is the expectation that the current Global War on Terrorism would evolve into a "long war" against a variety of threats. These factors combined gave shape to the Navy's plans for a force of approximately 313 ships to be reached by 2020.
At an annual cost of $13 billon to $20 billion, and competition from the other services for scarce defense resources, homeland defense agencies, and domestic programs, getting from here to there, without doubt, will be a top challenge for Admiral Mullen-and the next two or three CNOs, for that matter. A new era for the U.S. Navy has dawned.
Dr. Truver is group vice president, National Security Programs, Anteon Corporation, and directs Anteon's Center for Security Strategies and Operations (CSSO). Mr. Goodman, Senior Naval Programs Analyst at the CSSO, provided the foundation research for this review.