"Sea Base Ships for the Future"
(sec N. Polmar. pp. 104-105, March 2005 Proceedings}
Major General Gordon Nash, U.S. Marine Corps, Director, Expeditionary Warfare Division-This article presents the alternative of converting a commercial vessel for use as an afloat forward-staging base and a possible component of a future sea base. It does not, however, fully explore the importance of the seabasing concept and the range of capability that must be developed to enable it.
Seabasing is a much-needed national capability. When the Indian Ocean tsunami devastated Indonesia and surrounding areas in December 2004, sea-based naval forces were virtually the only assets capable of bringing relief supplies to those in need. This sea base formed in support of Operation Unified Assistance consisted of ships from the USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6) and USS Essex (LHD-2) Expeditionary Strike Groups, the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) Carrier Strike Group, seven ships from Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons 2 and 3, as well as the hospital ship USNS Mercy (T-AH-19), USNS Niagara Falls (T-AFS-3), and forward-based helicopters from Okinawa and Bahrain. More than 14,000 sailors and Marines operating from the sea base delivered more than 6,000,000 pounds of relief supplies and equipment and did so with more political acceptance than may have been possible with land-based efforts. Our ships will continue carrying out humanitarian assistance missions by gaining rapid access to remote areas or areas in which existing infrastructure has been destroyed or is unusable.
Seabasing is equally essential for combat operations. Successful joint operations require the joint force to move and operate without significant restrictions within and throughout contested spaces at acceptable risk. The United States needs access anytime, anywhere, without a permission slip. case in point: In early March 2003. the Turkish Parliament denied permission for U.S. troops to flow through the country to northern Iraq. On 20 March 2003, the "shock and awe" phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) began without a northern front. The resulting operational delays and difficulties clearly illustrate the potential pitfalls associated with dependence on foreign permission for U.S. military operations, even when dealing with NATO allies.
The sea base, when implemented, will provide the operational independence that was lacking on the northern front in the initial phases of OIF and also will support employment of troops and enhanced security. Seabasing complements and supports the Marine Corps concepts of Operational Maneuver from the Sea and Ship-to-Objective Maneuver, the Army concepts of Operational Maneuver from Strategic Distances, and the Air Force concepts of Global Strike, Integrated Air and Missile Defense, and Operational Access.
Seabasing will provide a national capability for projecting and sustaining naval power and joint forces from a base at sea, without the need to establish an intermediate land base. Seabasing will free airlift and sealift assets to support missions ashore and provide a foundation for projecting offensive and defensive fires. Secure, mobile, and networked sea bases also will serve the vitally important function of reducing the vulnerability of our forces to terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. If we look to where we are likely to fight in the future, seabasing seems even more important and relevant. Around the world, governments likely will remain under internal pressure to refuse support to the United States. In the Pacific, one needs to look only at geography to know that a sea base would be relevant.
The Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) (MPF[F]) is a key component of the sea base, but it is not the entirety of the sea base. MPF(F) must be able to do all that Mr. Polmar mentions and more. It must also be able to replenish and be replenished while under way. It must possess the capability to rapidly transfer large cargo at sea in a variety of sea states. It must be able to offload exactly what is needed, when it is needed, without pulling into port.
Even with the highly capable MPF(F) just mentioned, the sea base is not complete without warships such as amphibious assault ships (LHA[R]s/LHDs), landing platform dock ships (LPD-17s), dock landing ships (LSD-41s/49s), carriers (CVN-21s), destroyers (DD[X]s), littoral combat ships (LCSs), and submarines (SSGNs) to berth troops and to help keep the base secure. The sea base also will need a mix of high-speed surface and air intertheater and intratheater connectors to join its elements.
Many of the technologies necessary to fully realize seabasing are under development. Some of the platforms have not yet been built. Scientists and engineers working with operators will bring seabasing to a reality through a rigorous test and evaluation process. In the words of Marine Corps Commandant General Michael Hagee, "the seabasing we want is about doing OIF without Kuwait; it is about doing the arrival and assembly at sea and not only going to [the port of] Umm Qasr but going all the way to [the inland city of] An Nasiriyah." To conduct operations in this new way. we may need to look to new ways of funding, perhaps using the combined budget dollars of each of the services. This transformational capability, in the end, is a national capability that will enable the joint warfighting team.
Forming the future sea base is more complex than fielding MPF(F) and too important to delay. We need continued conversation among the services, within the scientific and technical communities, with defense analysts and think tanks, with industry, with lawmakers, and with our allies to make sure we build the right capability for our nation.
