High-Speed Sealift Is a Joint Mission

High-speed vessels, such as the Navy's Joint Venture (HSV-X1) and the Army's Spearhead (TSV-1X), not only are first-rate troop transport vessels, but project power inland by supporting aviation and littoral missions as well. If joint component commanders thoughtfully integrate HSVs with other assets, mission effectiveness will take off.

The recent introduction of high-speed vessels (HSVs) into military service is the most exciting thing to happen to the surface fleet since the introduction of the Aegis radar system. Already, the performance of the Joint Venture (HSV-X1) and similar ships during Operation Iraqi Freedom has made many take notice of the capabilities these vessels bring to the war fighter. Though it may be a stretch to call speed by itself transformational, it is fair to say that the wave-piercing catamaran, in conjunction with other Navy initiatives in the rotary-wing and special warfare arenas, promises to transform significantly the way the Navy does business in the littorals.

However, there stands a divergence on how these ships should be employed in a joint operation. The Army views the HSV as a theater support vessel with a focus on logistics. The Marine Corps holds a similar view, though it envisions operational maneuver, noncombatant evacuation, and riverine operations as well. The Navy sees the HSV as a littoral combat-oriented platform.¹ To maximize the contributions of HSVs in operational employment, the Department of Defense (DoD) needs a joint approach and a multimission solution. The best way to employ the HSV in an operation is to place all vessels under direct control of the joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC) and enable the JFMCC staff to use these few flexible assets dynamically across military components.

Concept and Capabilities

The current generation of military HSVs is based on technology fully developed by the commercial sealift industry. Substantially developed in the 1980s, the Australian firm Incat's wave-piercing catamaran is one of the most commercially practical hull forms for speed with relative economy. The firm's MV Cat-Link V currently holds the transatlantic crossing speed record of 39.897 knots, set in 1998. In this country, the Army has driven much of the interest in high-speed ships to help shrink its deployment timeline. It leased the Joint Venture and Spearhead (TSV-1X) for joint experimentation.

Both the Joint Venture and Spearhead deployed to Southwest Asia in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Spearhead was used for intratheater transport to Kuwait, moving two Patriot missile batteries from Qatar, 500 tons of ammunition from Jordan, and the 101st Air Assault Division Military Police from Djibouti, all at much higher speeds than possible with current intratheater sealift. The Joint Venture played a special operations role in the first days of the war, serving as a "mother ship" for SEALs and their watercraft operating against the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr in a micro version of the Navy's Sea Basing operational concept.

The latest HSV leased from Incat for military use is the Swift (HSV-2). She entered Navy service in August 2003 to serve as an interim mine countermeasures commandand-control ship after the decommissioning of the USS Inchon (MCS-12). The Swift is slated for experimentation with the Navy's littoral combat ship and Sea Basing concepts. Built with military service in mind, she incorporates many of the lessons learned from experience with the Joint Venture and Spearhead. Major enhancements include:

* Low-maintenance helicopter deck with hangar facilities for two MH-60 helicopters

* Strengthened roll-on/roll-off vehicle ramp to accommodate M1A1 main battle tank

* Enhanced stern crane for small-craft operations

The Swift best represents the type of vessel the joint force commander can expect to employ in the next major operation. Its capabilities will provide the basis for later discussion on operational employment.

The Swift, with a speed of more than 46 knots, is almost as fast as the lighter Spearhead.² The ship is lightly armed and her weaponry is primarily for self-defense. The helicopter deck, which the theater support vessel currently does not have, is certified for the H-46 and H-60 helicopters in addition to several smaller airframes. A key capability is her innovative hangar facilities, which allow for storage and maintenance of two of the new MH-60S helicopters. The 12-foot draft allows access to ports denied to deep-draft sealift. Moreover, the HSV extends her operating reach into far more littoral areas than currently is possible with frigates and destroyers, which means the Swift can support helicopter and personnel operations farther inland than other ships with helicopter assets.

