"Navy Culture and Military Education"
(See P. Donahoe, pp. 50-53, July 2005; D. Leney, pp. 8-10, p. 64, September 2005 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral James A. Winnefeld, USN (Ret.)-Commander Leney and lieutenant Colonel Donahoe have done us all a service by focusing on the challenges and dilemmas facing any officer in the middle ranks in contemplating attendance at one of the war colleges. These dilemmas often get lost in the rhetoric of absolutes sometimes voiced by educators unfamiliar with historic (and often current) naval assignment and promotion patterns, but very familiar with the benefits of higher education. lieutenant Colonel Donahoe ably poses the challenge and Commander Leney competently examines the dilemmas facing today's officers.
Commander Leney offers some trenchant, and in my opinion, spot-on observations about the tradeoffs of war college education on the one hand and screening and promotion imperatives on the other. Among these observations: "The key to war college survival, therefore, is to attract front-runners who can survive the fitness report sideline." (And, I would add: "forego a tour in a front-runner's highly visible operational or Washington billet.")
Leney also believes that formalizing service college attendance as the other services have done may be a worthy longterm goal but it "... also would require re-tooling existing career paths."
In the last quote, Commander Leney poses both the challenge and the dilemma. Resolving that dilemma is not something that is within the power of the individual middle grade officer. His conclusion is that in the interim the "benefit-risk decision ... is likely to remain in play." My take on this is that any ambitious officer (and most are) should be wary of going into automatic when considering war college attendance under current conditions.
Rarely has the dilemma of the idea vs. the currently practical been posed so ably on the pages of the Proceedings. Well done to both officers. We need more of this type of balanced and thought-provoking discussion as we consider screening and promoting our best officers.
"Amphibious Force: Quo Vadis?"
(See N. Polmar, pp. 85-86, September 2005 Proceedings)
Major General Gordon C. Nash, U.S. Marine Corps, Director, Expeditionary Warfare Division-Norman Polmar's USS San Antonio (LPD-17) piece misses the mark in two significant ways. First, he cites the recent Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) report on LPD-17 as a reason to reevaluate the future of the U.S. amphibious force structure. It is important to note that the principal observation in the report is the senior member's comment: "... San Antonio is a highly capable platform with great potential for future useful service to the Fleet." If one were to use the report as Mr. Polmar suggests-to reconsider the program and future amphibious forcesthis long-term assessment carries far more weight than short-term discrepancies that have been or will soon be fixed. The report documented incomplete work at the time of the trial; the decision to conduct trials with incomplete work, however, was the most effective and efficient way ahead for the program. In fact, the prioritization of critical path work enabled LPD-17 to complete INSURV underway system demonstrations with an average grade of 92%-a remarkable achievement for the lead ship of a new class.
Second, Mr. Polmar presents a superficial argument concerning the relevance of our nation's expeditionary forces. By stating that "[we have] not carried out an opposed landing in more than half a century" and concluding "the role of the LPD-17 [and expeditionary fighting vehicle] must be questioned," Mr. Polmar ignores a half-century of evolution and development in amphibious and expeditionary operations and doctrine. An op-posed landing may be more relic than reality, but the Navy-Marine Corps team I know provides the combatant commanders with ready forces tailored to conduct important missions such as those intrinsic to a special operations capable Marine Expeditionary Unit, e.g., non-combatant evacuation, security operations, tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel, hostage recovery, clandestine reconnaissance and surveillance, airfield seizure, and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief. (The San Antonio weathered Katrina at Pascagoula with no appreciable damage and is now feeding and housing shipyard workers, providing a base for National Guard units, and assisting Navy diving and salvage detachments who are clearing the port for ship traffic.)
Moreover, the global war on terrorism demands versatile, flexible naval forces that are forward deployed and capable of engaging potential threats to the security, safety, economy, and the environment of the United States; LPD-17 is a key platform for that role.
