In our November issue, key aides to CNG Admiral Mike Mullen—Vice Admiral John G. Morgan Jr. and Rear Admiral Charles W. Martoglio—wrote The 1,000-Ship Navy: Building a Global Maritime Network. Proceedings asked the commanders of the world's navies: What do you think of the concept described in the article?
Vice Admiral Russell E. Shalders
Royal Australian Navy
Mariners through the ages have shared a common interest in ensuring the oceans are a safe and secure place for commerce and the business of nations. The 1,000-ship Navy concept builds on this historic bond and is a logical extension of the outcomes of globalization. As an aim point, Admirals Morgan and Martoglio articulate well the value of addressing maritime security in a collaborative fashion. Their proposals recognize the many capacity-building activities already under way on a regionalbasis. The Royal Australian Navy's involvement in the successful Pacific Patrol Boat program is an example of the type of regional initiative that their concept espouses. The provision by Australia of 22 patrol boats and critical ongoing support, including experienced maritime advisors, to 12 Pacific island countries has assisted these nations in developing the capacity to address maritime security issues.
Similarly, the Western Pacific Naval Symposium is achieving results in increasing understanding and cooperation in the conduct of operations in our region. Shaping bilateral and multilateral exercises to reflect the national interests of participating nations is another approach to improve capacity and share information and best practices.
The concept acknowledges the many users of the sea and the diverse agencies involved in maritime security. An interagency or "whole of government" approach to maritime security is at varying stages of development around the globe. It is perhaps the biggest opportunity and challenge proffered by the concept. While navies are generally already in the business of sharing information and capacity, the involvement of other government and commercial agencies has latent potential. In Australia, the establishment of a Joint Offshore Protection Command, a collaborative Defense-Customs organization led by a navy admiral and established within the Australian Customs Service, is an example of one nation's solution to interagency coordination.
As noted in the article, a number of specific challenges will have an impact on the 1,000-ship construct. It is too easy to find barriers to the success of visionary ideas, and I will not dwell on this aspect. The considerable progress already made in regional attempts to mutually prosecute the maritime security threat highlights what can be achieved. However, perhaps the greatest challenge in globalizing the effort to secure the sea will be to generate the necessary mindset, trust, and transparency. There are potential sovereignty, legal, and technical issues, but with time, these can be addressed. We have seen this happen when nations face common threats, for example in the implementation of the Proliferation Security Initiative.
The admirals raise a number of important points in their thought-provoking article, and I congratulate them for articulating a most worthwhile vision. From the Royal Australian Navy perspective, we look favorably on any initiative that increases maritime security awareness and cooperation. In my view, this is the true value of the 1,000-ship Navy concept. The Royal Australian Navy continues to engage with our regional partners to build capacity and to encourage cooperation wherever possible. We are on board and willing to pursue the ideas outlined so cogently by John Morgan and Charlie Martoglio.
Rear Admiral Minko Kavaldzhiev
Bulgarian Naval Forces
The changes in the contemporary security environment, globalization, the fight against terrorism, asymmetric threats, and efforts in the wake of natural calamities have shown clearly and unambiguously that no single country can manage by its own means today's challenges. These points prove the need for an increasing role of international cooperation in all spheres. In view of these considerations, I support the admirals' concept. I think it is indicative of a process that has started and provides a chance for naval cooperation between many countries for the benefit of security at sea as a whole.
I fully agree with the opinion that the 1,000-ship Navy should integrate the naval forces and ship industry on a worldwide scale with a view to increasing the number of sensors providing global surveillance of the marine environment. Because most of the attacks against merchant ships and illegal human, drug, and weapon traffic are effected near the coastline, I think military and civil coastal surveillance systems as well as coast guard personnel and border police could also be employed. Participation of the latter would close the circle starting from identification of illegal acts or security threats and ending with punitive measures undertaken by the appropriate executive authorities. The mutual exchange of information and harmonized collective actions will prevent criminals from finding shelter and safe refuge, escaping the territorial waters of one country and hiding in another.
In many cases, however, the process of mutual exchange of information and concordance of actions is impeded by bureaucratic hindrances, which could slow information exchange to the point of making it useless. In most cases, local legislation is too restrictive with respect to providing such information to other countries. Although unable to ensure their security in their own waters, some states zealously guard their sovereignty, unwilling to accept help from outside. Combined, these factors bring about many questions for the practical accomplishment of the 1,000-ship Navy concept.
I feel optimistic with respect to the concept establishing a global network, which could provide sea security. Common interests and countries seeking their further economic development will inevitably lead to closer cooperation.
Vice-Admiral Drew W. Robertson
Canadian Navy
The idea of a 1,000-ship Navy is an importantquestion to put before this forum. In the broadest sense, the general concept fits well with the world view of the Canadian government. Our recent International Policy Statement commits to "a new global role that will serve our national interests and contribute to a safer and fairer world."
In North America, our maritime security cooperation with U.S. authorities is being enhanced across all relevant government departments. Abroad, for much of the past decade the Canadian Navy has been actively engaged in operations as foreseen for the 1,000-ship Navy. Since the mid-1990s, our frigates have deployed as fully interoperable members of U.S. Navy carrier battle groups to the Persian Gulf region. Following II September 2001, as the initial national commander in Operation Enduring Freedom, I watched our role evolve from the close protection of U.S. Navy amphibious ready groups into the leadership of a multinational group of warships in the campaign against terrorism, ultimately under the designation of Coalition Task Force 151.
Our success at coalition command and control is a function not only of a high level of interoperability with the U.S. Navy, but also our national predisposition to multilateral cooperation. The Canadian Navy is sensitive to the differences between formal alliance commitments and the varied objectives of individual members of "coalitions of the willing." These attributes align well with our interests and our capability to facilitate cooperation among other nations.
Many positive opportunities frequently arise. The 1,000-ship Navy concept is possible because of the classic confluence of the military-diplomatic-constabulary roles of navies. Regional matters—be they diplomatic in nature, or criminal or terrorist activities, or environmental issues dealing with oceans governance, or pure military operations—might best be addressed through encouraging common procedures and standards, and the development of suitable, affordable platforms, and networked technologies.
The challenges, however, revolve around national disparities and interests. Command-and-control arrangements will need to limit security restrictions to allow for maximum situational awareness and action. We will need to manage the natural competition between coalitions of the willing and the formal· alliance structures that will continue to exist. And in public discussion of the concept, we should not allow the mistaken impression to develop that the higher end of the conflict can be left to only a few nations. The unique flexibility of navies to perform a wide range of roles flows from the qualities inherent in a combat-capable multi-purpose force.
In the end, however, the security of the maritime commons is necessary for the general benefit of our increasingly globalized world. It is in the interests of all nations to contribute to the goals of the 1,000-ship Navy concept and the broader enhanced security cooperation that would underwrite the effort at sea. The experience of recent operations gives me great confidence that we have taken useful steps toward making it happen.
Admiral Rodolfo Codina Diaz
Chilean Navy
Admirals Morgan and Martoglio's position is consistent with the necessary international cooperation the global world demands. Their proposal is also consistent with the idea stated by Admiral Vern Clark at the Sea Power Symposium 2003, when he pointed out that "…Sea Power 21 is about projecting joint and combined, decisive—and I underline decisive-capabilities from the sea, operating in an information-rich environment…"
Undoubtedly, the Chilean Navy's position is in accordance with the Chilean government's view, stating that national development can only be achieved through international cooperation and, along these lines, is also consistent with the authors' proposal. The participation of states willing to join this endeavor should begin with a review of those capabilities that provide effective combined-force operation.
