During a safety stand-down following an F/A-18 Hornet accident several years ago, the Marine Air Group-31 commanding officer observed to me and my fellow aviators that MiG-29 pilots need not fear air-to-air combat or base bombings at our hands. The enemy would not have to engage us; all he had to do was sit back and watch us kill ourselves on takeoffs and landings.
At the time, we thought he was wrong; today, I think he might be right. The Marine Corps tactical air mishap rate for fiscal year 2004—an alarming 6.37—was the worst since 1990. Of eight mishaps, seven-and very possibly the eighth-occurred during the administrative or tactical administrative portions of the flight. Most skill-based errors occurred while executing fairly routine maneuvers that should be nearly automatic. In 1991, the Naval Safety Center recorded 30 errors; this past year Marines logged more than 100.
Why such an increase in the number of skill-based errors? Consider the following:
* A documented decline in the quality of aviators entering VFA-125, the Hornet fleet replacement squadron (FRS)
* Increased system complexity
* More collateral duty assignments
* Not enough money for spare parts and flight hours
* Leadership
These issues are at the heart of the what's wrong. Added to this mix are an increased operational tempo and shortcomings in our training programs. The mishap rate has nowhere to go but up unless we solve these problems.
Quality of Student Aviators
Some student naval aviators, not surprisingly, look for the shortest route by which they can earn their wings, make it to the fleet, and lead Marines. The first step in the process for all Marine students is primary flight training, where they get about 66 hours in the turboprop T-34C. Primary training instructors normally are helicopter and KC-130 pilots who fuel the fledgling pilots' belief that the best and fastest way to the fleet is not through the multiyear jet pipeline. As a result, the students with the highest composite and Navy standard scores are not choosing jets, and this is creating a whole new set of challenges for the training community.
Following T-34 training, flight students move on to the T-45 training system, where they get about 157 flight hours. By the time newly designated aviators fresh from the training command join the FRS, they have about 225 hours in the cockpit. Before the advent of the T-34C/T-45 training system, jet-pipeline students completed a shorter T-34 course, flew the T-2 Buckeye, and then transitioned to the TA-4 Skyhawk for advanced training. They flew three different aircraft, went to the ship in the T-2 and the TA-4 and had 310-plus hours when they got their wings.
Today, not only have they lost a chance to fly a third aircraft, they have lost 80 to 90 flying hours—and every hour is important at this early stage of the game. Their lack of experience shows when they enter the replacement squadron, and it carries over to their first fleet squadron, which must bear the burden of helping the young aviators make up for the lost hours. All this notwithstanding, many new aviators are able to transition smoothly to the highly demanding single-seat F/A-18 cockpit.
For those who struggled in the T-45 program and who may have struggled during T-34 training as well, however, the transition can be fraught with difficulty. The squadron can no longer count on the best and most able entering the program, and must train this new breed of student to continue to meet the fleet demand.
Composite scores are not absolute predictors of pilot performance but trend analysis at VFA-125 for fiscal years 2001 to 2003 vividly illustrates that below-average aviators require substantially more resources (i.e., flight hours) to complete the syllabus than do those who are average or above average. Analysis of the data clearly shows that as composite and standard scores increase, the young aviators experience fewer difficulties.
The average composite/standard scores for new aviators entering VFA-125 was 21 1/52 for fiscal years 1996 to 2003. Those entering with this combination typically completed the syllabus with the exact amount of flight time-130 hours-prescribed by the syllabus. As scores fall below average, flight time required to complete increases dramatically because of the requirement for extra training flights (training command performance is, in fact, a good predictor of future performance). Students experiencing difficulties are given incompletes on training flights and increased time in the simulator to grasp the critical concepts they must master in order to progress in the training syllabus. Remember, however, that simulators, while great tools to increase exposure to new weapons and systems in the F/A-18, are only part-task trainers; they cannot replace skills gained only by flying the aircraft and devoting brain matter to multiple tasks on missions that rarely go as planned.
Why are we working so hard to pass students who are not progressing normally? Fleet shortages have forced the commands to train these students at all cost. When we try to drop the below-average students, higher-ups beyond the squadron level force the students back into training. It is not uncommon to have a student complete training with as many as six signals of difficulty, and to have arrived with at least that many from their previous training. Only six years ago, the rule was three strikes and you're out; more than three throughout the entire training syllabus was cause for attrition.
