"A Bridge Too Far"
(See B. Stone, pp. 31-35, February 2005; M. Bowman, p. 18, April 2005 Proceedings)
Hamlin A. Caldwell Jr., Charlottesville, VA-Lieutenant Stone's article and Vice Admiral Bowman's critical comments concerning it precisely show the function and value of the U.S. Naval Institute and its Proceedings. The intellectual integrity of the U.S. Navy is significantly derived from the intellectual integrity of Proceedings' open forum.
"A Bridge Too Far" is a tightly reasoned and well-documented analysis of what Lieutenant Stone perceives to be serious problems in Naval Aviation. He mentions by name the flag authors of policies with which he disagrees. My careful re-reading of the article, however, revealed none of what Vice Admiral Bowman describes as "personal attacks against one's integrity or intelligence." Personal attacks do undermine the chain of command, but Lieutenant Stone made none.
I also disagree with Vice Admiral Bowman's opinion that critical discussion of policies or opinions in Proceedings should be deferred until their authors are no longer on active duty. Solutions and improvements are situation and time critical, not personality critical.
Neither do I believe that intelligent and professionally involved junior officers, such as Lieutenant Stone appears to be, are "in ignorance of most of the details and the environments in which senior-level decisions are made" as Vice Admiral Bowman states. Conversely, there has always been a professional mandate for flag officers to better understand the details and environment in which junior-level decisions are made.
"'River Kwai Syndrome' Plays in Law of the Sea"
(See F. Gaffney, p. 2, March 2005; W. L. Schachle, pp. 14-16, April 2005 Proceedings)
Captain George Galdorisi, U.S. Navy (Retired) and Dr. Scott C. Truver-While we recognize and respect Proceedings' desire to be a stimulus for professional dialogue and to be even a bit edgy, we are stunned that the magazine granted valuable space to such a one-sided and myopic polemic. In our view, articles like Mr. Gaffney's are not designed to stimulate a professional dialogue but to inflict his jaundiced perspectives on others without leaving room for healthy debate.
The "River Kwai" analogy is so far-fetched that it does not merit the space to punch holes in it. The author then uses the pejorative acronym LOST to refer to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) even though LOST is found nowhere in the extensive literature on the Law of the Sea Convention, while the acronym UNCLOS is used universally. To grind home his dissatisfaction with UNCLOS, he uses LOST a dozen times on one page, perhaps a record even for the type of inflamed, narcissistic journalism he practices.
The author then takes aim at the U.S. Navy for its support to UNCLOS, leaving any reader who has not followed this issue extensively to conclude that it is the Navy and only the Navy that wants to inflict this unwanted treaty on an unwary country. Mr. Gaffney ascribes far too much power to the U.S. Navy to influence all of these powerful stakeholders. Acceding to the Law of the Sea Convention is not a Navy issue; it is a national issue. In that, Mr. Gaffney's selective myopia or ignorance is breathtaking! The author conveniently fails to mention, for example:
* The Democratic Bill Clinton administration submitted the treaty to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent, stating, "Early adherence by the United States to the Convention and the Agreement is important to maintain a stable legal regime for all uses of the sea."
* In an effort to make the Convention palatable to not only the United States but to the other major industrialized nations, the George H.W. Bush administration spearheaded a negotiating initiative that resulted in the 1994 Implementing Agreement that addressed initial concerns with the Convention, particularly those voiced by President Ronald Reagan, who nonetheless stated that the United States should become a party to UNCLOS.
* The Republican George W. Bush administration has strongly supported the treaty from the outset and through its ambassador to the United Nations declared in November 2001, "I am pleased to inform you that the administration of President George W. Bush supports accession of the United States to the Convention."
* In October 2003, the Republican-majority Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on the Law of the Sea Convention and invited testimony from more than a dozen witnesses and had numerous other supporting documents submitted for the record. In the end, the committee voted 19-0 to send the Convention to the full Senate for ratification.
* In 2004, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers, called the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea a "top national-security priority."
* In its September 2004 report to the President and the Congress, the U.S. Commission on Oceans Policy recommended "The United States of America immediately accede to the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention. Time is of the essence if the United States is to maintain its leadership role in ocean and coastal activities."