When analyzing the needed operational capabilities, it is of significant importance to review the judicial implications—both global and regional—to advance the establishment of a framework that allows facing new threats in the different maritime spaces.
Similarly, it is of utmost importance to analyze our service capabilities to interoperate with other navies, not only those with high technological development, but also those of the same region. This will not only enhance cooperation, but will provide an invaluable opportunity to advance confidence-building measures supporting regional integration.
Further, the initiative to include the private sector—the shipping industry in particular—in this global security network is an opportunity to improve technological capabilities in countries such as Chile. Our nation, aware of the need to conduct efficient surveillance and control activities in the vast Pacific Ocean, has begun construction of an Offshore Patrol Vessels program.
Finally, the transnational threat assessment affecting global security has been a permanent concern for the Chilean Navy. Aware of the relevance of global maritime security, the main subject of the IV Exponaval and International Conference for Latin American Defense, to be held in Chile in November 2006, is "Global Commerce and Maritime Power." This event will allow participating countries to exchange views on this important subject and further their contribution to the freedom, security, and well being of nations.
Vice Admiral Zdravko Kardum
Croatian Navy
The idea to establish a naval network with 1,000 international-community ships, aimed at sustaining maritime security, is an excellent project that should be given attention by all navies and maritime countries in the world. There is no doubt we can build and sustain maritime security necessary for the common good, only through total cooperation.
The Croatian Navy is extremely interested in the security of not only the Adriatic and Mediterranean seas, but also globally, because the Republic of Croatia is a maritime country and a responsible member of the international community.
The issue of establishing maritime security on the Adriatic Sea has been considered at great length by the Croatian Navy with those involved in general maritime security. The oldest Croatian maritime university has initiated a project involving all Adriatic countries in the establishment of regional maritime security. This microlocation initiative is compatible with the ideas proposed by the admirals.
To maintain maritime security, it is important to involve merchant ships and coastal stations in the global maritime network. We need to have our eyes wide open and the exchange of information provided on time and in good faith.
This is a very good opportunity for the Croatian Navy, which has operational forces for homeland defense—traditional naval tasks—and a coast guard. The admirals' idea is extremely encouraging for small navies as it gives them a significant role in a very important mission. The sense of worth and self-confidence in those navies will increase. Further, the project will not threaten national interests; rather, it will enhance those interests because national and regional security is an integral part of global security. The Croatian Navy wants to be a littoral Navy, sized and shaped to be capable of protecting Croatian sovereignty and national interests within its internal waters, territorial sea, and the Zone of Ecological Protection and Fisheries, with no intent to endanger any other nation. At the same time, our navy would like to be a respected and reliable factor in international maritime security. This strategic commitment is fully in accordance with the article. That concept can only strengthen our position.
We believe that the idea itself should pose no problems and that, in good faith, it is possible to find good and practical solutions. The Croatian Navy is able to participate as an active and respected member of global maritime security. Croatian Navy and Croatian merchant ships could be a part of the global maritime network by operating for the benefit of maritime security on national, regional, and global levels.
The Croatian Navy is committed to this idea. It is also aware that the Adriatic Sea is our main economic resource and the initiator of development for the Republic of Croatia.
I express my gratitude to you for the honor and opportunity of expressing the visions of our small navy and nation with a rich maritime tradition and, in this way, conveying our ideas on this internationally important issue.
Rear Admiral Nils Wang
Royal Danish Navy
Being a straightforward and very logical proposal, the initiative and the bold visions behind it are welcome. I certainly see opportunities in the concept. I do not think one should take the term "1,000-ship Navy" as an exact figure, but more as a philosophy or way of thinking aimed at creating a global maritime network.
The philosophy behind the proposal and the types of operations envisioned fit hand in glove with Danish naval thinking. A littoral nation, Denmark relies heavily on undisrupted maritime supply lines. Vital bridges, offshore oil installations, and more than 100,000 ships passing through Danish waters every year make for potential risks across the full array of threats. Danish prosperity depends to a high degree on the freedom of the seas. Danish merchant shipping operates worldwide, earning some $26 billion annually. At anyone time Danish merchant ships will be found in the major choke points all over the world. Hence, the threats described are very much a Danish problem, at home as well as abroad.
As one of the founding members of NATO, Denmark has a long-standing tradition for cooperation with alliance navies. Over the years cooperation has been established with the Baltic rim nations in a number of constabulary areas. In the last 15 years Danish naval units have taken part in NATO- or U.S.-led operations. In addition, Denmark has participated regularly in NATO's standing naval forces for many years. Hence, the Danish Navy has acquired solid experience in cooperation with navies from a variety of nations.
Through the procurement of the Absalon-class combat support ships and the follow-on of three large frigates, the Danish Navy will possess modern ships with a global reach, yet with a littoral-operations capability. The Flyvefisken-class'participation in Allied Harvest (mine countermeasures) and Active Endeavor (choke-point protection) proved that smaller Danish units also have a part to play in a future 1,000-ship Navy.
The flexible design of the Absalon-class enables the ships—in addition to traditional maritime roles—to take on the role of a grey hospital ship with a 70-man medical staff. The necessary medical equipment is being procured, and operational status in this role is expected in 2007. However, accentuated by the tsunami catastrophe, smaller humanitarian aid packages (tents, blankets, water purifiers, etc.) will be procured this year and be a permanent part of the ships' standard outfit, regardless of role, deployment area, or tasks, to enable them to provide basic assistance at all times. The concept is planned to include all major units.
As for problems, or rather challenges, behind the 1,000-ship Navy philosophy, information sharing and intelligence fusion are the first to spring to mind. Second—realizing that no one has sovereignty on the high seas—creating common protocols and perhaps even common rules of engagement, which could ultimately allow use of force to counter threats in international waters, could prove another challenge.
Interoperability, communications, and information exchange could also be obstacles. However, more than a decade of Partnership for Peace activities, including the development of the NATO/Partnership for Peace Stanag 1,000 series, has shown the way and could provide the foundation for worldwide maritime cooperation. An internet-type maritime global network with a controlling agency and a common database may be required. New automatic identification and electronic nautical chart systems, among others, will undoubtedly be useful tools for information exchange.
All in all, I strongly subscribe to the philosophy of creating a global maritime network to counter the menaces that exist today in the maritime domain.
Vice Admiral Hans Holmstrom
Finnish Navy
The Finnish Navy welcomes the concept of the 1,000-ship Navy. As a small nation we are very familiar with the challenges that Admirals Morgan and Martoglio point out. Nearly 90% of our foreign trade is transported on a hull, which makes Finnish society very much dependent on global maritime security. Despite this fact, our own capability to protect the sea lines of communications is very limited outside our territorial waters. The Finnish Navy is mainly designed for national defense and the protection of territorial integrity of Finnish waters. The posture of the Navy provides tools for countering threats against shipping in our own area of responsibility, but the farther we sail from the Finnish coast, the more we have to rely on others.
I believe Finland definitely should be an exporter of security. Unfortunately both the structure and size of our navy restrict our ability to provide assets outside our own area of operations. Nevertheless, we are developing our capabilities to participate in multinational operations within all European waters.
