The U.S. Navy decided to stop constructing diesel-electric submarines a half century ago, but that long-ago decision may have come home to haunt today's submarine force. The all-nuclear submarine force now finds that success in eliminating the diesels has left the Navy without boats that can realistically serve as aggressors, a situation that has forced the incongruous leasing of a submarine from Sweden to play that role in fleet exercises and the development of ASW tactics (See story, pages 22-23).
Some Navy leaders are now considering the acquisition of quiet air-independent propulsion (AIP) submarines for the exercise/training role. And, according to some reports, such AIP submarines could be useful-and significantly cheaper in terms of cost and people-for certain other, specialized, submarine roles.
The United States became the first nuclear power to cease construction of diesel-electric submarines because of (1) the promised-and fulfilled-efficacy of nuclear submarines, (2) the long distances to the Navy"s forward operating areas, and (3) the high level of defense funding for much of the Cold War, especially for deterrence, that provided sufficient funds for an all-nuclear submarine force.
The Navy's leadership made the decision to stop constructing diesel-electric submarines in 1956, when only a single nuclear submarine, USS Nautilus (SSN-571), was at sea. The Navy's long-term blueprint-developed in 1957-provided for 127 submarines by the 1970s:1
- 40 Polaris ballistic-missile submarines (1,500-nautical mile missile range)
- 12 Regulus II cruise-missile submarines (1,000-nautical mile missile range)
- 75 torpedo-attack (antisubmarine) submarines
All were to have nuclear propulsion except for ten attack submarines: the existing six submarines of the Tang (SS-563)-class, Darter (SS-576), and the three-unit Barbel (SS-580)-class. They would serve many years in the Navy; the last of these non-nuclear submarines to be retired would be Blueback (SS-581), decommissioned in 1990 after 30 years of service.
Of the other nations that have constructed nuclear submarines, Britain's Royal Navy, faced with severe fiscal constraints, also decided, in the early 1990s, to operate an all-nuclear submarine force.2 Subsequently France reached a similar decision, thus only China and Russia have continued to operate diesel-electric as well as nuclear submarines.
Early Calls for New Diesel Subs
As the U.S. conventional submarine force began to decline precipitously in the 1970s, several voices were heard urging the Navy to procure new diesel-electric boats. Such submarines, it was argued, could be useful as antisubmarine targets, and for special operations and research roles.
Foremost among the early advocates were retired Captain K. G. Schacht, a recognized submarine authority, and Commander Arthur (Art) Van Saun, a former commanding officer of Barbel. Both men argued for a small number of non-nuclear submarines to supplement the Navy's growing and costly nuclear submarine fleet.3 The ranks of diesel-electric submarine advocates were soon joined by members of Congress, especially Representative William Whitehurst, Republican from Virginia, and Senator Gary Hart, a Colorado Democrat, as well as by several non-submarine flag officers, among them Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, former Chief of Naval Operations (1970-1974), and Vice Admiral John T. Hayward, a pioneer in the development of nuclear propulsion and nuclear weapons, who was the Navy's first assistant CNO and then deputy CNO for research and development (1957-1962).