* The December 2004 presidential response to the Oceans Policy Commission report stated "As a matter of national security, economic self-interest, and international leadership, the Bush administration is strongly committed to U.S. accession to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea."
While Mr. Gaffney could be forgiven for acts of omission as discussed above, he makes several broad statements that are just plain incorrect, such as, "In fact, LOST's current text is identical to the one President Reagan rejected in 1982." In 1994, all parties to the Treaty, as well as the United States, approved an Implementing Agreement substantially modifying the objectionable seabed mining language. In April 2004, all living, former legal advisors to the State Department affirmed that in their opinion the 1994 Implementing Agreement had binding legal effect in its modification of UNCLOS and that it satisfactorily resolved the Reagan administration's objection to the treaty's deep seabed mining regime. A January 2005 Congressional Research Service report put it even more directly, noting, "As a result of consultations conducted by the U.N. Secretary General since 1990, an agreement responding to the objections made by the United States and other industrialized countries was negotiated. The 1994 Agreement relating to implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention, and its accompanying Annex, is considered an integral part of the Convention package that entered into force on November 16, 1994." Either Mr. Gaffney simply did not know about this Agreement or, by ignoring it, he wants it to go away.
In the ensuing ten-plus years, the U.S. strategic paradigm, dependent as it is on littoral operations against the shore, has made accession to the Convention even more compelling. U.S. military strategy, operations, and tactics are crucially dependent on the navigation rights, flexibility, and mobility conferred by UNCLOS.
Certainly, disputes might still arise, but the legal standing of the United States, particularly in protecting important navigation rights through straits and other international waterways, is much more enhanced with than without UNCLOS.
Beyond these important strategic concerns, UNCLOS has become more than just another treaty. The result of the largest single international negotiating project ever undertaken, with its provenance extending at least to the 1958 U.N. Territorial Sea Convention (to which the United States is a party), and in the interim the 1967 U.N. Seabed Committee discussions, it founded a new era on, under, and over the world's oceans. UNCLOS represents the commitment of 148 signatories to the rule of law and a basis for the measured conduct of affairs among states throughout the world-a rule of law that the United States must promote and sustain if it is to succeed in endeavors such as the global war on terrorism.
If the United States has learned anything since the attacks of 11 September 2001, it is the difficulty of doing things unilaterally and the importance of international cooperation and of having coalition partners in any vital endeavor. Acceding to the most comprehensive international treaty ever created could be an important first step for this country to signal our willingness to cooperate with the international community in matters of critical mutual importance. Mr. Gaffney would be well served to temper his dissatisfaction with the treaty and consider this larger context, unless, perhaps, he enjoys being LOST at sea.
"The Academy Can Do Better"
(See B. Fleming, p. 88, February 2005; K. Inman, pp. 12-16; B. Latta, pp. 16-18, March 2005; R. Thomas, pp. 19-20, April 2005 Proceedings)
Captain Donald K. Forbes, U.S. Navy (Retired)-As a Naval Academy graduate and former Commandant of Midshipmen, I take issue with specific aspects of Professor Fleming's article.
It is more appropriate that the dean of admissions or others at the Naval Academy with more current and intimate knowledge of the admissions process address in detail the merits and shortcomings of the professor's article. I would prefer to address some generalities he has made.
I would hasten to point out that Professor Fleming's assertion that the Naval Academy is academically competitive for only about 50% of each class are the words of an academic elitist who ignores the fact that academic achievement is not the sole factor in determining those who are offered entrance to the Naval Academy. The gauge known as the Whole Man/Person Multiple is used, in which academic factors play about a 60% role. Certainly, the Naval Academy aspires to have as many academically gifted midshipmen in each class, provided they are not dispossessed of those other qualities so necessary to support the mission of the Naval Academy, which is to educate and develop the future combat leaders of the naval services.
Whereas academics are important to that development process, years of experience have shown that academics are not necessarily a predominant factor in combat officer development. In addition, the author's statement that "weaker academics means weaker officers" is stereotypical and has been shown to be untrue throughout the history of the Academy.