Operational Employment

Given the capabilities of the HSVs, they are employable in a wide variety of missions that can serve all of the component commanders. The joint force land component commander (JFLCC) looks to them primarily for cargo and troop hauling. The JFMCC sees them as a littoral command and control platform and mobile helicopter base. The joint force air component commander (JFACC) values the HSVs in a combat search-and-rescue role, and the joint force special operations component commander likes them for sea-based force insertion and support. The missions envisioned for the vessel include:

* High-speed intratheater transport into shallow or damaged ports

* Sea-based logistics

* Special Operations Forces (SOF) insertion, basing, and support

* Antisubmarine warfare (ASW), including command and control (C2)

* Antisurface warfare (ASUW), including C2

* Mine countermeasures, including C2

* Maritime interdiction operations (MIO)

* Noncombatant evacuation operations

* Helicopter "lily pad" range extension operations

* Mining

* Sea-based medical support to land forces

* Riverine operations in support of SOF and land forces

* Counternarcotics operations

The joint task force commander has two options for employing HSVs in an operation. First, HSVs could be apportioned to different component commanders for the duration of the operation to allow maximum responsiveness for component-specific missions. Second, the joint task force commander could assign all HSV assets to the JFMCC, who would employ HSVs in the most effective manner overall to achieve the joint task force objective.

Because the various missions have different emphases based on the phase of an operation, apportioning HSV assets among the components for the duration of an operation would be ineffective. Although it would give combatant commanders direct control over assigned assets, which increases responsiveness, it would not effectively synchronize maritime efforts. The sea is a vast maneuver area and the threat environment can change rapidly. Apportionment stovepipes not only would inhibit synergistic use of assets, but would affect adversely HSV force protection efforts as well. For example, the JFLCC might have vessels dashing unprotected through an ASW threat area with no knowledge of a small-boat threat at a troop redeployment objective. Most important, however, this method of apportionment would not allow for flexible and scalable application of combat and transport power based on the changing needs of the operation.

The JFMCC is the best candidate to optimize HSV employment throughout an operation. Joint Publication 3-32, Doctrine for Command and Control of Joint Maritime Operations (still in draft form), makes the case: "Maritime planners must be able to fully recognize and integrate different capabilities, requirements and limitations of multimission forces. It is important to understand the crucial implications of multi-mission tasking for logistics operations and offensive and defensive operations. These implications must be factored into JFMCC decisions regarding delegation or transfer of command relationships and decisions regarding employment of multi-mission platforms. Some capabilities of multi-mission ships may be made available to other components in direct support based on the JFMCC's apportionment recommendation to the JFC [joint force commander]."³

The primary driver for JFMCC control is the HSVs helicopter-support capabilities, because the HSVs multimission capability is largely dependent on which helicopters are assigned. The HSV can support two H-60 airframes. She can carry the MH-60S Knighthawk, primarily for logistics, search and rescue, and airborne mine countermeasures; or she can carry the MH-60R Strikehawk, which is ASW/ASUW strike focused and carries dipping sonar and sonobuoys. She can carry two of the same variant, or a mix of the two. She can carry the armed or unarmed version and can receive and hangar other DoD H-60s such as the MH-60K or -L SOF versions. Given the array of sea-based rotary-wing assets available to the JFMCC, he is in the best position to manage helicopter assignment and rotation based on mission and threat assessment.

Optimal JFMCC Organization

It is one thing to say JFMCC is the best candidate for HSV management, but quite another to say current JFMCC doctrine is up to the task. The Navy has had a reputation for years as the "least joint" of all the services. Other component commanders may have strong arguments against a JFMCC monopoly over HSV. Concerns can be alleviated or mitigated by an effective and responsive JFMCC organization. Because the HSV can do so much for so many, it is imperative the JFMCC staff be properly trained to plan and produce a maritime tasking order that effectively synchronizes the efforts of its assigned assets-including the HSV-with the operations of the other component commanders to achieve joint task force commander objectives.

The JFMCC staff must sequence and synchronize HSV missions so the right HSVs are placed in a materially and geographically feasible position for follow-on missions with minimal cost in resources. This would be handled best through the creation of an HSV specialist billet on the JFMCC staff, which would be responsible for coordination of vessel and rotary-wing assets and would liaison with other component staffs on HSV missions. This effort is critically important, because the JFMCC will need to rely much more heavily than he ever has on coordination and input from the staff liaison officers.

Enabling cross-component support of the HSVs may be a difficult practice to instill in a staff that heretofore was focused on carrier battle group employment, but it will become routine given time and practice, as the JFMCC staff will come to enjoy the flexibility the multimission HSVs provide. Also, since multiservice rotary-wing aviation is interoperable with the HSVs, JFMCC planners often will find themselves in a pinch for JFMCC airframes, only to find a few extra through their staff liaison officer chain. In fact, the HSVs may provide the necessary impetus for change in the JFMCC culture, instilling true jointness and setting the stage for even greater success in the Sea Basing concept of the future.

