Washington policymakers often use the analogy of "draining the swamp" to explain current operations in Iraq against the backdrop of the global war on terrorism. If only we can rout terrorism in Iraq, the argument goes, then the attacks against the United States and its interests around the world will go away, much as draining the swamps during construction of the Panama Canal helped to virtually eradicate malaria in Panama. The analogy begins to fail, however, when we consider that the current "swamp" encompasses the entire Southwest Asia region. In the short term, we can decrease terrorist influence dramatically in Iraq by building a "dike" of U.S. military presence in that country, but terrorism can be defeated only through one of two paths.
The first path was envisioned in President George W. Bush's original doctrinal statements. In a leap truly breathtaking in its nearly Wilsonian idealism. President Bush ardently advocated the export of individual liberty and liberal democracy. His contention was that democracy, once planted in Iraq, would spread throughout the Persian Gulf region, bringing stability and economic growth. This vision has run headlong into the realities of extremist Islamic ideology.
Radical Shiite Islam, with its adherence to strict religious law and goal of reestablishing a Caliphate government in the region, actively resists the President's plan. That the government of Iran actively and members of the Saudi royal family quietly support this extremist Islamic vision places these nations in opposition to U.S. foreign policy, despite their public protestations to the contrary. In addition, there is Syria, Iraq's "twin" in the Middle East, which is governed by lifetime presidents backed by a Baathist political party that remains in power through terror, coercion, and the export of state-sponsored terrorism. These are the nations from which radical Islam continues to flow into Iraq, rendering the task of draining the Iraqi terrorist swamp increasingly problematic. This conclusion brings us to path two.
The second path recognizes the true extent of the swamp as encompassing not only Iraq but also its neighbors and recommends the obvious solution: drain the entire swamp. Saudi Arabia's contacts with the West raise the hope that continued political and economic pressure can speed acceptance of reform by the House of Saud. Certainly, no one would welcome war or revolution in the nation that contains two of the most holy sites in Islam. Syria and Iran, however, are different matters.
Syria has been a net exporter of terrorism for more than 30 years and is a longtime enemy of peace in the region. Intelligence reports quoted in open sources suggest that, during the final days before the war in 2003, large numbers of trucks left Iraq and entered Syria. Might this nation be the hiding place of the long-sought-after weapons of mass destruction? The same open-source reports acknowledge that large numbers of the foreign insurgent terrorists flooding into Iraq have come across the poorly guarded Syrian border.
Syria, by its actions, has placed itself in conflict with regional stability, the continued balance within the international system, and the interests of the United States. The paltry size and relative technological backwardness of its military would render it a weak defender should we choose to disrupt and destroy this national base of terrorism. Its reaction to the democratic uprising in Syrian-occupied Lebanon, however, suggests an internal weakness that invites a different path. First, it might be susceptible to coercive diplomacy. second, to attack Syria is to risk bogging down U.S. forces, even temporarily, while telegraphing our hostile intentions to the real threat in the region: Iran.
The leaders of Iran have cast the United States as the "Great Satan." They actively have exported terrorism, sponsored the taking hostage of foreign nationals, and generally incited the region against the United States and the West. Their actions earned them a place in the now-famous "Axis of Evil," and their reaction has been telling.
Rather than pursue the domestic reforms or external diplomacy necessary to reassure the West, Iran has pursued nuclear weapons, as well as the means to deliver them to nations as far away as Central and Western Europe. It has prolonged negotiations with the West on nuclear proliferation, buying time for further development. A successful test detonation and the quiet announcement of the possession of additional weapons would be great victories for Tehran, with all that it represents.
The Iranian government is a religious theocracy founded on a radical form of Shiite Islam. It has a powerful allure for the Shiite majority in Iraq, which suffered for decades under the dictatorial rule of the Sunni-backed leadership of Saddam Hussein and still neither understands nor accepts the cultural primacy of the West. The United States' successes in Iraq and the possibility of the introduction of democracy there have sparked the other great migration of foreign insurgent terrorists into Iraq, from Iran.
The United States faces a great challenge in Iraq. The increase in troop levels got us through the elections in January, but it will be insufficient against the long-term flood of insurgents from outlying terrorist swamps. We must take action or face a region fraught with future instability. By its own actions. Iran presents the logical next target in the global war on terrorism.
Either we must carry out the Bush Doctrine to its ultimate end in Iran, or we must pack up in Iraq and come home. We have stepped into the breach, and to ask U.S. troops to just hold their own against an unremitting flood of terrorism would be unforgivable. The entire swamp must be drained!
A naval flight officer, Commander Hendrix currently is an associate at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. He holds masters degrees from the Naval Postgraduate School (national security affairs) and Harvard University (history), and is a doctoral candidate at King's College, London.