Baghdad: Help Wanted

Beleaguered Baghdad joint staffs are critically undermanned and overworked. The Navy isn't doing its fair share. Army Lieutenant General David Petraeus leads the Multi-National Security Training Corps-Iraq—which is 78% understaffed by the Navy.

The U.S. effort in Iraq is the single greatest challenge facing our military. Like Bosnia and Afghanistan before it, this type of warfare is the way of the future for overseas military operations. Yet, in headquarters staffs across Baghdad, the Navy is assigned only a tiny role, which it is filling only half heartedly. Of approximately 3,000 staff billets, only 6% are assigned to the Navy. Of those 176 jobs, the Navy is filling only 100—the worst billet-fill rate of any service. In the critical startup staffs for reconstruction and stand up of the Iraqi security forces, the Navy is filling only 21% of its assigned billets. For the good of the country and the service, the Navy should fund a call for volunteers and immediately send 300 or more people to Baghdad to fill our assigned staff slots.

Staffs Need Help

U.S. success in Iraq hinges on three major efforts. First, we must employ our combat power to defeat the insurgency. Second, we must build an Iraqi security structure with the necessary personnel, equipment, and organization to keep the insurgency in check after we leave. Third, we must complete the promised reconstruction of critical infrastructure, including the implementation of the $18.4 billion in U.S. assistance funds, to allow the Iraqi people to get back on their feet as quickly as possible.

To accomplish these tasks, we have established five staffs in Baghdad.

The standard joint staff fighting the war is the Multi-National Force Iraq (MNF-I), commanded by Army General George casey, reporting to the Central Command. It has 1,700 military billets; the Navy has 87, all of which are filled (its best performance in theater).¹ There are 250 vacant billets, at least half of which could be filled by Navy personnel.

The Multi-National Security Training Corps-Iraq (MNSTC-I) is responsible for building the Iraqi security Forces (ISFs). It is led by Army lieutenant General David Petraeus and reports to MNF-I. It has 594 billets, 390 of which are filled. While one could argue that this effort is the most important leg of the three-legged stool of our success in Iraq, the Navy fills only 13 of 57, or 22%, of its assigned billets. At least half of the remaining 200 vacancies could be filled by Navy personnel.

For reconstruction, two staffs report to Ambassador John Negroponte. The Iraq Reconstruction Management Organization (IRMO) is a State Department entity providing plans, policy, and oversight of the reconstruction efforts. It has 266 billets, none specifically assigned to the services, but most of which could be filled by military officers, including reservists and retirees. Of the 266 billets, only 116 are filled. The IRMO human relations officer reported he could use 25 naval officers "in a heartbeat."

The second reconstruction staff is the Project and Contracting Office (PCO), a joint (but Army-resourced) entity charged with implementation of the $18.4 billion in Iraq reconstruction funds. About half civilian, it has 154 military billets, of which 106 are filled. The Navy fills 6 of its 17 assigned billets, and has the skill sets available to fill all 48 of the military vacancies on staff.

Finally, supervising the International Zone and providing support for all coalition efforts in Baghdad is the Joint Area Support Group (JASG). JASG is effectively the mayor, police/fire department, and public works department for the United States in Baghdad. Chronically manned at only 50%, it recently received a new reserve unit and now has 91% of its 130 billets filled. The Navy fills none of its 15 assigned billets.

Excluding the major warfighting MNF-I staff, the U.S. effort in Baghdad is 64% manned, and the Navy fills only 21% of its assigned billets. (See Table 1.) If every aspect of the war were going well, we might assume that 64% manning is sufficient. But with the stand up of the ISF behind schedule, reconstruction behind and struggling to get started in the face of a growing insurgency, and staffs routinely putting in 100-plus-hour workweeks, these staffs clearly need more help.

Navy Should Provide More Support

Of all the services, the Navy has the fewest assigned billets, the lowest fill-rate of billets, and the fewest reserves recalled. The Navy should fill these billets and bolster these staffs so it can get the work done and get home, because:

* It is good for the country. Our nation needs these jobs filled, and filled well. Fully manned, truly joint staffs do better work and produce a better product than half-empty all-Army staffs.

