The Marines in Review

The author Robert D. Kaplan found himself in a front row seat during a trip to Iraq last April. Researching the modern American military, Kaplan got much more than he bargained for. When the Marines were ordered to hunt down the insurgents responsible for killing and mutilating four Americans in Fallujah, Kaplan decided to stay with the Marine unit he was with and got a close up and personal view of modern urban combat.

Kaplan was cooking breakfast one morning after the initial assault when the rattle of small arms fire and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) broke the pre-dawn quiet. He looked up and saw the Marines around him react instantly to the source of enemy fire about 300 meters away. The company commander gave no commands. "It was a collective impulse-a phenomenon I would see again and again over the coming days," said Kaplan. He had felt that the Marines he was with were much like him, if not nearly as well read. Once immersed in the sheer confusion of an urban firefight, Kaplan realized he was wrong. Every instinct screamed for the cover of a thick wall, yet each Marine grimly moved forward, just like their predecessors at Belleau Wood, Tarawa, and Chosin. "I realized that they were not like me," Kaplan later reported in a The Atlantic Monthly dispatch, "they were Marines."

The Marine Corps accomplishments for 2004 certainly underscore Kaplan's conclusions. The Marines are not like everybody else.

Operations

Ongoing stability and support missions in Iraq dominated the news at home and the Corps' operational tempo last year. Preparing Marines for Iraq and maintaining them at full effectiveness became the focus for 2004, as the Corps continued to make superlative contributions to the global war against Islamic insurgency and terrorism.

The most significant contribution was the return of 26,000 Marines to Iraq in March. Under the command of I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) commander Lieutenant General James T. Conway, the Marines were assigned to rotate with Army forces in the Sunni-dominated Al Anbar province that include Fallujah and Ar Ramadi. Other Marine elements, including 11th and 24th Marine Expeditionary Units/Special Operations Capable (11th and 24th MEUs(SOC)), deployed and served in Iraq as well.

Fallujah 1

When the Marines returned to Iraq in March 2004, they had hoped to apply some time-tested principles derived from the Corps' extensive experience with insurgencies in Latin America chronicled in the classical Small Wars Manual of 1940 and from Vietnam. Mixing a graded understanding of culture and psychology, the Marines planned to provide "carrots" that would divide the silent majority of Iraqi civilians from the Baathist diehard loyalists of Saddam Hussein and jihadists who had swarmed to the Sunni Triangle. At the same time, the visible capacity to apply "sticks" by force of arms would remain the iron fist inside the velvet glove. The 1st Marine Division, led by thenMajor General James N. Mattis, had undergone an intensive pre-deployment training regimen that emphasized the cultural awareness and less dynamic aspects of stability and support operations.

The ambush and subsequent mutilation of four U.S. citizens in Fallujah on 31 March gutted the Marines' preferred approach. On 2 April, the Marines were ordered to enter the volatile city, 40 miles west of Baghdad, to find and punish the perpetrators of the attack. Without time to insert human intelligence assets or sensors, conduct formal reconnaissance, add reinforcements, or shape the battle space, the Marines isolated Fallujah, a city of 250,000, on 5 April. The assault element was comprised of just two battalions (1st Battalion, 5th Marines and 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines) reinforced by tanks, amphibious assault vehicles and light armored vehicles (LAVs).

On 7 April, the Marine force pushed forward into the dense city to begin Operation Vigilant Resolve. They quickly established a presence in the city by seizing a large industrial area and began working with friendly Iraqi elements to try to find a precise means of identifying the insurgents responsible for the grisly ambush. The former regime elements and Arab insurgents who had been hiding inside the city put up a stiff resistance, with one counterattack successfully blunting a Marine patrol, producing ten casualties. The attackers did not display a grasp of basic tactics or marksmanship, but what they lacked in training they made up with reckless zeal.

