In February, the North Koreans announced they had some nuclear weapons. It may be the only significance of the North Korean announcement was that it was public. Since they have not conducted any sort of test yet, it is impossible to tell whether the bomb or bombs exist or whether they work. It is assumed that the North Korean weapons are built of plutonium processed from reactor fuel rods. The North Koreans have agreed to abandon their bomb program, but they continue to attempt to produce U-235, another bomb fuel. However, it appears that the U-235 program has not been successful. All this is rather speculative, given the closed character of North Korea.
As the United States showed in 1945, it is simple to build a U-235 bomb; the gun-type bomb that destroyed Hiroshima had never been tested. However, its simplicity came at a price-it was an inefficient way to use material that was expensive to produce. U-235 is only 0.7% of natural uranium, and processing techniques are difficult and tedious. However, a reactor fueled with less-refined uranium can produce plutonium. This bomb material is relatively easy to produce, but building a plutonium bomb is more challenging technically. A simple gun-type bomb is difficult to build because the pieces begin to react before they reach critical mass. The great secret of the plutonium bomb was how to arrange the explosives. It was not only a matter of getting the timing right, or of calculating how much plutonium was needed, but also of understanding plutonium enough to know how to compress it.
In the past. Chinese policy has been to encourage nuclear proliferation, and it is not clear whether they provided the North Koreans with a bomb design. It is also possible that North Korea obtained a bomb design from Pakistan in return for ballistic missiles. In either case, if the North Koreans already had a tested bomb design they could forego testing. Without such a design, they could not be sure their weapon would succeed. If the North Koreans' goal is a hydrogen rather than an atomic bomb, the chance of a fizzle is greater, because a hydrogen bomb is a more complex proposition.
The North Korean bomb program can be interpreted in various ways. The simplest is they have convinced themselves that they are under a threat, and they see the bomb as insurance against attack. It is even possible that the North Korean view sees South Korea as a mortal threat that should be removed someday. The combination of nuclear bombs and long-range missiles would be seen as a deterrent against U.S. intervention in some new Korean War.
A less benign view would be that bombs and missiles are the only products North Korea can export to support its economy. North Korea is already a major missile exporter. The bomb is in demand because many Third World governments see it as an equalizer. The emergence of the United States as the sole superpower, and the demonstration, in Iraq that the U.S. government feels the time is ripe to push for democratic reforms abroad, would cause many dictators to look for insurance.
Yet another possibility is the North Koreans see their bomb as a way of forcing the United States to deal with them. They claim their goal is a nonaggression treaty, which they present as a way of ending the Korean War that began in 1950. The United States has avoided such a treaty because it would also be a way of preventing this country from intervening should the North Koreans choose to attack South Korea again.
Historically, the Koreans' main enemy has been Japan. In 1910, Japan took over Korea, and by all accounts treated the Koreans badly. They justified their behavior partly by racism. It is conceivable that Japan is the target of any North Korean bomb program. A threat against or an attack on Japan is probably the one thing the North Koreans could do that would be genuinely popular in South Korea. The Japanese are aware of this issue. As North Korea has developed its missiles and its bomb, the Japanese have become uncomfortable with their "peace" Constitution, which in theory renounces the use of force. The Japanese armed forces are officially Self-Defense Forces, and in the past their charter was limited to direct defense of the Japanese home islands. Any attempt at offensive military force, except at sea, was barred. Ironically, the United States, which imposed the "peace" clauses in the first place, found such ideas less attractive in the 1970s, as the Soviet presence in the Far East grew and U.S. resources seemed to shrink. The Japanese bought increasingly sophisticated systems and weapons, but never in the quantities the U.S. government advocated. The one success of the U.S. policy was an agreement that Japan would defend sea lanes out to 1,000 nautical miles from Japanese shores.