As an entrant to the Academy from the fleet via the Naval Academy Preparatory School who graduated in the top 7% of his class and went on to earn a master's degree in aeronautical engineering from Michigan, I find Professor Fleming's elitist disparagement of fleet sailors and Marines unworthy and unwarranted. It clearly defines his lack of understanding of the fleet appointment program established more than 75 years ago by the Congress. Over those years, that program has provided the Academy and the Navy with many distinguished combat leaders, including a most recent Distinguished Graduate, Vice Admiral Gerald Miller.
Competitive sports at any level are important to leadership development through the development of important qualities such as team work, esprit de corps, and individual courage-all important factors in successful combat operations. Yes, intelligence is also important, provided it can be applied properly in the tasks of leadership and the planning and execution of combat operations. But among all who graduate from the Academy, intelligence is a relative term on the higher end of the intelligence scale. At the Academy we are not dealing with the type of students who attend colleges and universities as a passport to professional sports, while majoring in basket weaving. We are dealing with scholar athletes of somewhat minor varying academic capability, all of whom are exposed to and must complete demanding academic and professional programs.
Contrary to Professor Fleming's views, one does not have to be team captain or quarterback to develop or attain leadership qualities and traits that stem from participation in competitive sports and the leadership development programs that are part and parcel of the Academy experience.
In sum, I find it most difficult, but not impossible, to understand how a professor with 18 years at the Academy fails to comprehend the real purpose of the Academy, which is to develop the future combat leaders of the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps. Academics are but one factor in that process, and not necessarily the most important factor for each midshipman.
"Liberty Victims Did Not Die in Vain"
(See A. Wells, pp. 88-89, March 2005; A. J. Cristol, p. 28, April 2005 Proceedings)
Rick Russell-This article is marred by the author's unsupported attack on A. Jay Cristol's study, The Liberty Incident: The 1967 Attack on the U.S. Navy Spy Ship. I was the acquiring editor for Cristol's book at Brassey's. Before joining this publisher, I had served ten years as a historian in the Contemporary History Branch of the U.S. Naval Historical Center. This book is not "bad history," as Wells claims. Its impressive endorsements and published scholarly reviews refute such a verdict. Instead, this book is the most thorough study of the attack offered to date and represents a major leap forward in our understanding of what happened to the Liberty (AGTR-5) on 8 June 1967. Furthermore, documents obtained from the National security Agency via the Freedom of Information Act subsequent to the book's publication reinforce the author's findings. Still, whether historians or policy makers, we view it as the last word on the subject only at our peril. Thus, rather than accept Wells's notion that our culture is endangered by bad history-apparently meaning history with which he and others with strong opinions do not agree-we might prevail on those agencies of the U.S. government that still hold classified material to help to advance the historical process by releasing documents pertinent to this subject. It should be selfevident that excessive secrecy is a greater threat to our culture than open and fair debate.
"Detention Center Conviction Highlights Supervisory Deficiencies"
(See K. Houlgate, p. 2, February 2005 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel Ralph A. Dengler, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve-I vehemently take exception to this article. I became the commanding officer of 2d Battalion, 25th Marines in September 2004. Previously, I was 2/25's executive officer during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and have remained intimately involved with the legal proceedings related to the death of an Iraqi detainee while in 2/25's custody.
In the first instance, let me state that Major Clarke Paulus is an outstanding Marine officer who I personally believe will be vindicated. It is wholly inappropriate, however, for Major Houlgate to weigh in on the courts-martial of Major Paulus, and former Sergeant Gary Pittman, a reservist, because their clemency and appeals processes are still ongoing. Major Houlgate's transgression is exacerbated by his claim to "have direel knowledge" about the incident, none of which is part of any record in these cases and all of which can be nothing but hearsay because Major Houlgate was not part of 2/25 during OIF. Rather, he served in a special projects capacity at 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), responsible for providing air conditioning to units in theater. A publication of Proceedings' renown should also exercise better journalistic restraint when such judicial matters are pending.