Besides direct participation in multinational naval operations, the article also offers an alternative method to increase global maritime security—security assistance. In this I see an opportunity for small navies like ours. Security assistance does not require a large fleet. Exporting security know-how could be an economically feasible way for all small navies to extend their reach. It may also be easier, for some countries, to accept security assistance from a small nation rather than from an alliance or a single power. Assistance from a small nation is not a threat to the sovereignty of the receiving nation.
I encourage everyone to benchmark other, more distant areas of the globe to find the best practices for maintaining and increasing maritime security. For example, Finland has had good experiences from national cooperation and regional maritime safety arrangements with Sweden, Estonia, and Russia. These have had a positive influence on our own national security, and we are ready to share them with other willing nations.
Admiral Alain Oudot de Dainville
French Navy
According to its roles and missions, the French Navy has developed a vision: comprehensive protection and prevention. Its tenets are similar to the proposals made by Admirals Morgan and Martoglio.
We have always thought that threats to stability must be addressed within a global and broad perspective and not solely focused on terrorist activities. In 2003 we promulgated the maritime safeguard concept to federate, in a comprehensive perspective, all the contributions of the Navy to maritime security and safety, spanning the whole range of operations at sea: from rescue to military support to law enforcement activities, from coastal surveillance to anti-pollution operations, and from Caribbean narcotics operations patrols to Indian Ocean maritime and leadership interdiction operations. In our vision, navies have a role to play in countering or mitigating all threats and dangers occurring at sea that may affect human beings. High-intensity warfare at sea or in the littorals, our core business, stands at the end of such a continuum.
Since the 19th century, French public services' assets have operated with interagency coordination. In the maritime domain, the service lies in the office of the "prefet maritime," an active duty admiral. As a unique representative of the Prime Minister, he is entitled to act as the coordinating authority for all government agencies involved in law enforcement duties or in the protection of people, property, and environment at sea. During recent years, the scope of this security posture has been increasingly affected by high-seas activities. We fully support the "think globally" part of the slogan, in full compliance with the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea, which remains essential in this position. We also promote regional cooperation as a first step, as we intend to share our concept with our European partners.
Today, French naval forces maintain a global-reach capability. Manned by people who have been educated and trained in such contingencies, they could provide security cooperation or support disaster relief anywhere in the world. We fully endorse the principle of voluntary participation in a global network of cooperating navies. We will be ready to bring our expertise and capabilities to such an effort with one thought: cooperation is mainly to help others in helping themselves. Because maritime and littoral activities are pivotal to national interests, we must encourage and attract all partners without trespassing on their legitimate sovereignty claims.
In our countries, there is not enough awareness of the daily contributions of maritime activities to society's and individual welfare and way of life. Promoting the standing role of navies around the world in keeping these activities safe and functioning should also increase our fellow citizens' perception of the role of their navy.
As solidarity at sea is not an empty word, cooperation against all the dangers, threats, and risks at sea is a goal we should share.
Vice Admiral Lutz Feldt
German Navy
Global challenges cannot be handled by individual countries alone, hence, the concept of a virtual 1,000-ship Navy developed by the U.S. Navy and aiming at a global maritime network is a logical consequence of this fact and a step in the right direction.
Because Germany, more than almost any other country, heavily depends on the use of the sea for its imports and exports, it has a vital interest in being able to use the sea lines of communication freely and unhindered. Maritime security, however, is an issue that touches on the tasks and responsibilities of more than a navy. This becomes particularly clear when the civilian-shipping sector is to be incorporated-as in the 1,000-ship Navy concept.
Crucial for the success of such a concept is a common understanding of the importance of the sea and its use, which has many facets: Indirect economic use as a transportation route, direct economic use (fishing, crude oil and gas production), and recreational use.
These aspects, each touching on the security and safety in the maritime domain, should be dealt with in an overarching concept.
To some degree, maritime networks already exist, stemming from various global and regional sea power symposia. Further, Germany contributes in a substantial way to international maritime security in the context of the global war on terrorism, in particular its continuous participation in operations Enduring Freedom and Active Endeavor. In addition, the German Navy has assigned units, primarily frigates and mine countermeasures ships, to the four NATO maritime groups on a permanent basis. Thus Germany, in close cooperation with other nations, exports security into regions not immediately within its sphere of influence, yet still within its sphere of interests. In a European context, the German Navy is actively involved in shaping the maritime portion of the European Union battle groups, thus further developing and strengthening capabilities. Moreover, as a littoral state, Germany has one of the largest navies in the Baltic Sea area, playing a lead role regarding the integration of new NATO and EU members of this region. A prominent example is its participation in the Baltic Naval Squadron working group, which it has chaired from the beginning.
The German Navy has a broad assortment of maritime capabilities and experience that could be contributed to a global maritime network. For instance, Germany is in the process of creating a Center of Excellence for Operations in Confined and Shallow Waters located in Kiel. Among others, this center will investigate issues and prospects regarding maritime security provisions such as warding off mine threats by terrorists in coastal areas. Germany will invite other nations to participate once the center is accredited by NATO with the results made available to all alliance members.
The German Navy's capabilities were also evident during the tsunami disaster humanitarian relief operations in the form of a combat support ship. Thanks to its excellent logistic and medical capacities, we were able to provide help independent of any land-based infrastructure.
The broad range of capabilities that navies possess can be connected to global maritime security networks. The growing awareness in political circles that comprehensive security and safety can be ensured onlyin an inter-governmental approach to adequately meet future challenges and risks is cause for optimism. This will also offer maritime options to be brought into effect more frequently in the future and enable them to be integrated into a comprehensive security concept.
A global maritime network, however, can only become reality if all parties involved agree that this will generally enhance security and safety. Consequently, one basic requirement for the successful implementation of such a concept is that economic interests of individual countries be deemphasized in favor of the overall gain. Implementation must be rooted in true partnership and be transparent to everyone involved. The German Navy is actively supporting multilateral actions in the widespread arc of global maritime security.
Rear Admiral A.R.S. Nuno
Ghana Navy
The maritime domain is constantly challenged by traditional and new threats, all increasing in quantum, actors, nature, and scope. The cumulative effect is that the great maritime commons, from which we have built, communicated, and created our civilization, is being held for ransom.
The international community is becoming more responsive to these threats, however, the issue of collective policing and action has not been adequately addressed. In this regard, the 1,000-ship Navy is of seminal importance. My colleagues' thoughts are incisive, and their arguments are strong.
Conflicts from Sierra Leone through Liberia to Cote d'Ivoire, have had a negative impact on the stability and development of the region. Illegal importation of small arms and weapons by air and sea facilitates these conflicts. Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea region continues to increase. Nearby Somali waters were rated among the most pirate-infested waters in 2004/2005.
The west coast of Africa is infamous for the transit of drugs. In September 2004, a French warship intercepted a Togolese tugboat, Pitea, off the coast of Ghana with more than two tons of cocaine worth $50 million. Coupled with drug trafficking is the related problem of illegal immigration by sea.
With the 9/11 experience, a new threat surfaced: the possibility of using the ocean highways and platforms as instruments of terrorist attack. It is a collective danger that requires a collective response.
