"Navy Medicine in Critical Condition"
(See J. Rappold, pp. 25-27, December 2005 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral John M. Mateczun, MC, U.S. Navy, Deputy Surgeon General-Dr. Rappold is a great physician but his assessment of the health of Navy Medicine does not fit the facts.
Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom saw the fruition of a clinical dream: Forward surgery that freed operating rooms from their tie to hospital platforms and the movement of life-saving surgery to the front during maneuver warfare with the agility to keep moving forward. This was accomplished for the first time in combat in unison with one of the most transformational changes in the history of combat medicine-critical care air transport.
These two changes revolutionized the system of care both in and outside theater. A critically wounded Marine, sailor, soldier, or airman might receive life-saving or stabilizing surgical intervention within minutes of being wounded, receive continued resuscitation and intensive care during transport, benefit from follow-on surgery in Europe, and be moving to CONUS sometimes within a day.
I strongly disagree that the lives of the injured were put at risk. In fact the data demonstrate exactly the opposite. We achieved the highest rate of survival of the combat injured in history. Of the wounded who reached medical care alive, 96% survived. This is complemented by the lowest rate of disease and non-battle injury in history. These are phenomenal achievements, by any standard, in expeditionary medicine and force health protection.
As sometimes happens in medicine, I disagree with Dr. Rappold's assessment, but emphatically agree with much of his treatment plan. Better communication, organization, training, and commitment to jointness are not only necessary, but mandatory for increased effectiveness in wartime and increased efficiency in peacetime as well.
I do disagree with Dr. Rappold's prescription to decommission the hospital ships. The USNS Mercy (T-AH-19) and Comfort (T-AH-20) are not terminal. Their use in reaching out in a positive and visible way to people who may have no other contact with America was proven in Indonesia during last year's tsunami relief efforts. The effort created immense good will, the chance to influence people in the Global War on Terror, and an opportunity to increase theater security cooperation. As far as their use in disaster relief at home, whenever there is a need to use them to assist Americans who can't get help any other way, we must be ready to do so when we are called. That's what our life of service is about.
"No True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle for Fallujah"
(see T. Belanger, pp. 82-83, November 2005 Proceedings)
Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired), Director Emeritus, Marine Corps History and Museums-That journalism is the first draft of history is a well-worn but demonstrably true cliché. If so, then books such as Bing West's No True Glory are second drafts and deserve more generous treatment than West has received from Captain Belanger. The author marches in step with other journalists who have written estimable books on Marine battles fought in wars not yet won (or lost), among them Robert Sherrod (Tarawa), Richard Tregaskis (Guadalcanal Diary), and John Hersey (Into the Valley). Now so has Bing West. Sherrod continued later with On to Westward and the more deliberately researched History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II. Hersey went on to write his masterpiece Hiroshima, which first appeared as an article in New Yorker magazine. Tregaskis wrote Vietnam Diary. Many other books written in this genre and produced at white heat, some worthwhile, some worthless, could be cited.
Captain Belanger skewers Bing West with faint praise such as "West's research is reasonably thorough" and is more sharply critical with "The discrepancies and omissions become dangerous because, as years go by, this book may distort our collective memories of very important events." The latter could have been said about the books by Sherrod, Tregaskis, and Hersey. Every historian, journalist, or academic recognizes that absolute Truth is a Holy Grail, something to be sought but never found.
No True Glory should be regarded as a story-in-progress. Bing West began the Marine parade in Iraq with his celebratory and prize-winning The March Up. His current No True Glory is much less exuberant but equally vividly written. Obviously there is much more to come, perhaps too much as events unfold, than can be said by West in just one more book. This is a war that has yet to be won.
"How to Win in Iraq"
(See T. DaIy, pp. 14-19, December 2005 Proceedings)
Lieutenant R. Howard Walton, JAGC, U.S. Naval Reserve-lieutenant Colonel Daly's article is certainly thought-provoking and seems to present some very logical and well-reasoned solutions to fixing our badly broken strategy in Iraq.
In order to facilitate the type of changes that Colonel DaIy suggests, it will cost money, and lots of it. While there may have been the political will immediately after 9/11 to put in place the type of measures necessary to man and fund an occupation of the scope envisaged by Colonel DaIy, i.e. the immediate recall of the entire Guard and reserve to full time active status (with retraining of Navy and Air Force personnel to act as civil affairs and similar specialists in order to augment Army and Marine Corps capability) and a 20%, across the board, tax hike, such measures are now politically impossible for an administration that only a little more than a third of the population approves of to carry off.
I fear that the reality of our future in Iraq is that it will mirror what happened in Vietnam. We will work to get the situation to some sort of stalemate under which the Iraqis can somewhat contain the insurgency on their own, at which point we will declare ourselves the winner and go home. A few years later, the fledgling regime will fall under the scimitar of Islamic fundamentalism, and the situation in the Middle East will be worse, not better, than when we started this war.