Second, Major Houlgate has taken snippets of perspective he garnered while serving as a rifle company inspector-instructor (I&I, Company F, 2/25) to broadly-and incorrectly-characterize the 2/25 staff and the Total Force concept in general. Major Houlgate slanderously portrays a staff with whom he had little or no experience or direct dealings. Indeed, 2/25 was activated twice during Major Houlgate's I&I tenure. How then can he so arrogantly decry the reserve battle staff? What "constant gossiping and griping common among his fellow officers at the command post" was Major Houlgate privy to?
Major Houlgate criticizes 2/25's "stockpile" of majors and attributes an "it's not my job" attitude to his "brother" field grade officers. This contention could not be farther from the truth in 2/25. Yes, the staff was comprised of mostly majors, some of whom served in captain or lieutenant billets. But this reality, whereby officers first serve an active-duty tour before joining the Marine Corps Reserve, is a strength, not a hindrance, and in no way reflects a dysfunctional personnel assignment system. Let me emphasize that nobody on the 2/25 staff shirked responsibility or challenge during OIF. We were in a war, with no more sacred charge, writ large, than to accomplish the mission and take care of our Marines and sailors. Indeed, I would pit that battle staff-as well as my battle staff today-man for man, billet for billet, against any other battle staff, active or reserve.
2/25 was tasked by the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), its initial higher headquarters, to "be prepared to temporarily detain enemy prisoners of war awaiting transport to more permanent MEF facilities." This duty was one of a myriad of taskings from the 15th MEU, which also included combat operations, maintaining critical avenues of approach around Nasiriyah, including four bridges, and destroying remnants of Iraq's military, Saddam's Fedayeen, and vestiges of his regime. The tasking to establish a temporary detention facility was scrutinized among these other taskings during the battle staff's deliberate execution of the Marine Corps planning process. Initially, the battle staff assigned a staff non-commissioned officer in charge (SNCOIC) to run the facility, but when the scope of the tasking crept into a permanent function and facility, the staff assigned an officer in charge (OIC), a reserve major from the S-3 shop who was serving as the battalion gunner. Later in 2/25's OIF role, when the opportunity and need arose for additional weapons training and refresher ranges, the "Gunner" reassumed his role as such and Major Paulus, then the Headquarters and Service Company executive officer, was the logical replacement. He was familiar with the detention facility and his other daily responsibilities allowed for this added responsibility. Thus, contrary to Major Houlgate's flawed and ignorant depiction, a capable, willing officer was made the OIC on both occasions, regardless of what component he was from.
Finally, the notion that "[t]he judge advocates probably saw prosecution of an active-duty Marine officer as their surest bet" is absolute tripe. Major Houlgate fails to recognize that the original OIC, a reservist, was charged, fully investigated, but then vindicated following an Article 32 hearing. (Incidentally, the Iraqi detainee had not died during that officer's tenure, but a mere several days into Major Paulus' OIC role.) The prosecution chose to give immunity to the SNCOIC (a reservist) while plea bargaining with another reservist. Moreover, Major Paulus' then-company commander, a reservist, still faces a Marine Forces Reserve Board of Inquiry as a result of the underlying incident.
I will not comment on the merits of the investigation or the courts martial. My tactual knowledge and statements already are of record, and I will await the outcome of the clemency and appeals processes before I contemplate further comment.
"Have We Found a Weapon to Fight IEDs in Iraq?"
(See N. Friedman, pp. 4-6, January 2005 Proceedings)
Christopher Hileman, Senior Regional Intelligence Analyst, Gulf States, Joint Task Force Guantanamo Bay-I was a leader in the counter-bomber effort in Iraq in late 2003 through early 2004 so I read the article by Norman Friedman with great interest to this aspect in fighting the improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs).
I approached the counter-bomber effort from a human intelligence (Humlnt) viewpoint combined with exploitation of devices from the combined explosives exploitation cell and the explosive ordnance disposal teams. We came across several key factors in fighting the problem.
First was identifying the master bomb makers. From what we could tell, some of the more sophisticated IEDs shared a lot of the same traits in different parts of Iraq. At the time, it was rare to find the same IED in Basra and Baghdad. We found that the former regime had bomb programs, one of the biggest being the Al Ghafiqi Project that was run by the Iraqi Intelligence Service. This program was started in the early 1980s and ran through to the beginning of the war. It is impossible to know how many people Al Ghafiqi had trained over the years. Studying the program, however, allowed us to identify signature traits of IEDs that may be hallmarks of Al Ghafiqi-trained personnel.