These points make it important for the Gulf of Guinea region to cooperate in building a security regime, which would be a part of the 1,000-ship Navy. The Ghana Navy, as part of its desire for a regional and global security regime, supports the U. S. European Command initiatives on African coastal security. Ghana hosted a May 2005 conference that was a follow-up to the Gulf of Guinea Security Conference held in Naples, Italy, in October 2004, and which my predecessor attended.
We are therefore already in the cooperative sphere and importing maritime security. In the face of growing poverty, poor nations including Ghana need the support of big navies and the international community to procure and equip their navies.
The imperatives of the 1,000-ship Navy are many and diverse but can be outlined as spatial, legal, and operative.
- To be effective, there should be no sea area or region that the 1,000-ship Navy could not cover. There will be varying strengths depending on threat thresholds, priorities, and capabilities, but any sea space uncovered serves as a fault line that can be exploited to derail the whole. This is the spatial imperative.
- The legal imperative is the constitutional framework for the operational apparatus. The ocean space can be defined in terms of sovereignty, sovereign rights, and global commons. These must be factored in with the competencies and operational capacities of the differing navies. Our discourse must hammer out the appropriate legal framework.
- The third imperative-the operative-is in some respects derived from the first two. We need the ships and equipment to have a 1,000-ship Navy. We must define the end state and establish command-and-control procedures. There must be synergy of the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.
- To achieve the laudable objectives, the suggestion that bigger navies and industry should cooperate in making available ships at cheaper cost to smaller navies is very important.
There are collective actions in some regions. The Gulf of Guinea region must come on board. Globally, the 1,000-ship Navy offers appropriate deterrence and response. We can export and import security and create overarching efficacy. The imperatives may be many, but the three outlined here are important. We cannot have a seamless result, but we need the 1,000-ship Navy.
Admiral Arun Prakash
Indian Navy
If the daring proposal put forth by the authors strikes a chord in this part of the world, it is for two reasons. First, the Indian economy, having emerged from many years of self-imposed isolation, has been experiencing the joys as well as the tribulations of globalization for the past decade and a half. And second, when terrorism struck a savage blow in the heart of New York and Washington on 9/11, we had already been battling this dreaded scourge for many years in a conflict that extends from our mountains to our seas.
Globalization has led to tremendous growth in seaborne commerce and increasing exploitation of the seas for other purposes. This in turn has been inevitably accompanied by an increasing trend toward piracy and other maritime crimes; we thus see the new "silk routes" attracting latter-day buccaneers who respect neither national laws nor international boundaries. Man-made borders are meaningless before natural disasters, and we have seen the devastation wrought by earthquakes, tsunamis, cyclones, floods, or droughts cutting across nations and clearly demonstrating that no single country can by itself hope to cope with such catastrophes.
As I write, a biennial event, Milan 2006, is taking place in Port Blair in our Andaman and Nicobar group of islands. Milan is Hindi for "confluence," and nine navies have gathered here from the extended Bay of Bengal neighborhood to meet and glean mutual benefits that professional and cultural fraternization bring. This year's Milan has special significance, because Port Blair and the surrounding islands suffered major damage from the 2004 tsunami. Among activities at Milan is a seminar on regional maritime cooperation, which will discuss the security of international sea lanes and disaster management.
Living in a dangerous neighborhood, having established bilateral patrols and initiated regional maritime cooperative endeavors, albeit in a small way, we understand what the authors are talking about. We agree that such cooperation, if extended globally, will require resources that go well beyond the capability of any single nation or even a group of nations.
The 1,000-ship Navy envisioned by the authors will, however, be an international "force in being" which presupposes not just "willing navies" but also political consensus across the board, and reassurances related to sovereignty issues, intelligence sharing, command and control, and other transnational concerns. There also needs to be a clear understanding and commitment for contributors to this "dormant navy" to respond when the call comes. Inreal life however, it is possible that this excellent concept may founder on the rocks and shoals of national sensitivities.
A possible method for establishing the 1,000-ship concept would be under the aegis of the United Nations, with each member asked to earmark certain units as UN forces. The UN, through its maritime agencies, has demarked areas of responsibility for hydrographic survey, issue of navigational warnings, and search and rescue responsibilities. This format could be replicated or modified for policing and maintenance of good order at sea, as envisaged by the 1,000-ship Navy.
Admiral Slamet Soebijanto
Indonesian Navy
I agree with the wonderful 1,000-ship Navy concept to establish and maintain a dramatically increased level of international security in the maritime domain. I also agree that today, more than ever, the security of an individual nation is tied to global security.
That Navy, however, will require large sums to support the ships. It will need a standard operating procedure, interoperability, and internal command-and-control procedures. It must include the shipping industry on an international scale and the cooperation of our maritime industry.
The Indonesian Navy has actively contributed to counter piracy efforts and transnational crime through cooperative efforts with Malaysia and Singapore in the Strait of Malacca. These actions demonstrate our concern for maritime security. However, our national interests cannot be ignored. Our navy's priority is cooperation with all neighboring countries that share a sea border with Indonesian territory to maintain maritime security and to foster mutual confidence. No less important is our navy's obligation to patrol Indonesian territorial waters. These constraints would limit our opportunity for joint operations with the 1,000-ship Navy.
Moreover, the Indonesian Navy's participation in the concept requires the permission of the Indonesian armed forces, its Department of Defense, and our government.
Admiral Sergio Biraghi
Italian Navy
The 1,000-ship Navy concept, presented in its essential features at the International Seapower Symposium in Newport, Rhode Island, is a very bright and comprehensive approach toward building a global maritime network, highly required today in the complex and challenging security arena we have to cope with. As understood, the details of this initiative have to be further investigated, but I am convinced it offers a wide array of opportunitiesto the navies that agree to this global partnership.
I believe the strength of the concept lies in the flexibility of its implementation, in the fact that all nations are called to deal with a series of common threats, and within the contribution that every nation can offer to security in the maritime domain. It should be measured by how each nation's national interests match global interests.
As very clearly defined in the article, maritime security is an international problem that requires an international solution, and no single nation can manage the issues on its own. International cooperation thus becomes imperative.
How does Italy and the Italian Navy plug into the concept? I feel safe to say, "in a very smooth manner." Indeed, we have been actively operating according to the plotted track. In fact, the Italian Navy, while thinking globally, has been acting regionally. In the Wider Mediterranean—a concept that includes the Black Sea, Atlantic approaches, Middle East, Arabian Gulf, and western Indian Ocean—a robust surveillance posture is paramount, through continuous presence and control of our surrounding maritime spaces. Nevertheless, well aware that such activity is in itself insufficient, we have invested tangibly in the field of international cooperation and cross-agency coordination.
Besides promoting various cooperative initiatives—ADRION, the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative with the Hellenic Navy, and 5+5, involving five navies each from the European Union and North Africa—a series of bilateral training activities have been launched with Algeria, Croatia, Israel, Libya, Malta, Russia, Serbia-Montenegro, and Tunisia. The added value of these initiatives is to bring together countries with different cultures and economies, but all sharing the desire of cooperation in maritime security.
We have decided to venture farther. The occasion was offered by the Regional Seapower Symposium, which the Italian Navy hosts in Venice every two years. At the 2004 meeting, I presented to the 25 foreign delegations and several international institutions attending, an innovative project called Virtual-Regional Maritime Traffic Center.
This network, operational in an interim capacity since last June, is aimed at improving the exchange of information about merchant traffic transiting, inbound, and outbound, the Wider Mediterranean. The formula for its success lies in the combination of pragmatism and transparency.
