Navy Helos Should Support SEALs
Lieutenant Commander John Zerr, U.S. Navy
Not since the days of Vietnam have the Navy SEALs been afforded the opportunity to work this closely with their naval rotary-wing counterparts during wartime. You have written a new page, not only for naval aviation but for naval history as well."1 Commodore Bob Harward, Commander Naval Special Warfare (NSW) Task Group 561, wrote these words as part of a "bravo zulu" to Navy helicopter support of NSW operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).
Active Navy antisubmarine helicopter squadrons (HSs) and light antisubmarine helicopter squadron (HSL) detachments supported the takedown of Iraq's Mina al Bakar and Khor al Amava oil platforms in the Persian Gulf, preventing an environmental disaster. Additional HS support for clearance operations in the Khawr Abd Allah waterway eventually opened the port of Umm Qasr for humanitarian aid. Because Army and Air Force special operations helicopters were tasked heavily with other special warfare requirements, the call went out to Navy rotary-wing units.
Recent Naval Special Warfare Assignments
In the fall of 2001, the Kitty Hawk (CV-63) Battle Group was assigned NSW operations in the Western Pacific. In the winter of 2002, the Constellation (CV-64) Battle Group was tasked to conduct similar operations against the So San, a North Korean vessel carrying Scud missiles. In the spring of 2003, the Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) Battle Group joined with those two battle groups to conduct NSW operations during OIF. These are but a few examples of recent special operations missions that required battle group helicopters-a requirement that will grow as the worldwide war on terror progresses.
Navy helicopters bring these capabilities to the special operations fight:
* With the SH-60B Seahawk, HSL units can provide command-and-control and sniper platforms in low-threat maritime environments.
* The HH-60H combat rescue variant of HS units can operate in medium-threat overland and maritime environments to support numerous NSW operations, including special reconnaissance, direct action, visit, board, search and seizure, close air support, and medical evacuation.
* Reserve helicopter combat searchand-rescue/special warfare support squadrons fly their HH-OOHs in support of NSW as a primary mission.
Support of special operations missions requires dedicated carrier air wing HH-OOHs for short periods, but it does not detract seriously from other strike group missions. The HS squadrons typically deploy with four SH-OOFs and three HH-OOHs. Using two or three HH-OOHs to support SEALs still leaves four or five carrier-based helicopters-in addition to HSL and HC aircraft. (During OIF, HS-4 accomplished the Abraham Lincoln Battle Group's helicopter missions with four aircraft.)
The Way Ahead
It is time for the Navy to establish special operations as a strike group requirement and take the necessary steps to enhance current capabilities. Rather than reacting to special operations tasks as they arise, the Navy should actively train and prepare for them. This will require integrated Navy helicopter-SEAL workups, development of the capability to stage helicopters ashore with organic force protection, and a substantial change in how strike groups view and employ their helicopters.
In the recent NSW operations noted above, SEALs and their rotary-wing counterparts did not work together until their missions were assigned. Thus, "miniworkups" were required to establish the necessary working relationships and capabilities prior to operations. Understandably, special operations forces are reluctant to go into combat supported by unfamiliar assets and personnel. In the words of Rear Admiral Albert Calland, Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command, "the days of meeting a SEAL team for the first time as a helicopter crew briefs the mission need to go away."2
Integrated training cycle workups would eliminate the need for last-minute training sessions. After several months working together, SEAL-helicopter squadron relationships would be well established, as would the synergy that derives from intense integrated training. Deployed strike groups then would be far better prepared for a range of special operations contingencies.
Disparities in deployment cycles will make integrated workups difficult but achievable. Deployment schedules highlight strike group and SEAL deployment timelines. If the strike group's deployment overlaps the deployment of two SEAL units, dedicated workup time with each unit could be planned. In any case, scheduling problems will diminish as commitment to the concept of integrated workups increases and face-to-face discussions ensue.
Iraqi Freedom NSW support operations were expeditionary in nature. Helicopters were deployed to forward-operating bases in Kuwait; coalition special operations units provided force protection. As the war progressed, however, most of the coalition forces redeployed away from the forward-operating bases, and helicopter detachments had to assist in force protection, a mission for which they were not prepared adequately. This is not an insurmountable obstacle if relatively few dollars are invested in the proper equipment and sufficient time is devoted to force protection training. Equipment pools should include Kevlar helmets and flak jackets for forward-deployed helicopter detachments, and most required training can be conducted by the SEALs during workups.
