Close the Open Door to War

The new "Bush Doctrine" of preventive war was put to the test in March 2003 with the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Since then, debates have raged domestically and globally over the efficacy and morality of such a strategy. Iran could be the next target, but the decision to go to war with it or any other state must be made only after a legitimate threat has been diagnosed.

In a speech delivered to graduating cadets at the U.S. Military Academy in June 2002, President George W. Bush outlined a revised national security strategy to deal with the changing international environment. Most significant, the President announced that, in the aftermath of the events of 11 September 2001, the United States would take military action to counter threats before they are "fully formed."¹ The announcement and subsequent utilization of what is now called the Bush Doctrine immediately sparked widespread concern that this addition to international law would be haphazardly cited to justify any number of wars of choice. Proving the point, in short order a flurry of threats of preventive war ensued in many of the world's hotspots.

There are numerous popular and policy concerns that have been raised by the Bush Doctrine and its use in Iraq. Some fear U.S. intervention has increased the flow of recruits to terrorist organizations and made any peaceful solution to the terrorism problem impossible. Others fear the United States may have a "short list" of states that are candidates for preemptive attack and Iraq is just the first act in a tragic drama. Still others fear less-responsible nations will exploit the precedent set in Iraq to prosecute preemptive wars of their own. Finally, many fear the U.S. invasion of Iraq might have had the opposite of its intended purpose: to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

None of these concerns appears to be unfounded. When considering what the next target of U.S. action might be, the most commonly mentioned are Iran, Syria, and North Korea.² Iran is a known supporter of international terrorist organizations and is defiant in its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Syria also is deeply involved in supporting terror, has a known chemical weapons capability, and is thought by many to be hiding fugitives from the government of Saddam Hussein and possibly even a good portion of Iraq's former weapons of mass destruction inventory and infrastructure. North Korea is identified for its proliferation of weapons of mass destruction delivery systems and its pursuit of atomic weapons. Some of the concern about this short list of candidates is overblown, however. After all, there are "experts" on the fringes of the debate who suspect the United States wishes to attack Russia preemptively to stem the flow of Russian arms to the Middle East, and to attack Venezuela to secure a non-Arab source of oil.³

After filtering out the most outrageous theories, several serious candidates that might exploit the Bush Doctrine remain. One of the most obvious is Israel, which has conducted numerous preventive wars and strikes in the past half-century, including the Sinai campaign of 1956, the Six-Day War in 1967, the strike on the Iraqi nuclear facility at Osirak in 1981, and the invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Israeli planning for preventive war against conventional military threats likely continues to this day, given its geographic location and military resources and organization, and Israel has been conducting an ongoing preventive war of a sort against terrorists in the territory of the Palestinian Authority for several years.⁴ Indeed, in May 2004, an unnamed Israeli defense official explained to Globes Online that Israel was committed to developing sea-based expeditionary forces capable of acting throughout the Middle East, saying, "We have no intention of occupying territory, but we also have no intention of ignoring problems liable to threaten our national security in the coming decades."

A careful examination of history and available information shows the People's Republic of China was predisposed to preventive war prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq. To overcome perceived inadequacies in its conventional forces, current Chinese military doctrine relies on gaining the initiative by striking first.⁵ This is particularly disconcerting when one considers Taiwan might have a justified fear of the People's Republic and appears to be developing its military to be capable of thwarting China's plans preventively as well.⁶

The most troubling flashpoint for a preventive war justified by the Bush Doctrine is the turbulent relationship between India and Pakistan. Both countries are new nuclear powers with relatively weak controls over their nuclear forces, and a decades-long conflict over the province of Kashmir has kept relations between the two neighbors tense. In addition, following the Iraq war, members of the governments of both India and Pakistan openly declared their nuclear neighbor as a fit case "for preventive war." seeing the potential for disaster, U.S. secretary of State Colin Powell had to warn India not to draw a parallel between Iraq and Pakistan.⁷