Some of the problems that could arise with the 1,000-ship Navy concept are those linked to political sensitivities and technical factors. Not all nations and/or navies are ready to take such a historical leap. The solution could be a very patient activity keyed to building confidence, so that age-old ideological barriers can be torn down and operational and technological assistance can be provided to the less able navies. Further, an effective step-by-step approach—working on regional maritime networks at first and later tying them up if and when they flourish—will prove a winning hit.
Last, a concept that can never be overestimated is the conviction by each and every nation that to contribute to global security is the most cost-effective manner of safeguarding their security and interests.
Admiral Takashi Saito
Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force
All the personnel of the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) and I respect the significantefforts of the United States and the U.S. Navy to maintain the present international order. However, no single nation, not even the United States, can deal with all of the various problems facing the international community today. As the authors mentioned, international cooperation is essential to ensure global security. Additionally, the establishment of a global maritime network through regional and international cooperation is indispensable to promoting maritime security, for example, when dealing with transnational threats such as terrorism, piracy, smuggling, and weapons proliferation.
To respond to the changing security environment, the Japanese government adopted new National Defense Program Guidelines in December 2004. These state that Japan's security policy is to improve the international security environment through cooperation with the international community. Support activities for Operation Enduring Freedom and commitment to Proliferation Security Initiative activities conducted by the JMSDF are examples of our efforts to bring Japan's security policy to fruition. These activities also lead to the establishment of a network for ensuring security in the maritime domain.
This type of network among navies has been developing steadily through regional naval frameworks such as the Western Pacific Naval Symposium. We have many challenges to be solved, however, to realize the 1,000-ship Navy. The first is the promotion of cooperation at the regional level. To encourage many countries to join the maritime network, it is necessary for it to be flexible to account for the regional security environment. The next challenge is the promotion of cooperation at the domestic level. Interagency cooperation at home, particularly between the navy and maritime law enforcement agencies such as the coast guard and maritime police—a pressing matter to most countries—is a prerequisite for an effective network. Establishment of a global maritime network depends on a shared sense of value and a code of conduct, whichcan be developed through the efforts cited here. Such a network is vital to promoting maritime security in the 21st century, and it will appear when a strategic convergence of regional cooperation and domestic cooperation is achieved. The establishment of this global maritime network is an important mission for us as we face the new threats in the 21st century.
Vice Admiral J.W. Kelder
Royal Netherlands Navy
The concept of the 1,000-ship Navy is in line with the current focus of the Netherlands Navy. At present the navy is being reorganized and modernized with the aim of adapting our capabilities to the new operational environment. This environment demands not only that navies are increasingly focused on maritime expeditionary operations in support of land operations but also that our fleets are capable of protecting maritime interests against a diversity of asymmetric threats. In short, navies must be able to provide security at sea and from the sea.
Doing this, the Netherlands Navy is deployed not only in its home waters, including the Caribbean Sea, but is also conducting expeditionary operations by contributing to Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean and CTF 150 in the Arabian Sea. Our marines have been providing election support in Afghanistan and are still there as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. They also provide force protection to fleet personnel operating in a Provincial Reconstruction Team under International Security Assistance Force command.
Maritime security threats—piracy, drug trafficking, illegal immigrants, weapons smuggling, and weapons of mass destruction—as well as potential conflict areas, are diverse and unpredictable. Many nations experience common threats to maritime security such as the attacks on USS Cole and MV Limburg, which showed the world the vulnerability of shipping to maritime terrorism.
With globalization and the continuing increase of maritime trade comes a growing dependency of Western economies and prosperity on the free and secure use of the sea. But globalization not only affects the economic ties that bind us, but also in the effects of the threats to maritime security. Drug trafficking affects not only one country but a whole region. The consequences of piracy attacks in the Indian Ocean are felt on the stock exchange in Amsterdam. A terrorist attack against shipping, off shore or at harbor installations, will reverberate around the globe.
This global outlook is not only important for military operations but is also increasingly relevant when providing humanitarian aid to civil authorities. Recent experiences with the tragic consequences of major natural disasters indicate that this task is not limited to our national boundaries but evolves globally as well. Security-sector reform is a globally growing task field; further exploring use of advanced information systems or helping other nations to develop an adequate naval or coast guard element may also create a more secure maritime environment.
All this leads to the conclusion that a secure maritime environment can only be maintained in a global setting; just protecting our home waters is not enough. No nation can do it alone. The critical success factors for providing global maritime security are the ability to cooperate and to communicate within a joint environment with units not only from traditional alliances, but increasingly with those from a much broader coalition. Global maritime security requires a global maritime picture, very much in line with the air pictures maintained by air traffic control centers. This picture would make potential threats to the maritime environment more visible and facilitate our reaction to developing threats.
As such, the concept of the 1,000-ship Navy is warmly supported and is completely in line with the mission statement of the Royal Netherlands Navy Command: one navy-marine corps team providing security at sea and from the sea.
Rear Admiral David I. Ledson
Royal New Zealand Navy
A helicopter view of 1,000 ships patrolling the world's oceans would make a magnificent sight—but would those ships genuinely make an effective global maritime network against global terrorism and in providing humanitarian relief?
The concept of such a network—roaming across the global maritime commons—as envisaged in the article is an interesting one. However, if the opportunity it promotes is to be seized across the globe, then discussion of its pros and cons is important especially if the 1,000-ship Navy is not to be just another worthy vision languishing as a bumper sticker on the office notice board.
The concept and the characteristics that frame it seem to hint that geo-strategic changes in recent years require navies to adopt new roles. Since the early 1990s, however, significant changes across the landscape have been remarkably few, and the traditional roles of navies continue to be relevant.
It is also important to note that navies have had at various times in their history to deal with many of the threats that some contemporary commentators characterize as new. The nature and characteristics of national and human interactions has not yet changed to the extent that navies are irrelevant and reduced to trying to invent new uses for old capabilities.
Some thought needs to be given to the practicality, or otherwise, of considering the oceans as a commons—and, indeed, whether the oceans in this sense include the high seas, exclusive economic zones, and territorial seas.
There are significant difficulties in taking too broad an approach that, perhaps, become more apparent if the sea is considered not just as a maritime highway, but also as a supplier of resources. Unsurprisingly, the terrestrial concept of sovereignty—ownership—is being applied to increasing maritime areas and being able to exercise this sovereignty is seen as an important national responsibility.
An Atlantic-Europe strategic perspective rather than a Pacific-Asia one may also shape the view of the oceans as a commons. In a general sense, archipelagic geography exerts an influence on Asian relationships and on Asian maritime strategies that does not appear evident in the Atlantic context.
Care needs to be taken to ensure that we are not seduced by the intellectual and visual attraction of simple ship numbers away from the more complex but more important issues associated with defining credible capabilities for those ships.
The concept of large numbers of ships patrolling the farthest reaches of the oceans on the off-chance of doing some good needs to be replaced by the concept of ships with the capabilities that enable them to share maritime domain awareness, and to respond appropriately to incidents, operating in response to targeted information and with agreed measures of success.
The last point is very important. While ships may not complain about endless patrols away from home, sailors will. Ultimately, it is they who do the hard yards, and those who send them to sea need to be able to demonstrate that they are making a difference.