The diesel submarine issue was intensified by the Falklands conflict of 1982. The inability of British nuclear submarines to effectively support commando operations forced the dispatch of the diesel-electric submarine HMS Onyx from Britain to the South Atlantic, a distance of some 7,000 nautical miles.4
During the war the Argentine submarine San Luis, a German-built Type 209, undertook a 36-day patrol during which she located and operated in the area of the British carrier force. Although San Luis reported firing several torpedoes at British ships, she scored no hits because of faulty wiring of her fire control system (which had been overhauled during a recent yard period). British antisubmarine forces prosecuted numerous suspected submarine contacts, expending a large number of weapons, but without success.5
U.S. Secretary of the Navy John Lehman observed:
force that is essentially stationary while operating in a specific area is not
surprising. These submarines are extremely quiet when operated at low
speeds and for this reason substantial helicopter, subsurface, and surface
anti-submarine warfare defense is required whenever a naval task force is
constrained to a limited area.6
After the war, Admiral Sandy Woodward, who had commanded the British forces in the Falklands campaign, said that the U.S. Navy probably should have a half-dozen diesel submarines for high-risk submarine operations such as inshore surveillance, operating in shallow, mined waters, landing agents, and other activities when one should risk a smaller, cheaper diesel submarine rather than a nuclear submarine. He also pointed out that, at the time, a diesel submarine cost one-third to one-fifth as much as an SSN.7
The "Submarine Mafia"
In the 1980s the Israeli Navy approached the U.S. government for funds and support for the construction of three modern diesel submarines to replace a trio of older boats. Almost simultaneously, U.S. shipyards were being approached by South Korean representatives who wished to build perhaps two submarines in the United States, to be followed by additional construction in Korea. Several U.S. yards that were not engaged in nuclear submarine construction expressed interest, and a tentative agreement was reached with the Todd Pacific Shipyards whereby Israel and South Korea would construct submarines of the same design, which had been developed by an Israeli team that included the German firm IKL and the Dutch firm RDM. The Australian Navy also expressed some interest in buying into the arrangement. Bath Iron Works and Lockheed Shipbuilding also expressed interest in the program.
Such a construction program, it was estimated, could lead to a production run of two or three submarines per year while providing employment for up to 7,000 shipyard workers and supporting-industry workers in the United States. This was a critical factor in view of the numerous American shipyard closings during the 1970s and 1980s. Further, building those submarines would facilitate importing technical data into the United States. This would have provided U.S. naval officers and members of Congress with an up-to-date view of this field while providing a basis for better understanding of the non-nuclear submarine threat to the U.S. Navy.
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The U.S. nuclear submarine community immediately opposed the program, citing nuclear submarine technology loss to other countries if diesel submarines were built at any U.S. shipyards. The vehemence of those objections led Representative Whitehurst to write to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger:
submarine program of their own, but their going to this length [halting
foreign construction in U.S. yards] absolutely confounds me. There is no
possibility of the transfer of technology, so what on earth is their objection?
The opportunity to create additional jobs for American workers and keep
these shipbuilding companies viable ought to outweigh any suspicion the Navy
might have that this represents the nose of the camel under the tent in forcing
diesel submarines on them.8
The submarine community's objections prevailed. The Israeli submarines were built in Germany, the South Korean submarines were built to a German design in Germany and South Korea, and the Australian submarines were built in that country to a Swedish design.
The adamant objection to diesel submarines being built for the U.S. Navy or allied navies originated with Admiral H. G. Rickover, who had long claimed that "the Navy" had opposed nuclear submarines, preferring instead diesel submarines, which were less capable (and less-costly) than nukes. Navy Secretary Lehman forced Admiral Rickover into retirement in January 1982, but his influence endured. From mid-1982 until 1994 the Navy had a succession of nuclear submariners as Chief of Naval Operations, all Rickover protegés. Further, after Admiral Rickover's departure the head of naval nuclear propulsion continued to be a full admiral, appointed for an eight-year term (the CNO normally serves for only four years). With these and other nuclear submarine flag officers in key Navy positions in Washington, advocates of non-nuclear submarines were actively and effectively opposed by the senior submarine admirals, who were known as the "submarine Mafia."9
But interest in non-nuclear submarines in the United States continued. In 1990 former Secretary of the Navy Paul H. Nitze and ex-CNO Zumwalt proposed the acquisition of a small number of such craft to compensate for the expected decline in the number of nuclear submarines. The non-nuclear submarines would be employed for a variety of missions, both combat and support.10 Increasingly, the principal role envisioned for non-nuclear submarines was antisubmarine training. With an all-nuclear U.S. submarine force even the smallest SSNs could not effectively simulate diesel-electric submarine targets for ASW forces. The SSNs are too large, have very different signatures than the typical submarines of Third World navies, and are operated quite unlike the submarines the U.S. Navy would be confronting. As one submarine officer wrote, "Substituting the artificially handicapped SSN for simulated enemy [diesel submarines] in any exercise borders upon the ridiculous."11
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The post-Cold War cutback in SSNs made this situation critical, with few submarines available for training air and surface ASW forces. The Navy's ASW forces have encountered unexpected difficulties in operations against some South American submarines in several exercises. And, Israeli submarines were said to always "sink" the high-value ships in exercises against the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. The ASW situation is further exacerbated in the relatively shallow waters of littoral regions, the expected primary battleground of future U.S. naval operations.