Above all, a paradigm shift is required. Traditionally, Navy helicopters conduct search and rescue, antisubmarine warfare, and logistics support-to the exclusion of almost everything else. The NSW mission area generally is ignored-if known at all-even though it has been in Navy helicopter required operational capabilities/projected operating environment documents for years. At the same time, actual missions have been executed repeatedly and Navy helicopters were designed specifically with special operations in mind. Unfortunately, it appears that Navy leaders are reluctant to support NSW, much less send Navy helicopters overland.3 Instead, strike group commanders must take ownership of NSW-including the overland piece—and make it a graded portion of workup evolutions, such as Navy composite training unit and joint task force exercises.
Practicing NSW contingencies prior to deployment will bring SEALs and supporting helicopters together and familiarize planners with the options for meeting various special operations tasks. Lessons learned during workups would be incorporated in contingency planning for actual operations. The result would be strike groups that are better prepared to meet an obviously emerging requirement.
Conclusions
The Navy cannot afford to turn a blind eye to NSW support missions. Given secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's emphasis on military transformation and employment of special operations forces in the war on terrorism, now is the time for change. Iraq might be the last theater of war that allows us to build large forces prior to combat. Future conflicts are likely to be time-critical and fought with the forces on hand. For naval special warfare, that includes Navy SEALs supported by the Navy helicopters that operate daily with the fleet.
1 NSWTG CENT message 211028Z March 2003.
2 Lt. G. SoltciO, USN, "Flag Panel had a Lively Discussion of HeIo Issues," 2003 Symposium Synopsis, Naval Helicopter Association Rotor Review, Spring 2003.
3 Soltero, "Flag Panel."
Lieutenant Commander Zerr, formerly the operations officer of Helicopter Antisubmarine Squadron 4, is deployed with that squadron as maintenance officer.
Hybrid-Electric Drive Will Eliminate Tactical Shortfalls
Captain Francis M. Wald, U.S. Marine Corps
The Marine Corps' current family of combat and combat support equipment prevents it from truly conducting expeditionary maneuver warfare (EMW). These vehicles require quantities of bulk fuel that cannot be provided adequately by existing logistics equipment under the restraints imposed by BMW's key operating concepts: operational maneuver from the sea (OMFTS), sea basing, and ship-to-objective maneuver (STOM). To successfully conduct EMW, the Marine Corps must immediately adopt hybrid-electric drive systems in lighter combat and combat support equipment to reduce overall bulk fuel requirements.
Unquenchable Thirst
The Marine Corps' current inventory of combat and combat support equipment voraciously consumes fuel: during combat operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in 2003, I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) consumed more than six million gallons of JP-8 fuel per month.1 Department of Defense-sponsored studies show that as much as 70% of a unit's logistical transport is dedicated to bulk fuel.2 (Table 1 lists the fuel consumption rates of key combat and combat support equipment.)
Although the Corps successfully transported the required bulk fuel during OIF, the campaign was not conducted from the sea under the EMW doctrinal concepts of sea basing or STOM. A vital land base in Kuwait provided Marine logisticians with a suitable ground source of bulk fuel throughout the operation. Prolific use of contracted civilian line-haul transportation to move bulk liquids from Kuwait to the 1st Force Service Support Group's mobile replenishment sites highlighted the current inability to sustain combat and combat support equipment in a conventional conflict. Marine forces, however, must be able to sustain operations in an even more austere environment-one imposed by the constructs of EMW, without major landlines of communication and host-nation support.
The operational concepts of OMFTS, sea basing, and STOM are the foundations of expeditionary maneuver warfare:
* OMFTS entails the use of the sea as maneuver space to gain a positional and temporal advantage over an enemy force, which may or may not be guarding coastal approaches to inland objectives.
* Sea basing is a key component of OMFTS. Logistic support remains at sea and resupply is conducted from the sea base without a build-up of logistics bases ashore.
* STOM envisions tactical employment of forces from the sea base directly to inland objectives, including those far inland.
Expeditionary maneuver doctrine does not provide a solution for sustaining combat forces after actions on the objectives have been completed. Assuming forces remain in the vicinity of the objectives or conduct further combat operations that require mobility, refueling of Marine combat vehicles will be necessary.