The final major candidate to prosecute a preventive war that could have major global repercussions is Russia. Its war against Chechen separatists, coupled with frequent terrorist attacks deep in the heart of Russia by Islamist terrorists, might have much the same result for Russians that terrorist attacks had on Americans. It is easy to foresee a Russian preventive attack against one or more of its southern neighbors for supporting or harboring terrorists, or against Georgia to resolve ongoing disputes.⁸ Indeed, in the wake of a recent terrorist attack against a school in Beslan, Russia, where more 400 civilians were killed, Russia has said it is preparing to make preemptive strikes against terrorists worldwide, although many doubt Russia's ability to follow through on this threat.⁹

There is obvious danger if states exploit the U.S. model for intervention. One possible result is the increased potential for small wars (or worse) in the future. Another problem is that in the end (somewhat ironically) not only could the adoption of this policy cause an increase in the number of conflicts that break out into war, but it also could drive the very proliferation of weapons of mass destruction the United States wishes to contain. Iran and North Korea have accelerated their nuclear, biological, and chemical weapon programs in the past year. It is likely that Iranian efforts to develop longer-range missiles and nuclear enrichment are driven by a desire to have a credible nuclear capability to deter U.S. military action before the United States has enough forces free from Afghanistan and Iraq to be able to back up diplomacy with force.

With careful consideration of the implications of the Bush Doctrine, important questions arise. How far is the United States willing to take this policy? Is the United States willing to let other nations use the Bush Doctrine to justify their own preventive actions? Would the United States be willing to conduct preventive strikes if an ally is threatened? When addressing these questions, the pressing task for proponents of this policy is to define clearly the circumstances under which this flavor of preventive war is acceptable.

The Law of Armed Conflict recognizes two common principles when the use of force is considered: necessity and proportionality. The principle of proportionality governs the type and scope of military action that is permissible in a given situation where a decision has been made to go to war; as a result, it is of little concern here. In this case, however, the principle of necessity is critical because it addresses the question of whether the use of force is justified at all in a conflict.

The legality of preventive war is a topic of long debate among scholars of international law, and complete agreement on the issue likely is impossible. The scholars who believe preventive war might be acceptable when a threat is clear argue that preventive strikes are a natural extension of the inherent right of self-defense; consequently, they relabel them "preemptive" to keep the principle distinct.¹⁰ The preemptive category presupposes, however, that a threat is imminent, and the Bush Doctrine states that the United States will not necessarily wait until a threat is imminent. As a result, the war on Iraq must be characterized as a preventive war, even if one contends that it is a new and acceptable form of such a war. Among those scholars who support the notion of preemptive war, three criteria have been identified as justification for action: immediacy of the threat, adequacy of the nonviolent responses to the threats, and right intentions in the preemptive response.¹¹

Immediacy implies the nation considering preemptive action must have a reasonable belief an attack is near. Adequacy implies all reasonable peaceful means to avert a conflict have been taken or judged ineffective, and the use of force is the only remaining credible response to the threat. And right intentions implies the nation considering a preemptive attack is doing so for just reasons. It is important with respect to immediacy that a state need not be completely certain an opponent intends to strike, but only reasonably certain. Complete certainty raises the bar so high a state almost never would be able to act when a threat appears to exists, and such a requirement would not sufficiently deter an aggressor from planning and threatening an attack. The Bush administration proposed and implemented an adaptation to the doctrine of preemption. The test of immediacy has been discarded and a new test has been substituted based on hostile intent.

The process of determining whether force is authorized in a particular circumstance already has a well-defined model in the U.S. military rules of engagement. Currently, a commander is permitted (and actually obliged) to use defensive force when an opposing force commits a hos tile act or exhibits hostile intent. After a hostile act has been committed, few debate whether the use of force is authorized. Hostile intent is more difficult to identify, but the U.S. military has several models implemented at the tactical level of warfare that have proved useful. At the strategic level of war, however, no reliable model appears to exist. To help rectify this deficiency, some indications that a state or organization might harbor sufficient hostile intent to justify preventive action include:

* Capability: Does the state or organization possess, or is it close to achieving, the capacity to attack the threatened nation?

