Given current and projected threats, fiscal constraints, shifting alliances, and a shrinking Navy, it is vital for U.S. national security that the Coast Guard and Navy plan and field forces collaboratively.
On 27 September 1942, Coast Guard Signalman First Class Douglas Munro and Navy Reserve Coxswain Samuel Roberts were killed in action as they evacuated 500 Marines from a Guadalcanal beach. They served together in a joint Navy-Coast Guard unit, and on that eventful day, both had placed their Higgins landing craft between the beachhead and the enemy, drawing Japanese fire and covering the Marines until they could be taken aboard.1
Sixty years later, on 25 April 2004, Coast Guard Damage Controlman Third Class Nathan Bruckenthal and Navy Boatswain's Mate First Class Michael Pernaselli and Signalman second Class Christopher Watts were killed in action by a suicide bomber driving a wooden boat packed with explosives. They served together in a joint Navy-Coast Guard unit conducting maritime intercept operations in the northern Arabian Gulf, and they died together while defending Iraqi oil terminals.2
Serving together, sometimes even dying together, is a Navy-Coast Guard tradition. In time of war or when the President directs, the Coast Guard serves as part of the Navy. While this proven relationship is an enduring continuity, it remains misunderstood by many outside the two services and subject to periodic questioning.
As recently as summer 2003, secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld had "all but decided to remove the U.S. Coast Guard from participation in future wars."3 Twelve months later, after the suicide boat attack in Iraq, he reversed himself and requested additional Coast Guard assets—two patrol boats, two law enforcement detachments, and supporting forces—to join the four patrol boats, two law enforcement detachments, and one port security unit already deployed to the Iraqi theater.4
Operation Iraqi Freedom underscored the value of the Coast Guard-Navy relationship for overseas crisis and conflict response. For this contingency, the Coast Guard deployed to the Persian Gulf and Mediterranean two highendurance cutters, eight 110-foot coastal patrol boats, four port security units, one seagoing buoy tender, and elements of an environmental strike team. While this redirection of forces from domestic peacetime duties to overseas combat operations was consistent with the service's statutory authorities, long historical record, and existing contingency plans, some in the Department of Defense were concerned whether the Coast Guard could sustain such operations while simultaneously adding maritime homeland security responsibilities to traditional missions such as drug interdiction and fisheries enforcement.
Given current and projected threats, fiscal constraints, shifting alliances, and a Navy reducing to some 100 surface combatants, it is vital for U.S. national security that the Coast Guard and Navy plan and field forces collaboratively—forces that are within budget, provide complementary support, and give national leaders adaptive and capable resources suited to the full range of 21st-century operations. Yet the concerns voiced by Defense policymakers remain troublesome, because the Coast Guard is stretched thin. These are serious issues, and serious discussion is needed to address them. If wrong or shortsighted decisions are made today, it may be costly—or impossible—to turn them around in some future crisis.
Practical, Prudent Benefits
The Coast Guard's agreement to deploy selected forces to Operation Iraqi Freedom came after a careful assessment of its defense obligations, new homeland security responsibilities, and traditional missions.5 The forces deployed were sized for the jobs at hand and complemented U.S. Navy and other DoD assets in theater, while at the same time ensured that priorities at home could be met.
Shifting threats and evolving operational requirements always have required the Coast Guard to allocate its forces agilely against a prioritized list of missions. In February 2003, when the Office of Homeland security raised the national threat level to "high," the Coast Guard quickly repositioned offshore law-enforcement assets to respond to security-related needs, using aircraft patrols in place of the cutters that were relocated. While this and countless similar actions demonstrate the inherent flexibility of a multimission agency, the Coast Guard has been stressed increasingly by recent fiscal shortfalls, and it has been forced to acknowledge—reluctantly—that "quantity has a quality all its own."
In fact, the Coast Guard already has acknowledged that it lacks sufficient forces to conduct all its statutory missions optimally. Commandant Admiral Thomas H. Collins admitted in April 2003 that, in his judgment, his service would never reach adequate "capacity."