As the problem quickly grew, we realized we were dealing with people trained by the former regime, people who had been trained by the Iranians to fight Saddam, and foreign fighters with their own knowledge. The opening of Internet cafes all over Iraq enabled the average insurgent to obtain IED knowledge without an instructor.
One of the other issues was the ample supply of explosives, artillery shells, rockets, missiles, etc. In addition to our ammunition supply points (ASPs), an untold number of caches were hidden all over Iraq. Some estimates put the availability of explosives and military ordinance at more than a million metric tons. Protecting the ASPs from theft was next to impossible due to lack of manpower. Moving them was not a solution because many of the storage facilities were unstable due to improper maintenance and ammunition storage procedures. This ample supply of explosives must be shut off to decrease the supply of IEDs.
Another big issue was getting units to report the IED incidents so they could be tracked. Many disabled IEDs without reporting, or, if the IED failed to cause any damage, units simply moved on. This made it impossible to track the number of incidents or to identify where hot spots might be developing. We had to educate the units on reporting IEDs, as well as on identifying bomb makers in field interrogations. That effort to get information to and from the units will continue to be key.
Lastly, we found that getting all of the data on IED and sharing it among all the players was a resource-intensive challenge. Information sharing in the intelligence community in many ways is still a new concept and requires getting everyone to talk no matter what the service or agency.
The IED fight changes every day. The enemy quickly adapts to our tactics, techniques, and procedures. For example, insurgents circumvent IED countermeasures by using VBIEDs to ram convoys. They place IEDs in the daylight and attack in high-traffic areas where finding the emplacement is impossible. The sudden increase of VBIED's over the last half of 2004 and into this year shows the enemy's willingness to risk civilian casualties to strike at their targets. The enemy has also become adept at concealment of devices, Grafting items that would do a Hollywood special effects technician proud.
The use of IEDs and VBIEDs by insurgents in many ways has prolonged the war and destabilized Iraq. Their use also lowers the morale of U.S. and Coalition troops standing at checkpoints and driving the roads of Iraq. They boost the insurgents' confidence with every successful attack.
The counter-bomber campaign is likely to affect us in future conflicts, and it has possibilities for use in the United States. The construction of an IED/VBIED is not that complicated. Many of our enemies are watching the fight in Iraq to see what works. No simple solution can neutralize the threat. We must closely study technical methods as well as intelligence collection and targeting of individuals and groups with the most knowledge and skill.
"Military Versus Civilians: Can We All Get Along"
(See G.C. Allen, p. 103, March 2005 Proceedings)
Colonel Charles E. Laedlein, U.S. Air Force (Retired)-The March issue of Proceedings contained two articles discussing the relationships between uniformed and civilian members of the military services. As a retired officer and a current Civil Service employee, I found both articles interesting and a welcome recognition of the challenges presented by today's evolving military force structure and mission. I fear, however, there may be an important omission in these articles: the unique status and role of the contractor support employee.
As recognized in "Reminders for Leading Civilians," two distinct classes of civilians support the military forces. The first group comprises members of the Civil Service. Like their military counterparts, they draw a federal paycheck, are subject to unique statutory and regulatory limitations, and work directly for the federal office that hired them.
On the other hand, as mentioned in Commander Vandroff's article, the second group works for a company that is providing specific services in accordance with the terms of a government contract. Unlike Civil Service employees, members of the second group are supervised and led by their corporate supervisors. (The contract may, however, permit these employees to respond to requests by military officers or Civil Service members.) To emphasize their unique and distinct status, contractor employees have the right to strike and may walk off the job at any time, unlike military members and federal civil servants. Application of such rights can be disconcerting to military commanders used to applying the Uniform Code of Military Justice and Civil Service regulations in order to ensure continuous personnel support of a critical project.