* Motivation: Does the state or organization have deeply held beliefs that are used to justify nonmilitary conflict, and may they be used to justify an attack?

* Preparation: Is the state or organization planning, positioning forces, and rehearsing to execute an attack?

* Desperation: Does the state or organization believe it has exhausted all reasonable peaceful means of resolving a dispute?

* Indifference: Has the state or organization been indifferent, uncooperative, or hostile to unilateral or multilateral attempts to resolve the conflict peacefully?

* Impunity: Does the state or organization believe it can execute an attack and survive without serious consequences?

Two of these principles have caveats. First, with regard to motivation, it is important to note that the beliefs used to justify competition or conflicts do not have to be well founded, only deeply held. One need not demonstrate a potential attack is the result of rational thinking to justify preemptive action. second, with regard to capability, one need not consider only the capabilities of the potentially hostile nation to meet the test. If the threat nation is actively developing, training, supporting, or equipping other states or organizations to act as proxies in a conflict, a threatened state may reasonably conclude its opponent has the capability to strike.

The process for justifying the war in Iraq demonstrates the most notable flaw of this doctrine: its justification is inherently subjective. In identifying a hostile act there is usually a "smoking gun" that proves the validity of one's case-not so in the case of hostile intent. At the time of the conflict, Iraq appeared to meet the capability criterion and clearly met the motivation, indifference, and impunity criteria, but probably did not meet the preparation and desperation criteria. The United States, Britain, and Spain explicitly laid out their case against Iraq, and the U.N. Security Council voted unanimously to authorize "serious consequences" for Iraq if it failed to comply with U.N. resolutions. There was heated debate, however, and many nations expressed reservations. Given all this, the Iraq war no doubt will continue to provide much food for thought among students of foreign and military policy.

To illustrate the pitfalls of this process further, consider a potential U.S. case for preventive war against Iran:

* Capability: Iran has the capability to strike the United States, but currently only through unconventional means. Iran, however, does appear to be developing nuclear weapons and long-range delivery systems that will be able to reach U.S. allies. In addition, Iran is a known sponsor of terrorism, and links between Iran and al Qaeda are numerous and well documented.

* Motivation: Iran clearly demonstrates hostility to the United States through its statements and policies. Indeed, Iran appears to have cultivated a quarter-century of conflict with the United States to facilitate the achievement of its internal and regional political objectives.

* Preparation: Iran does not appear to have made offensive plans or preparations to attack the United States or its forces abroad.

* Desperation: Iran does not appear to believe the use of force is its only, or even best, option in resolving disputes with the United States.

* Indifference: Iran's on-again, off-again interaction with the International Atomic Energy Agency and apparent commitment to continue to pursue its nuclear program demonstrate indifference to international concerns and peaceful attempts to resolve disputes.

* Impunity: Iran's efforts to stall international inspections and nuclear controls, combined with efforts to conceal and harden suspected nuclear facilities, indicate Iran believes it can act with measured impunity.

Of the six criteria, three appear to have been met, one may have been met, and two do not appear to have been met. Is Iran, therefore, a reasonable target for preventive war? Probably not. Still, the trend on all of these tests has not been toward peace in recent months

The adoption of preventive war, whatever one chooses to call it, is a policy decision that appears to create more policy problems than it solves. The decision to conduct a preventive war in Iraq has opened a door and allowed air to fuel numerous diplomatic fires throughout the world. Whether the initiator once again is the United States or another aspiring power in the world, the likelihood of preventive wars in the future is rising. One can see that numerous regional powers and rogue states already have made public statements indicating a willingness to use the Bush Doctrine to their own advantages. With a wellthought-out test for hostile intent at the strategic level, policy experts and decision makers can assess the threat a nation or organization poses without having to wait for a threat to become fully formed and unstoppable. Such a test will reduce the subjectivity in a decision to go to war, standardize the criteria used to trigger conflicts under the Bush Doctrine, publicly spell out the conditions that must exist for this type of preventive war to be permissible, and begin to close this open door to war.