Just as quickly as the Marines were ordered into the town, they were ordered to stop and reverse themselves. Apparently, political leaders in Washington had not appreciated the international political and media impact of ordering the Marines into such a tense situation. The imagery of the Marines' dogged attack and collateral damage in a city packed with noncombatants was not anticipated, and no one was prepared for the political blowback. The Marines withdrew to the edge of the city.

Before he left Iraq for a new position on the Joint Staff in September, lieutenant General Conway made public his views about the decision-making process behind the initial orders and the vacillation that led to the withdrawal. Subsequent efforts to install an Iraqi force to contain the insurgents failed to provide improved security and allowed the chancre to fester. Of greater concern to the Marines was the time the insurgents were given to prepare for the eventual battle. The Marines of I MEF, led by lieutenant General John F. Saltier, knew that they would have to cut out the cancer.

An Najaf

In August, I MEF was called upon to take control of the holy cities of An Najaf and al Kufah from the radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and his militia. The militia had used the country's second oldest city (An Najaf), its neighboring city, (al Kufah), and their shrines as strongholds for resisting Baghdad and political reform. To quell this anti-Iraqi activity, the 11th MEU(SOC) and two U.S. Army cavalry battalions were ordered into the ancient cities to secure the major shrines and critical infrastructure. This set off an intense two-week, inner-city fight that included very close combat in the revered Wadi alSalam Cemetery, where the opposition sought refuge, fighting from mosques and hiding in tombs sacred to Shi'a Muslims.

The battle began before dawn on 5 August when the al-Sadr militia attacked the city's main police station. The Marines' ground force, centered around 1st Battalion, 4th Marines (1/4), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John L. Mayer, provided a quick response force to assist the police at the request of Governor Adnan al-Zurufi. Five days later, the Marines, augmented with Army and Iraqi infantry, were still at it. "We went down there to assist in a battle we did not ask for, but one which we were not going to run away from either," Mayer was later quoted saying.

Throughout the battle, the Marines and sailors from the MEU, and soldiers from the Army's combat-proven 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry and 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, played cat-and-mouse with the militia. Close air support delivered by Marine Cobras, fixed-wing aircraft, and Air Force AC-130s knocked out enemy strong points. Ultimately, they persevered over the militia forces, turned the city over to Iraqi civilian control, and began assisting in training and equipping Iraqi security forces. Marines conducted security patrols in the city while slowly building up the ability of the Iraqi forces to maintain order. Within 90 days, progress was evident. Colonel Anthony M. Haslam, the 11th MEU(SOC)'s com-mander, accurately could claim that Iraqi security forces "have demonstrated their ability to keep this province and its citizens safe and secure."

Fallujah 2

When the Marines again were ordered to attack Fallujah in November, it appeared that Washington had learned lessons from the first attempt. This time the political angles were sorted out, the Iraqi leadership and allies prepared, and a strategic communications plan was in effect. For this battle, planning time was granted and used wisely while special operations and intelligence assets identified key targets. A completely integrated battle plan was put into place.

For Operation Phantom Fury, later renamed Operation al-Fajr (Arabic for dawn) by the Iraqi Defense Minister, the Marines were reinforced. Instead of just two battalions, six reinforced battalions were assigned to the assault, including two superb Army battalions. Iraqi security forces were brought in to help secure key buildings and mosques. Regrettably, as the Marines predicted in April, the enemy had used the six months to prepare as well.

The Marines sought to gain an edge on their opponents with an opening ruse. Anticipating the enemy believed the Marines would attack from the south, they reinforced that misperception by deception. The town was isolated and a massive information operation urged the city's residents to move out. Many did flee, but some 2,000 to 3,000 insurgents were thought to still be in the city.