Thus, while contractor support employees constitute an important part of the military team approach to mission accomplishment, it is important to remember that they work strictly in accordance with the terms of their company's contract with the military and at all times remain under the direct control and supervision of their company's leadership. Contractor support employees perform duties as described in a contract's statement of work, and any proposed changes to their duties must be fully coordinated in advance with appropriate federal contracting officers. Should military members attempt to lead or manage a contractor's own employees, they may find they have materially changed the terms and conditions of the contract between the company and the government. This "constructive change" could, in turn, result in a company asserting a claim for additional payment and the military member facing possible administrative or disciplinary action for an improper obligation of federal monies.
This distinction in the civilian workforce becomes dangerously blurred when military units list civilian contractor support employees on unit rosters, report them as being on temporary duty or leave, or refer to them as being part of a unit's employee workforce. The bottom line is that civilian contractor employees work for their employer (the contractor) and not for the military department contracting for the support. It is a critical distinction and one which should be fully understood by military leaders. Q
"DD(X) Navigates Uncharted Waters"
(See P. Morin, R. H. Smith, pp. 20-22, March 2005; S. Borgerson, pp. 20-21, April 2005 Proceedings)
Steven S. Aronson, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme Division, DD(X) Advanced Gun System Government Technical Team-I appreciate Chief Morin's opinion regarding DD(X), although I disagree with his conclusions. I would like to say there are distinct differences and requirements for these two ships. Agreed, the littoral combat ship (LCS) modular configurable design offers exciting potential for effective operations inside littoral waters, however, the multi-warfare platform, DD(X), will bring the capability to the littoral battle space and well inland while stationed over the horizon.
The two Advanced Gun Systems (AGS) and 80 MK 57 Vertical Launching System (VLS) cells are DD(X)'s land-attack offensive punch. These capital weapon systems are indeed difficult to replace. The reality of ship design demands large, very capable weapon systems as part of the ship's structure. Thus, they can only be replaced/modernized during a major overhaul because they are not modular/convertible in the LCS sense-yet they have multi-mission potential as well as technology refresh capability that exceeds the convertible LCS capability. This is what we demand of a major combatant.
The MK 57 launcher is compatible with all current and planned vertically launched missile weapons. Considering the total VLS capacity of an expeditionary strike group (ESG) that has Aegis combatants and submarines, VLS capacity is adequate such that DDX cells beyond 80 would be excessive.
AGS will be ready to support a family
of weapons based on a spiral design leveraging from the long-range land-attack projectile (LRLAP). AGS/LRLAP brings an all-weather land-attack range and lethality that does not and will not exist for any other asset in the fleet. The industry team dedicated to fielding AGS/LRLAP will face numerous and significant technical challenges during the next five years. All of the component technologies, however, have been demonstrated in the environments they are intended to operate. It is true that the AGS/LRLAP vendors have understated the technical challenges of fielding this weapon. However, they are very close to successfully demonstrating they will be able to deliver the advertised capability. The AGS magazine design is modular, lending itself to replacement by emergent technologies when they mature.
The challenges of bringing a rail gun to the fleet as a strike weapon are exponentially more difficult than AGS/LRLAP. To help understand the challenge, I find it helpful to follow the energy. How much energy (fuel) will it take to get the projectile off the rail? One advantage of a propelling charge is it does not deplete fuel resources. The greatest challenge will be the projectile. The projectile will have to be very lightweight, survive tremendous O-forces, operate at very high velocities, and operate in a strong electromagnetic pulse environment. The projectile will either have to be guided or very accurately aimed. The technology does not exist to aim or guide under the environmental conditions described. A lightweight kinetic kill projectile has not demonstrated lethality against strike warfare target sets. The ability of the lightweight projectile to survive atmospheric re-entry (exo-atmospheric trajectory would be necessary for defilade targets, and all targets will likely be defilade due to curvature of the earth) and guide while conserving its kinetic energy seems problematic. I think 20 years is an aggressively optimistic estimate of when we will have a rail gun for strike warfare. By the time a rail gun is ready for fleet use, DD(X) overhaul and perhaps replacement of one or both of the guns is certainly an option. One gun replacement will probably be optimum because rail gun and AGS will likely be effective against different target sets.