What's the lesson for future administrations? Don't commit to an extended land operation unless you think it is important enough to disrupt the civilian economy and the daily lives of the American people (and not just those in uniform) to do so. Should you decide the job is worth doing, then strike while the iron is hot, develop a war plan, and get the American people to commit to it while they are still sufficiently mad about whatever attack or insult occasioned the war in the first place, and go in with overwhelming force.
lieutenant Colonel H. T. Hayden, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)-lieutenant Colonel Daly's article called for a "National Counterinsurgency Plan." Unfortunately, it is much too late for a national counterinsurgency plan and trying to win is out of the question.
There are insurgents but there is a far larger resistance movement whose ranks are filled by former Ba'athist political leaders, Fayadeen, unemployed former military, and Islamic Jihadists (Iraqi and foreign). The majority of the enemy combatants in Iraq are resistance fighters who fight against the occupation and this is drawing local recruits. The Faydayeen, a creation of Saddam's son Uday as a counter-balance against his father, was a ready-made foree for resistance and revenge alter U.S. forces took Baghdad. The large number of unemployed Republican Guards and Ba'athist parly leaders were only too eager to help.
What went wrong in Iraq'? Not enough troops to occupy and "pacify" the belligerents in 2003. disbanding the entire army and police, and our failure to have a postconflict plan were the biggest mistakes of all. This is not to forget our double cross of the Shi'ites after the IWI Gulf War. when they rebelled and the United States did nothing to help them. They know that Iran is their only avenue to total religious freedom and independence.
There are 220.000 Iraqi soldiers and police trained and equipped for operations and there is sufficient leadership to deploy 120 army and police battalions of various degrees of readiness.
If you use the readiness reporting system of the U.S. Army, there are only two or three battalions up to speed with U.S. infantry battalions. However, if you think in Arabic terms, there are over 36 battalions ready. A plan 75% ready today is better than a plan 1009r ready next week.
The U.S. political tide has turned against the war in Iraq and it's time to cut the best deal possible and then depart. It is time to turn the security operations over to the Iraqis and stop wasting time trying to superimpose our national counterinsurgency campaign plan on something that is far past its time.
"The Armed Forces Need Another Top Gun"
(See R. Parker, p. 58. December 2005 Proceedings)
Kevin Fitzpatrick-Dr. Parker is certainly entitled to his opinion regarding linking the popularity of the Tom Cruise film to an upwards spike in recruiting. But I recall the 1980's as a period of significant upheaval in our economy. One source of jobs and training for young people then was the military. It was also a time of relative peace in which the lethal 1983 bombing of the Marine Corps barracks in Lebanon marked the only significant loss of life for our forces. So, perhaps we are giving this box office jewel a bit too much credit.
I would suggest to Dr. Parker that, while marketing the military through the movies might be an enticing concept, we might be better off with honest civilian leadership that had a coherent plan for Iraq instead of our current puzzling strategy, and a Congress that reads the Constitution and takes back its power to declare war.
Today's young people are smart, brave and willing to serve their nation in the armed forces. They are also bright enough to watch the news reports in clear-eyed fashion, noting excessive tragic deaths in a poorly-planned war based on reasoning made from wholecloth. Instead of wistfully hoping for another Tom Cruise clone blessed with a million-dollar smile flashing across the sky in an F-14, we could just offer potential recruits a good dose of the truth.
"Before the Storm: al Qaeda's Coming Maritime Campaign"
(See J. Pelkofski, pp. 20-24, December 2005 Proceedings)
Edward V. Blackmore-Captain Pelkofski makes a case for expanding the Fleet to protect against terrorist attacks on naval vessels. He acknowledges that the attacks in the past have been largely indistinguishable from piracy, and are as rare as terrorist attacks.
It seems to me that given the widespread pirate attacks on commercial vessels of the United States and other nations, and the low level of terrorist attacks on our Navy, that the most appropriate response of the United States is to greatly expand coordination with appropriate elements of those nations where most attacks, are taking place. This coordination should include:
* Establishment of an international agency to combat maritime attacks to include both piracy and terrorism.
* Providing satellite information to facilitate detection and tracking of possible pirate- or terrorist-operated vessels before they reach port.
* Increased training of foreign elements without undue pressure from us.
* Providing surplus ships and rehab support to front line nations.
* Support by existing Navy and Coast Guard commands with emphasis on the values of both action and training.
* Increased coordination with U.S. involved vessels and firms.
Such action would help mitigate widespread condemnation of U.S. unilateralism. Special effort will also be needed to minimize front line nations' concerns for their sovereignty.
"What Would Stephen Decatur Do?"
(See T. Cutler, p. 2, November 2005 Proceedings)
Chief Petty Officer Edward Kotkiewicz, U.S. Navy (Retired)-1 was pleased to read lieutenant Commander Cutler's Commentary in the November Proceedings. He has touched on an issue that has long bothered me, the Navy's lack of interest in its rich history. I have always admired the way Marines seemed to bond with their service.
I would like the Navy to make a few changes to its historical record-keeping. These changes should carry the weight of both the CNO and the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy.