"Keep the Best, Let Go of the Rest"
(See P. Marin, pp. 50-53, February 2005 Proceedings)
Master Chief Navy Counselor (Surface Warfare/Air Warfare) Paul Pierce, U.S. Navy-Congratulations to Chief Morin on his award-winning and thought-provoking essay. I doubt that any thinking person would dispute the need to keep the best and let/make poorer performers leave the service, but I would like to offer two comments on the topic related to the issue of equity.
First, what about the separation of poor quality officers? The enlisted forces are already disproportionately bearing the brunt of the Navy's drawdown and rightsizing, as they did during the drawdown of the 1990s. For example, an early-out message is on the street that solicits early separation by sailors. In addition to that, the perform-to-serve (PTS) initiative has been in place for almost a year. PTS is a rack-and-stack system that culls poor performers from the bottom of the enlisted ranks. As the Navy searches for ways to shape the force (i.e., cut end-strength), it seems only fair that some of the scrutiny placed on the enlisted force also be directed toward the poor performers of the officer corps.
second, while I wholeheartedly embrace the idea of culling poor performers, it should be done without regard for community manning. Community manning is not a performance factor within the control of any sailor. In fact, looking at how much community management varies from rating to rating and from year to year, a convincing argument can be made that nobody has control of enlisted rating manpower management. That doesn't mean we don't try hard, but rather that our enlisted manpower management processes are badly broken. Otherwise, how could sailors in a single paygrade, such as E-3, have advancement opportunities that range from as low as 1.9% to 100%? And how could it vary so widely from cycle to cycle? Navywide opportunity to petty officer third class is about 35% per cycle. Five years ago, it was 80%, and five years before that it was 41%. Going by each rating shows an even wilder picture, with huge swings in opportunity (more accurately, the lack of it) over each cycle. So, when we consider who to send home, we should look at performance of the individual regardless of whether he or she has been promoted because, again, promotion is more a function of community manning than of performance. An operations specialist seaman with 1.9% advancement opportunity actually may be a much better performer and asset to the Navy than a musician with 100% advancement.
"River Kwai Syndrome' Plays in Law of the Sea"
(See F. J. Gaftney. p. 2. March 2005 Proceedings)
RCUI- Admiral W. L. Schachte, Jr., U.S. Nary (Retired), sen-eel more than 30 years as a line officer and in the Judge Advocate's General Corps-Mr. Gaffney's fanciful allusion to the movie The Bridge on the River Kwai in relation to the Law of the Sea Convention (Convention) is an insult not only to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, who are on record in strong support of the United States joining the Convention as a national security priority, but also to the thousands of military men and women of the United States who rely on the Convention's navigation and overflight provisions every day around the world. A more accurate comparison would be between Mr. Gaffney's assertions and mindcontrol techniques of the former Soviet Union that denied the existence of absolute truth and manipulated words to have the opposite of their true meaning. This is clear to anyone who reads the entire Convention.
Mr. Gaffney's assertions concerning the Convention are without merit, and I am disappointed that the Naval Institute would allow its forum to be used for such an unfounded attack on a matter of significant national security importance. Indeed, it is impossible to engage in a reasoned debate with Mr. Gaffney because he repeatedly misstates the "facts" relative to the Convention in a deliberate, concerted effort to mislead the public and our government leaders. It is bad enough to be wrong, but there is something more serious at work when facts are ignored and one consciously and purposely misleads.
Support for joining the Convention is not restricted to the Navy. Since the 1994 Agreement, the Convention has been strongly supported by the Department of Defense, Department of State, and other federal agencies. Private industry interests, such as our oil and gas industry, shipping industry, commercial fishing industry, and many others, also have strongly supported joining the Convention. In fact, there is not a single U.S. interest that would be better served by the United States being outside the Convention than inside it.
To state, as Mr. Gaffney does, that the Convention was "negotiated in a diplomatic context openly hostile to U.S. military and economic might and dedicated to reducing U.S. advantage" is dead wrong. Only in the context of the seabed mining negotiations was there any ideological confrontation and that pitted the developing countries against the industrialized countries of East and West. All fundamental U.S. global military mobility, global navigation and overflight, telecommunications, oil and gas development and transportation, fishing, and protection of the marine environment objectives were achieved in the 1982 text. The 1994 Implementing Agreement addressed and accommodated all of the specific objections raised by President Ronald Reagan, and it made fundamental legally binding changes that supersede the 1982 text.
I was an active participant at the time, and President Reagan never raised a sovereignty issue relative to the Convention. In fact. President Reagan concluded the treaty was so favorable to U.S. interests that, in his 1983 Ocean Policy Statement, he ordered the U.S. Government to abide by and exercise the rights accorded by the non-deep seabed mining provisions of the Convention. Indeed, the treaty enhances both the combat mobility of our naval and air forces and enhances our national security. There is nothing questionable about the "pedigree" of this Convention.