There are dangers in using the analogy of maritime security in the navy context as "an importable or exportable product." While this approach may be acceptable for commercial organizations, the analogy risks creating a misalignment with the core purpose and culture of navies around the world—in fact, with their reason for being. The principal purpose of any navy is to contribute to the prosperity and security of its country's citizens, and this is done through service on the sea.
The assurance of maritime security in its broadest sense is an important task for navies; it always has been and always will be. In the past, navies have tended to regard this as a navy-only job. Today, there is increased recognition that navies working inside an inter-agency network provide a more effective strategy.
As great a challenge as providing an effective and networked 1,000-ship Navy is that of proving an effective and networked "whole of government" approach to the array of security threats that face us on and around the seas, an approach that provides both roads and resources—some on the commons and many on "private land."
Rear Admiral Jan Eirik Finseth
Royal Norwegian Navy
Illegal activities such as piracy, smuggling, and terrorism know no borders and are rarely connected to a specific state. Neither are natural disasters or environmental hazards. Maintaining sea trade and international regulations, search and rescue, and the provision of comfort following disasters are among the traditional naval tasks of all free nations. As such, the ideas of a Global Maritime Network and the 1,000-ship Navy are very interesting.
Norway is a maritime nation largely dependent on free trade directly for its own needs and through its huge merchant fleet. Offshore oil and natural gas production and extensive fisheries make our country totally dependent on law and order at sea and of global security. To achieve this at home we must be able to contribute abroad. While humanitarian relief rarely is a difficult political issue, a global war on terrorism may be subject to debate. Under all circumstances, all deployments of units of the Royal Norwegian Navy would need political backing.
The Royal Norwegian Navy normally restricts its operations to the Norwegian Sea and the Mediterranean. Operations in the littorals are our strength, and our navy is designed and trained with this in mind. At the same time, the Norwegian merchant navy is regularly operating worldwide and clearly represents a source of information.
The importance of civilian shipping and our dependence on free trade cannot be overstated. Piracy or terrorism, asymmetric warfare or simply the random laying of a few sea mines, would seriously disrupt trade and increase transportation costs dramatically. This would affect most, if not all, nations. It is easy to agree with the authors that this remains a common, international task.
In addition to cooperation among navies, a robust system of naval cooperation and guidance of shipping must be created when needed. In this aspect Norway considers itself one of the lead nations in NATO. We have the right deployable equipment and experienced personnel, secure communications, and contacts in the shipping environment to add a useful capability in a geographic area.
The littoral combat skill of the Royal Norwegian Navy would effectively fit into the tasks and outlined ideas behind the 1,000-ship Navy. Sustainability outside traditional waters would pose a challenge that could, however, be mitigated through NATO cooperation. All deployments would be subject to political approval, which a UN mandate calling for military assistance would make much more likely.
The authors introduce a principle that should be given international attention—the collective responsibility of all free nations to uphold and support the economic and other interests of each other. In this aspect, most navies could contribute.
Admiral Jorge Ampueo Trabucco
Peruvian Navy
The concept of a global maritime network, which would allow the naval power of the world states to be used in a coordinated manner, is a proposal that deserves to be considered. In a globalized world, where new transnational threats replace traditional threats at an accelerated rate, this network would allow the implementation of an intra-state alliance against those new actors who threaten our people through organized crime and international terrorism, and force them to face the consequences of their acts.
Internationally, this would become a symbol of mankind's capacity to face a common enemy. Such a network would imply the desire to develop an interoperable capability among our navies. It would, without a doubt, represent a unique challenge for states with developing economies because of costs required for common equipment. For these reasons, imaginative and cooperative solutions are necessary. The most important issue in facing a common enemy, however, is to reinforce peace and trust among the states, which would help create a dynamic integration, particularly at the regional level.
In like manner, this concept could extend to combat various illegal activities on the world's oceans, contributing to maritime security and marine ecosystems protection.
The main problems with this concept are driven by the states' internal policies. Many would face legal restrictions, lack of political will, and nationalist sentiment, mainly among smaller nations who will see their sovereignty sacrificed for; the international relationship.
In that context, such an arrangement would force the negotiation of rules for coordination and engagement, as well as rules for the use of network capacities; to review the scope of the "principle of no intervention in others' state matters;" and to establish a relationship and interdependency with international organizations.
On the operational level, the development of adequate platforms for command and control, as well as a transparent intelligence sharing system for efficient operation would be necessary.
Fleet Admiral Roman Krzyzelewski
Polish Navy
Much has been said about change and emerging threats after the attacks on 11 September 2001. We must understand that the threats did not suddenly appear on 9/11. They existed for a long time before, but never on such a scale. During the Cold War the terrorist threat was a local hazard overshadowed by a bigger danger—the possibility of a global conflict between two power blocs. That great threat forced bloc members to closely cooperate with each other. The end of that global threat with the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the end of the bipolar world brought a feeling of relief. But that was only an illusion, the local threats had mutated into a global danger, the best evidence being 9/11.
As much as those of the 1990s cherished the relief and illusion of global security, today, everyone is aware of the mutated threats. The maritime community, dealing every day with forces of nature and taking advantage of the freedom of the seas, is especially aware of how sensitive that environment is to hostile activities.
As a seaman and a naval officer, I cannot disagree with the 1,000-ships concept and fail to notice profit from such a solution. It should be noted that the concept is not an entirely new idea within the maritime community. Similar solutions on a smaller scale were and are successfully implemented in many regions of the world. It would be a great achievement to implement the concept globally. Close cooperation among the various institutions would ensure not only a global security but also, thanks to that variety, would be cost effective. The concept's implementation, however, is not an easy task.
Any coalition or cooperation is based on a common objective. For regional solutions the common objective is usually easily defined; that of the 1,000-ship Navy may be more difficult. Terrorism has a broad definition and it is hard to find anyone meaning suitable for all interested parties. Even with agreement on a common, specific definition, there remains the matter of priorities. Various institutions see different threats as the most dangerous; we always consider a direct threat as most serious.
Another crucial problem is the matter of information exchange. The issue has been discussed many times in forums, and the problem's complexity is generally recognized. It is clear that the most important information is usually confidential and, as much as everyone is eager to receive such data, one is not so willing to share it.
The idea of the 1,000-ship Navy is definitely an aim we should strive for, however, the procedures and regulations required for its creation and conduct need much effort and some changes in thinking. It seems logical that in the meantime we should focus on developing regional programs and build them with a global system in mind. That requires close cooperation, coordination, and experience exchange between the regional programs.
Admiral Melo Gomes
Portuguese Navy
I am convinced that, more than an opportunity, this concept should be viewed as a growing reality. Rather than identifying problems, I will focus on two main ideas: The concept's strengths and way ahead, and the Portuguese Navy's contribution.
Globalization is straining national security systems that cannot cope with some non-state actors who are far more powerful than their systems. Further, the law of the sea is friendly to those who do not comply with the rule of law, allowing them freedom of maneuver until reaching shore. Then, incipient coastal surveillance systems, combined with scarce maritime assets because of insufficient investment mainly related to the peace dividend following the Cold War, provides safe ground for unlawful activities to flourish. This generates vast sums of money that are invested in increasingly sophisticated assets and processes to nourish this chain.