Now things are changing. Pointing out that missile defense is difficult at best, the Japanese are talking about a doctrine of preemption. To implement it, they are buying tankers to extend the range of their F-15 fighters, participating in the U.S. missile defense program, and buying Aegis ships so they can be armed with antimissile weapons. The sea lane agreement is having consequences also. As Americans well know, the further a naval unit is from shore the more important it becomes for that formation to have its own air power. In the Japanese case, the earlier helicopter-carrying destroyers (DDHs) are to be replaced by what look like small carriers. With the advent of vertical and/or short takeoff and landing (VSTOL) aircraft, such as the Harrier and the new F-35B, such ships can act like small strike carriers.
This change is still embryonic. The Japanese defense budget is not growing, and indeed the high cost of missile defense is crowding out other programs, including DDH construction. However, the trend is interesting because it may reverse a long-standing policy. In addition to the direct interest in missile defense against North Korea, the Japanese are showing interest in engagement beyond earlier practices. For example, Japanese troops are participating in Afghanistan and in Iraq, albeit on a decidedly noncombatant level.
Why should Americans care? For years Japan has not been pulling its economic weight on a military level; indeed, in the past, Americans complained that by limiting military spending the Japanese had gained an unfair Cold War advantage.
The real question is what effect Japanese rearmament would have in the Far East, which may really be the question of how far back memories go. For at least a decade after World War II, many in the Far East found a resurgent Japan a greater threat than Communist China. In 1950, the United States tried to set up a Far Eastern equivalent of NATO. A Far Eastern NATO would have used the economic strength of Japan as a basis. Because Japan was so far advanced over most other countries in the region, its position in such an alliance would have been more economically important than Germany's ever was within NATO.
The Far Eastern initiative never went anywhere, because the governments the United States contacted, those of Australia and the Philippines, made it clear that Japan was by far the greatest threat. That is why the treaties with those countries are bilateral. They remembered far too much. Conversely, without any pressure to come to terms with former victims, at least officially, the Japanese have avoided the sort of public atonement the Germans went through. To make matters even more interesting, at least in China and North Korea, the experience of fighting the Japanese has been elevated to a unifying theme.
The situation elsewhere in Asia may be more complex. The Japanese World War II slogan was "Asia for the Asians," and current Japanese texts often portray the war as a heroic attempt to liberate Asia. That the reality was more squalid, and that the Japanese exploited every place they liberated, may not be remembered. For years after the war, many leaders of newly freed Asian countries were reminded that without the Japanese they still would be living in colonies. Even the Chinese Communists once admitted that they had benefited from the Japanese invasion of their country.
So what happens now? One possibility is that memories of the reality of World War II, and resentment of what may be seen as continuing Japanese economic aggression, will cause many countries to seek shelter against such a threat. In that case, China may be the natural haven. Governments may feel compelled to choose between two potential regional superpowers, China and Japan. They also may be impressed by a sense that the Japanese economy is stagnant and likely to suffer further while China's is apparently booming. Such an arrangement most likely would eject the United States from the Far East.
However, it is also possible that memories have cooled, and that Japanese investment over southeast Asia is seen benignly. In that case, the time may be ripe for something like the mutual security organization the U.S. government had in mind in 1950. Moreover, regional governments have felt Chinese pressure, and it is clear China is arming more. China may therefore look like a potential threat. That Japan is offshore, without an army capable of invading, may make it an attractive ally.
That brings us back to North Korea. Just how dangerous is it. compared, say, to Iran? The current view is that the ongoing war against terrorists is a more immediate problem than the more distant one of nuclear weapons. The terrorists all seem to emerge from the chaos of the Middle East, and the hope is that this bomb can be defused by the spread of democracy. That is not just the current administration's view-it is a long-term theme in U.S. foreign policy. As evidence of how deep this feeling goes, readers will remember how embarrassing it was during the Cold War when the United States supported dictators because they ran countries in strategic places. That practice would not have been a problem if the United States had not been such a champion of democracy as the solution to world problems. The bomb may be terrifying, but the terrorists are killing people right now. They get priority.