Book Reviews

Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency

Anthony James Joes. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2004. 351 pp. Maps. Notes. Bib. Index. $35.00.

Resisting Rebellion is a comprehensive study of insurgency and the struggles nations have faced to contain them in the past two centuries. Understanding the tactics employed in insurgencies and the political motivation necessarily linked to every action of both the insurgent and counterinsurgent forces are perhaps several of the most important tasks modern military and political leaders must face. Through this book, author Anthony James Joes establishes himself as an authority on an age-old subject that has come to the forefront of U.S. politics and military strategy. He walks the reader through a rebellion, from the conditions that make its inception possible to the strategies used to determine its ultimate success or failure, winding through hundreds of years of empirical data in support of his findings.

Joes embarks on his study with the grass roots of insurgency, by examining the strategies and tactics employed by guerrilla elements to achieve their aims, as well as by discussing the historical environments that have allowed these movements to flourish. He cites examples from such diverse figures as the Confederate raider John Mosby to Chinese communist leader Mao Zedong. Going beyond simply exposing the mechanical workings of rebellion, the book also explores the deeper and more elusive issues of the ideological startups and continuance of such movements. Joes helps the reader to understand the factors that have led to popular revolt, from religion and economic motivations to oppressive occupation.

Resisting Rebellion explores the growth of guerrilla activity as it develops into a war of movement and the factors that help determine its fate, such as foreign involvement, geography, and demographics. The inner workings of rebellion, from the simple beginnings of an ideal to an internationally recognized struggle, are exposed with a literary ease that will keep even the novice reader engaged. Citing such examples as the Boer War in South Africa and the Algerian war with the French, Joes masterfully references his arguments with historical facts.

In a logical progression, Joes tackles the next and perhaps most important question facing our country and other industrialized nations today: What is the foundation of a successful counterinsurgency strategy? Prisoner procedures, population control measures, force structure, and a myriad of other operational and strategic decisions are examined using the history of both highly effective and ineffective counterinsurgency campaigns. From the Machiavellian examination of Roman General Scipio Africanus in Spain to the U.S. and French pitfalls in Vietnam, Joes explores the nuances of counterguerrilla operations and the sometimes unexpected levels of effectiveness achieved by those efforts.

Resisting Rebellion truly is an educational experience for readers of all backgrounds. With its impressive list of historical references, it summarizes concisely hundreds of years of civil unrest and evaluates trends for both success and failure of insurgencies and the efforts to quell them. Joes has peppered his book with first-class research material that clearly underscores each of his conclusions. Unlike the dozens of so-called authoritative examinations of the enemies we face in the global war on terror from overnight experts, Joes presents himself as a well-versed expert on the topic.

The author's style is equally appealing to both the casual reader and the scholar of unconventional warfare, who now have an unintimidating entry into understanding the tumultuous world of rebellion. And the professional soldier has a new reference manual available for understanding one of the most significant threats on today's battlefield. Joes has written what will become the newest addition to the mandatory reading lists of military educational institutions.

Mutiny

Julian Stockwin. New York: Scribner, 2004. 322 pp. $24.00.

This latest installment in the adventures of Thomas Payne Kydd opens as he is returning to European waters in the ship-of-the-line Achilles from the Caribbean at the start of 1797. He stops at Gibraltar and is ordered to remain there indefinitely, the Achilles consigned to act as guard ship now that the Royal Navy has been forced from the Mediterranean. Kydd is saved from a potentially dangerous entanglement with a local Army officer's wife by being ordered to temporary duty in a frigate sent to attempt the rescue of a British diplomat from a Venice under threat of Napoleon's advancing forces. The mission is accomplished, and on their return to "The Rock," Kydd finds his ship ready to head to England.

The voyage proves to be an eventful one. A Spanish frigate is smashed and her fat merchant consort, carrying a Spanish grandee and a money chest, is taken prize. In sight of Brest on the French coast, the Spanish prisoners rise, retake their ship, and make port. Off the Lizard, after pressing a dozen men from an inbound merchantman, the captain decides to make a purchase from a proximate fisherman and receives rumors that the fleet at Spithead has mutinied. Properly cautious, the captain sends one of his officers ashore east of Plymouth to discover the situation there. The officer's report of a similar situation leads the captain to make for the Nore at the mouth of the Thames.