Throughout the 1990s, both the Navy and Coast Guard were hard-pressed to respond adequately to unanticipated contingencies with their diminishing force structures, and post-Cold War budget reductions seriously exacerbated the difficulty. It was the harsh reality that numbers do count and that force levels were inadequate that led Admiral Jay Johnson, then Chief of Naval Operations, and Admiral James Loy, then Commandant of the Coast Guard, to sign the Navy-Coast Guard National Fleet Policy Statement in September 1998. This policy committed both services to the development of complementary forces that collectively could address the entire range of 21st-century naval and maritime threats as then understood. It also would leverage each service's core competencies to improve overall capability, interoperability, and affordability and provide economies of scale with respect to total ownership cost. In January 2001, Admiral Vern Clark underscored the critical role for the Coast Guard in addressing the "numbers problem" by means of a National Fleet: "I stand four-square behind the arrangements and the agreements in place and the Navy's commitment to the Coast Guard. . . . We need to build as much combat capability into the Coast Guard as possible."6
The Coast Guard's Multimission Military Role
After 11 September 2001, maritime homeland security requirements intensified sharply. With the greater need for port and cargo security, plus safeguarding the territorial sea, exclusive economic zones, and marine transportation system, the Coast Guard found itself spread more thinly than ever. Moreover, the transfer of the Coast Guard to the new Department of Homeland security, accompanied by congressional directives that forbid any relaxation of "traditional" missions in favor of maritime homeland security, prompted some in DoD to question whether the Coast Guard would "be there when it's needed." As The Washington Post reported, some Defense and Navy officials suggested the Coast Guard restrict itself to "guarding the coast"; that overseas deployments of Coast Guard units be "written out" of DoD operational plans; and the Navy begin developing organic equivalents for many capabilities provided by the Coast Guard, such as maritime interception and port security in forward areas.7
It is a mistake, however, to construe the Coast Guard's name to imply its primary purpose is merely to guard the U.S. coast. Certainly the Revenue Cutter Service was established in 1790 primarily for protecting the U.S. coastline against smugglers, but seven years later, its cutters were conducting coastal defense and protection of shipping missions.8 Today, according to 14 USC 1, the Coast Guard is "a military service and branch of the armed forces of the United States at all times," and 14 USC 2 requires the Coast Guard to "maintain a state of readiness to function as a specialized service in the Navy in time of war." The implications of this statutory foundation are clear, as national security strategist Colin S. Gray explains:
The national-defense mission of the U.S. Coast Guard is not a bonus, or an add-on, to an essentially civilian character. The Coast Guard is, and has always been, a military service. It has never been intended to be the American service sustained to fight for the right to use the sea: That, of course, is the role of the Navy. Nonetheless, the conduct of military operations in coastal waters is integral to the purpose, and has to be reflected in the equipment, of the Coast Guard.9
The most recent campaign for restricting the Coast Guard's national defense functions often cites redundancy between the Coast Guard and Navy. But the Coast Guard is no more a second Navy than the Marine Corps is a second Army. The Coast Guard exists for separate and distinct reasons—only one of which is to be a U.S. armed force. The Coast Guard is somewhat similar to the Naval Reserve, whose military capability buys the Navy—and the nation—a cost-effective force multiplier during national emergencies. Having a ready, capable pool of small combatants, patrol craft, maritime patrol aircraft, and special-purpose cutters on hand allows the Navy to stretch its still-thinning fleet effectively and economically.
Department of Homeland security secretary Tom Ridge understood this reality. When asked in September 2003 about the wisdom of deploying Coast Guard forces overseas, he explained that Coast Guard personnel "are trained to do many different things on behalf of the country. And when the need arises, they can surge to fill that need and then go back to their more traditional missions. It's . . . part of the approach that we're taking with many men and women within [the] Homeland security [Department].... Everyone should be satisfied with their ability to meet either military or maritime missions."10
What Secretary Ridge knew is that the Coast Guard, the world's tenth largest naval force, has significant capability, experience, and expertise in conducting both homeland security missions and expeditionary naval warfare operations in the littorals. With Navy force reductions and a world plagued by regional instability, the Coast Guard's cutters, coastal patrol boats, and multimission aircraft take on new significance. In this regard, the Coast Guard is a naval force-in-being, one the United States can rely on for complementary capabilities such as force protection, thus freeing high-value Navy warships for critical strike missions. In-theater Coast Guard forces protect the seaports of debarkation, sea lines of communication, the combat logistics force, maritime prepositioning ships, and the sealift force. And because the Coast Guard and Navy are interoperable, each can support the other effectively.
Fielding Complementary Forces
The real issue here is not whether the Coast Guard should be included in war and contingency plans, but ensuring that its ability to contribute there is retained as an element of operational flexibility.
To fully satisfy its obligations, the Department of Homeland security needs access to certain maritime capabilities, of which the Coast Guard provides a large part. Similarly, the Navy has its own required capabilities—some organic, some not-for carrying out its missions. Particularly in the middle region of the range of conflict, the two services share a need for certain capabilities, some of which traditionally have been provided across service lines. Key examples include expertise in maritime interception, force protection, and port security.
But the Navy's primary operational focus is overseas, and most of the Coast Guard's concerns are closer to home. Thus, even when significant requirements overlap, this de facto division of labor justifies why at least some capabilities need to be duplicative. Moreover, virtually all of these are in the low-to-middle range of conflict and thus require "low-mix"—frigates rather than aircraft carriers. It also means that these common capabilities can be used by either service if a low-end crisis requires more force structure than either can provide alone.