One byproduct of this more permissive policy, aside from the issue of quality of new aviators, is a growing feeling among instructors that the leadership doesn't trust their judgment. The result has been a shift in the role of the instructor pilot from producing high-quality, "brought-up-under-the-wing" aviators to simply cranking out numbers regardless of skill. Overall, below-average aviators, as measured by their composite/standard scores create a strain on the replacement squadron
Fixing the tactical aviation mishap rate will mean fixing the student aviator quality problem. As a good first step in the last year, the Corps has toughened the standards to become a Marine aviator. Because of the length of time it takes to train a Marine aviator—attendance at Basic School and other training wickets may require more than four years to make it to the fleet—the tactical aviation community will not reap the benefit of higher recruiting standards for years.
But we should look beyond the quality of the students coming in; we should look at what we demand of the students before they can get out of flight school and into the fleet. Students whose scores fall below a combined composite/standard score of 190/45 should be given additional training while still in the T-45 syllabus and not simply passed along to the replacement squadron.
Nearly a quarter of the 200 students at VFA-125 in fiscal years 2001 through 2004 had scores below the suggested standard. These 43 students could have remained in the T-45 program gaining additional experience at a significantly lower cost. The T-45 cost per flight hour is approximately $1,000, compared to $4,000 to $6,000 per hour for the F/A-18.
Another option would be a 25-hour program for lowerperforming students that mirrors the Air Force's Introduction to Fighter Fundamentals course. This would include basic formation, tactical formation, and other sorties that emphasize the high workloads typical of F/A-18 sorties. Completing this fighter lead-in program in the training command would give below-average students a better chance of success and, ultimately, ease the burden on fleet squadrons. These measures could preserve valuable and limited resources in the fleet while getting the most out of the Marine Corps investment in each new aviator. A program on this scale will need full support of senior leadership for implementation.
Sucking Flight Time Dry with Collateral Billets
Consider the new aviator who has had some difficulties along the way but persevered and joined the fleet as a competent aviator. What is in store for this new F/A-18 pilot? Maintaining proficiency competes for time with collateral duty assignments. Compared with other services that employ tactical aircraft, Marine aviators must do so many other things that flying may seem like a hobby.
A new Marine Hornet pilot stepping into his squadron comes to understand quickly that flying is not his only job. Some collateral-duty assignments have to be done to allow the squadron to operate, but there are all the other responsibilities: coffee mess officer, voting officer, Navy-Marine Corps Relief and Combined Federal Campaign drives, command historical officer, respiratory program manager, and so on.
The combat wingman program or level-two series of sorties give the nugget a three-month reprieve from collateral billet assignments to allow him to achieve the level of readiness required of a wingman in combat. Unfortunately, depending on when the new guy has checked in, whether it's a post-unit deployment cycle in which the majority of mid-grade captains are at the three-year point and are executing follow-on orders, or it's voting season, or the Marine Corps Ball needs attention, the nugget's time in the combat wingman program is cut short. He is not getting to be a better aviator.
There are costs associated with paying too much attention to collateral duties; many Marine aviators find themselves:
* Working the collateral billet assignment until ten seconds prior to the time hack for the start of the brief
* Continuing during the brief to devote attention and brain matter to other issues not related to the upcoming flight
* Checking, as soon as the brief is over, a couple of more e-mails, putting out a few fires or sorting out a non-flight-related issue
* Cutting short the debrief to attend to issues in the collateral billet
Increasing Systems and Weapons Complexity
All that time spent on collateral duties takes away from the young aviator's primary job: training and maintaining proficiency in flying the Hornet. In only four years, the complexity of the weapons and systems capability has increased dramatically. These advancements include the Global Positioning System and its associated smart weapons: the joint direct attack munition, joint standoff weapon, and the extended-range standoff land-attack missile (preferred weapons in the first stages of any conflict), Nitehawk forward-looking infrared/Litening Pod for the F/A-18D, and the associated laser-guided weapons, new radars and radios, the high-speed antiradiation missile, the AIM-9X Sidewinder air-to-air missile and helmet-mounted systems, and the recent addition of data links (such as Link-16), the majority of which are not taught in the FRS.
You just do not load and drop the bombs like in the old days; most of these systems require use of the tactical aircraft mission planning system in order to function properly with the aircraft interfaces. Tactics are subject to yearly reviews, and a new software version comes out every few years along with the weapons systems that forced the software change.
The current F/A-18 training and readiness manual recommends 17 to 19 pilots per squadron, a level that has been essentially unchanged for years and certainly does not incorporate any consideration of the extraordinary complexity introduced since manning levels were last studied in 1994. Marine aviators, like those in other services, are Type A personality types who will push themselves to get the job done no matter what the time and resource constraints.
