One Bullet Away
Nathaniel C. Fick. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2005. 384 pp. Illus. $25.00.
Reviewed by David J. Danelo
At first glance, military readers looking for a defining memoir of a Marine officer in the first two years of the global war on terror might not gravitate towards Nathaniel Pick's One Bullet Away. They would quickly observe that the author was previously profiled in Evan Wright's Generation Kill, and would mistakenly assume they already know his story. No presumption could be more incorrect.
One Bullet Away begins in the same way that Marine officer candidates receive their introduction to the Corps: aboard an "ancient white school bus." Pick describes his motivations and impressions as an innocent, somewhat naive Dartmouth junior who "wanted to go on a great adventure. . . to do something so hard that no one could ever talk shit to me." With fewer places left in the world "for men to wear armor and slay dragons," Fick—like many of us—found the Marines.
Fick's journey in OCS began in 1998, during the peace dividend years when scholars ruminated about the end of history. For the reader, his odyssey ends after he leaves the Corps and learns his replacement was killed in Iraq. Not only have the times changed, but Fick has also. His tone is wiser and darker. As he walks the Antietam battlefield with a childhood friend and reflects on his command of a reconnaissance platoon during the 2003 destruction of Saddam Hussein's regime, Fick comments, "Sometimes the only way to fight evil is with another evil, however good its aim."
Nathaniel Pick describes the personal evolution and transformation of the officer aspirant with the clarity of a novelist such as James Webb or Pat Conroy. Pick's vignette of a battalion staff officer in Afghanistan ordering his platoon to trudge through sand wearing 100-pound packs while other Marines (including the staff officer) sit comfortably on trucks and humvees will make any true warrior's blood boil. And his summary of "legal authority vs. moral authority," as he struggles to maintain his platoon's trust after driving into an ambush in Muwaffiqia, Iraq, is presented more clearly and succinctly than a thousand group discussions or leadership seminars ever could.
Fick chooses brilliant stories and then tells them to his readers using the lean, confident prose of an Ivy League graduate. Perhaps because he wrote the book during his first year of graduate schoolFick left the Corps to pursue a double major at Harvard Business School and the Kennedy School of Government—his tone has the warm, confident cadence of a favorite teacher, professor, or coach. He educates about his experiences without being haughty or self-aggrandizing, leaving both Marine veterans and uninitiated civilians feeling as though they have learned the inside scoop.
When One Bullet Away occasionally skirts politics, Pick wisely gives voice to the prescient observations of the young Marines in his recon platoon instead of airing his own opinions. During a conversation soon after the fall of Baghdad, one of Pick's men asks him what will happen next. Pick tells the men the Iraqis don't care about democracy; they need clean water and proof that Americans are actually the winners. Another corporal speaks up with his prediction: "Pretty soon no one will want us here. . . we'll be back in Vietnam. Only instead of reading about it in a book, we'll be living it."
The last section of the book is initially a letdown but ultimately proves to be a triumph. Although the subject of the warrior's return home and transition into civilian life deserves a great deal of treatment, Fick condenses the "aftermath" into less than ten pages—a small disappointment for those now fully engrossed in his journey. Once again, however, his anecdotes are like a platoon raid—brief, powerful, and simple—leaving the reader with much to ponder about citizenship, duty, and military service.
Mr. Danelo served as an operations officer and convoy commander with the I MEF Headquarters Group at Camp Fallujah from February to September 2004. A former USMC captain and infantry officer, Danelo left active duty in November 2004. He is a 1998 Naval Academy graduate currently at work on a book about combat in Iraq.
Nelson's Eyes: The Life and Correspondence of Vice Admiral Sir Henry Blackwood, KCB
Leslie H. Bennett. Brussels: Seff Edition, 2005. Appen. Bib. Index. 279 pp. $36.00.
Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel John Abbatiello, U.S. Air Force
The approach of the Trafalgar bicentenary makes Horatio Nelson a popular topic in bookstores. Most recently, Edgar Vincent's Nelson: Love & Fame (2003), Joel Hayward's For God and Glory: Lord Nelson and His Way of War (2003), Andrew Lambert's Britannia's God of War (2004), and John Sudgen's Nelson: A Dream of Glory (2004) seek to explain how Britain's greatest naval commander influenced the outcome of the historic struggle with Napoleonic France. While Nelson's key role in Britain's eventual victory at sea is indisputable, historians have generally avoided examinations of his contemporaries—less glamorous naval officers who likewise made important contributions to the Royal Navy's dominance during the Age of Sail. One exception to this trend is Leslie Bennett, whose Nelson's Eyes examines the naval career of a key contributor to Britain's victory at Trafalgar.
Bennett's biography of Sir Henry Blackwood, who commanded the frigate HMS Euryalus during the Trafalgar campaign, is a scholarly investigation of an important figure of the era. The author, a career marine insurer and son of a Royal Navy officer, demonstrates his command of the evidence through extensive quotations from correspondence between Blackwood, his commanders, and the admiralty. Bennett scoured the National Archives at Kew, British Library, National Maritime Museum at Greenwich, and many other archive repositories for documents relating to Blackwood's career and uses these sources to paint a clear and refreshing picture of a typically professional and aggressive naval officer.
Bennett sets Blackwood's career within the context of a Royal Navy rapidly expanding to meet French challenges at sea during the American Revolution, French Revolution, and Napoleonic Wars. Blackwood, the seventh son of a wealthy Ulster family, went to sea as an 11-year-old boy in 1781, passed his lieutenant's examination in 1789, and earned his first post captain command in 1795. As the first lieutenant of HMS Invincible, he saw action during the Glorious First of June in 1794. In 1800, as the captain of the frigate HMS Penelope, 36 guns, he intercepted the Guillaume Tell, 80 guns, which was the last surviving French ship-of-the-line from the Battle of the Nile. Using his frigate's superior speed and maneuverability, he fired a number of broadsides into Guillaume Tell's stern, slowing the larger vessel enough for two British thirdrates to close and finish the destruction—all at a loss of only one crewmember killed and three wounded on his own ship.
Blackwood later served as captain of the frigate HMS Euryalus, where he located Admiral Pierre-Charles Villeneuve's combined force at Cadiz in mid-August 1805, raced back to England to report personally to Nelson, and immediately returned to the coast of Spain to keep watch on the enemy. Just off Cadiz, Blackwood maintained a close observation of the Franco-Spanish fleet in early October. Villeneuve sailed on the 19th and Blackwood shadowed the enemy force as it headed south for the Mediterranean, constantly updating Nelson with position reports. On the morning of the 21st, Nelson's force closed for the attack, and Blackwood took his position as a signaling frigate abeam HMS Victory. The aftermath of Trafalgar witnessed HMS Euryalus serving as the temporary fleet flagship of Vice Admiral Cuthbert Collingwood, while HMS Royal Sovereign underwent repairs, and providing transportation for the vanquished Admiral Villeneuve back to England.
After participating in Nelson's state funeral on 3 January 1806, Blackwood took command of HMS Ajax, 74 guns, and proceeded to his station in the Mediterranean. In February 1807, Ajax blew up at anchor off the mouth of the Dardanelles after a fire spread to her magazine. Blackwood survived the disaster—both physically and professionally—but for years would grieve the loss of 300 men, almost half of his crew. He later captained another ship-of-the-line, commanded a squadron, and served as captain of the fleet for the Duke of Clarence (future King William IV). In 1819 Blackwood was promoted to rear admiral and the following year assumed command as Commander-in-Chief, East Indies. Prior to his death in 1832, he also served as C-in-C The Nore and achieved the rank of Vice Admiral of the White.
Bennett's fascinating study offers general readers and serving officers a glimpse into the challenges of combat and command during the Age of Sail. Other than the publisher's annoying inconsistencies with fonts and lack of indentations for new paragraphs, this book was a pleasure to read and should adorn the bookshelves of all readers interested in this intriguing period of naval history.
Lieutenant Colonel Abbatiello received his doctorate in War Studies from King's College London and currently serves as Deputy Head, Department of History, U.S. Air Force Academy.
