Commentary: Civilized War Is Uncivilized

Waging so-called civilized warfare does not serve the nation's interest. The United States plays by the rules of international law, but its enemies do not. And, because they do not fear us, war is more likely. We have lost track of the fact that military force is violent coercion and must be exercised in a way so frightening that no adversary will consider provoking us.

The goal is not to look civilized. It is to be civilized by deterring wars; failing that, conclude them quickly. But four characteristics of civilized warfare guarantee continued conflict: proportionality, an artificial distinction between combatants and civilians, reluctance to punish collectively, and the undue rush to end conflicts.

Proportional retaliation ensures a never ending cycle of retribution, such as the Palestinian Intifada. It enables our enemies to select the level of violence they can sustain and we cannot. To break that equilibrium, we must deploy overwhelming force in unpredictably disproportionate manners so as to win one conflict and deter the next.

Distinctions between combatants and civilians are artificial because, in fact, they are all enemies. The nation's success in defeating conventional military formations and its reluctance to attack civilians provide powerful incentives for adversaries to fight from civilian sanctuaries. But we attacked civilian populations in the past-including our own Civil War-with positive, if distinctly untidy, results. Bombing attacks on German and Japanese cities were essential to ending World War II. Because of respect for the hard side of U.S. policy, there were few incidents of insurgency when we occupied and rebuilt their countries.

The Roman Empire understood regime change. After defeating a country, it moved quickly to demonstrate the advantages of membership in its political and economic systems. Those who resisted the changes were dealt with severely. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, we ignored the necessity of instilling fear in the Iraqi civilian population. Coalition air and missile strikes were precise to the point of irrelevance. "Shock and awe" requires that someone be shocked. Instead of killing the enemy, some buildings and rusty tanks were destroyed for television viewers, while thousands of enemy soldiers simply went home-many to fight another day.

Western nations are squeamish about group punishment. Certain groups, however, may be everything an enemy combatant cares for. Suicidal enemies do not fear death unless we can put at risk the things they value most—which generally includes their families, villages, countries, and institutions. Recruitment of suicide bombers would become far more difficult if they left legacies of misery and death instead of honor and financial gain.

History is replete with examples of how the rush to end conflict often leads to further war. Long periods of peace usually follow clear victories. Some issues do not lend themselves to diplomatic solutions and thus must be fought to conclusion. Gulf War II stems from U.S. failure to finish Gulf War I. Increasing numbers of scholars view World War II as an extension of World War I ("the war to end all wars") caused by a faulty peace treaty and the failure of the Allies to cripple Germany's military capacity. The United Kingdom and France have not fought each other since the decisive Napoleonic wars of the early 1800s. In the ancient world, long-term peace came when Rome obliterated Carthage and Alexander the Great conquered Persia.

We tend to view the world as it should be, rather than how it is. Cynics say no good deed goes unpunished. Our civilized notion of conflict fits both these observations. Self-imposed restraint and the misplaced belief we must remain civilized in the face of enemy barbarism constitute a recipe for defeat. In Iraq, U.S. management of reconstruction efforts is exceptional. At the same time, as the Marines say, we should be "no better friend, no worst enemy." So far, we have it only half right.

War is behavior modification through fear and annihilation. The Cold War did not turn hot because U.S. and Soviet leaders understood all-out war would kill most of their populations and render their countries uninhabitable. Rules of "civilized" warfare actually prolong conflict and reduce deterrence—especially when an uncivilized combatant games the system against a country playing by the rules. That leads to the most uncivilized outcome of all: more frequent and lengthy wars.