The battle began with special operations forces seizing the hospital on Sunday, 7 November, and with the Marines seizing the two bridges that span the Euphrates River on the east side of town. After an artillery barrage on insurgent positions, the Marine/Army force swept in from the north the next evening. Initially, they met with light resistance. The enemy did not defend any major strong points for several days, slowly pulling back toward the south, where they were blocked by Marine LAVs. Only the occasional sniper delayed the drive toward Route 10, the major artery that severed the city from east to west. By Tuesday, the Joint/Coalition force held the northern half of Fallujah. The hammer was cocked and a solid anvil in place.

On Friday, the insurgents began to contest the Marines for each building. The easy penetration of the first few days ended. Perhaps initially dazed by the direction and tempo of the initial assault, the insurgents now showed more mettle. From interconnected buildings, tunnels, and prepared ambushes, the insurgents slowed the Marines' advance. Every building held an ammunition cache. Each street presented snipers, improvised explosive devices, and minor ambushes. While the ambushes varied in technique, each displayed a degree of complexity and preparation not seen in April. The result was a chaotic struggle, with enemy squads appearing behind the Marines as they cautiously pressed on. The 360s, nonlinear front of this urban battle is something the Marines were trained for, but still found unsettling.

The Marines compressed the insurgents into the kill zone in the southern end of town. Cornered, the enemy lashed back by rushing at the Marines. As lieutenant Colonel Gareth Brandi, CO of 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, put it, "The enemy is right were we want him. He's coming to us, and we're killing him."1

By 14 November, the battle was over and Fallujah was returned to the control of the Iraqi government. An estimated 1,000 insurgents had been killed, and another 1,100 were captured. Any others had slipped away, or remained hidden inside the battered city. The grim contest cost American forces as well. More than 50 Americans were killed, and 450 were wounded. Nearly two dozen Marines made the ultimate sacrifice. This was a far cry from the 142 Marines lost and 857 wounded in Hue during the Vietnam war, testimony to the effectiveness of urban combat training the Marines have devel1 oped over the years.

The success of the Marines was marred by an incident that was captured on video by a freelance correspondent on 13 November. The video showed the apparent shooting of an unarmed captive by a Marine. The possible unlawful use of force highlighted both the stress and ambiguity of the "three-block war," but validated the critical decision-making skills and moral values training invested in the development of Marines. The disposition of this incident has yet to be determined.

Afghanistan

While attention has been focused on the intense urban battles and counter-insurgency in Iraq, Marines also were engaged elsewhere. As part of the ongoing efforts to secure Afghanistan, U.S. forces continue to support the elected Hamid Karzai government and the Afghan National Army. The Marines were ordered to provide one battalion to help stabilize the region near Bagram and Kabul, and 2d Battalion, 8th Marines (2/8), lieutenant Colonel Robert G. Petit commanding, initially filled the bill. Petit's leathernecks were replaced by the Camp Lejeune-based 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines (3/6), in May. That battalion conducted security and civil military operations mainly throughout Khowst province out of Forward Operating Base Salerno, but also in the eastern Paktia and Nangarhar provinces. The battalion, under the leadership of lieutenant Colonel Julian D. Alford, worked with the 25th Division Afghan Militia Force to help the transition from chaos to order.

The 22nd MEU(SOC), commanded by Colonel Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr. made a major dent in the Taliban's plans to disturb the peace in the central province of Oruzgan, north of Kandahar. The Marines were ordered to the area in mid-March for a three-month mission to help stabilize an area well known as a stronghold of antigovernment resistance. It was extremely rugged country that had not seen what an agile, combined arms force could do. The first challenge was to get there, not an easy task given the distance and rugged mountain ridges that transect the area. The unit offloaded its equipment and vehicles in an Arabian Gulf port and were flown by the Air Force into Kandahar. It quickly transitioned from deployment to employment in Operation Mountain Storm.