Marines have to be more than pilots: We have to be grunts, too. We are rated first and foremost on our ability to lead Marines and to perform collateral duties-and not on our ability to employ the F/A-18. Unlike other military aviators, we are also overinvolved in aviation maintenance, which we need to give back to our non-commissioned officers. Being pulled in so many different directions means something will have to give, and unfortunately, it may be the brief and debrief that loses the battle. The time stretch means there is not much left over to devote to premission study and planning.
Sorties and flight hours provide aviators the opportunity to plan, brief, execute, and debrief-all necessary skills that must be reinforced to maintain tactical proficiency. The Marine Aviation Campaign Plan, reviewed in 2002, drives the hours and numbers of sorties we fly. It established a sortie goal of a minimum of 12 to 15 sorties per aircrew per month. Based on a 1.3-hour sortie, the goal translates into 187 to 234 hours per year.
The increase in systems and weapons capability, however, now dictates more sorties to achieve combat readiness. Sortie-based training should be reevaluated and readjusted to a more realistic goal of 15 to 18 sorties per month or 234 to 280 hours per year per pilot—an increase per squadron of approximately 840 hours. These increases would undoubtedly have a significant impact on our combat capability—and our mishap rate. Increasing flight hours and sorties will, of course, require an attendant increase in funding for parts, fuel, and manpower to meet the adjustments.
Simulators may offer some relief. Increasing the use of the simulator to four to six events could lead to dropping two flights per month per aviator. Most important to remember, though, is that simulation is an augment to overall combat readiness, not a replacement. The future of simulation does not mean we can cut flight funding 20% and still maintain readiness and safety to avoid skill-based errors. We are very close to the bottom line for reductions in flight time-we cannot cut more. Because we need more flight time, not less, it is important that our leaders not sell simulation as an answer to our flight hour problem.
Fundamental Leadership Issues
The Marine Corps lost 108 aviators through resignations in fiscal year 1997. There were many reasons, but the zero-defects mentality at higher headquarters—you can't make a mistake and recover—topped the list. Leadership reversed this. Today, there has never been a better time to be an F/A-18 pilot in combat. In garrison, however, it is another story. There, the increased mishap trend is prompting some to revert to zero defects once again.
Should a squadron commanding officer be fired for a mishap? It depends. But if you think there is no choice, then you are part of the zero-defects crew. I have discussed this with many junior officers, and my feeling is that the zero-defects mentality is slowly working its way back into our culture. The sad but indisputable fact is that zero-defects leaders breed more of the same—weak leaders who are afraid to speak up.
Bringing Down the Tactical Aviation Mishap Rate
A detailed discussion of composite squadrons is beyond the scope of this article, but it is worth mentioning. Equipping squadrons with six F/A-18A/Cs and four F/A-18Ds (or, even better, six and six) would not only dramatically increase the combat capability of each squadron, but would also solve a number of the safety issues. Every tactical aviation mishap in fiscal year 2004 occurred in single-seat aircraft squadrons. Given that we are all flying the same airplanes, executing the same missions, and training the same amount of time, the lopsided statistics illustrate the benefits of a two-seat community in which more time can be spent studying the mission, not to mention splitting the same number of collateral billets among twice as many officers.
The tactical aviation mishap rate stems from complicated long-term relationships growing out of leadership decisions, training decisions, and budget decisions. To take the rate down at all, we must address the most pressing problems:
* Decline in the quality of aviators entering the FRS
* Time required to master the increased system complexity
* Unrelenting expansion of collateral duty assignments
* Lack of funding for increased flight hours and parts
We don't need to commission studies and spend time and money looking for the obvious solutions to these problems. What we need to do is spend less time on our ground jobs and fly more to maintain proficiency in the F/A-18.
In March 2004, the Marine Corps Times ran an article discussing the high mishap rate in fiscal year 2004. A lieutenant colonel working in aviation safety for the Marine Corps pronounced the trend "disconcerting," mainly because the accidents occurred in a year in which aviators had logged fewer flights than in an average year. He went on: "If you think about it, one would hope you'd have fewer mishaps with fewer flight hours." He missed the whole point. If an aviator does not have enough flight time to maintain currency, let alone proficiency, his safety record can only get worse.
Marine Corps senior leadership should fight for flight hours and return our training focus to preparing to deploy tomorrow. We are, after all, at war, and the focus needs to be on meeting commanders' needs today and not worrying about issues that we can entrust our staff NCOs to handle.
If we fail to recognize the reality that aviators need to fly to maintain proficiency, we will continue to set up our tactical aviation squadrons for failure. Those who train tomorrow's young aviators will lack the experience they need to meet the training needs of our squadrons years from now. The vicious cycle could be just beginning.
Major Richard Hendrick is an FRS instructor with VFA-125, Naval Air Station Lemoore. He previously served as the pilot training officer for VMFA-122 at Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, South Carolina.