Most Alternatives Fall Short
When fielded, the MV-22 Osprey may provide commanders a partial solution by reducing the number of ground combat vehicles used to transport Marines to their objectives. But if large numbers of armored and light-armored vehicles are used, the requirement to provide substantial amounts of bulk fuel remains. The Marine Corps does not have sufficient KC-130 Hercules aircraft to serve as refuelers for a MEF-sized ground element-especially when refueling the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF)'s aviation combat element aircraft is deemed the KC-130's primary mission.
The Corps' other organic aviation refueling platform, the CH-53 Sea Stallion, is envisioned to be fully employed ferrying equipment inland, which leaves some type of ground transportation as the only realistic option. The crux of the problem is moving fuel from the sea base to the objectives in sufficient quantities to support thirsty combat equipment-especially in STOM, when enemy coastal defenses may have been bypassed.
There are few workable solutions under the construct of STOM and sea basing. The amphibious assault fuel system's output could be increased beyond its 1.2-million-gallon-per-day rate. Although this system ties naval oilers to an expeditionary ground fuel bladder/pump system, it requires a secure beach and thus is not a realistic solution in the STOM scenario. Solar energy simply does not yield the power needed to move equipment weighing almost seven tons quickly enough for combat operations. Alternative fuels include fuel cells that run on hydrogen, plasma fusion engines, and inertial confinement fusion engines. Although research has been ongoing since the mid1950s, the two fusion technologies remain in the early developmental stage for productive use. Hydrogen fuel cells were introduced recently in concept vehicles by firms such as BMW and Honda, but they require heavy and extensive hydrogen supply infrastructures that make them unsuitable for expeditionary operations.3 By far, the most attractive option to solving the bulk fuel issue is to reduce the need for fuel.
The only practical way the Marine Corps can sustain EMW operations ashore is to pursue alternatives for reducing vehicle fuel requirements. One easy option is simply to employ lighter, more agile internal combustion (IC)-powered vehicles. In the equation for vehicular energy consumption, the vehicle's mass (weight) has the greatest effect on fuel economy. The MAGTF Expeditionary Family of Fighting Vehicles project is examining a series of lighter combat vehicles that would weigh around 20 tons, as compared to more than 60 tons for an MlAl tank and 31 tons for an empty expeditionary fighting vehicle.4 Compared to current equipment, the lighter vehicles could reduce demands for fuel by about 20%.
Hybrid-Electric Drive Systems
Another option is to adopt hybrid-electric drive systems for combat and combat service vehicles. They consume an average of 40% less fuel than current equipment.5 A hybrid-electric system couples an IC engine with an electric motor (EM) and an electric power storage system. The IC engine generates electricity by way of a generator for use by the EM and for storage in anticipation of surge requirements. Hybrid-electric systems come in two varieties, either of which would vastly improve the fuel economy of the Marine Corps' current vehicle fleet:
* Parallel systems couple a traditional drive system (transmission, transfer, differentials, and axles) directly connected to the IC engine with an EM that provides extra power when needed and captures electricity when the vehicle brakes using a process called regenerative braking.
* Series systems remove the IC engine from direct connection with the driven wheels and eliminate the other components of a traditional driveline (transmission, transfer case, driveshaft, differential, axles). Instead, the IC engine (called an auxiliary power unit) drives a generator that feeds power directly to the EM and energy storage system.
Employing hybrid-electric drive motors in combat equipment has other benefits in addition to the reduced fuel usage. Because the IC engine produces excess power that is stored in batteries or "ultracapacitors" for future use, it is possible to shut down the engine and use stored energy. Thus, a hybrid-electric vehicle is much quieter because it emits only the sound of tires moving over the ground and a low electric hum. (The Navy had done this for years with diesel-electric submarines on silent-running mode.) Another benefit of hybrid-electric motors is the electrical energy produced by the IC engine while the vehicle is stopped. If it is left running past the point where the onboard storage devices are recharged, the excess energy can be used to power auxiliary systems, such as floodlights, communications arrays, radars, or other electrically powered devices.6
Hybrid-electric systems for automotive use are in their infancy. One argument against using them in combat equipment is their battery requirements. The weight and size of the traditional lead-acid batteries needed for hybrid-electric systems are prohibitive—but advanced energy storage technology can alleviate this problem. Industry developers use ultracapacitors and new organic-metal battery cells to store the massive amounts of energy needed for hybrid-electric systems, which reduces the weight of the storage system to acceptable levels.7 Another argument is that electric drives simply do not have the power to effectively propel combat equipment. This view is based largely on what most people imagine when they think of electric vehicles: small cars with short ranges and slow speeds that require an electric socket for recharging. Recent operational testing of hybrid-electric military vehicles has proved them capable of performing the full mission profile of current equipment while maintaining reduced fuel requirements.8 There are two hybridelectric systems on the road today that could reduce MAGTF fuel requirements significantly: the Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Targeting Vehicle, a proposed High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle replacement that is MV-22 transportable; and the ProPulse Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck built by Oshkosh.