Contrary to Mr. Polmar's implication, the ship was conceived, designed, and developed in the strategic context of a postCold War world. This strategic context includes concepts such as expeditionary maneuver warfare, operational maneuver from the sea, and ship-to-objective maneuver. I invite Proceedings readers who are not familiar with these concepts to view Marine Corps Concepts and Programs 2005, available via a link on the Marine Corps website (http://www.usmc.mil).
As the Navy's resource and requirements sponsor for Expeditionary Warfare programs, 1 am personally involved with the Navy acquisition team as we work with industry to deliver this new ship to the Fleet. While walking the decks of the San Antonio in July, I saw the ship and its crew coming to life. When I asked a crewman what was needed to get her to sea, he enthusiastically answered: "Sir, all we need is our Marines." I am confident that the ship and program are on track to deliver greatly needed capability to the Navy-Marine Corps team.
"Lessons from 60 Years Ago"
(See H. Ullman, p. 2, August 2005 Proceedings)
James D. Perry-Harlan draws a number of questionable lessons from history. He argues that in the two World Wars, there were "really no winners." Really? In my view, victory and defeat in both conflicts had real, significant, and durable meaning for all involved. If the Allies squandered their victory after the Great War, they were still the winners in 1918 for all their subsequent folly. If the Allies permitted their former enemies to prosper after 1945, they were still the winners for all their subsequent generosity.
Ullman's observation that the world wars entailed "carnage and casualties" is simply banal. A global struggle against a competent peer competitor is never a walkover. Casualties and destruction are admittedly regrettable, but victory and defeat nevertheless create clearly distinguishable postwar environments for the participants. To appreciate this, just consider what postwar Europe would have looked like after German victory in either conflict.
The postwar economic successes of Germany and Japan hardly validate Ullman's claims that the "losers were really the winners" or that the former Axis powers "won the peace." By this logic, if the Allies had followed the Morgenthau Plan and permanently impoverished Germany, they would have "won the peace" rather than losing it! The outcome of World War II cannot be measured solely in economic terms, and we cannot simply compare postwar gross national products (GNPs) to determine the "real" winners and losers. Moreover, after May 1945, regardless of West Germany's rising GNP, that of the Third Reich always remained zero.
Ullman asserts that culture and ideology play large roles in decisions for war and peace, but his explanations for why Japan declared war in 1941 and sued for peace in 1945 are entirely consistent with rational actor theory. One need not understand Japanese culture or ideology to understand the motives-fear, honor, and self-interest-he assigns Japan; one need only read Thucydides.
When Ullman contends that the Middle East today needs a Marshall Plan, he again misreads history. The Marshall Plan succeeded because Europe had an entrepreneurial tradition and an educated technical workforce that today's Middle East does not possess. Postwar Europe enjoyed democracy, free markets, the rule of law, sanctity of contracts, and property rights. Few of these institutions exist in the Middle East today. Until they do, why pour largesse into the pockets of the corrupt and squalid thugs who rule the region? A recent Atlantic Monthly article notes that Yasir Arafat embezzled more than a billion dollars in foreign aid to the Palestinian Authority, while very little reached the average Palestinian. Is this Ullman's recipe for addressing the root causes of terrorism, promoting stability, and transforming losers into winners?
He is correct when he contends that reading history does not guarantee against repeating past mistakes. This is especially true if one does not understand what one is reading. It is not enough to know the past; one must also understand it.
"Breaking the Color Barrier: The U.S. Naval Academy's First Black Midshipmen and the Struggle for Racial Equality"
(See P. Stillwell, p. 80, July 2005 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel Victor O. Dewey, U.S. Army (Retired)-Thanks for the excellent book review by Paul Stillwell. I look forward to reading Robert Schneller's book about breaking the color barrier at the U.S. Naval Academy. Sadly, I believe the U.S. Navy still has a long way to go before it will receive a Bravo Zulu for racial integration.