Their arrival occurs amid news the Spithead mutinies are on the verge of ending, but all soon are aware the infection is taking hold at the Nore as well, and somewhat different lines are being drawn. Kydd, who began his naval career as a pressed man, is torn between an appreciation for the truth of many of the seamen's complaints and his new duty as a freshly minted master's mate and officer-to-be. Lacking any close companion to advise him, he gradually is taken up by events and ultimately becomes secretary to Richard Parker, "president" of the Nore mutineers. More and more ships join the action, including those from farther up the coast. Inevitably, Parker, who has been relatively reasonable in his objectives, loses control of events, and the government marshals its forces. With all supplies and communication cut, the mutiny is strangled into submission.

The leaders of the action are identified and marked for courts-martial, including Parker—and Kydd. One by one, the identified ringleaders are processed through largely pro forma court proceedings. When Kydd's name is called, he is saved by a clever maneuver by his long-time friend and hitherto absent shipmate, Renzi.

Assigned to duty in another liner, the Triumph, Kydd finds himself on blockade duty off Holland. There, two months later, he participates in the Battle of Camperdown. From his position on a gun deck, all is confusion, noise, and smoke, and he has little idea of what is occurring. When the lieutenant-in-charge is concussed by a passing round shot, Kydd takes over and keeps the battery in action. Success is theirs, of course, and Lady Luck continues to court Kydd. He is reassigned to the badly chewed-up liner Tenacious as acting fourth lieutenant, only to find Renzi also has been transferred from his ship to be acting third.

Julian Stockwin has concocted another event-filled tale of naval adventure that leaves one little time to catch one's breath. His descriptions are vivid and on the mark, and along the way he cleverly and concisely works in tidbits of late 18th-century seamanship and shiphandling.

The Sling and The Stone: On War in the 21st Century

Thomas Hammes. St. Paul, MN: MBI Publishing, 2004. 228 pp. Bib. $29.95.

Marine Colonel Thomas Hammes continues his analysis of fourth-generation war in his new book The Sling and The Stone. As a continuation of his September 1994 article in the Marine Corps Gazette, "The Evolution of War: Into the Fourth Generation," Colonel Hammes argues that warfare evolves from generation to generation and that each new generation of warfare has occurred because of the political, social, and technological aspects of society combined; technology alone cannot explain the natural evolution of warfare.

The author examines this theory of evolutionary and fourth-generation warfare by first looking at the development of the first, second, and third generations. He defines first-generation war as the direct destruction of the enemy at close range, characterized by large armies operating on battlefields as cohesive units. This evolved into second-generation warfare as the machine gun, magazine-fed rifle, and rapid-fire artillery became available.

Prior to the nation-state, the ability to field large-scale armies of commoners was extremely limited. With advances in agriculture and rail technology, nations were better able to equip and manage their armies, and the author argues that all of these factors led to the stalemate in the trenches of World War I. These changes, coupled with dramatic changes in doctrine, allowed for the third generation of maneuver warfare, fought from about 1939 through the Cold War. It is this type of warfare with which most modern military commanders are familiar.

A common theme found in each succeeding generation of warfare, Colonel Hammes argues, is that a combatant is forced to reach further and further into the enemy's territory to meet and defeat him. He states that fourth-generation war is focused very deep in the enemy's rear. It is aimed not at forces but at the very will to fight. As a modern example of evolving fourth-generation warfare, the author uses the present situation in Iraq and the problems the United States and its allies have experienced there. He argues the war began as a textbook example of third-generation maneuver conflict, but since the official end of hostilities, it has evolved into a fourth-generation war. This new kind of war, the author says, uses all available means-political, economic, social, and military-to convince an enemy's decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit.

The author uses several examples to support his thesis and traces the evolution of fourth-generation warfare from its infancy to what he believes will be the norm in future conflicts. He traces the roots of this new way of war to Mao Zedong and his ability to use lessons learned and to organize them into strategies for seizing power, fundamental precepts on which all fourth-generation war is built. The book follows the birth of fourth-generation war through Vietnam, the Nicaraguan conflict, the Palestinian Intifada, al Qaeda and Afghanistan, and the war in Iraq.

Colonel Hammes explains fourth-generation war as evolved insurgency, where the ideals are rooted in the belief that political will, when properly employed, can defeat greater economic and military force. This brand of warfare is out to attack the minds of the enemy. Fourth-generation war also is focused on the "long-haul," where time is measured in decades rather in months or years.

Fourth-generation war is here to stay, the author argues, and will continue to evolve with society, the author suggests we must integrate all elements of national power to deal effectively with this form of conflict. It will take a cultural shift for government to recognize and deal with it successfully, he says, and we must remain flexible to deal with the unexpected and anticipate changes.

The Sling and The Stone is an excellent overview of the future of warfare and the challenges faced by militaries designed to fight on a very different battlefield. Understanding these challenges is the first step in success.