With such a tremendous enemy, how can democracies prevail? I believe the only way is to adopt a different approach, one of enhanced cooperation and information exchange that brings national security systems together, sharing vital information, and acting before the crucial moment occurs. A network-centric global security system, based on trust, information exchange, and credibility, is needed. Among those I include coastal surveillance systems, such as the vessel traffic system, and above all, efficient command and control of the diverse coastal and maritime patrolling assets needed to team for success.
Having said this, it is incumbent upon world's navies to take the step, cooperate, and win, or stay behind transnational and global enemies, non-accountable and ruthless, driven by profit and indifferent to a civilized code of conduct.
Although small, the Portuguese Navy's centuries of experience securing overseas territories against enemies and pirates and today, cooperating with African nations—Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Sao Tome et Principe, and Cape Verde—may be of value to networking the world's navies for a common goal. This accumulated knowledge has given us a thorough understanding of the road to success: cooperation. This is the simple and mighty factor that can make the difference. We are ready to pursue it, as we know there is no alternative.
In sum, I support the overarching concept. More than an opportunity, the 1,000-ship Navy should be seen as a stimulating challenge to be pursued, bringing a new sense to the concept of fleet-in-being. I therefore recommend bringing responsible people together, create the networks, and enhance mutual trust to make this idea work.
Vice Admiral J. Mudimu
South African Navy
The concept of the 1,000-ship Navy within the context of a global maritime network capable of countering global terrorism and providing humanitarian relief during natural disasters is not only a tall order but, while noble in its intent, is derived from a critical assumption. This assumption pre-supposes a global maritime security charter; a charter that not only implies agreement of internationally acceptable maritime security principles, but recognizes national and regional interests and priorities. Proceeding from this and within the context of an African (national and regional) perspective, the comments that follow have been formulated.
A determination is growing in Africa that African problems, including security issues, should and will be solved by Africans. African governments, including the South African government, have launched numerous initiatives to give effect to this determination. We understand that economic and social development cannot take place in the absence of a peaceful and stable environment. Threats to security are numerous and wide-ranging. Some are rooted in colonial and post-colonial history, others in the competition for land and resources or in criminal greed. Still others have an ethnic or cultural dimension. Africa has not escaped friction arising from the evolution of global geopolitics. It is contended that the greatest threat to security on the African continent is that of poverty, declining health status, and a lack of education. It is furthermore a continent of great diversity in beliefs and value systems, yet there is a strong sense of common purpose and mutual dependency.
The South African government firmly believes that the future of South Africa is inextricably linked to the future of the African continent and that of our neighbors in southern Africa. Therefore, it is our contention that socio-economic development cannot take place without political peace and stability, as they are prerequisites for socio-economic development. It is thus within this context that the South African Navy finds itself in a position whereby national interests, coupled to regional interests on the continent of Africa, determines its strategy, posture, and force design. The South African Navy intends to achieve this through the promotion of confidence and security-building measures. These will be accomplished by engaging in cooperative ventures with its counterparts throughout the region in such fields as maritime defense planning, combined exercises, procurement of arms and equipment, training and education, and the conduct of exchange visits. In this regard it seeks to:
- Promote the development of a regional maritime regime such as the establishment of a regional maritime authority.
- Promote the development of a standing regional force for regional disaster relief and peacekeeping, having common doctrine and operational procedures.
- Promote the development of a regional search-and-rescue regime.
- Promote upkeep and repair assistance.
- Promote the transfer of technology.
- Further the development of a regional hydrographic regime.
- Further the conduct of regular combined exercises by regional forces.
- Further the sharing of training facilities.
- Further the attachment of personnel.
The vision for maritime cooperation on the continent of Africa will be translated into reality by the South African Navy through the following actions:
- Contributions to the African Standby Force.
- Growing the capabilities of their own and South African navies.
- Establishing Regional Maritime Capability Nodes (Centers of Excellence).
Thus, the global maritime network concept may be a viable option if it can be aligned to regional initiatives. Regional interests must be addressed by recognizing their security needs and links bound to a global maritime security regime or charter. The concept needs to be read within this context. The African regional narrative requires a unique response from the South African Navy, and it is envisaged that similar, yet different narratives will reside within other non-African regions. The art in establishing the global maritime network will lie in creating a framework that allows regional responses to these unique narratives, within the broader parameters of the global maritime network and its associated charter.
Admiral Sebastian Zaragoza Soto
Spanish Navy
Maritime security is recognized as a top concernby most countries. Any multinational initiative in this area needs to be proactive with full political support from the governments involved. Once political support is granted, navies know how to face this challenge in strict compliance with international law. An increasing number of maritime security initiatives in response to the new threats demands common global coordinated effort by the navies. The proposed worldwide maritime security network has, in some ways, already erupted in a self-synchronizing and self-organizing manner. All free nations have instinctively reacted and developed the embryo of a multinational maritime force without even knowing it.
Our individual efforts have shown that no independent approach will be successful given that now, more than ever, we need each other to control and safeguard the maritime space. In this regard, every man and woman, every sensor, every ship, and every bit of information we can gather for this common task is needed and will make a valuable contribution for a safer ocean. We do not need to develop new equipment, but we need to efficiently use what we have.
The global network will probably be too complex to be led by just one nation or organization; however, we need to assure a permanent coordination among all navies, agencies, and international organizations.
Spain has a very important role to play in any maritime security initiative, whatever its ultimate form. Our country is in a unique geographical location on the southern border of Europe with the African continent, at the Strait of Gibraltar. Spain is a crossroads, where the fight against terrorism, illegal immigration, and drug trafficking at sea are becoming ever more important.
The Spanish Navy is expeditionary in nature and consequently is well prepared to export maritime security abroad in coordination with other friendly and allied navies. As far as challenges go, I envision the following:
- Inter-agency coordination at the international level. This task is more political than naval. Fighting crime at sea goes beyond the "just military" approach. Navies can do the job and find it easy to work together, as we have been doing for years, but it will not be the same when it comes to cooperation with civilian agencies. They have different procedures, mentality, and rules, and work in different areas. In this sense, one of the most important challenges we face is to ensure understanding and cooperation among these diverse bodies by efficiently sharing information, avoiding undesirable overlaps, and coordinating action. This will be impossible without a clear and committed political will.
- Legal aspects. Some recent multinational activities, mostly in the fight against terrorism, have not paid the deserved dividends because the international community lacks the appropriate legal framework. Together we must find a legal solution to preserving the natural flow of friendly maritime trade while denying freedom of action to those criminals who attempt to use the maritime space for illegal activities. In this regard, international political consensus will definitely be of the greatest importance.
- Involvement. I believe that the widespread involvement of littoral nations in sensitive areas around the world is vital. Anything they can do at sea, no matter their capabilities, in this common effort is most welcomed.
In fact, we can build a 1,000-ship Navy by joining efforts instead of building new units. If nations realize that their efforts, even though limited, are useful for the common task and represent a gain for them in terms of security and developments, and if we are able to build their confidence and trust in us and learn from our methods, then we enlarge our own capabilities to a limit that we could never reach on our own.
I fully agree that this concept of many different navies under many different flags working together for a common objective is the way we should proceed.
Rear Admiral Anders Grenstad
Royal Swedish Navy
Sweden has a long maritime tradition because of both its geographical position and its strategic location in northern Europe. During the Cold War, the Baltic Sea was an arena in which NATO forces struggled with Warsaw Pact forces for control and dominance. As a non-aligned country, Sweden was obliged to develop a maritime strategy of its own, as well as a variety of defense material. As a result, Sweden has very strong maritime capabilities, which can prove to be useful in the littorals such as mine clearing and antisubmarine warfare, submarine, and amphibious operations.