Out of approximately 900 USNA graduates in 1962,1 had only two black classmates. One could conclude that there was a lot of foot dragging regarding black recruiting between the time Wes Brown graduated in 1949 and our graduation 12 years later. In 1962 there was a general attitude that the U.S. Navy was all white, with Filipino mess stewards, while the U.S. Army was heavily infused with blacks. When I decided upon graduation to take a commission in the U.S. Army, I recall a USNA company mate (from the South and later a flag officer) harassing me about my career decision with mocking words imitating a stereotypical southern black just off a plantation. It was insulting then, and an episode that one never forgets.
The May 2005 Proceedings, pp. 127141, lists current naval flag officers. A head count of African-American officers reveals: Admiral: O out of 10; vice admiral: 1 out of 26; rear admiral: 2 out of 57; rear admiral (selectees): 7 out of 114; and rear admirals (other): 2 out of 96. The total number of African-American flag officers equals 12 out of 303, or 4%. This is actually shameful in today's military service. Maybe someone in the U.S. Navy will wake up and smell the coffee? Q
"Déjà Vu All Over Again"
"A Gunboat Navy for the 21st Century"
(See J. Collins, pp. 18-20, July 2005; and E. Kimura, pp. 44-46, July 2005 Proceedings)
Peter G. claymore-As one with academic training in history, I was pleased to see two articles in the July 2005 Proceedings, those of Collins and Kimura, which link the past to the present and emphasize the need to learn from mistakes and successes. Americans, it seems, have always been looking for the cheap, magic solution to the security problem-and then since the days of the Continental Congress strangling that solution through parsimony.
Willful disregard for the past and wishful thinking about the future has led to virtual unilateral disarmament after nearly all wars with attendant difficulties at the start of the next one. There is a tendency to forget that quantity and quality are both vital to successful military operations. Thomas Jefferson's gunboats lacked both plus the critical element of flexibility, as emphasized by Colonel Collins.
In addition to the gunboats of the early 19th century, today's littoral combat ship (LCS) is a descendent of another failed system: the Civil War monitor vessels. These were relatively cheap and easy to produce and were successful in coastal and riverine warfare. They were woefully inadequate for deep-water operations. The expanding international interests of the United States at the end of the century resulted in a diverse fleet suited to power projection, in-depth defense, and of sufficient size to deploy, remain on station, and rotate without excessive strain. Kimura points out that the U. S. had learned this lesson at the end of the War of 1812.
Now more than ever the United States is integrated into the world economy and depends upon foreign trade over secure sea and airlanes (although very few containers and little bulk cargo are transported by air). There are still terrorists to be intimidated and defeated just as there were two hundred years ago. Few things are as intimidating as a carrier battle group, or maybe a battleship-led surface action group, backed up by integrated ground, air, and logistics support forces. We have learned this lesson a number of times but must have the will to field and fund such forces for the lesson to be useful. Otherwise, we shall continue to look for the silver bullet with the cost of gold.
Current struggles in the field and on the home front indicate that we might have forgotten another set of lessons learned 50 years ago. Like the suicide bomber of today we found that we could not defeat the Kamikaze at the point of attack. Because a suicide bomber wants to die, if he gets there he has succeeded. Hardened targets, flexible in-depth defense, and aggressive offensive operations against the physical and emotional support systems of the Kamikaze were successful and could be again.
"Spence Dry: A SEAL'S Story"
(See M. Slattery and G. Peterson, pp. 54-59, July 2005 Proceedings)
William J. Daugherty-The story of Navy SEAL Lieutenant Spence Dry raises an important issue that the Department of the Navy should address. Like Spence Dry, there are undoubtedly other members of the sea services who were killed in action while on clandestine missions, but who also, because of continuing security classification, remain in the records as deceased in "training accidents" or other non-combat causes.