The combination of MK 57 VLS and AGS will give DD(X) the offensive power our fleet needs. These systems are flexible enough to meet future needs through spiral design. DD(X) (spiraling to CG(X) for CG-47 replacement) and LCS are the right combinations of ships to meet naval offensive surface combatant commitments for the next 30 years.
"A Year of Compromise"
(See E. Wertheim, pp. 32-40, March 2005 Proceedings)
Chief Cryptozogic Technician (Interpretive) Robert Burns, U.S. Navy, Defense Threat Reduction Agency-Eric Wertheim's synopsis of the Russian Navy's activities during 2004 did not fully encapsulate many of the more memorable events of last year. Mr. Wertheim surely might have mentioned some or all of the following events:
* February: (1) The Slava-class carrier Varyag, the Udaloy-class destroyer Admiral Tributs, and the Grisha V-class light frigate Koreyets conducted a port call to the Republic of Korea; (2) The Delta IVclass ballistic missile nuclear submarines Novomoskovsk and Kareliya both failed to successfully launch SS-N-23 ballistic missiles during Exercise Bezopasnost 2004, one of the more "grandiose" (in the words of several Russian military analysts) strategic nuclear forces exercises in the past 20 years.
* July: Despite a fire in April 2004 and following more than seven years of inactivity and shipyard upgrades (restarted only after the August 2000 Kursk accident and failed rescue operation), the Elbrusclass submarine rescue ship Alagez returned to service at the Pacific Fleet's Rybachiy submarine base
* August: The Ropucha II-class tank landing ship (LST) BDK-11, the Udaloy-class destroyer Marshal Shaposhnikov, and the Tarantul Ill-class patrol gunboat R-29 conducted a port call to Kure, Japan (this contradicts Mr. Wertheim's assertion that it was the Mitmfan Moskalenko, a Northern Fleet unit, that conducted the Pacific Rim port call).
* September: (1) The Akula Il-class nuclear-powered submarine Vepr conducted the first-ever visit by a Russian nuclear submarine to a NATO country (France); (2) The Slava-class carrier Moskva conducted a deployment to the Mediterranean Sea with port calls in Turkey, Greece, and Italy; (3) The first hull of the new Project 1198.0 class of diving ships completed factory and state trials and was due to enter naval service in October. This is the first new diving ship built for the Russian Navy in the past 20 years.
* October: Russia's Northern Fleet and the U.S. Navy conducted Exercise Northern Eagle 2004, the first-ever joint at-sea exercise between the two former adversaries. The exercise focused on counterterrorism and weapons of mass destruction nonproliferation, in line with President Bush's Proliferation Security Initiative. Participants in the exercise included the USS Hue City (CG-66) and Udaloy-class destroyers Admiral Levchenko and Severomorsk
* November: The Krivak II-class frigate Pytlivyy and the Kashin-class guided missile frigate Smetlivyy participated in NATO's Operation Active Endeavor in the Mediterranean Sea.
* December: (1) The first hull of the new Project 1171.1 (modified Alligator LST) class of amphibious landing ships- VitseAdmiral-Ivan Gre/i-was laid down; (2) The first hull of the new Project 1828.0 class of intelligence collection ships-Admiral Yurij Ivanov-was laid down.
"Navy's Reserve Will Be Integrated with Active Forces"
(See D. Anderson and J. A. Winnefeld, pp. 6162, November 2004; D. Woods, A. Balunek, pp. 14-16, January 2005; J. Manfreda, pp. 26-27, February 2005; L. DeVries, pp. 26-28, April 2005 Proceedings)
Commander Richard S. Martinson, U.S. Coast Guard (Retired)-Captain Joseph Manfreda's comments regarding the integration of reservists into active-duty forces was like reading a piece of ancient history.
I have been retired for a decade and I cannot speak to the state of the Coast Guard Reserve today. I am, however, most familiar with the problems that led to the integration of reservists into the active-duty Coast Guard in the early 1990s.
During the 1980s, Coast Guard reservists were basically on the outside of the mainstream Coast Guard. Assigned to reserve units with little relevance to any active-duty functions, they were forced to beg, borrow, and steal for the use of equipment and for active-duty training support, not to mention trying to gain any semblance of acceptance as a contributing equal at an active Coast Guard unit. Isolated units as well as individual members did achieve success in their attempts to associate meaningfully with active-duty commands but it was an ongoing struggle that was regularly interrupted with changes of supervisors or commanding officers.