Operational Vignette

HSV employment under the JFMCC can be demonstrated by the following hypothetical vignette.

In June 2006, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was thrown into chaos after opposition leader General Rafael Pagaza overthrew the government. North Korea soon provided military advisors and equipment to General Pagaza, hoping to gain access to Congo's uranium. In August 2007, General Pagaza invaded northern Angola and Congo-Brazzaville, seizing key oil fields and refineries.

Joint Task Force Congo was formed to restore territorial integrity of Angola and Congo-Brazzaville, with follow-on action anticipated against the Pagaza regime. The U.S. role was limited to logistics, air superiority, maritime operations, and special operations in support of multinational land forces. Local airfields and ports were no longer safe, with widespread unrest reported. Though DRC's naval threat was minimal, two North Korean Romeo-class submarines with minelaying capability were operating in the waters off Angola. Since adjacent African nations refused to grant basing rights, the joint task force commander developed a course of action that relied on Sea Basing.

The sea base primarily consisted of the Truman Carrier Strike Group and Expeditionary Strike Group 2. The USS John F. Kennedy (CV-67) surged forward to support joint special operations forces, embarking two Marine Corps CH-46 squadrons and several companies of Army helicopters. The Navy's single squadron of 8 HSVs, along with 16 MH-60S and MH-60R helicopters, was assigned sectors for ASW, ASUW, mine countermeasures, and MIO operations.

JFMCC's top priority was to locate the submarines, and the HSVs' ability to launch their MH-60S helos for a sector search, then bolt ahead at high speed to recover, enabled dramatic gains in search area over monohull ships. In fact, an HSV-launched Seahawk had a sonobuoy hit on the second day of operations and quickly located the first Romeo. Another HSV was performing an ASUW screen when her MH-60R detected two DRC Shanghai II patrol craft inbound. One was destroyed by a Penguin missile, while the other sped off and never again strayed outside the mouth of the Congo River.

HSV-based SEALs made contact with the Angolan Army commander, who volunteered troops for the assaults on Luanda and Point Noire. The dilemma for JFLCC was transporting the infantry units hundreds of miles from the inland mountainous terrain they currently occupied. JFMCC rogered up and diverted four HSVs from MIO and MCM duties. The ships embarked a mix of Army, Navy, and Marine helicopters, then sped at 47 knots to a point just 80 miles from the encampment. The Angolans were shuttled by helicopter to the HSVs, which raced north and discharged the troops with reconnaissance provided by organic MH-60S assets. The JFMCC was impressed by how fast the HSV/H-60 package could reach any point 200 miles inland while avoiding risky dispersal of high-value surface escorts.

The operation slowed somewhat when two MH-60s were diverted to conduct a combat search and rescue for a downed EA-6B crew, but the objective was met with hours to spare. Once troop deployment was complete, two HSVs embarked a medical staff and were employed for triage duties, though casualties were light.

This operation demonstrates the tremendous flexibility the HSVs give the joint task force if properly employed by the JFMCC. Such success is not possible unless the JFMCC staff is in tune with joint task force mission priorities and in lockstep with all forces involved. The lessons learned from the JFACC experience can be taken on board with ease if JFMCC planners are open to it. Given the asymmetry of future operations, we simply cannot afford to be standoffish about integrating JFMCC.

The role of the HSVs in a military operation has been limited and primarily experimental to date. Though HSVs already have demonstrated tremendous potential for employment in a combat environment, how the joint task force will manage their employment in a future operation is unknown. Some operations will ask nothing more of HSVs than to shuttle people and equipment from point A to point B, in which cross-component use would be a nonissue. Other situations may dictate a limited multimission application, but where asset apportionment for the operation's duration makes sense. The real challenge will be to figure out how to employ the HSVs in a complex and dynamic environment, where multimission flexibility is a force multiplier.

The HSVs have tremendous potential as maritime assets for the JFMCC and can play a powerful role in logistics and maneuver warfare. Their main operating area is that classic seam in joint operations, the littoral environment. In the transport role, the HSVs have enormous impact on JFLCC-focused land operations, while their aviation assets can project power inland. In a matter of hours, they can shift gears into a classic JFMCC sea control role, hunting submarines with airborne dipping sonar. The JFMCC organization is in the best position to properly manage and integrate these multimission platforms, but it will not come easily. JFMCC doctrine must be written to enable dynamic and robust use of the HSVs across component boundaries. It is better to do this now than to read about it in the next operation's "lessons learned" message.