Today the most serious threats, which can be used to foster and encourage increased joint, interagency, and international cooperation, are transnational. Since the end of the Cold War, the Baltic Sea countries have entered into agreements on a number of subjects—for example, maritime domain awareness, search and rescue, and environmental control—to strengthen maritime security in our part of the world.
The 1,000-ship Navy concept transfigures many regional initiatives into one large global concept. It is indeed true that, if we are to effectively challenge transnational threats, regional initiatives must be scaled up. To be successful, we need to extend early-warning time and shrink reaction time. For example, we need to receive accurate information on suspicious cargo or ships early, long before they enter our region.
The idea of a global maritime network is strongly supportable, and will, in my opinion, increase security in the maritime domain. It is prudent, however, to let the network grow out of the local and regional initiatives, as we must be certain that all political and legal issues have been addressed and resolved. I also foresee many practical problems with interoperability and rules of engagement, among other issues, but we must start now.
I welcome the initiative and am looking forward to the continued development of the program.
Admiral Yener Karahanoglu
Turkish Naval Forces
There is no doubt that the world oceans and seas are becoming smaller as globalization takes effect and emerging technologies change every aspect of human activity on the seas. The steady increase in maritime shipping in the last decade had both positive and negative effects on maritime security. The terrorist attacks on 9/11 appeared as the dark results of globalization and altered the dynamics of security paradigms worldwide. The reaction was widespread and produced an array of actions and precautions.
The post-9/11 period saw the "safety first" maxim in the maritime domain change into the "security first" maxim, with chain reactions in many fields including economic, legal, operational, and technological. This change is reflected in the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and its activities over the past few years, including the implementation of the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code System and the revision of the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation Convention. United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1373, 1540, and 1566, along with the Palermo and Vienna protocols, provide a necessary legal framework to combat terror, human and drug trafficking, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery. In addition, the continuous increase of technical innovations is helping to make the maritime domain more manageable and controllable.
The 1,000-ship Navy is synergetic, calling for the integration of the world navies in security, rather than defense tasks. It, however, needs an implementation paradigm.
First, a globally recognized maritime picture will have to be established. The nations' individual efforts must be integrated, under most preferably IMO or NATO aegis, to increase situational awareness.
Second, increased maritime vigilance and deterrence, while enhancing dialogue and cooperation among neighboring littorals, can be promoted by joint naval and coast guard presence operations along with information exchange within and outside the region.
Third, regional maritime security operations—either individual or collective—can be affiliated with global and regional large-scale maritime security operations, thus broadening the scope of security.
The activities of the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group since 27 September 2001 and Operation Black Sea Harmony being conducted by the Turkish Navy since 1 March 2004 are examples of this vision, a microcosm of what the 1,000-ship Navy aims to achieve.
The Black Sea task group, a cooperative of six littoral navies of the area, promotes interoperability and a common security vision. The force's combined training focuses on basic naval warfare disciplines as well as maritime security operations.
The Black Sea littoral coast guards are cooperating through joint exercises as well as periodic meetings at the commandant level. The Border Coordination and Information Center, located in Burgas, Bulgaria, and supported by six littoral coast guards, is a center of information regarding illegal activities in the Black Sea area.
Operation Black Sea Harmony provides year-round maritime security in the Black Sea through presence operations involving shadowing, trailing, and interdiction with the full cooperation of all Turkish agencies. It has become affiliated with NATO's Operation Active Endeavor in the Mediterranean. The multi-lateralization of the operation continues through discussions with the Russian Federation and Ukraine. Other littorals have also been invited to join the operation.
These initiatives are solid examples of regional cooperation in maritime security around the Black Sea, where no terrorist incident has taken place in the last decade. The 1,000-ship Navy concept would meet the 21st century needs for maritime security. Since the required technology is available and ongoing regional applications and experiences prove its utility, it would be applicable as long as the political wills of the nations are incorporated. This does not seem difficult to achieve because every nation, regardless of their political disputes, prefers the smooth, uninterrupted flow of maritime shipping, protected against terrorist threats and other risks.
Admiral Sir Alan West
Royal Navy
I was delighted that I was able to travel to RhodeIsland in September last year with many other heads of navies to hear Admiral Mike Mullen, Vice Admiral John Morgan, and Rear Admiral Charles Martoglio put forward the case for developing the 1,000-ship Navy at the International Seapower Symposium. I was even more delighted to be asked to comment on the excellent article that appeared in the November edition of Proceedings, which set out more fully the concept for building a global maritime network.
I applaud this initiative. For many years it has been my strongly held belief that ensuring the security of our trade routes is as much of a problem now as it was many years ago when merchant ships were armed to protect themselves from attack. Today the security and economic prosperity of our nations is utterly dependent on ensuring that the freedom of the seas is maintained and this will continue to be the case as the pace of globalization continues. We simply cannot afford to have disruptions to shipping or increased costs of shipping as the result of threats of attack. Fortunately acts of piracy have mostly consisted of small-scale robbery, which has not affected global shipping. However, in recent years maritime terrorism has appeared as a very real threat. There have been some notable attacks but we have been fortunate in that a concerted and sustained attack on the lifeblood of the global economy has not yet emerged. Add to this the other threats to security and economic well being posed by smuggling, drug trading, illegal immigration, and human smuggling and it is very clear to me that maritime security is an international problem that requires an international solution.
Much has been done in recent years to establish regional dialogue, and in some cases coordination, but we are sadly a long way from achieving a global network. The key to successful and meaningful progress in establishing such a network is to move it on beyond an exercise in building a recognized maritime picture to one that brings all the interested parties together, or at least gets them all talking to each other, and places greater reliance on intelligence for the cueing of reactive forces. This is not purely military activity and to be fully effective in building a common picture of maritime activity from which the correct reactive forces can be cued, it needs to encompass all the possible sources of information in an international and interagency approach, along the lines of the model so well developed in Key West, Florida, for counter narcotic operations. As well as the traditional military sources of information provided by ships and aircraft supported by electronic, signals, human and image intelligence feeds, maritime security operations need to encompass more effectively national sources of information from customs forces, law enforcement agencies, the shipping companies, financial institutions, other non-government organizations and agencies, and transportation authorities.
Because maritime security operations need to include more than military forces, and more than just ships, my only concern with the concept concerns the term "The 1,000-ship Navy." We need the global maritime network but nationally we need to promote our individual contributions to this international effort as a cross-government approach working hand-in-glove with other national nongovernment authorities and interests. In some countries the term may be misinterpreted and opinion may be alienated before the concept gets established.
The article correctly identifies the current sensitivities to the exchange of information and other issues, which have so far prevented regional dialogue from developing into effective regional coordination and action. Overcoming these regional difficulties is essential before we can move on to a more global approach. Pressure will need to be brought to bear from national concerns and the international community to break down these barriers to progress and to ensure that we invest in the security structures that we need-a small price to pay to ensure the freedom of the seas and the continued uninterrupted development of the global economy. Of course the resources that will be required to develop these international structures are in short supply and richer nations may need to give incentive to the concept by reaching into their pockets.
In summary—we need the global maritime network and I support the thrust of the article, however, our initial priority must be the development of effective regional structures involving more than just ships.