Now let me address Mr. Gaffney's erroneous bulleted assertions.
* To state that the Convention gives opponents legal grounds for challenging Navy operations such as intelligence collection in and submerged transit of territorial waters is false. This assertion demonstrates a fundamental lack of understanding of both the Convention and the law of the sea. There is no change from existing law recognized by the United States and existing treaties to which the United States is a party with respect to intelligence collection in and submerged transit of territorial waters, except for two fundamental improvements: first, the maximum breadth of the territorial sea is fixed at 12 miles, and second there is a right to submerged transit of straits overlapped by the territorial sea. Moreover, the Convention does not deal with or alter the practice of nations with respect to covert intelligence activities in the territory of a foreign nation.
* The Proliferation security Initiative partners are parties to the Convention, and it is completely incorrect to suggest that the Convention would prohibit the United States alone, or collectively, in the exercise of the right of self-defense from taking any and all measures we determine appropriate to protect our nation, including intercepting and boarding ships on the high seas. To the contrary, the Convention substantially enhances our ability to combat terrorism and rogue states. Without the secure navigation and overflight rights guaranteed by the Convention, it would be much harder for us to bring the war on terrorism to the terrorists. Nothing in the Convention prevents the interception or boarding of a ship on the high seas in the exercise of the right of selfdefense. President Bush's Proliferation Security Initiative is being implemented in accordance with the Convention, which provides the basis for the growing coalition of states we are assembling as part of that initiative.
* Concerning the Navy's use of active antisubmarine sonars, Mr. Gaffney obviously is unaware that the provisions of the Convention regarding the protection and preservation of the environment do not apply to warships. Accordingly, nothing in the Convention requires restrictions on antisubmarine sonar to protect whales.
To state the United States would face two choices if its activities are challenged, compulsory dispute resolution or the Law of the Sea Tribunal, is false. The United States will exercise the "military activities exemption" as provided in the Convention as have others who already have exercised this exemption, including the United Kingdom, Russia, France, Canada, Mexico, Argentina, Portugal, Denmark, the Ukraine, and Norway. Thus, all of Mr. Gaffney's rantings about the World Court, the World Trade Organization, and other totally irrelevant assemblies of "politicized international panels" are ludicrous and again show that he has chosen to ignore the facts. It also is incorrect to assert that the United States historically has refused to agree to compulsory dispute resolution. The United States is a party to many treaties providing for compulsory arbitration or adjudication. It has done so when those provisions advance United States interests. Finally, the Convention expressly states that the decisions of the Law of the Sea Tribunal have no binding force except between the parties to a case.
Finally, Mr. Gaffney erroneously asserts that the United States is better served simply by relying on Customary International Law. What he fails to recognize is that the edifice of customary law on which we currently rely has the Convention as its foundation. Destroy the Convention, as he hopes to do, and you destroy the foundation for our current positions regarding the content of the international law of the sea. We will return to the trend in the 20th century that the Convention was designed to remedy, and which, thus far by our operating under its provisions, we have deflected. The 20th century trend is an accelerating slide toward a world in which we have to buy or fight for navigation and overflight rights off foreign coasts that we get for free in the Convention.
Our military planners have long understood that the long-term strategic flexibility of the United States depends on protection of the global mobility of its forces from political coercion by the many nations off whose coasts we must operate. This is best achieved by operating under the terms of a recognized international agreement. Such a recognized international agreement is the Convention. It is thus no mystery why our military leadership formally has advised the appropriate Senate committees that becoming party to the Convention "remains a top national security priority."
EDITOR'S NOTE: Proceedings plans to publish a detailed review of the Law of the Sea Convention by Rear Admiral Schachte in a future issue.
"Critical Dilemma: Loyalty Versus Honesty"
(sec J. Hoar. p. 2. January 2005; J. Collins, pp. 10-12, February 20Oi; R. R. Boyd, A. Brown, pp. 22-24. March 2005 Proceedings)
James M. Dempsey, former lieutenant, U.S. Naval Reserve-Colonel Collins seems to miss the point of General Hoar's comments. Either integrity is important or it is not. And if honesty is an essential component of integrity, then honesty cannot be dismissed because it is not politically correct. General Hoar is not suggesting that senior military officers "fall on their swords," but that they speak the truth, even if the truth is not consistent with the spin our politicians put on a series of events.
lieutenant Colonel Peter Flatten, U.S. Army (Retired)-Colonel Collins's comment tracks well until he writes of "disparafe groups" who strive for and reach a consensus and then, not successful, resign en masse. This has the earmarks of a cabal and raises the question: What are the Joint Chiefs (and/or Joint Staff) doing?