One officer in a Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class submarine wrote:
solution. We must create an aggressor unit, the mission of which would be
to portray, as accurately as possible, the capabilities of those diesel submarine
forces about which we are most concerned. This aggressor unit must operate
on one of those submarines of concern, preferably a [Soviet] Kilo or [German]
Type 209. It's time for the U.S. Navy to build or buy one or more of these
submarines.12
Another supporter of this concept wrote:
Kilo-class submarines, but would help to return us to proficiency against all
diesels. This is not to say that we aren't proficient, just that the lack of a real-diesel
platform to continually train with has been a clear deficiency for all units that search
for subs.13
The word "diesel" in this context includes the air-independent propulsion (AIP) submarines that began entering service in the late 1990s. These non-nuclear submarines, with several in operation and more under construction for other navies, have the ability to cruise at slow speeds for up to 30 days at very low noise levels without snorkeling. During this period, Vice Admiral John J. Grossenbacher, Commander Submarine Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, called the Swedish submarines and the German Type 212 submarines fitted with AIP "a challenge to our undersea dominance."14
Beyond ASW training, other roles appear highly suitable for non-nuclear submarines: special operations, landing and recovering SEAL teams and other personnel, and intelligence collection and surveillance operations in hostile areas. Today the Navy uses submarines of the Los Angeles-class, with four ex-Trident submarines undergoing conversion to the SEAL transport role. While the latter submarines would have great value in some scenarios, in most situations postulated for the future a submarine would be required to deliver or remove a small number of people-probably less than a dozen-in a relatively shallow, restricted area. Should a large, nuclear-propelled submarine, with a crew of 150 or more be employed for such missions when a small, diesel-electric/AIP submarine with a crew of 25 to 45 could carry out many of those special missions?
Objections Don't Hold Water
The usual objection to employing non-nuclear submarines for combat missions is their limited transit speed. But a look at U.S. special operation submarines prior to the mid-1980s, when diesel-electric submarines were employed exclusively for this role, shows that they performed admirably. As noted, in the Falklands War of 1982 the Royal Navy had to dispatch a diesel-electric submarine, Onyx, to the war zone for special operations because such craft were more suitable for that role than were nuclear submarines. Similarly, Onyx and another British diesel-electric submarine, Otus, carried out special operations in the Persian Gulf during the 1991 Gulf War. Those actions were conducted thousands of miles from the nearest naval base.
By the early 1980s the U.S. submarine community's opposition to non-nuclear submarines had centered on: (1) the perception that the Navy's leadership had long opposed nuclear submarines, preferring instead lower-cost diesel-electric craft; (2) the concern that nuclear submarine technology would be transferred to countries purchasing U.S.-produced diesel submarines; and (3) the fear that funds spent for non-nuclear submarines would take away funding from nuclear submarines. These objections are no longer convincing.
The first issue no longer has credibility, as from 1982 onward the Navy's leadership has included nuclear submariners in the most senior positions. With respect to the second issue, non-nuclear submarines now built in the United States would be based on foreign design, as would their key components-sonar, pumps, and quieting equipment. Sensitive nuclear submarine components are not applicable to non-nuclear submarines. Further, during the past two decades several non-nuclear shipyards expressed interest in constructing such submarines.
Only the third issue-money-has any merit. On several occasions senior members of Congress have expressed interest in funding non-nuclear submarines for the Navy outside of the existing submarine budget.15 The probable cost of an advanced non-nuclear/AIP submarine today is about one-fifth the cost of a modern U.S. nuclear attack submarine. Thus, coupled with the lower manning costs, and the potential availability of overseas bases for non-nuclear submarines, they may be an attractive supplement to the nuclear submarine force.