The Battle of An Loc
James H. Willbanks. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2005. 226 pp. Illus. Notes. Bib. Index. $29.95
Reviewed by Colonel Gordon W. Reiser, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)
The author, a retired Army lieutenant colonel and combatant at An Loc, gives us an insider's view of a hard-fought battle in 1972, late in the Vietnam War. This expertly researched and well-written book will engage veterans (like me) who agreed with the reasons for that war and admired the efforts of the Army of Vietnam (ARVN) forces, as well as those who were less taken with the war's conduct and ARVN effectiveness. It makes a fine companion to The Easter Offensive (Annapolis: Naval Instititute Press, 1995) by retired Marine Colonel Gerald H. Turley.
Although I hesitate to use such words in the current era of political shoddiness and media imprecision, Willbanks' scholarly work truly is "fair and balanced." He thoroughly studied the struggle from both the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and ARVN-U.S. sides.
The prelude to the siege of An Loc is set forth in detail, complete with NVA and ARVN orders of battle and their goals. In addition, Willbanks reviews the reputations and personalities of key U.S. and ARVN commanders.
In the wake of the 9/11 Commission Report and widespread Monday-morning quarterbacking on U.S. intelligence failures going back to Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, it is instructive that both U.S. and South Vietnamese intelligence sources indicated the North Vietnamese "were not planning anything big for 1972." At the same time, most analysts agreed that any major NVA attack, if it came, would occur in South Vietnam's Military Regions I and II, north of Military Region III, which was the area of operations for the 5th ARVN Division and its attached and supporting units.
In the event, the NVA launched massive attacks in all three of those military regions—and the 5th ARVN Division and An Loc were soon in peril. As the battle unfolded, an influx of U.S. advisors (including the author, who was wounded in action) and dedicated U.S. air support served to turn the tide in the ARVN's favor. Nonetheless, when the battle ended, An Loc and its population of about 15,000 had withstood an estimated 78,000 NVA artillery shells in 90 days; the city was reduced to ruins. No building was spared from damage. "The stench of garbage and death permeated the air. . . .Sixty dead from the 81st [ARVN] Airborne Ranger Battalion had been buried. . . in two neat rows near the city market."
Most South Vietnamese units performed heroically throughout the battle; some fell apart and deserted the fight. The ARVN forces committed to the defense of An Loc and related relief efforts sustained 5,400 casualties, including 2,300 killed or missing, and several U.S. Army advisors were killed or wounded.
On the enemy side, the butcher's bill was much higher; it is estimated the North Vietnamese suffered 10,000 killed and 15,000 wounded. "The area in and around the city was littered with over 90 burnedout NVA tanks and other vehicles."
More important, the NVA, which outnumbered its foe by at least three-to-one at the battle's onset, failed to achieve a critical objective of North Vietnam's "Hguyen Hue Campaign." The largely unsuccesful campaign, known more familiarly in U.S. military circles as the "Easter Offensive," was named—ironically, as it turned out-for the Vietnamese hero who defeated Chinese invaders near Hanoi in 1789.
Colonel Willbanks, a faculty member of the Army Command and General Staff College, has written a first-class battle history that all serving military officers would be well advised to read and absorb. Given rapidly expanding U.S. advisory and foreign military training tasks in the current war against terror, his book should be added to the required reading lists of every service and joint mid- and top-level school.
Colonel Keiser, a former Senior Editor of Proceedings, served in Vietnam as an advisor with the ARVN Rangers and Marines.
Imperial Grunts: The American Military On The Ground
Robert D. Kaplan. New York: Random House, 2005. 448 pp. Illus. Notes. Bib. Index. $27.95.
Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Frank G. Hoffman, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Retired)
Francis "Bing" West, the noted author of The Village and The March Up, calls Bob Kaplan "America's Kipling." This apt comparison is evident in the author's new Imperial Grunts. In his time, Kipling extolled the contribution of Britain's forces in their stabilizing mission during a storied imperial century. While he enjoyed a reputation as a novelist and children's author, evidenced by Kim and The Jungle Books, he may be remembered by military readers for his poetry, especially "If," "Gunga Din," and the popular "Tommy" of Barrack Room Ballads. Kipling was renowned for his keen powers of observation, his unique ability to capture the dialect of his colorful characters, and a marvelous capacity for blending history, heroes, and local culture.