Conclusions
Employed together, hybrid electricdrive systems and lighter weight combat vehicles could save as much as 60% of the fuel used by Marine Corps equipment today. This would drastically reduce fuel requirements for MAGTF elements committed to sea basing and ship-to-objective-maneuver operations.
Instead of posing limitations to expeditionary maneuver warfare-as do our current combat vehicles—a light hybridelectric fleet would provide Marine Corps commanders with extended range, additional time on station, and greater tactical flexibility during the conduct of operations ashore. The time to procure such proven systems is now.
1 MEF Headquarters (G-4 Office), 6 August 2004.
2 Frank Colucci, "Military Vehicles Could Benefit from Hybrid Electric Engines," National Defcnse, January 2004, p. 26.
3 "MAGTF Expeditionary Family of Fighting Vehicles," Marine Corps Systems Command, at www.naval-industrypartners.com/2002/02% presentalions/tcchneeds/johnson.pdf (12 Jan 2004); "Pulsed Power Capabilities: High Energy Density and lnertial Confinement Fusion, 1998," Sanclia Corporation, at www.saiulia.gov/pulspowr/hedief/ (12 Jan 2004); "Fuel Cell Technology Showcase, 2004," Society of Automotive Engineers, at fuelcells.sae.org/ (12 Jan 2004); "BMW Hydrogen Power, 2004," BMW of North America, at www.bmwusa.com/Joy/Drivc/Technology/llycrogen.htm (20 Jan 2004).
4 J. Bayer, M. Kopiin, J. Butcher, K. Friedrich, T. Rocbke, H. Wiegman, and G. R. Bower. "Optimizing the University of Wisconsin's Parallel Hybrid-Electric Aluminum Intensive Vehicle," Society of Automotive Engineers, Inc., 1999, at www.cac. wisc.edu/~vehicle/tech_report/fcc99.pdf (12 Jan 2004); "MAGTF Expeditionary Family of Fighting Vehicles."
5 'ProPulse Hybrid Electric Drive Technology," Oshkosh Truck Corporation, 2003, at www. oshkoshtruck.co.uk/PDFS/Oshkosh_ProPulsc_drivc_hr ochure.pdf (12 Jan 2004).
6 Colucci, "Military Vehicles Could Benefit from Hybrid Electric Engines," p. 26.
7 Andrew Burke, "Ultracapacilors: Why, How, and Where Is the Technology," Journal of Power Sources. November 2000, p. 48.
8 LCpI. J. Agg, USMC, "Corps Unveils Hybrid Tactical Vehicle," Quantico Sentry, 18 December 2003, p. 1.
Captain Wald won second prize in the 2004 Expeditionary Warfare School Essay Contest. He is a G-3 (Operations) watch officer on the staff of 1st Force Service Support Group in Iraq.
Good Leadership Is the Same Everywhere
Lieutenant Commander Timothy Ciampaglio, U.S. Coast Guard
Leadership is essentially the same, no matter who you are or where you work. Prior to accepting duty as commanding officer of the Washington (WPB-1331), a 110-foot patrol boat, I had compiled a command philosophy for leadership on a Coast Guard cutter with these traits as its core:
* Promote an open flow of communications in a nonthreatening environment.
* Keep customs, courtesy, and discipline as top priorities.
* Expect each individual's best effort daily.
* Encourage risk taking and initiative; empower your people to take ownership.
* Set your people up for success through training.
* Set and adhere to safety guidelines.
* Expect leadership to be displayed by all crewmembers.
* Let your people know you care for their personal and professional well-being.
* Avoid complacency.
* Maintain self-control when challenged with difficult situations.
