Security Needs a Professional Officer Community

After the attack on the Cole (DDG-67) and the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, the Navy identified the need to increase the size of our security forces. We have nearly quadrupled the Master-at-Arms force, from some 1,700 to more than 6,000, with plans to expand to more than 10,000 over the next five years. In addition, our security needs have become more sophisticated. The addition of waterside security boats, sophisticated waterside sensors, increased facility hardening criteria, and the need for creative random antiterrorist measures have moved the scope of the security officer's responsibilities from traffic management and enforcement to comprehensive installation security.

At overseas installations, host-nation sovereignty issues, dissimilar work and social cultures, and different political and legal relationships at every location complicate the problem.

What is the problem? Simply put, we have quadrupled the size of our security forces and tripled their responsibility, but we have not increased the seniority or numbers of security force leaders. I have an organization working for me as large as a Navy Hornet squadron that is run by a lieutenant, with no other officers assigned. This not only has direct problems, but also creates second and third order effects in discipline and management.

Using Naval Station Rota, Spain, as an example, the driving under the influence (DUI) rate among my security Department is equal to that of the rest of my command combined. In my 15 months of command, the only equal opportunity complaint has come from the Security Department. The only civilian personnel formal grievance has come from the security Department. The only anonymous letter-writing campaign complaining about workload has come from the security Department. A year ago, the highest on-base vehicle accident rate was—you guessed it—in the security Department.

In one of the the worst episodes thus far, I convicted four of my patrolmen for a DUI and attempted cover-up. It seems that after consuming considerable alcohol, patrolman one wrecked his car on the way back to the base. Patrolman two (the passenger) was drunk as well. Patrolmen three and four were called to come assist, but as they all had been drinking together, it is probable they were legally drunk as well. All four rendezvoused and attempted to extract the mishap vehicle from the scene but failed. They then piled into the second car to go to security, not to report the accident, but to find a chain to reattempt to move the vehicle. But before leaving the scene, patrolman one removed the license plates from the wrecked vehicle. Why? To avoid it being traced to its owner. Why? Because the vehicle did not have proper base registration, a safety inspection, or insurance. On arriving at the security Department, patrolman one, in a wave of guilt, turned himself in; the other three quietly departed and did not offer up their versions of the story until I charged them with dereliction of duty and obstruction of justice. During the fact gathering, patrolman two lied, saying he and patrolmen three and four left the bar by taxi and were nowhere around the accident-until investigators discovered his wallet in the accident vehicle. At mast I took a stripe from each of them and took their security badges.

I am concerned that the majority of my significant behavioral incidents and internal management problems are coming from my department charged with enforcing the regulations. When security patrolmen have this level of problems, they lose credibility as an organization, and overall command security and discipline are open to compromise.

This long catalog of incidents might make it seem that department is failing. Outwardly, nothing is further from the truth. The base is secure and safe. Force protection standards are in compliance with theater standards. External inspections and audits show all is being done correctly. Cooperation between my Security Department and the host-nation security folks is excellent. Interaction with the local national civil authorities is excellent. We recently initiated U.S./Spanish Navy armed waterborne security patrols, increasing the security of U.S. and Spanish vessels inside and outside the harbor. However, all these successes could be quickly negated by an incident or accident in which one of my security patrolmen demonstrated a significant lack of judgment.

The episodes of off-duty unprofessionalism and internal management issues stem from a combination of youthful patrolmen and a lack of supervisory billets. Until recently, the Master-at-Arms rate and law enforcement specialists required a pay grade of E-5 or above for transition; however, the increase in billets has resulted in direct accessions from boot camp through A school. When the security force was quadrupled, there was no commensurate increase in supervisory billets. Therefore, the increase in responsibility combined with younger, less mature patrolmen has overwhelmed the hierarchy within the department. My security officer puts in a longer work week than any of my other department heads, and only rarely takes leave. He has no military assistant to take his place for short periods, and therefore no departmental sounding board or alter ego.

Recognizing this lack in leadership early on, I searched for an officer I could take out of hide to insert as the assistant. However, the lack of seniority of the security officers severely limited my options. I needed someone with more experience than a fleet lieutenant (junior grade), but who did not outrank the security officer himself. I finally received an assistant port operations officer (a chief warrant officer third class selected for lieutenant [J.g.]) who had just completed a tour as ship's bo'sun on a carrier. He immediately made a significant difference in the climate and efficiency of the department. I have since assigned one of my station pilots, aviation professionals not cops, to the department to further ease the strain.

However, this is only a stopgap. We need an institutional increase in Security Department leadership and day-to-day supervision. Of my large operational departments, security is the only one not run by a commander—and those other departments have lieutenant commander assistants and numerous lieutenant division officers. My fire department has one assistant for each of four operational shifts.

What is the solution? First, the Navy needs to invest in more officer billets for assistant security officers and watch section leaders. Second, the rank associated with the security officer at large and/or at overseas installations needs to be increased to the commander level. Third, the security officer career path needs to be more formally instituted into the officer professional progressions managed by the Bureau of Personnel. An additional line designator or new staff corps is required to institutionalize the security force. In the process, and to provide the requisite professional growth, the transition of security Departments to separate commands under administrative and operational control of the installation commander might be desirable. Similar growth in community occurred in cryptology in the 1940s and 1950s, in the explosive ordnance disposal community, and recently in information technology. This increased emphasis and investment in Navy security professionals will complement and enhance the recent deployment of the mobile security forces and increase the available talent pool for assignment as force protection officers.

We also should study the security structures of our sisters services, where specific career paths are well defined and sufficiently senior, to institutionalize standards and leadership.

The Navy has concluded that today's security environment requires significantly more fleet and installation security than in the past. We have increased manning at the deckplate level. Now we need to put in place a professional officer community that is a mixture of line officers, limited duty officers, and warrant officers comfortable with the technical aspects of security and its contribution to the Navy as a whole. On service selection night at the Naval Academy, the security officer community needs to be an option, because the Navy needs it to be a mainstream line function.