Because of the asymmetric nature of the terrorist and rogue-state threats now confronting the United States and its friends and allies, low-end combat capabilities and a sufficient number of corresponding low-end platforms will be key for countering the widest range of adversaries, both domestically and abroad. The Navy's enthusiasm for the littoral combat ship—approximately the size of many current and projected Coast Guard cutters—confirms its confidence in this view. Therefore, one can argue that overlapping, even duplicative, Navy and Coast Guard capabilities in the low-to-middle range convey significant mutual advantage, both because they are embodied in the most flexible and useful assois we can buy and because the resulting increase in platform numbers provides a wider range of employment options to the nation as a whole.
Although the Coast Guard resources of potential value to the Navy will be assigned primarily to homeland security duties and so-called traditional missions, their ability to take on Navy roles when higher priorities dictate can only improve the nation's overall preparedness. As long as interoperability is preserved and a formal mechanism is established for cross tasking Navy and Coast Guard assets, the resulting larger pool of compatible resources will increase the flexibility and coverage capacity of both services. It is time to make National Fleet a reality.
Looking Ahead . . . with Caution
Those who question the appropriateness of the Coast Guard's recent Iraqi deployment undoubtedly have the best interests of the nation at heart. Many believe the Coast Guard was seriously challenged to conduct all its missions at home even before it dispatched forces abroad, particularly in light of the high probability the war would increase the homeland threat level. Others simply feel the homeland security role is more compelling. Fundamentally, the debate revolves around the character of the current threat, the allocation of responsibility, and force size—notably, sizing the Coast Guard and Navy to meet new global dangers to the United States and its allies.
Although the bulk of the Coast Guard's duties are domestic, its status as an armed service is a key element of its value to U.S. political and military leaders. By combining law-enforcement authorities and military capability, the Coast Guard provides the United States a maritime/naval resource whose versatility is unique in the government. Many countries throughout the world routinely accept and request the U.S. Coast Guard's presence and have agreements allowing the Coast Guard to conduct missions in their waters or authorizing combined maritime operations. Coast Guard cutters demonstrate U.S. commitment and resolve but are less provocative to regional and local sensitivities than large, haze-gray warships. Furthermore, there is a strong fit between the Coast Guard and many world maritime forces.
From another perspective, the Coast Guard can "speak the language" of both civil and military organizations—an important advantage as U.S. military forces look increasingly to civil entities for their expertise and assistance in dealing with complex transnational or nontraditional threats, such as mass refugee flows or narcotics smuggling. With its experience coordinating the actions of U.S. civilian agencies and military services in the maritime arena, the Coast Guard plays an important, if not vital, bridging role in U.S. national security affairs.
The Coast Guard's inevitable shift toward homeland security will little alter this equation. Without significant and unlikely legislative changes, the service's core responsibilities will not be altered, and it will remain our fifth military service. To be sure, these difficult times demand some accommodation with the Navy about foreign deployments, allocating missions, and protocols for mutual assistance. But to maximize unity of effort, any agreements must continue to respect the Coast Guard as an integral member of the armed forces and see the enduring value of the Coast Guard-Navy relationship.
1 Dr, Robert M. Browning Jr. (Coast Guard Historian), "Douglas Munro at Guadalcanal," Undated Official U.S. Coast Guard Monograph.
2 Patricia Kime, "Interview: Iraq Casualty Was Dedicated, Thoughtful," Navy Times, 7 June 2004, p. 25.
3 John Mintz and Vernon Loeb, "Coast Guard Fights to Retain War Role," The Washington Post, 31 August 2003, p. A07.
4 Jason Ma, "Coast Guard to Deploy More Ships, Law Enforcement Personnel for OIF," InsideDefense.com, 2 June 2004.
5 The Coast Guard used the same careful assessment when it deployed its forces to Vietnam in 1965, the Persian Gulf in 1991, and Haiti in 1994.
6 Adm. Vern Clark, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, Remarks, Surface Naval Association Annual Meeting, Arlington, VA, January 2001.
7 Mintz and Loeb, "Coast Guard Fights to Retain War Role," p. A07.
8 Robert Erwin Johnson, Guardians of the Sea (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1987), p. 2.
9 Colin S. Gray, "A Coast Guard for the Future: America's Maritime Guardian," Comparative Strategy 18, no. 2 (April-June 1999), pp. 11-128.
10 Secretary Tom Ridge, Department of Homeland Security, press conference, 2 September 2003.
Captain Stubbs served 30 years in the Coast Guard, with duty as a senior strategic and force planner, a combat tour in Vietnam, and command of a major cutter. After 11 September, he participated in the Commandant's strategic task force to define the Coast Guard's way ahead in homeland security. He works for Anteon as a national security consultant.