Designated as Task Force Linebacker, and reinforced with a highly skilled Army light infantry battalion, 22nd MEU then conducted a dozen operations designed to stun the opposition, shape the battle space and generate intelligence about the TaIiban. The results speak for themselves, both politically and militarily. Voter registration proceeded without major incident, and the subsequent elections were a major step forward for the Afghans. The MEU set the conditions for these political aims by conducting 360 patrols and 175 cordon and search missions, by uncovering 65 caches of weapons, by engaging the Taliban 32 times with 101 enemy killed in action, and initiating 108 civil affairs projects. It also captured 2,500 weapons and 80,000 rounds of ammunition. In addition, more than 2,000 local nationals benefited from the MEU's medical program and more than 58,000 Afghanis registered to vote. The Joint Task Force commander, Army Major General Eric T. Olson, congratulated the Marines on their effort, noting "Never in the history of Operation Enduring Freedom has there been an offensive operation like the one the 22nd MEU conducted. Never have we been this successful. You have made history here."

The 22nd MEU displayed the extraordinary flexibility and combat power inherent in the MAGTF concept. These operations once again proved, in Colonel McKenzie's words, "Our NCOs were the most potent weapon in the MEU's arsenal," and that "Marines remain the master of small unit actions."

Other War on Terrorism Missions

While Marines were making headlines in Afghanistan and Iraq, there were just as many silently working around the globe. More than six hundred Marines served as part of Joint Task Force (JTF)-Horn of Africa. The task force is ashore operating from Camp Lemonier, Djibouti. The mission of this force is to try to prevent this area of the world from becoming the next Afghanistan by working proactively with local leaders in Ethiopia, Sudan, Yemen, Eritrea, and Kenya. This is a region where half the population is unemployed, HIV/AIDs is rampant, violence is an accepted form of discourse, and conditions for social unrest are prime. The task force is trying to keep its area off the scope and off CNN. It appears to be successful.

Other examples of constructive engagement include Marines training their counterparts in Georgia and Chad. To reduce the cross-border flow of contraband, arms, and people, Marines are training Chadian troops in small-unit tactics as part of a program sponsored by the State Department and Marine Forces Europe. This joint program seeks to reduce the potential for terrorist safe havens in Chad.

In Operation secure Tomorrow, the Marines revisited a hotspot from their past. The often-troubled island nation of Haiti once again found itself embroiled in violence in March when President JeanBertrand Aristide fled the country. A combined JTF of 1,700 Americans and 1,000 allies from Canada, France, and Chile were sent to stop the complete disintegration of public order. This force was commanded by Marine Brigadier General Ronald S. Coleman. Marine participaation included a Fleet Anti-terrorism Support Team and the 3rd Battalion, 8th Marines (3/8) under lieutenant Colonel David H. Berger. Their work was assisted by Marines from Haiti with local contacts, language skills, and acute cultural awareness.

Marine Reserves

The contributions to the nation's security by its legion of Marines have been a Total Force effort. To date the Marine Corps has activated 95% of its reserve units with more than 30,000 Marine reservists. This is more than 75% of the reserve's total strength. As the year ended, more than 13,000 reservists were still mobilized serving in Iraq, Afghanistan, and throughout Africa. The reservists, as they have since the Korean War, proved to be capable of rapid mobilization and frontline combat employment.

Elements of Marine Force Reserve (MarForRes) also conducted a significant portion of the homeland security, counter-drug, and theater security cooperation efforts assigned to the Marines. Over the course of the year, reservists could be found in Afghanistan, the Georgian Republic, Colombia, Guantanamo Bay, and the Philippines. Lieutenant General Dennis M. McCarthy, Commanding General, MarForRes, praised his Marines, "When I visit the units that have been activated and talk to the commands where they've been assigned, the one comment I get time and time again is that you can't tell them apart from the active units. That's the kind of feedback I like to hear."

As the year ended, MarForRes was preparing to mobilize an additional 7,000 combatready troops for activation and deployment.

