I recently had the distinct pleasure of deploying to Baghdad, Iraq with Naval Special Warfare Squadron 1 (NSWRON 1) as head of their fire support (air, artillery, and naval gunfire) shop. My experiences there were very rewarding and introduced me to an aspect of warfare that I had not been able to see before from the relative safety of my cockpit 20,000 feet above the battlefield.
The squadron was a 400-man task group comprised of SEALS, Seabees, Marines from Marine Corps Special Operations Command Detachment 1 (MCSOCOM DET 1), and coalition special forces. The special warfare community has been using the composite squadron concept for several years now. The benefits include better integration with conventional forces and improved flexibility in mission execution.
Operationally, the squadron was broken down into Naval Special Warfare Task Group-Arabian Peninsula (NSWTG-AP) and four task units (TU). Each unit would conduct missions in their respective area of operations (AO) dispersed throughout the Iraqi Theater of Operations (ITO). The task group (TG) would act as a headquarters element that coordinated support and deconfliction efforts from a centralized location in Iraq. My duties included the scheduling and coordination of all fire support measures including rotary and fixed wing gunships, conventional tactical air support, and, in a few cases, artillery batteries.
Serving in this role has left me with the opinion that naval aviation must do a better job of supporting special operations forces (SOF) missions. Naval aviation should learn from the experiences of the Air Force and Army and build on them to perfect their own SOF support. Rotary wing SOF support should be made a permanent subset of naval aviation and be a priority for future acquisition and training decisions. In addition, an aviation liaison naval officer (LNO) should be assigned to deploying special operations squadrons.
Assets
HCS-4, attached to Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC), provided the best support of any forces in theater with their four HH-60H Seahawk helicopters. This reserve squadron and NSWRON 1 cultivated a solid relationship during the work-up period prior to deployment. Aircrews from HCS-4 epitomized the flexibility and "can-do" spirit for which naval aviation is famous.
Fixed-wing support from the carrier was considerably more difficult to coordinate. When we first arrived in theater, the carrier operating in the Arabian Gulf had an established 12-hour fly window, while Air Force assets covered the remaining 12 hours. This worked well for strike fighter missions, since both services were operating aircraft with similar capabilities. It left a gap, however, in coverage for electronic warfare missions because carrier-based Prowlers were the only tactical assets in theater. Unfortunately, the carrier's operating hours did not coincide with the timeframe within which most of our missions were being executed.
After about three weeks of unsupported requests, we were able to arrange with the carrier to provide a window of support during hours closer to what we typically needed. This allowed us to significantly reduce the threat to the operators. However, it also reduced our flexibility since we had to plan missions to accommodate the carrier's designated times rather than the needs of the SOF operators. In most cases we were able to work something out, but doctrinally speaking, the supporting assets should not be dictating the mission requirements. We felt that the additional capabilities the Prowler provided were worth the added risk caused by scheduling missions during more predictable times.
At one point we were assigned a mission of strategic importance and extremely high risk. Although this was deemed the number one priority mission in the theater, we still ran into significant resistance while trying to get assets in place to support the operation. Mission timing was such that we were already executing it while the generals and admirals were still discussing whether or not to provide the assets required. Disappointment and professional embarrassment resulted as I attempted to explain to the SOF operators that they would be facing additional risk while the fleet Navy was fighting political battles over how to support their mission. Eventually, the right decisions were made to get additional assets into theater to cover the period of time that the carrier was not operating; nevertheless it took more than a month for this to occur.
In the meantime, mission timing precluded launches from the carrier operating in the Arabian Gulf to meet the required tasking. An obvious short-term solution was to operate a detachment of the Prowler squadron from one of the many airfields available in Iraq until additional assets arrived in theater. Navy leadership would not even discuss this option. While I understand the political ramifications of putting carrier-based aircraft ashore, a war zone with casualties mounting every day is no place for this kind of posturing.
There was a point at which the carrier was preparing to go into port while the request for forces was still working through channels at Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) headquarters. The carrier had prepared the Prowler squadron to execute a beach detachment to cover this period. Regrettably the request from headquarters did not make it out before the ship had pulled in and the Navy would not offer up the capability without being asked. Combat operations require that military forces lean as far forward as possible to support the men and women on the ground. Senior leadership must understand that mantras like "One team, one fight!" become empty slogans when those going in harm's way see the assets they need, already in theater, not allowed to support them.
The LNO Position
Air coordination is best performed by someone who understands the needs and limitations of both the SOF operators and the aviation assets supporting them. Although the fire support billet does not require aviation experience, it is certainly preferred. An aviator should be a permanent asset of the squadron whenever air support is going to be needed in the planned theater of operations. This could take the form of a permanent position on the SEAL Team or a temporary assignment that should include, at the very least, the certification exercise work up period and the entire deployment. Either option would provide the aviator assigned with the time to learn the nuances of SOF missions and the best way to support them. Furthermore, the operators would have a chance to become familiar with the aviator's capabilities. Marine Corps forward air controllers and certain SOF units have been working this way for years and the concept has served them well.
Special operations missions tend to require execution on short notice. Human intelligence and other sources often present information of a fleeting nature that must be acted upon within a matter of hours before it expires. SOF operators benefit greatly by having someone available to translate their needs to the various aviation platforms available. Strike Lead and Joint Terminal Attack Controller qualifications, as well as Strike Warfare Commander's Watch or Combined Air Operations Center experience are a recommended base level of experience. Effectiveness at this job will be determined by the aviator's ability to successfully interact with and translate between SOF operators, Combined Forces Air Component Commander, Air Support Operations Center, and conventional Army units.
Summary
There is much more that the U.S. Navy can do in the Global War on Terrorism. Rotary wing, fixed wing electronic attack, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support to SOF is a tremendous force multiplier. The ubiquitous presence of naval forces makes them the first choice to move into a conflict ashore. There must also be a contingency to make these forces expeditionary if the need arises. There are Navy assets currently not operating at the high operational tempo that ground conventional and SOF units are experiencing. Support to these ground troops is vital and should be the plan during the Strike Group work up, rather than a contingency that is coordinated in theater. Military leadership cannot lose sight of the fact that their number one priority must always be the men and women at the tip of the spear that they wield.
Lieutenant Commander Speredelozzi is the EA-6B Prowler branch head at Air Test and Evaluation Squadron Nine (VX-9). In addition to his tour of duty in Iraq with SEAL Team One from April-July 2004, he is a veteran of Operations Enduring Freedom Southern Watch, and Joint Guardian. He has logged more than 2400 flight hours in 15 different airframes.