Following my tour on the Washington, I attended graduate school at Carnegie Mellon University. One of the course books for the leadership class was The Leadership Challenge by James Kouzes and Barry Posner.1 After completing that book, I realized my ten traits of shipboard leadership aligned closely with the authors' "ten commandments."
From the outset as captain, I put in practice my belief that an open flow of communications in a nonthreatening environment is essential to a positive work atmosphere. This means people at all levels must be able to present ideas and opinions without fearing retribution. For urgent or operational matters, input was given differently from that for administrative or less urgent matters. Operational matters require quick decision making. Thus, prior to executing a mission, I asked my department heads and the executive officer (XO) for their views on the conduct of operations. Their thoughts and recommendations were based on experience, unit instructions, and past feedback. I encouraged them to create a plan of action different from each other's, which created a variety of solutions from which I could choose. After receiving input and making my final decision, we briefed the crew.
During the debriefing sessions held following missions, everyone in the crew provided feedback. The sessions were free of personal ridicule. Openness to critque is important because it leads to continuous improvement. For routine or administrative matters, we encouraged input continuously to ensure optimal results. To maximize empowerment, crewmembers should have a say in decision making.
This process relates to Challenge's first commandment: Search out challenging opportunities to change, grow, innovate, and improve. It is important to question the status quo. Given open communications, your crew will be empowered to critically analyze each evolution and freely offer ideas for improvement.
My trait pertaining to military courtesy and discipline was aimed at upholding the Coast Guard's standards for such everyday matters as personal and uniform appearance. The crew was a reflection of my leadership abilities. When people outside the unit encountered one of our crewmembers, I wanted them to leave the meeting impressed by having met someone who was respectful, knowledgeable, and disciplined. This aligns with Challenge's seventh commandment: Set the example by behaving in ways that are consistent with shared values.
I expected everyone to give his or her best effort every day. At the same time, I appreciated the fact that best efforts can fall short of expectations and still result in a job well done. These cases were training issues and the reason I—and my senior leaders—was there. When people do not give their best, corners are cut and often someone gets hurt. This trait reflects Challenge's fourth commandment: Enlist others in a common vision by appealing to their values, interests, hopes, and dreams. Much of the common vision should include doing your best work all the time. Coming up short of your supervisor's expectations is permissible—as long as you gave your best effort.
I considered risk taking, initiative, empowerment, and ownership to be critical elements of success. Regardless of their past history, when crewmembers reported aboard, I assumed they had good intentions and would keep the best interests of the unit in mind. This empowered them by giving them a sense of ownership of their department or division. Clear minimum standards encouraged the crew to make any changes that met or exceeded them. Initiative was rewarded and nurtured. If people made mistakes or failed while taking risks, they were not discouraged. They were encouraged to take ownership for the failure or mistake and asked to explain their intended outcomes. If they were things that could be accomplished, we assisted them in meeting their goals; if they were not of use to the unit, we explained why and moved on. This approach conforms to Challenge's second commandment: Experiment, take risks, and learn from the resulting mistakes. Encouraging risk taking is essential to solid leadership.
It was paramount that the crew members believed they were being set up for success. I insisted that they set high training standards and met them. Because of the small size of the crew, it was advantageous to set our standards higher than those required by the Coast Guard in certain mission-critical areas. As commanding officer, I set the standards, ensured compliance, and took time to explain to the crew why our standards were higher. We never assigned anyone to a job that he or she had not been trained to do. If crewmembers failed to perform tasks they had been properly trained to do, we critiqued their performance and had them repeat the tasks until they were done correctly. People never were allowed to quit unless there was a threat of injury, damage, or a time constraint. Everyone must finish his or her task (or training event) feeling like a winner.
After every mission or training session, we sought feedback. Through conslant training—and seeking improvement through feedback—individuals gain the confidence that allows them to maximize their capabilities. This is similar to CAa/lenge's third commandment: Envision an uplifting and ennobling future, which requires rehearsing with visualization and affirmation. When members of your command are charged with a task, they should visualize and rehearse it and see themselves completing it successfully.
The Washington always adhered to safety guidelines. Crewmembers were instructed to immediately report anything perceived as unsafe. Everyone was empowered to shout "avast" to stop an activity if they saw something unsafe. It was an obligation on the part of all hands and there was no retribution if the person was wrong. This coincides with Challenge's fifth commandment: Foster collaboration by promoting cooperation goals and building trust. Every evolution on a cutter has some degree of risk, which might include death or serious bodily injury. Crewmembers have to trust each other and rely on each other's ability to take preventative measures when necessary.