Tsunami Relief Efforts

Just as the year was ending, naval expeditionary forces demonstrated their responsiveness and readiness in the Pacific. Responding to one of the world's deadliest natural disasters, Joint Task Force 536, under the command of Lieutenant General Robert R. Blackman Jr., Commanding General of III Marine Expeditionary Force on Okinawa, was organized to assist in the response to the 26 December tsunami that killed more than 300,000 around the Indian Ocean basin. This relief effort included the employment of the 15th MEU(SOC) led by Colonel Thomas C. Greenwood to Indonesia and Sri Lanka where it contributed to disaster relief and humanitarian assistance tasks.

Shaping Tomorrow's Force

As busy as the Marine Corps has been for the past year, it has not stopped the Commandant, General Michael W. Hagee, from shaping today's programs and force structure for increased effectiveness against tomorrow's anticipated adversaries. The most significant move General Hagee made was to assign the commander of the 1st Marine Division, Lieutenant General James N. Mattis, as the new Commanding General at Quantico. In his job as the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development, Lieutenant General Mattis has re-energized the activities at Quantico and focused their support for the operating forces at the tip of the spear. More important for the future, he has exploited his experiences in Afghanistan with Task Force 58 and his two tours in Iraq to accelerate the incorporation of lessons learned into all aspects of the Marines' force development efforts as discussed below.

* Programs. The tilt-rotor MV-22 remains at the top of the list as the Corps' number one aviation priority. The Osprey's speed, range, and survivability are key to making operational maneuver from the sea a viable means of striking at a time and place of the Marines' choosing. Regrettably, the Pentagon continues to undercut investments in this program while ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan continue to erode the existing medium-lift deficiency by rapidly wearing out the fleet of older CH-46s.

In addition, the Marines have selected a future unmanned aerial vehicle to replace the almost two decades-old Pioneer. The new system, the tilt-rotor Eagle Eye being developed by the Coast Guard, can take-off and land vertically from ships. An initial operating capability is projected for 2009. Based on their utility in current combat operations, the Corps probably will further expand its unmanned systems programs.

The Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) affords great speed and mobility in the water and ashore, along with a powerful 30-mm. chain gun. While the EFV is much heavier than today's vehicle, it is four times faster in water with a speed of more than 20 knots. Currently, the program remains in the development and demonstration phase. Testing at Fort A.P. Hill, Virginia, with an early model exceeded all expectations. In the past year, the Pentagon delayed the initial procurement two years, further slowing its introduction into service.

Fire support remains a critical shortfall for operational maneuver from the sea and the Marines have several programs underway to address the problem. Recent combat operations have shown the need for rugged, lighter, and more lethal systems that can be employed and supported in expeditionary environments. The M777 lightweight howitzer is seen as a critical component of the overall fire support capability of the future Marine air-ground task force. A replacement for the venerable but significantly heavier M198 155-mm. howitzer, the M777 completed its operational testing at the end of 2004, and production has begun.

* Marine Corps Systems Command. The Commandant's principal agent for acquisition and maintenance of systems and equipment used by Marine forces is the Marine Corps Systems Command (MCSC), led by Brigadier General William D. Catto.

In 2004, MCSC identified and validated dozens of urgent equipment needs in support of deployed Marines in Iraq. The command provided enhanced armor protection to more than 5,000 vehicles to protect Marines from the dangers of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and roadside bombs. It delivered more than 200,000 inserts for standard small arms protection, IED detection dogs, jamming devices, unmanned air and ground vehicles including explosive ordnance disposal robots used in more than 2,000 counterIED missions, communications equipment and first aid kits. Because of MCSC's responsiveness and its professional staff of acquisition experts, Marines in harm's way have been equipped with updated equipment and the latest personal protection systems. Their mastery of the Pentagon's acquisition bureaucracy has addressed critical combat needs and saved Marines' lives.