It seems to me the conflicted senior officers not having their recommendations adopted could request early relief, reassignment, or retirement through ordinary channels. If they are so dismayed by the course of events that declaratory resignations are deemed necessary to end their careers with exclamation points, then I count them as principled and also arrogant. Only future events will be able to measure whether their views were more sound than their civilian masters.
"A Bridge Too Far"
(see B. Stone, pp. 31-35. February 2005; K. Harrison, pp. 10-12. March 2005 Proceedings}
Vice Admiral Mike Bowman, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Commander, Naval Air Forces Pacific-Junior officers always have been more than willing to point out perceived deficiencies in our Navy and Marine Corps, and I am all for giving them venues to do just that. But we need to realize they often do so in ignorance of most of the details and the environments in which senior-level decisions are made.
By publishing this article the Naval Institute has no doubt made this lieutenant a hero to many of his peers and at the same time pulled the carpet right out from under people such as Vice Admiral Jim Zortman (Commander, Naval Air Forces Pacific) who are working hard to do the right thing for Naval Aviation. Naval Aviation's leaders (as humans) and their decision making are never going to be absolutely perfect, but they deserve much better judgment from the Naval Institute in what it publishes.
I have no heartburn with the issues. In fact, less flight time for simulators and retirement of the S-3 are two issues I personally have spoken against. We should let lieutenant Stone and anyone else articulate their opinions of professional issues such as these, but I am totally against providing a public forum with which to make personal attacks against one's integrity or intelligence, particularly when the individual is still on active duty. In this case, the personal attacks serve no useful purpose, and in fact, they undercut the chain of command, thereby making solutions and improvements more difficult to attain.
"Annual Report to the Membership"
(See P. M. Slillman. T. L. Wilkerson, p. S, March 2005 Proceedings)
Laurie Stearns, former Managing Editor, Naval Institute Press (1986-1989)-It would set off alarm bells if my local Friends of the Library group sent me a report boasting that it was devoting its energies to preserving its own financial health rather than aiding the profession it was founded to support. I hear those same alarm bells now about the U.S. Naval Institute. The Annual Report to the Membership uses the word "business" 17 times, and enthusiastically endorses the business fads and buzzwords-"business within a business," "core competencies," "champions"-of the day.
Business plays a large role in American life, and some businesses accomplish admirable things, but the Naval Institute is not and should not be a business. It is a service organization, like the Red Cross or the USO. Its mission is not to make money-its mission is to provide an independent forum and to advance understanding.
When those who run the Naval Institute perceive it as a business and not as a service organization, they cannot help but undermine its mission. Businesses give first priority to their own survival; everything else is secondary. Projects that are felt to cost too much (perhaps the Institute's oral history program?, its photo library?, or its magazines?) can be cut back or abandoned altogether.
To be sure, to carry out its mission the Naval Institute needs resources and must use them wisely. But the "course correction" described so melodramatically and with such self-congratulation in the Annual Report is just another wrong turn. Where in the report are the principles of service, excellence, dedication, duty, honor, courage, and loyalty that should be at the heart of the Naval Institute? They are not even hinted at. Instead, the report celebrates "operating margin," "expense controls," "cash flow," and "portfolio performance."
In typical business-speak, the Annual Report says the "reality" is that "we are what we measure." I disagree. All too often measurements are subjective and superficial. At the deepest level, we are what we believe, dream, and strive to accomplish. If the Naval Institute believes in making money, dreams of a favorable balance sheet, and strives to cut costs even when those cuts curtail its mission, this is not a reality I as a member can support.
"The Academy Can Do Better"
(See B. Fleming, p. 88, February 2005; K. Inman, B. Latla. pp. 12-18. March 2005 Proceedings]
Lieutenant Commander Robert W. Thomas Jr., U.S. Navy, Navigator/Operations Officer, USS Louisiana (SSBN-743) (Blue)-As a naval officer, former Naval Academy company officer and instructor, and one of the "9 out of 10" who were not offered admission to the U. S. Naval Academy, I would like to educate Professor Fleming about a few things. First, the mission of the Naval Academy is not to develop poet laureates. The function of our service academies is to provide the nation with young men and women who can lead our military. I don't believe that superior punctuation and grammar provide the United States a decisive edge on the battlefield. As for the commanding officer who has the time to lament the poorly written memos on his desk, he needs to move on and let war fighters command his ship.