* It is good for the other services. They need a break. During my recent stint in Baghdad I saw Army officers on their second one-year tours and senior Marines called out of retirement to fill critical billets, at the very moment that I was fighting to get the Navy to fund a 15-day extension to my orders. The Army Reserve, for instance, has run out of civil affairs officers-when the 800 currently in-country roll out, there are none to replace them. A few hundred motivated Navy officers could easily fill basic civil affairs billets, all of which are critical for the reconstruction efforts.

* It is good for the Navy. If these regional wars (Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq, etc.) are the future, the Navy should participate as much as it can. Opting out reduces the Navy's relevance in the global war on terror.

* It is good for Navy professionals. Months in a joint, coalition, interagency wartime environment are worth years of college studies in joint military education. We all wear the uniform to defend our country-today, Baghdad is where the defending is happening most acutely, and those who want to serve there should be allowed to.

Navy Actions Required

8 Immediately fill approximately 75 Navy-designated vacancies on joint staffs.

* Immediately fill another 25 potential Navy slots at the Iraq Reconstruction Management Organization.

* Find volunteers to fill at least 200 of the 600 additional non-Navy vacancies on these staffs.

* Find 100 civilian volunteers from our Navy civilian, retired, and reserve folks to fill vacant civilian positions.

If one counts all active, reserve, civilian, and recently retired Navy service members, the Navy has a million people on whom it can call. If it chooses to, the Navy can find the 400 people needed to fill the billets in Baghdad.

Secretary of the Navy Gordon England, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Vern Clark, and Chief of Naval Personnel Vice Admiral Gerald L. Hoewing should assign the highest priority possible to any wartime staff with Navy vacancies, and the next-highest priority to any other service vacancies on those same staffs, and provide the funds to allow Navy personnel to serve in Baghdad. Some will worry that filling other service vacancies will then designate those billets as "Navy billets." But, so what? The billets will not exist long-term anyway, because the staffs in question will go away when their missions are completed. Even if the billets become designated "Navy," the Navy apparently can choose not to fill them because that is what it is doing now in Iraq.

Naval Forces Central Command (NavCent) should assist the Central Command in a concerted human resources push to fill the more than 1,000 staff vacancies (military and civilian) in Baghdad. The Navy should list every job on a central Web site and take out full-page ads in USA Today and The Wall Street Journal. Many of the jobs could be filled with Navy and DoD civilians on leave from their regular positions. While recruiting for Central Command and State Department vacancies is not a doctrinal role for NavCent, somebody needs to do it. The Navy should step up and make it happen. When the Navy is behind the eight-ball (as it is in Iraq), it cannot afford the union not-my-job mentality.

Commanders should encourage and enable service in Iraq for all willing officers and senior enlisted professionals, even if it means a little discomfort in staff strengths in the United States. With the exceptions of shipboard wardrooms and flying squadrons, it is hard to imagine a mid-grade officer billet more critical than a wartime staff in Baghdad.

Officers and senior enlisted personnel should volunteer for six months of staff duty in Iraq. If you want the most fruitful and productive months of your career, go to Iraq now. Contact information for leads at the five staffs is provided in Table 2. Write, call, work the system-just get there.

If Admiral Clark provides funding priority—if NavCent provides the complete list of vacancies—if supported commanders approve the requests-the Navy could fill 400 vacancies with volunteers in weeks.

There Is an All-Reserve Solution

If the active component cannot provide the personnel to fill the Baghdad billets, the reserve component can. Both the recruitment efforts described above and the actual personnel could come from the reserve component, as long as funds are available. Budgeting $200,000 per officer per year, it would cost $40 million a year to fill 200 crucial slots in Baghdad. Before I went to Baghdad, I could think of a lot of ways to better spend $40 million. Now, having been there, I cannot.

Conclusion

As a nation, we cannot afford to be blase about filling billets on the critical staffs that will determine the ultimate outcome of the contest in Iraq. As an armed service, the Navy cannot stand by and refuse to carry its share of the load. The Navy immediately should prioritize sending 200 to 400 Navy personnel to Baghdad to help win this conflict, and get ready for the next one.