* Marine Corps Lessons Learned Center. Another key initiative to improve the future operational readiness of the Marine air-ground task force was the establishment of the Marine Corps Lessons Learned Center (MCLLC). This initiative by the Commandant was taken to ensure the rapid collection, assessment and dissemination of knowledge gained in the field against today's increasingly adaptive enemy. Building upon early efforts conducted by Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) during Operation Enduring Freedom, MCLLC has matured into a program to ensure that the latest tactics, techniques and procedures are quickly packaged and transmitted to Marines throughout the training and education system. These same lessons are also applied at MCCDC for changes to future Marine doctrine, organization or equipment.

* Marine Corps Warfighting Lab. Under the leadership of Brigadier General Thomas D. Waldhauser, the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL) continued to enhance its unmatched reputation in 2004. The lab expanded its portfolio of activities on behalf of the operating forces currently in contact with the enemy. Its earlier investments in unmanned aerial vehicles (Dragon Eye) and ground robotic systems proved sound in combat operations. The lab's other projects included improved body armor, sniper identification, explosive device detection, and tactical communications gear. This latter category includes both the personal role radio that was a big success in Operation Iraqi Freedom, and now also includes the expeditionary tactical communications system that could be a breakthrough for overthe-horizon and on-the-move (OTH/OTM) communications.

The Lab is also focused on solving problems anticipated for tomorrow's Marine Corps. Its Sea Viking experiments are the major venue for testing new ideas and technologies. Sea Viking 04 focused on the OTH/OTM challenge and the integration of position location information. Other wargames and experiments have helped refine the nascent distributed operations concept and served to identify key training requirements for Marines in the 21st century.

Finally, MCWL continued to lead service efforts in joint experimentation and wargaming. Expeditionary Warrior 05, the Marine Corps' premier event, examined the role of distributed operations in the war on terrorists. In addition, Joint Urban Warrior, an annual event organized by the Marine Corps in partnership with Joint Forces Command, broke new ground in addressing improvements in joint, interagency, and combined complex urban operations.

* Force Structure Review. Recognizing the need to continually evaluate and adapt its force structure to ensure consistency with the needs of the combat commanders, General Hagee initiated a formal Force Structure Review during 2004. This effort used a Total Force perspective to rebalance the existing force to maximize support to the global war against terrorism and current warfighting requirements. This effort exploited savings from cuts to military capabilities that were less relevant to tomorrow's missions, producing a lighter, leaner and more agile force.

The result was the addition of two infantry battalions, three light armored reconnaissance companies, an air and naval gunfire liaison company, and two force reconnaissance platoons for the active force. On the Marine Corps Reserve side of the house, two artillery batteries were dropped to support the establishment of additional command and control, civil affairs, intelligence support battalion, anti-terrorism battalion, and two light armored units. Both the active and reserve components will see an increase in specific skill sets that are germane to the war on terrorists including explosive ordnance disposal, information operations, psychological operations, intelligence, and civil affairs.

The structure changes will be augmented by a host of training and educational initiatives undertaken by Major General Thomas S. Jones, commanding the Training and Education Command. These changes will sharpen the urban battle skills, cultural awareness, stability and support operations readiness, and intellectual preparation of Marines for irregular conflicts.

These structure and training initiatives amply demonstrate the Corps' unique institutional valuesits capacity to learn and adapt via constant evolution while maintaining a state of immediate readiness. The Marines carefully select lessons and identify opportunities to exploit. Under General Hagee's hand, they continue to balance change and readiness, carefully introducing and refining transformations which minimize costs and risk while increasing readiness. The Marines continuously evolve to prepare for future threats while standing ready to thwart today's foes.

Conclusion

Looking back over the year, Kaplan was right. The Marines are not like others. The Marines have what the Greeks called dynamis-the will to win in battle. This will animated both Alexander's phalanxes and the Marines in Mesopotamia. However, the success of the U.S. Marine Corps goes beyond its ability to attract and sustain individual warriors. Most organizations do not anticipate and continuously evolve to changes in the environment. Few institutions can sustain many missions and easily transition among tasks. This is what Marines did in 2004, what they have done for the last 230 years, and hopefully, can do for many more.