While I was often frustrated with the less-than-stellar offerings of my midshipmen students, I realized they had an academic load rivaling the most difficult of our nation's schools combined with extra requirements that are more important in the development of military leaders than worrying about the obsessive use of the passive voice. What Professor Fleming seemingly doesn't understand is that many of those admitted to our service academies aren't the products of the best of our public and private schools. They are potential leaders being afforded the opportunity to attend a premier university at the cost of a few years of service to their country. Many of those who are rejected, at the expense of the "lesser" students that Professor Fleming identifies in his article, will have little difficulty being accepted to another university and being successful. I know, because I was one.
During my service as a company officer, I found that many of my best leaders were minorities, recruited athletes, and prior enlisted. While they weren't the "straight A" students, they understood it takes more than good grades to be effective leaders. Academics are only a part of the equation. The idea that only "the team captain and quarterback" can be a leader on a sports team demonstrates how little Professor Fleming knows about the dynamics of the leadership laboratory taking place at the Naval Academy. In my career, I have worked with many Naval Academy graduates. Some were Trident scholars and Brigade commanders. Others were candidates for "anchorman" or spent large portions of their "free time" marching tours. Those who struggle to meet the minimum requirements and graduate have no less to offer our country than those who wear the gold academic stars on their midshipmen uniforms.
Despite myriad errors in Professor Fleming's argument, I do agree with him. The Naval Academy can do better; it may just need to start with the faculty.
Lieutenant Milciades Then, U. S. Navy-Professor Fleming talks about set-aside groups-underrepresented minorities, recruited athletes, and fleet sailors. According to him, they are all underperformers with bad grammar, or at least the ones in his class. As part of an underrepresented minority group and a former enlisted sailor, I am surprised that Professor Fleming has such a narrow view of what a good officer should embody. What the professor does not understand is that while the Naval Academy is an elite military and academic institution, its purpose is not to serve the academic elite and privileged who can afford better schooling for their children. It serves all Americans no matter their socioeconomic status. And if he does not think that socioeconomic status plays a part in the level of education students receive today, he is out of touch with today's society.
In addition, the prior enlisted midshipmen bring a level of knowledge, experience, and leadership that high school students do not have. I would never select an "academically qualified" high school student with very high scores over a young sailor or Marine who has served his country in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan and has lower, yet qualifying, scores. These sailors and Marines are selected because they have good high school grades, qualifying SAT scores, and because they have demonstrated superior levels of performance in the fleet or the Fleet Marine Force. The Admissions Department never would intentionally set up anybody for academic failure at the Naval Academy; if students are not qualified, they will not be admitted.
The Naval Academy's mission is to provide leadership for the naval service. That means that the officer corps needs to look more like the enlisted ranks. It currently does not. I don't like quotas, but when African Americans represent 18% of the enlisted ranks and only 5% of the officers, we have a problem. Last year's admissions cycle, the class of 2008, yielded approximately 70 African Americans and 116 Hispanics in a class of more than 1,200. If the Naval Academy does not produce graduates who look more like the fleet they will be tasked to lead, then it will not be fulfilling its mission. Professor Fleming advocates turning the Naval Academy into an Ivy League school that will produce writers, professors, researchers, and scientists, but not effective combat leaders. His vision will not yield a stronger Navy and Marine Corps. Instead, it will accomplish the opposite.
"There's No Need to see Red"
(See M. Crockett, p. 79. December 2004; M. Harrison, J. Lewis, p. 10, January 2005 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Steve Kurak, U.S. Navy (Retired)-lieutenant Commander Crockett's recommendation to do away with practice of recognizing 12 years of good service with the wearing of gold stripes does not go far enough toward eliminating the old-fashioned traditions so insulting to our new generation of sailors.
After eliminating this barbaric practice as proposed, we should then get rid of the preferred parking at the commissary and head of the pier, currently provided to those of higher rank or notable achievement, such as Sailor of the Quarter. Why must our sailors be subjected to these reminders that others have achieved more senior rank or otherwise excelled more so than themselves? In fact, why do we continue to allow our chief petty officers to wear a different uniform than petty officers and below? Surely this taunting of the junior ranks can not be healthy-perhaps we should revisit the whole notion of rank altogether.
"DD(X) Navigates Uncharted Waters"
(See C. Goddard and C. Marks, pp. 30-33, January 2005; RR. Morin, R.H. Smilh, pp. 20-22, March 2005 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Scott G. Borgerson, U.S. Coast Guard-In perhaps an overly eager attempt to sell this new surface combatant in your cover article, the authors use history in a slipshod manner when they compare the DD(X) to the HMS Dreadnought and the maritime transition from sail to steam. As they describe it, the DD(X) does indeed seem impressive, but they misapply these historical analogies when they highlight similarities to bolster their case while overlooking important historical differences and the unflattering details of the original events.