First, issue each active and reserve member of the Navy a copy of the annual All Hands calendar. This is an annual milestone of historical events. As it is reviewed, allow for units to provide additional events for future postings. Additionally, provide each command with a wider distribution of the January issue of All Hands. This is the "U.S. Navy Owner's and Operator's Manual." All Hands should set an example and provide a short history story in each issue. Rating exams should also feature a section on naval history. Finally, start celebrating the Navy's 13 October birthday seriously.
Thanks to lieutenant Commander Cutler and his attempts to record naval history. Thanks also for elevating the issue of heritage into the forefront of today's Navy.
"Should Congress Scrap Posse Comitatus?"
(See A. Pine, pp. 46-48. December 2005 Proceedings)
Norbert F. Toczko-Because of the delay in getting Department of Defense assets on scene after a national tragedy such as Hurricane Katrina, there has been much discussion about re-writing the Posse Comitatus Act. However, it is possible there might be a simple solution.
The President as Commander-in-Chief should simply change operational control of selected assets such as search-and-rescue, military police, medical, construction, etc., from their DoD parents to the Coast Guard for the short time state authorities need to formally request assistance.
By double heading their message traffic, these units could bring their parent commands up to speed on what is required so that they might hit the ground running when they are finally released to act.
"Marines Know Cammies . . . And Khaki Beats Purple as a Joint Color"
(See T. Kiefer. p. 93, December 2005 Proceedings)
HM2 Robert E. Simoneau, U.S. Navy (Retired)-I agree that the officer corps of all services, as well as E-7 and above, should go back to wearing khaki as a "garrison" uniform. Most of the required elements are already in the pipeline, and the World War II Navy khakis were sharp looking uniforms. The Navy should still keep their blues for winter wear.
I also agree that we should all use the current Marine Corps BDU's. As a hospital corpsman, I found that they are probably the most comfortable and convenient uniforms I have worn. The only other alternative would be for all to go to the overalls worn by submariners. It, too, is a practical and convenient uniform.
However, I feel that the following could also be implemented for personnel E-6 and below. First, keep the "Crackerjacks." They are not only traditional, but also more practical for ship-board storage. second, speaking of "Crackerjacks, for undress use, revert to another World War II uniform, the "Working Whites", in which the jumper was worn without the neckerchief. Last, bring back the "Salt and Peppers." This was a good intermediate working uniform when it was too warm for blues, and too cool for whites.
"Electronic Chaos"
(See F. Gayl, pp. 55-56, December 2005 Proceedings)
Commander Robert B. Watts, U.S. Coast Guard-While Major Gayl's article is very informative in describing the technical effects of an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) blast, I believe it is off the mark regarding the likelihood of such an attack being conducted on the United States. Specifically, he ignores a number of factors.
A nuclear attack on the United States, even a supposedly benign high-altitude air burst attack, would likely result in massive retaliation against any nation or sponsor state for such an attack. This response would almost certainly be worldwide even if the attacker were an elusive terrorist group. I would suggest that even moderate supporters of terrorism would give pause to any one group acquiring such a capability, especially given the volatile (and vulnerable) nature of Middle Eastern governments.
The article also ignores the immense technical challenges of acquiring a weapon and modifying it for atmospheric detonation. The often-cited example of the "Scud-firing merchant vessel" is an extremely unlikely and largely discredited threat. For this scenario to occur, even if we assume that terrorists could acquire a freighter covertly (possible), a Scud missile (difficult), small nuclear device fit to the missile (extremely difficult), it is extremely unlikely that they could acquire the training required to modify and operate these systems-let alone integrate them into one cohesive weapons system that could be deployed against the United States with little or no hint from our vast intelligence apparatus.
The challenges of the post 9/11 world and the subsequent Global War on Terror are complex. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11. public focus was on the high tech and catastrophic, perhaps rightfully so. given the horrific nature of the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. But now that we have time to pause and truly analyze the threat, we must focus on what is likely vice what is fantastic. Our defensive effort deserves no less.
"1931: The First Nautilus North Pole Expedition"
(See D. Walsh. p 87. November 2005 Proceedings)
Commander John Youngquist, U.S. Navy (Retired)-The second sentence in this article reads, "In May 1928 he [George Hubert Wilkins (1888-1958] made the first airplane flight across the Arctic Ocean going from point Barrow, Alaska, to Spitzbergen, Norway, and was knighted for this feat." The statement is accurate as printed, but history-oriented aviation and polar buffs might appreciate some clarification. Two years earlier-in 1926-the Amundsen-Ellsworth-Nobile expedition flew much the same route, albeit in the opposite directon. and in a dirigible instead of an airplane. In my view, Sir Hubert (as he is often called) deserves to retain his knighthood, especially in light of his many other achievements.
Additionally, the head of the "six member scientific party" embarked at Bergen was the Norwegian scientist Harald U. Sverdrup (1888-1957). In World War II he performed important work on predicting wind, waves, and swell-all of which proved invaluable (though not infallible) in the planning of American amphibious operations. For that and much other oceanographie work, the name Sverdrup is as famous among oceanographers as Bowditch is among navigators.