Kaplan may fall a close second when it comes to story telling and mastering Cockney accents, but is unrivalled today in his ability to weave detailed descriptions from the periphery of the American empire with anecdotes about today's troops as they battle to stabilize unruly areas.
Both authors glorify the common soldier and the civilizing mission of the West. But Kaplan falls just short of Kipling's classic call from "The White Man's Burden" to "Send forth the best ye breed/Go bind your sons to exile/To serve your captives' need."
Like almost all his work, this book is based upon Kaplan's extensive traveling and face-to-face contact with U.S. military personnel. He describes the present effort as "an odyssey through the barracks and outposts of the American empire." Kaplan's purpose is to explore what he calls "imperial maintenance on the ground" at the far reaches of our imperium, at the same time "seeking a rule book for its application."
While Kipling was the poet of the two, Kaplan's lyrical prose is highly readable and he frames the issues better and offers more guidance than Kipling did for his empire. The composite that emerges is a compelling description of the selfless sacrifice of many junior officers and enlisted personnel who defend this land far from family and home. Imperial Grunts is Kaplan at his finest, blending an admixture of international travel writing, first hand impressions of combat in snake pits like Fallujah, and dusty treks into the hinterlands of Asia. No other author combines such literary grace with such fearless reporting.
Imperial Grunts is organized into chapters based on each of the theaters assigned to the U.S. military's regional combatant commands. Each chapter defines the key regional disputes and includes lively descriptions of the relevant geography, culture, and history of the area. These chapters are framed around the life and personality of an American military member who is serving in that region. In each scenario, we find an able U.S. military officer making decisions at the far edge of America's unstated empire, with potentially huge ramifications, and with little guidance or assistance from Washington. Marine readers will identify with Kaplan's intense and incisive views in general, and from his shared understanding of urban combat derived from his advance with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines' drive into Fallujah in April 2004. In every chapter, the author presents a sympathetic perspective of the young, grimy, but completely courageous men and women who serve this nation's interests in the furthest and darkest corners of the globe.
A number of important themes emerge from Kaplan's purposeful wanderings that collectively make up his Imperial Rule Book:
* The role of American military power in imperial maintenance is indirect. "The more subtle and cautious its application of power, the greater would be America's sustaining impact. The United States could hold sway over the world only quietly, off camera, so to speak."
* The application of military power is minimal and the emphasis is on establishing a local solution to the problems at hand. "Imperialism is less about conquest of foreign peoples than about the training of local armies."
* "Force protection has become a debilitating obsession with the U.S. military," and contradicts the need to engage with local populations and establish relationships with key local leaders and intelligence sources.
* The role of technology in stability operations is inversely related to success. "The American military was most impressive when it knew how to be low tech, the same way as guerrilla fighters."
* Decisions are best made by people on the ground, on scene with a feel for actual conditions on the ground, not in the bowels of the Beltway bureaucracies, thousands of miles away. Kaplan found "Majors and master sergeants defining national policy at the fingertip level" with nuance and results.
* Bureaucracy should not stump effectiveness. The American military needs to maximize its influence while simultaneously minimizing its footprint. As Kaplan puts it: "The U.S. military was everywhere burdened by a top-heavy bureaucracy, with too many layers of staff that needed pampering. Thus, it was organizationally miscast for dealing with 21st century insurgencies. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. military had set up structures it was historically comfortable with, not those particularly suited for the challenge at hand."
Hopefully, the wisdom of these lessons will find their way into the ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review. While many may not agree with their imperial mission, Kaplan's odyssey among America's modern day warriors and their efforts to tame a Hobbesian world is a great read and an even greater set of policy guidelines.
Lieutenant Colonel Hoffman is employed by EDO Professional Services and works at the Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities in Quantico, Virginia.