Regardless of rank, we required everyone to exert professional leadership. An important part of leadership is doing what you know is right, which accords with Challenge's ninth commandment: Recognize individual contributions to the success of every project. Leaders should find people who are doing things right and reward them. By displaying proper leadership and recognizing correct behavior, the command sets the tone for striving to find people doing things right—as opposed to a focus on seeking and punishing misbehavior.
On our cutter, we let people know we cared for their personal and professional well-being and educational improvement. We knew each crewmember's personal goals and sought new ideas and resources to help in fulfilling them. Our active involvement in this regard helped to build a relationship of trust and loyalty. Unless proscribed by Coast Guard policy, we did not limit qualifications to assigned jobs. The only constraint to personal and professional development should be learning capacity-not rank or position in the organization. This is similar to Challenge's sixth commandment: Strengthen people by giving power away, providing choice, developing competence, assigning critical tasks, and offering visible support. Education is essential to this idea.
Complacency even for one minute can sink a ship. We told everyone that their fellow crewmembers trusted them to stand a taut watch. At the same time, I taught them to grow by permitting them to make mistakes; I was able pull them out short of disaster. Avoiding self-satisfaction and keeping a cool head relate to the eighth commandment prescribed by the Challenge: Achieve small wins that promote consistent progress and build commitment. To ensure the future matches the vision, leaders should give people choices and make those choices visible and hard to evade. By committing to stand a watch on a ship, a crewmember agreed to forego complacency. By remaining calm in the face of adversity, I showed subordinates they could follow through in the knowledge I would intervene if necessary.
The tenth commandment of the Challenge is to celebrate team accomplishments regularly and have fun. This is a critical aspect of leadership that too often gets overlooked because of operational tempo. We regularly recognized our people in promotion and award ceremonies.
Conclusions
Kousez and Posner have written a commonsense guide that will assist military leaders at all levels in developing practical leadership steps for their particular units and situations. Although some argue that leadership is largely inherent and cannot be learned, there is no doubt that officers and petty officers can profit from applying the successful techniques of others.
A command philosophy is a value system to be followed every day in every action. The crew members expect their petty officers and officers to set the tone and guide them. By referring to the command philosophy during debriefing and feedback sessions, leaders will reinforce the ship's value system and keep crewmembers alert to their duties and rcsponsibities.
1 James Kouzes and Barry Posncr, The Leadership Challenge' (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, Inc., 1995)
Lieutenant Commander Ciampaglio is chief of the reponse department at sector Key West, Florida.
Carrier Strike Groups Need a Combat Surge Capability
Commander Donald H. Braswell, U.S. Navy
The Fleet Response Plan (FRP) is welcome and overdue.1 It recognizes that the Navy must be ready to quickly deploy six carrier strike groups (CSGs) and an additional two CSGs 60-90 days thereafter. The FRP has targeted resources to run the fleet more evenly and efficiently. Even given this new posture, however, we may not respond quickly enough to meet some future contingencies. The Navy needs a combat surge capability to more rapidly supplement forward-deployed carriers and their embarked air wings.
The FRP assumes a static adversary who has not learned any lessons for the past 15 years. Lesson number one: Do not give the United States six months to build up its forces. When you attack, attack suddenly and with overwhelming force. Reach your major military objective in two weeks. Then batten down the hatches and see if U.S. citizens are outraged enough to send their sons and daughters to fight over your territorial gains.
Consider a move by the Taiwan government to unilaterally declare its independence from the People's Republic of China, which would force an immediate military response from the mainland. In this hypothetical crisis, the Navy probably would have one CSG in the western Pacific for the defense of Taiwan; a second strike group might not be available for 7-10 days. The on-station CSG would fight with its own resources until relief arrived—against a well-trained, modern enemy that is likely to exact much higher losses than the Navy suffered in Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom.
Increased combat losses, coupled with fewer aircraft on the flight deck, would reduce the CSG's striking power. The need to reinforce the on-station carrier as quickly as possible is obvious, but it raises key questions: What assistance can be provided? Who will provide it? How fast can it arrive?