The Vietnam War has been over for more than 30 years. It is time for the Department of the Navy to declassify at least the general circumstances, if not the actual mission details, of these deaths so that they may be recognized for their sacrifices. It is important for their memory and for their families' comfort that they received the Purple Heart, any other earned decorations, and the distinction of being acknowledged as killed in action. Anything less at this time is a grave and absolutely unacceptable injustice.
"Sudden Victory"
(See W. Murray, pp. 13-19, August 2005 Proceedings)
Midshipman SdlClass Andrew Orchard, NROTC, Auburn University-The rationale for using atomic weapons is frequently mixed up with Japan's decision to end the war. Separating these two issues allows a clearer appreciation of how Japan came to surrender and whether or not atomic weapons were decisive.
The dropping of the atomic bombs alone did not produce an acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration or the "sudden victory" Dr. Murray refers to. Instead, according to the United States Strategic Bombing Survey after the war, the atomic weapons only added to a sense of urgency that some decision must be taken. What that decision should be was a subject of open debate, if not open rebellion.
The pro-peace faction sought new leverage in the Supreme War Direction Council meetings that followed the first bomb. The sense of urgency permitted the prime minister to bring the Emperor into direct discussion and debate.
Late in the evening of 14 August, Emperor Hirohito attended a joint session of the Supreme War Direction Council and the Cabinet. After hearing arguments from the army to continue the war, Hirohito tearfully explained: "continuation of the war offers nothing but continued destruction." The Potsdam Declaration terms were the only solution to ending the war. The direct order from the Emperor even five days after the dropping of the atomic bomb on Nagasaki was the only way to subdue hard line officers like General Korechika Anami.
To the diehard military opposition, Japan's best hopes lay in inflicting heavy casualties upon the invaders. Many of these officers felt that the Allied advance could be halted, or at least better terms would be available if Japan continued to fight.
Even after being ordered by the Emperor to accept the Potsdam terms, General Anami and other officers felt that a last effort strike against the rumored invasion force near Tokyo Bay could result in better terms. Only the overriding loyalty to the Emperor led Anami to yield. Other military officers attempted a coup d'état to kill the Cabinet and destroy the recording of the Emperor's surrender message. Operational commanders prepared to continue kamikaze attacks on the U.S. fleet and to fortify beach defenses.
To these dedicated officers, the imminent invasion of Japan was not a means of dying with honor as Dr. Murray stated in his article. Operation Ketsu-Go was seen as a means to preserve the emperor and obtain better terms.
Japanese historian Kazutoshi Hando stated in 1965 "Japan's struggle to surrender was a kind of earthquake whose aftershocks may still be felt." Clearly, 60 years after the surrender of Japan, those aftershocks are still here.
"Damn the Bagpipes!"
(See M. and M. Fitzgerald, p. 73, November 2004 Proceedings)
Colonel Oliver M. Grant, U.S. Marine Corps-As a Marine of Scot heritage (highland warrior Clan Grant) I take special pride in my heritage and culture. I also noticed both authors last name "Fitzgerald" of Irish ancestry. While I understand their point, I was offended in the extreme by their characterization of the bagpipes as a questionable musical instrument, and of their further degradation of those who enjoy them as "fools." I also recognize the attempt at being humorous, without (hopefully) giving offense. In this age of political correctness, where the Navy and other services bend over backward to honor every culture with ethnic observance weeks, why is the defaming of an instrument associated with my heritage and culture allowed to be published? If this article had been about African drums, or Japanese lyre's, would you have allowed it? If we're going to be fair, then lets be fair and not defame other cultures, even in a humorous sense. I don't want to sound trivial, but if I am forced to observe other cultures weekly observances, I require the same level of respect. I love the bagpipes. They are my heritage. And yes, they were played in Baghdad, and I loved hearing the Marine Corps Hymn being played by the British bagpipe and drum contingent, as an honor rendered to our Marines. Maybe this article would have been better served if it had been reviewed for political correctness?