At this writing, the issue remains controversial. In an interview with Jane's Defence Weekly published in January, Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chief of Naval Operations, said: "The Navy has been struggling with the costs of keeping its submarine force structure and needs to start building two boats per year or see that number drop." However, Admiral Mullen said: "If we do not get them down to $2 billion per submarine, it is not affordable." Still, he rejected moving away from an all-nuclear?propelled submarine fleet: "It is my view that there is not much of a place for diesel submarines in our Navy . . . . The tyranny of distance and sustainability is something that nuclear power has solved for us in a very positive way."
But the realities of U.S. submarine costs and the future littoral battlefield may cause a reappraisal.
Mr. Polmar is a longtime contributor to Proceedings as both feature writer and columnist. He is the author of Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet, available from the Naval Institute Press.
1. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, The Navy of the 1970 Era (January 1958), enclosure to memo "The Navy of the 1970 Era," Op93G/ac ser 04P93 (13 January 1958). back to article
2. The four Upholder-class submarines, the last diesel-electric undersea craft to be built in Britain, were completed in 1990-1993. All four boats were taken out of Royal Navy service in 1994 and subsequently leased to Canada. back to article
3. See, for example, see Van Saun, "Tactical ASW: A Case for a Non-Nuclear Submarine," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (November 1978), pp. 147-151; and Schacht, Commentary on "Diesel Boats Forever?" Proceedings (February 1983), pp. 25-26. back to article
4. A total of five British SSNs were deployed to the South Atlantic during the Falklands War. back to article
5. A second Argentine diesel-electric submarine, the 40-year-old, ex-USS Catfish (SS-339), renamed Santa Fe, was caught on the surface while being used as a supply ship. She was damaged by antiship missiles and sank at South Georgia Island. back to article
6. Secretary of the Navy Lehman, Lessons of the Falklands: Summary Report (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, February 1983), p. 8. back to article
7. Adm. Woodward, talk at U.S. Navy Memorial Museum, Navy Yard, Washington, D.C., 18 June 1997. back to article
8. Rep. Whitehurst letter to Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, 20 September 1984. back to article
9. See, for example, Adm. James Watkins, USN, Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy, Subj: "SSN-21 Assessment Paper Written by [deleted]," 11 February 1985, ser 00/5U300058; Vice Adm. Bruce DeMars, USN, letter to Adm. Robert L. J. Long, USN (Ret), Chairman of the Board, Naval Submarine League, 29 January 1988; and Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General-Special Inquiries, "Report of Investigation Allegations of Repression by Navy Officials of Work-Related Private Writing Activities by a Department of Defense Civilian Employee," case no. S88L00000161, 11 October 1990. These documents address specific efforts by Adm. Watkins and Adm. DeMars to "squash dissent" to views of the submarine leadership (Adm. DeMars statement to OP-03 staff meeting, Pentagon, 8 August 1986). back to article
10. Former Secretary of the Navy Nitze, Adm. Zumwalt, and Norman Polmar, proposal "Developing a Lower-Cost Submarine Program," 24 September 1990. back to article
11. Capt. Schacht, "Diesel Boats Forever?" p. 26. back to article
12. Lt. Jack Shriver, USN, "Developing Real Anti-Diesel Tactics," The Submarine Review (April 1998), p. 91. back to article
13. Lt. Comdr. Carey Matthews, USNR, "Anti-sub warfare calls for 2 Russian diesels," Navy Times (26 February 1996), p. 33. A specific acquisition proposal for six non-nuclear submarines for this role is found in Congressional Budget Office, Budget Options (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 2001), pp. 137-138. back to article
14. Vice Adm. Grossenbacher, Naval Submarine League seminar, Alexandria, Va., 13 June 2001. back to article
15. Then-Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, discussion with the author, Washington, DC, 6 September 1995. back to article