For example, the design breakthroughs of the Dreadnought did change forever ship design and naval warfare, but this new ship also simultaneously made the rest of the British fleet obsolete overnight, even though at the time, and not unlike the U.S. position today, the Royal Navy was almost as large as all other world navies combined. In February 1905, First Sea Lord of the British Navy Admiral Jacky Fisher still decided to pursue this radical new design despite the fact that many in the British Parliament viewed it as a waste of resources. Admiral Fisher's critics saw no need for this new investment given Britain's naval supremacy over its nearest competitor, Germany. The decision by none other than Winston Churchill, a later First Lord of the Admiralty, to find a better fuel for the Dreadnought that would allow this massive battleship to achieve greater speeds with fewer mechanical mishaps also was wrought with intense controversy. Such fuel would mean a tactical decision to shift the British fleet from coal, a plentiful domestic product, to oil, which would in time tie British national security to foreign sources of supply. In 1914, the British Admiralty would have no idea that this new source of energy and the Anglo-Persian oil Company's rising stakes in the Middle East would later have unintended consequences. The Dreadnought also seems less impressive when one considers that the submarine, the aircraft carrier, and unfolding events would in short order end the brief reign of the great battleship, a rather uncomfortable outcome considering the dire questions about current major capital investments such as the DD(X).
We should not forget that the transition from sail to steam was hardly seamless. In fact, this propulsion change took more than a century, and while ultimately ships of sail would be relegated to a romantic, bygone era, new steam engines were plagued by exploding boilers, bad designs, and a reputation for injuring and even killing mariners (not to mention eclipsed in a relatively short amount of time by the turbine engine). Because steam as a means of propulsion was at first so unreliable and inefficient, until as late as the 189Os many ships carrying steam engines were also fitted with auxiliary sailing rigs. Further undermining this historical comparison in the DD(X) article, the shift from sail to steam was resisted by many in the "old guard" because this entirely new form of propulsion challenged thousands of years of precedent that literally defined how navies trained, sailed, and fought. This sea change completely redrew lines of command and control, permanently altered naval strategies as ships were no longer at the mercy of the wind, and placed more power in the hands of naval engineers. While the DD(X) does have many impressive technological innovations, unless it lacks propellers or can somehow launch itself into the air and fly, this new ship will merely be a variation on a theme and not a new symphony.
If history is any lesson, the fickle seas of foreign affairs may render the time, treasure, and talent spent building the DD(X) irrelevant. While I sense the authors' passion for the DD(X) project in which the Navy has invested so much, their article left me thinking about the care we should give when applying history to contemporary policy and Mark Twain's wry observation that, "History doesn't repeat itself, but it does rhyme."
"When Should We Intervene?"
(See A. Hsieh. pp. 61-63. December 2005: R. Bagian, p. 27. March 2005 Proceedings)
Captain Giuseppe Stavale, U.S. Marine Corps-This article demonstrates the author's admirable sensitivities for humankind but also, unfortunately, blatant contradictions. Cadet Hsieh's thesis proposes a quasi-formula for the United States to unilaterally intervene in humanitarian missions throughout the planet. Not only is her thesis idealistic, but based on the premise that the United States is the only capable nation that can offer assistance. She made no creditable mention of the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, European Union, or any other foreign power or international institution and any role they should have. She criticized the unilateral action of the United States invading Iraq in 2003, but suggested that unilateral action is acceptable for humanitarian operations, while acknowledging that even humanitarian operations could escalate into war as evidenced by Somalia in 1993. Essentially, Cadet Hsieh did not seriously consider the need to garner international cooperation for something less controversial than Iraq, such as humanitarian assistance.
Cadet Hsieh violated her own warning of not acting "purely from emotion," as she made an emotional appeal with the Rwandan case study for external intervention, primarily unilateral intervention by the United States. Although the Rwandan case study is a compelling model for U.S. intervention, her thesis and quasiformula failed to answer whether or not the United States was correct by not intervening in the 1994 genocide.
Besides these obvious contradictions, the most defective part of her argument is the call for "a definite exit strategy." I agree with her assertions that objectives should be set and clear and even prioritized. Objectives identify the main effort and allow us to measure the achievement of our strategic goals and whether we accomplished our mission. But "tying them to a definite exit strategy" is perhaps a cliché better suited for public consumption. Can anyone really define or plan for a "definite exit strategy?" The increasing call for an exit strategy in all military operations is becoming too politicized and actually has no definite tactical or operational value. Using past case studies such as the 1991 Gulf War and most major wars and conflicts prior to that, victory and mission accomplishment dictated what the eventual exit strategy would be. Sixty years after World War II, the United States is still in Japan and Germany. Was there a need for an exit strategy, other than victory, in 1941 when we entered the war? No, because no one could have predicted the Cold War.