Almost any strike-fighter pilot and many aircraft from similar production years can augment deployed F/A-18 squadrons. Because of recent efforts to standardize tactics with the Strike Fighter Training Program, we could augment squadrons with aircrews from multiple sources, including fleet replacement squadrons, the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center (NSAWC) in Fallen, Nevada, and other fleet squadrons. The EA-6B Prowlers could deploy—as they did during Operation Allied Force-and additional E-2C Hawkeyes could provide 24-hour airborne early warning coverage. Any mix of naval aircraft can be made available for deployment on short notice, and personnel from stateside carriers could assist in deployed carrier functions to prolong flight-operation windows.
Past Experience
In 1997, the Nimitz (CVN-68) conducted a high-intensity strike campaign with Carrier Air Wing 9. Although that surge exercise was only four days long, personnel and aircraft augmentations to the carrier and air wing were impressive: 257 active-duty and reserve personnel filled many key positions.2 While this number was acknowledged to be more than needed, the number and mix of personnel were selected to ensure success. Augmentees filled numerous critical billets, ranging from strike aircrews to flight deck fueling. Aircrews planned and flew strike missions; plane captains launched strike aircraft. (Catapult and arresting gear personnel were not augmented because of safety considerations.) This smoothly executed drill enabled the Nimitz Battle Group to generate more strike sorties than any other battle group since the Vietnam War.
Seamless integration of additional assets is not unusual the strike community. During the interdeployment readiness cycle, squadrons usually trade enemy and friendly air support without difficulty. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA)-25 and other squadrons incorporated guest aircrew in their flight schedules on a daily basis.
Surge Sources
Augmentation aircrews and aircraft should come from combat-ready units that are best able to respond. The ready carrier, whether stateside or overseas, may have to deploy within 96 hours with her air wing intact, so her personnel should not be stripped away. If a carrier is scheduled for the yard soon, however, combat-ready officers and sailors from her air wing would be available for deployment. In addition, naval personnel at the NSAWC are prepared to fill planning roles around the world.
The FRP provides numerous trained and ready personnel, but the challenge is to identify the most critically needed people and skills and ensure they are ready to respond. Thus, surge scenarios and procedures should be included in composite unit training and joint task force exercises. Both of these exercises have "surge days" as planned events, which would permit additional personnel and aircraft to augment the exercise CSG for short periods. Such experiments would assist in identifying the correct mix of personnel for future CSGs, improve augmentee training and readiness, foster a spirit of CSG-augmentee cooperation, and provide off-the-shelf plans for contingencies.
Timing
With proper planning, augmentation packages can arrive in 96 hours—a significant improvement over 7-10 days. Squadrons should identify assets for the surge role well in advance of deployment. Planning may be as simple as a standing letter of instruction identifying 30 personnel, 6 aircrew, and 4 aircraft for deployment on a moment's notice. Air Force tanking requirements should be identified as well. As crises develop, tankers are focused on the operational areas involved and can be available for delivery of Navy surge packages.
On day one of a developing crisis, the aircrew and personnel pack their gear. The aircrew practices field carrier landings to prepare for flying aboard the carrier. On day two, the Air Force tanker arrives and takes off with its cargo and aircraft in tow. The surge element can go to nearly any forward base in the world within 48 hours of takeoff. Navy strike aircraft could then fly to the carrier; transported personnel would be delivered as quickly as possible by C-2 Greyhounds.
Conclusions
Since the surge exercise in 1997, the typical carrier air wing's number of strike fighters has decreased from 50 to 46-and that number will fall to 44 soon. Although these 44 aircraft will be more capable of power projection than the 50 aircraft they will replace, fewer aircraft mean the air wing has less persistence and less ability to absorb combat losses.
By routinely planning and training for combat surge of aircraft and personnel, the Navy will be ready to increase the strength of forward-deployed carrier strike groups in a matter of days. The Fleet Response Plan has made this sort of augmentation possible-the learning curve of our potential adversaries makes it desirable.
1 VAdm. Michael Malone, RAdm. James Zortman, and Cdr. Samuel Paparo, USN, "Naval Aviation Raises the Readiness Bar," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 2004, pp. 39-41.
2 Angelyn Jewell and Maureen Wigge, "Surge 97: Demonstrating the Carrier's Firepower Potential," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1998, pp. 7981.
Commander Braswell is the commanding officer of Strike Fighler Squadron 25. He and the "Fist of the Fleet" are deployed with the John C. Stennis (CVN-74) Carrier Strike Group.