Professional Note: Fix Fires at the Fire Support Team

The mission of field artillery is to "destroy, neutralize, or suppress the enemy by cannon, rocket, and missile fire, and to help integrate all fire support assets into combined arms operations." The Marine Corps' artillery community is a society composed of conscientious professionals who take pride in their craft. And for some time, the general consensus of the community has been that structural and material repairs are required. In 1999, Commandant of the Marine Corps General James Jones issued a directive aimed at reviewing the role, mission, organization, doctrine, structure, and training of Marine Corps field artillery.¹

Since General Jones indicated his intent to "fix fires," much has been done to upgrade system acquisition and expand on the logic behind the acquisition of various systems. Delivery of new weapon systems boosts morale and capability, but morale and capability do not equate to the skills needed to plan for the maneuver commander's fire support.

The crux of our problem lies in the way we organize for fire support. If a force has a modern command-and-control system backed by properly trained fire support personnel, it can prevail in most combat scenarios—even if it is armed with an outdated weapon system. Thus, while I certainly do not oppose the acquisition of new systems, I believe the Marine Corps should give the highest priority to developing new and improved ways to train and assign fire supporters.

Fire Support Team Organization

There are three fire support teams (FiSTs) in the Marine infantry battalion (one per rifle company). Each team is composed of four key members:

* Team leader—usually a weapons platoon commander

* Forward air controller (FAC)—an aviator assigned to the infantry battalion

* Forward observer (FO)—an artillery officer attached temporarily to the infantry battalion

* 81-mm mortar FO—often randomly picked from the mortar platoon

The FiST is the best tool for employing supporting arms. A properly trained FiST is the rifle company commander's right arm for planning and using all available fires in a timely fashion. It is the interface between the company commander, the infantry battalion's fire support coordination center (FSCC), and supporting units.

Obstacles to Progress

Notwithstanding the key warfighting role of FiSTs, they rarely are capable of effectively performing their tasks until many weeks after they have been formed—even then, they are competent only at the basic level. This unsatisfactory situation results primarily from lack of home-station training.

Although there is supposed to be a constant and close relationship between each Marine division's infantry regiment and its supporting artillery battalion, many units fail to ensure their FiSTs are trained adequately. This comes about because of competing priorities rather than outright neglect. Moreover, the competence of teams will vary greatly from one rifle company to the next.

It is not unusual to find a FiST where: the leader knows little about fire support planning and integration; the artillery FO knows only the fundamentals of call for fire (CFF) and is unable to advise the company on artillery operations and fires planning; the 81-mm mortar FO has practically no experience; and the FAC, by virtue of his seniority, tries to assume leadership to fill a knowledge vacuum.

Artillery officers no longer are considered to be the resident experts in fire support, and they are not assigned as infantry battalion fire support coordinators, as in the past. The status quo would suffice if the average company-grade infantry officer had a tight grasp on fire support tactics, techniques, and procedures. But, as a rule, he does not, because he has a great deal to master in his own specialty.

Today, when a second lieutenant joins his artillery battalion after graduation from the Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, he most likely will be assigned as an FO. This comes at a time when his technical gunnery skills are fresh and in need of the kind of reinforcement that takes place at the artillery battery level. It cannot happen, however, if he is assigned as a FO, where his gunnery skills—which are harder to accumulate than FO skills—will deteriorate. Forward observation and related skills should not be confused with fire support skills.

For better or worse, FOs are the most visible projection of the artillery's face in the infantry community. Unfortunately, the current view projected is that of inexperience. In the absence of any practical operating experience, FOs are expected to professionally and confidently advise the infantry company commander on a wide range of fire support issues, including battery operations.

Remedial Measures

To effectively assimilate and train FiSTs, the Marine Corps should change the tables of organization (T/Os) for the artillery and infantry communities and realign the career progression of the artillery officer (Military Occupational Specialty [MOS] 0802) and enlisted scout observer (MOS 0861). As these officers and enlisted Marines advance, they should find themselves in key fire support assignments throughout the division.

Artillery regiments should mandate fire support training sessions for junior officers so they can learn from senior officers and staff noncommissioned officers (SNCOs). These detailed sessions would teach second lieutenants what is expected of them as FOs, and cover everything from the intricacies of the FiST to the conduct of fire support planning. Besides educating newcomers, the classes would serve as useful reviews for senior officers and SNCOs.

To make time for this critical training, artillery leaders should reduce the time that junior officers are required to spend on collateral duties. Most artillery batteries have SNCOs and NCOs who are more than capable of accomplishing any task given them—especially when they are afforded greater responsibly. This approach gives more tactical training time to the officer (usually an afterthought) and gives more responsibility and growth potential to enlisted Marines. As the junior officer's tactical knowledge grows, he would be obligated to impart it to his junior 0861s, thereby providing greater depth of knowledge at the battery and company level. Although most junior 0861s are more than capable of understanding fire support tactics, techniques, and procedures, they are not taught them formally.

Once a second lieutenant is promoted to first lieutenant and a 0861 becomes an NCO, they should be evaluated for possible reassignment to an infantry battalion. Beyond professional knowledge, the evaluation would include determining their potential as suitable artillery representatives to the infantry community.

Reassignment of 0802s and 0861s to infantry units would have these advantages:

* Artillery officers would be employed daily as professional fire supporters for the infantry, which is vastly different from being involved in purely artillery operations or being attached periodically to the infantry as an FO. Artillery officers and NCOs would be integrated in the day-to-day training routine of infantry Marines, and could ensure that the fundamentals of CFF and fire support planning were conveyed to every unit in the battalion.

* FOs would work side by side with the FAC (probably in the same office), thus promoting the cross pollination and refinement of ideas and capabilities.

* There would be less competing interests to keep the FiST from training. Learning would become more efficient because the key personnel would see each other daily

* In return, artillery units would get officers with firsthand experience in maneuver units. Over time, as they mature and assume greater responsibility in the artillery, the mind-set of the "redleg" would change as the community comes to see itself as fire supporters first and foremost.