U.S. Navy: The Navy Is in Crisis

The U.S. Navy is again in a state of crisis, which is manifested in several situations:

* Loss of leadership: During the first six months of this year, the Navy is losing the secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Assistant secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, Acquisition). All three men have been instrumental in moving the Navy into the 21st century. This has been the result in part of the great confidence in them by secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his senior staff.

* Fleet cutbacks: The fleet has been reduced to fewer than 290 ships, too few to carry out currently assigned missions. These missions are both forward presence-for political as well as military reasons-and combat operations in support of the war in Iraq. Unlike the 1991 war in the Gulf, when Saudi Arabia provided virtually unlimited use of bases, since 2003 the Saudi government has been niggardly in permitting U.S. and British forces to use its bases, increasing the significance of aircraft carrier and other sea-based operations. Similarly, when combat operations began in Afghanistan in 2002, only aircraft carriers could provide effective tactical air support for U.S. forces.

* Shipbuilding cuts: The current, fiscal year 2006 shipbuilding program provides for only four new ships for the Navy-one attack submarine (SSN), one littoral combat ship (LCS), one amphibious ship (LPD). and one replenishment ship (AKE). While the Bush administration promises to get Navy shipbuilding "back on track," remedial action will be difficult.

For example. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Vern Clark earlier had called for a fleet of some 375 ships as the number necessary to carry out assigned missions. Although he subsequently backed off that number-calling for a range of from about 260 to 325 ships-even a fleet of 300 ships would require a building rate of some 10 ships per year (i.e., 10 ships x 30-year average service life). Lower annual build rates, such as four ships in fiscal year 2006, in the near future would require far more than 10 ships per year to even reach Admiral Clark's "bottom line" of 260 ships.

This situation will be exacerbated by the planned construction of Military Prepositioning Force (Future) [MPF(F)] ships. These ships, not part of the "battle force," could provide a major advance in U.S. capabilities for overseas operations, far beyond current amphibious and prepositioning forces. However, MPF(F) ships undoubtedly will take money from conventional naval forces.

* Naval aviation directions: Naval aviation is being funded at reasonable levels. There are 128 aircraft funded in the fiscal year 2006 budget (up from 110 the previous year), with the plan for 173 in the fiscal year 2007 program. But in many respects-as addressed in recent Proceedings articles-naval aviation has lost its compass.1 The directions being taken in naval aviation could provide the future fleet with severely limited capabilities and flexibility.

Thus, in several respects, the Navy is in a state of crisis. There appears to be little probability that increased funding will be made available to mitigate the situation other than increases in pay and benefits for naval personnel. The cuts in Navy shipbuilding and operating funds are being applied to the buildup of the Army and Marine Corps. In addition, the Marine Corps increases are oriented primarily toward ground combat operations. Only the procurement of the MV-22 Osprey and F-35 short takeoff/vertical landing aircraft give promise of enhancing Marine assault and force projection capabilities.

These shifts in current military priorities from naval forces to ground combat forces is short-sighted and could have serious long-term implications. The situations in Afghanistan and Iraq undoubtedly will stabilize within the next few years, and U.S. ground forces will be withdrawn. Following that withdrawal, there will be a natural reluctance by the American people and the government to commit U.S. troops overseas in large-scale ground operations, as occurred after the Korean and Vietnam Wars. Those prolonged, high-casualty conflicts (unlike the 1991 Gulf War) generated great frustration and political division in the United States.

Thus, one can expect that for perhaps a decade or more after U.S. troops are withdrawn from Afghanistan and Iraq it will be highly unlikely that Americans will commit troops to major combat operations ashore. Rather, special operations forces and naval forces will likely be the forces of choice for future crises, support to counterterrorism operations, and limited conflicts.

At times in the past, the U.S. Naval Institute has played a key role in helping the Navy through crises. Indeed, the Naval Institute was established in 1873 as the Navy faced a series of crises: the fleet at that time consisted largely of outdated, Civil War-era ships. Few new ships were being funded, advanced steel ships were being built by European powers, and steam propulsion was being adopted for oceangoing ships.

Then, and at other times since, the Naval Institute helped the Navy to articulate its views and needs. But at this time of crisis in the Navy, the Naval Institute is undergoing-to use Pentagon jargon-a "transformation." Under new leadership, the Naval Institute is seeking to become a financially profitable organization, reversing loss trends of the past few years. While this effort must be applauded, for the Naval Institute could not long survive with continued financial losses, the current transformation has several facets that threaten to make the organization little more than a profitmaking publishing and conference house, rather than the highly respected professional society that has been its hallmark for more than 130 years.

Manifestations of this transformation include the recent loss of many key staff members. These include Paul Stillwell, head of the oral history program and an icon of the Naval Institute2; Fred Schultz, editor-in-chief of Naval History magazine; Julie Olver, managing editor of both Naval Historv and Proceedings3; Gordon W. Keiser, senior editor of both magazines4; Colin Babb, associate editor and book review editor for both magazines; and most recently, Fred Rainbow, editor-in-chief of Proceedings and long-time Director of Periodicals and Seminars. These individuals and others who have left, in this writer's opinion, have been critical to providing an effective "forum" that is vital to the contribution the Naval Institute can make toward helping to illuminate and resolve the crises facing the Navy.

At the same time, the Naval Institute is instituting a "super board" over the existing Editorial Board. In the past, the Editorial Board-of active and "former" naval persons-plus the organization's president and vice president comprised the Board of Control/Board of Directors. Although this arrangement has been undergoing gradual change, it still ensured that the management as well as the editorial policies of the Naval Institute still benefited the sea services.

The new super board may or may not be so focused. If it is not, the Naval Institute could become little more than another commercial entity catering to naval and military interests, unwilling to address the hard questions that will dog the nation's sea service. The members of the Naval Institute-past, present, and future-deserve more. And. the nation deserves a Navy that, in the future, is capable of carrying out the nation's political-military requirements. The Naval Institute could help to bring that about.