Accountability Ain't What It Used to Be

Once upon a time I commanded a ship. I was held accountable for things beyond my control, and circumstances I had not anticipated. For this I was relieved of my command and relegated to the ranks of the unpromotable. I was unhappy about this at the time, but have come to realize that, although I still disagree with the commodore who fired me, it was his prerogative to do so. And, in his mind and that of the chain of command, I was being held accountable for the responsibility and authority I had been granted as a commanding officer.

Now, a dozen years later, I find a three-star surface warfare officer (SWO) who apparently believes that I should not have been held so accountable. Nor, apparently, should anyone who has erred in some avoidable way. Vice Admiral Tom Church, the Inspector General of the Navy, said this at a Pentagon press briefing on 10 March 2005:

"I don't think you can hold someone accountable for a situation that maybe if you had done something different, maybe something would have occurred differently. It's a lesson learned that we need to capture and think about for the future."

Well, Admiral, you're wrong. We captured this lesson a long, long time ago. Commanders are accountable for everything their command does or fails to do. Failure to anticipate a situation is not an excuse. Situations beyond one's control are not an excuse. Uncharted seamounts, such as the one the USS San Francisco (SSN-711) recently struck at high speed, are not an excuse. Command accountability remains. It is a cornerstone of the Navy's tradition. It is embedded in military history.

But the admiral wasn't talking about the San Francisco. The subject was his investigation of U.S. interrogation methods, partly brought about by the graphic photographs from the Abu Ghraib prison incident. Enlisted personnel are being court-martialed, but I am not aware of any command-level officer being held accountable for that incident (Brigadier General Janis L. Karpinski apparently has been reprimanded.)

Nevertheless, the general embarrassed every officer who has ever served by essentially saying that those under her command were out of control-and that it was not her fault.

Perhaps they were. And you, General Karpinski, obviously did not have control. But you did have command. You did have responsibility for those under your command. You did have authority over your command. And your superior in the chain-of-command had authority over you and responsibility for you and your command as well. As officers in command, accountability for what occurred under your command is inescapable and unavoidable. At least, it was when I served, not so long ago.

Admiral Church, I guess, does not see things this way. One can't be held accountable for not having foresight or anticipating situations. Maybe he needs to read the "Hobson's Choice" essay taught at the Naval Academy and NROTC units, as he apparently has not:

"On the sea there is a tradition older even than the traditions of the country itself and wiser in its age than this new custom. It is the tradition that with responsibility goes authority and with them accountability . . . .for men will not long trust leaders who feel themselves beyond accountability for what they do. And when men lose confidence and trust in those who lead, order disintegrates into chaos and purposeful ships into uncontrollable derelicts."*

I guess since his investigation did not involve ships, accountability doesn't matter. I think it should.

Take off your SWO pin, Admiral. You are embarrassing those of us who take accountability seriously.