Contingencies such as peacekeeping operations, war (limited and unlimited), and humanitarian operations are fluid, not static. We must remember the maxim that "the enemy always gets a vote." With that said, the enemy always will try to adapt and counter our tactics, which will cause us to adjust also. The key is who can adjust and maneuver quicker and where it counts, while maintaining the initiative. At best, an exit strategy can be conceptualized and tentatively planned for, but the situation must develop and stabilize toward mission accomplishment before an exit strategy can be better planned and implemented. For example, who would have known that the United Nations would have pulled out of Iraq after thugs and terrorists bombed its mission, leaving the United States without a U. N. presence in Iraq for reconstruction efforts as Cadet Hsieh complained. It is disingenuous to promote a definite plan for a transition of operations to nongovernmental organizations and civil governments when the situation is still developing.
The danger of being wedded to a "definite exit strategy" and the timetables they imply is that expectations are formed within the realm of public opinion. If a threshold is not crossed in accordance with these expectations, then the perception arises that things are not going as well as they had been explained or promised. These are some of the problems with becoming tied to an unrealistic exit strategy. They also create political mileage for political opponents who might undermine the whole effort. We must remember that in most cases our critical vulnerability is our public opinion and its support for the task at hand. We should not sabotage our public opinion by misleading the public into an unrealistic exit strategy. The situation is analogous to high expectations in the stock market. Even though the economy may have grown, done well, and produced more jobs in a particular quarter, if it did not produce what was expected, it may disappoint investors and the stock market may suffer.
If the tsunami that hit South and Southeast Asia in December 2004 is any indication, collective international participation cannot and should not be ruled out when considering involvement in any international crisis; Cadet Hsieh left this out of her quasi-formula. The United States is engaged in seven security alliances and is member to many international organizations that should be leveraged when considering involvement in an international situation. Perhaps involvement could even take the form of "preventative maintenance" in which the United States could encourage other world powers and institutions that it is in their interests to "police" their own backyards, such as with the European Union. Surely, this type of action is in keeping with U.S. interests and may prevent actual physical U.S. intervention.
"Civilized Warfare Is Uncivilized"
(See P. Clauscn, p. 28, January 2005; P. Orlowicz, pp. 12-14, February 2005 Proceedings)
Captain Stephen E. Armstrong, U.S. Naval Reserve-As I understand lieutenant Colonel Clausen's commentary, he advocates using overwhelming force in disproportionate response, not discriminating between military and civilian targets, inflicting group punishment, and not terminating conflicts unless a clear victory is obtained, no matter the cost.
As a nuclear submariner, 1 would suggest that using nuclear weapons would achieve all of the above in a quick, efficient, and cost-effective manner. In any war of national survival, I am certain that any leader with a nuclear option would hesitate only a short while before using it to save the nation. Consequently, if Iraq had nuclear weapons last year, Saddam Hussein would have directed their use against any strategic target possible. He would have hoped to survive by either seriously impeding our attack or raising the political cost for our regional allies so high that they would have withdrawn their permission to use their territories to stage our attack.
We now know, however, that during the last 13 years of our 14-year conflict Iraq was not a threat to U.S. national survival. In 2002, Iraq had no more credible chemical and biological weapons or their development capability than any number of other countries and corporations. While they certainly possessed the talented scientists and engineers necessary to reconstruct their nuclear program, they had not mounted a successful effort. It appears that in the Iraq War, like the Vietnam War, the Korean War, the Spanish-American War, and numerous lesser conflicts we've engaged in over the past 200 years, the United States would have survived as a nation even if we "lost" the war. We have pursued these wars without resorting to all of our capabilities, knowing that we would need to live with the outcome, whatever it might be.
How do you pursue a war that you are not willing to go all the way to win? If our cause is not national survival, it is either to seek economic advantage or to improve the lives of the civilians in the region. We fought the first Gulf War for both of these causes, and we successfully eliminated Iraq's threat to the world's oil supply and liberated the Kuwaiti people. At most, we will receive only an indirect economic advantage in liberating Iraq. And the United States has never started wars just to improve the lives of foreign civilians. Our basic objective, then, is to have a post-war government that is friendly and transparent so that we can be sure they are not reconstituting their capability to threaten us with weapons of mass destruction. If our operations in Iraq had ended as a conventional war, our objective would have been to destroy the enemy's military through overwhelming force while minimizing damage to the civilian population (our original plan). Because we now face an unconventional war, we have to kill or capture the hardcore rebels, starve them of logistics, and eliminate their ability to recruit and train new rebels or obtain new logistics. We are on that path now, although the outcome is uncertain. Our chances of failing in this mission increase in proportion to the amount of havoc and destruction that occur on Iraqi civil society.