In 1987, frustrated with the stream of reservists who inundated his units each weekend and over whom he felt he had no real authority or control at any level, my group commander directed me to find a workable solution. I was the deputy group commander and had worked with reservists, both Coast Guard and Navy, in a variety of situations over several years. My answer was to incorporate them into the group's command structure so that we would have responsibility for their training and readiness and do away with the seemingly frivolous reserve units that appeared to exist solely as self-serving entities. With the blessing of the district commander, we implemented the idea with great success. The most immediate gauge of our achievements was that morale among both reserve members and the active-duty forces immediately improved with both groups suddenly able to understand how they fit together.
The concept was picked up by reserve Rear Admiral Bob Merrilees while he was assigned to the Pacific Area in the early 1990s. Studying our group's successes and employing his own working groups, Admiral Merrilees concluded, following 18 months of study, that the integration concept worked and would improve the overall training and readiness of the Coast Guard Reserve. His conclusions were presented to the Pacific Area commander in the spring of 1992 where they were immediately adopted with a recommendation forwarded to the Commandant suggesting that integration be implemented throughout the Coast Guard. And, as they say, the rest is history.
As important as integration was to the overall readiness of the Coast Guard Reserve, there were those who were not happy. Integration meant that there was not a need for as many senior officers as the old reserve unit system employed. Unfortunately, rather than accept that integration was working well for all other levels of the reserve program, and that constructive employment of senior officers should be an area to be studied and addressed, a campaign was waged by certain officers who wanted to return to the old system primarily for their own personal gratification. Thank goodness, for the good of the Coast Guard, they were not successful in their efforts.
At the time I retired from active duty, the melding of the reserve and active-duty forces truly fostered the idea of the one Coast Guard concept. I think the ease in which called-up reservists fit into the active-duty organization following the attacks of 11 September 2001 is a testament to the success of integration.
"Keep the Best, Let Go of the Rest"
(See P. Morin, pp. 50-52, February 2005 Proceedings)
Radioman Third Class Curtis Green, U.S. Navy (Retired)-Chief Morin makes a valid case for seeking and retaining the best enlisted personnel, and implementing a method for removing those who don't measure up. He does not, however, address the best use of these personnel that the Navy desires to retain once it finds them. I am referring to the current practice of the temporary assignment of ship's company enlisted personnel from all divisions to the security section. My youngest daughter is currently an electronics technician (as is Chief Morin) stationed on board ship. She wasn't on board for long before she was temporarily assigned to the security section and standing watches on the pier. I'm confident that the Navy spent a large sum in training my daughter to become an electronics technician, with a specialty in a particular type of radar system. To me, as a former Navy enlisted person and taxpayer, it doesn't make much sense to take the time and expense to train someone in a highly technical field only to subsequently use them in what I would call a non-technical assignment. This questionable practice is even more notable because the Navy now has a master-at-arms enlisted rating that would seem to best address security issues.
Toward the end of my enlistment, I was temporarily assigned to my ship's masterat-arms force under a system that required each ship's division to supply personnel for this duty on a rotating basis. The main difference between then and now is that there was no master-at-arms enlisted rating at that time to handle such duties. Even with the new rating, however, such temporary assignments to ship's security continue, some 30 years after my discharge.
It's an excellent idea and goal to find, recruit, and retain the best people possible for the Navy. But once you get them on board, utilize them in what you trained them for, not duty assignments that can best be handled by other enlisted rates.
"Wolf PAC: Exploiting Distributed Operations"
(See G.E. Glaros, pp. 42-45, February 2005 Proceedings}
Steven Zoraster-Wolf PAC may be a brilliantly conceived research effort, but that interpretation is not supported by an article created out of business-speak and military jargon held together by randomly inserted action verbs. Citing similar projects that were successful would have provided reason to expect Wolf PAC to be successful. The failure to mention even one is disturbing. Given the failure of the German U-boat campaign during World War II and strong naval participation in Wolf PAC, surely a better name could have been found?