"Navy History Is Worth the Cost"
(See M. Brilakis, p. 20. February 2005 Proceedings)
"On the Shoulders of Giants"
(See C. Michel, p. %. February 2005 Proceedings)
"Navy's Reserve Will Be Integrated With Active Forces"
(See D. Anderson and J. A. Winnefcld. pp. 6162, November 2004; D. Woods, pp. 14-15, A. Baiumek, pp. 15-16. January 2005; J. Manfreda, pp. 26-27. February 2005 Proceedings)
Captain Larry G. DeVriex, U.S. Naval Resen'e (Retired)-A Bravo Zulu to Colonel Brilakis-for his well-written article on the need to upgrade the teaching of the Navy's history to our own era and the need to maintain the Navy's museums.
Also, kudos to Christopher Michel. The unequal emphasis among services, with the Navy seemingly devoting the least amount of resources to history, is a continuing embarrassment. We need the reminder that history is a process that has to be nurtured. The writing of history should not just be left to the initiative of individual citizen historians external to the Navy or left to the Naval Institute.
In the same issue, Captain Manfreda wrote a letter focusing on a series of events in the Coast Guard Reserve to describe the lack of the understanding of past history and the failure to apply that learning to policy. Had the Coast Guard studied the need for reserve units-not just individual reservists supplementing the regular units-it might have avoided being unprepared. Is the Navy about to make the same mistake with its reserve by doing something similar because of a lack of the study of history? Perhaps the pending headcount cut of 19,000 Navy Reserve members could be avoided if the lessons of history were studied and learned.
A good response to Captain Manfreda's letter could be solicited from any senior Marine Corps officer on the topic, "Why have the Marines stayed with their reserve structure (of units) over the past 60 years from the challenges of Korea all the way through the current Operation Iraqi Freedom activations?"
By the way, the Navy Reserve is the only reserve component that does not have its own published history. An excellent chronology and a historical summary were produced by the Naval War College for the first 75 years, but neither are published. The other services have published histories of their reserves.
Let's document our history and learn from it.
"Liberty Victims Did Not Die in Vain"
(See A. Wells, pp. 88-89, March 2005 Proceedings)
Captain A. Jay Cristal, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired), and author of The. LiJ:erty Incident-Mr. Wells continues to perpetrate myths related to the Israeli attack on the USS Liberty (AGTR-5) 38 years ago.
The basis of Mr. Wells's argument is the myth that the Liberty was eavesdropping on "key Israeli political-military communications" from mid-May to 8 June 1967. The fact is that Liberty arrived on the scene at 0849 on 8 June and was attacked at about 1400 that same day after a mere 5 hours and 11 minutes on station. The Liberty had no Hebrew linguists on board, and whatever Hebrew language intercepts Liberty might have collected were not reviewed by the National security Agency (NSA) until days later. (see NSA report, "Attack on a SlGlNT Collector, the U.S.S. Liberty:' 1981. pages 62 and 64.)
Mr. Wells finds "of particular interest" interviews of secretary of State Dean Rusk and his key advisor, Helmut Sonnenfeldt. In a letter to me regarding the Liberty incident, dated 16 August 1990, Dr. Sonnenfeldt wrote "While I was keenly interested in the incident, I had no special knowledge and saw none of the traffic or internal flow of memoranda about it." An examination of all State Department documentation (see Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume XIX, 2004) and my personal interview of Dean Rusk do not reflect any evidence in support of Wells's claims.
Mr. Wells's statement that "the Liberty was a key source in the NSA network. She read the traffic. The information sent shudders down the spines of President Lyndon B. Johnson, secretary of State Rusk and key advisor Sonnenfeldt," is pure fiction. The NSA confirms on page 64 of its 1981 report that "the Liberty had no specific mission against Israeli communications. . .," and on page 62 it faults itself that NSA first heard Israeli Hebrew language messages collected by Liberty several days after the attack because no Hebrew linguist was assigned to Liberty.
A CIA memorandum dated 21 June 1967 and declassified on 12 January 2004 states, "The Israelis were not aware that they were attacking the Liberty. The attack was not made in malice toward the U.S. and was a mistake."
The NSA 1981 report, declassified 2 July 2003, regarding NSA signal intelligence intercepts, states: "While these reports revealed some confusion on the part of the pilots concerning the nationality of the ship, they tended to rule out any thesis that the Israeli Navy and Air Force deliberately attacked a ship they knew to be American."
Anyone interested in the details of that tragic event should examine the extensive documentary record (most original documents may be viewed at www.libertyincident.com) and should not be misled by myths such as those put forth by Mr. Wells.
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