The war against Iraq raises several daunting questions. Did Saddam Hussein have weapons of mass destruction? Was he a threat to the United States? Was he involved with al Qaeda and the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks?
The U.S. intelligence community consists of about 15 agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and National security Agency (NSA). Considering their combined budget of more than $40 billion, American taxpayers have a right to expect from them credible and timely intelligence.
A cardinal rule in the intelligence community is never to put out burn dope. The culture of intelligence is complex, competitive, compartmentalized, controlled, protective, and insular. Most "spooks" are career bureaucrats who work in an environment best described by sociologist Max Weber: when bureaucracy is optimized, individuals are dehumanized. As processed intelligence goes from the Director of Central Intelligence to the National security Council, deception and abuse of power can occur under the umbrella of political expediency—as it can in other nations.
In assessing threats and classifying targets, categories of "possible," "probable," or "positive" are used, depending on the quality and validity of the intelligence. Normally, the intelligence is from sources that can range from satellite photographs, to people on the ground, to communications intercepts.
Before 11 September 2001, a number of unclassified publications reported Saddam Hussein's disposition toward the United States. For example, several books identified him as a great threat whose agents had worked with Osama Bin Laden and who had received several varieties of anthrax and other pathogens from U.S. sources to use as seed material for a potential biological weapons arsenal.
What is known is that Iraq defied numerous resolutions initiated by the United Nations and was a source of instability in the Middle East. It was at war with Iran in 1980-81. In 1991, Iraq invaded Kuwait, and the United States led 34 nations in the Gulf War, which quickly checked an impotent war machine.
President George W. Bush publicly identified Saddam Hussein in early 2002 as a leader willing to gas his own people, a dangerous man who had the world's most dangerous weapons. In addition, the President said freedom-loving nations were obliged to hold him accountable and that was what the United States intended to do. Yet, in an opinion piece a year later, the CIA's senior political analyst during the Iraq-Iran war cited a DIA study asserting "it was Iranian gas that killed the Kurds, not Iraqi gas."1
In its final report, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission) found no compelling evidence that Iraq had either planned or perpetrated the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Further, citing a National security Council memorandum, the commission found that only anecdotal evidence linked Iraq to al Qaeda. Thus, the U.S. intelligence community failed to verify the existence of weapons of mass destruction, ascertain an association between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda, and find an operational link between Iraq and al Qaeda in the 11 September attacks. In all, this constitutes the largest intelligence failure in U.S. history.
Modern global terrorism goes back 30 years and involves more than 140 terrorist bands in 50 countries or disputed territories. Long before al Qaeda, it was a familiar tactic. Assessing the threat, recognizing vulnerabilities, and countering terrorism require leaders to select among political, military, and unconventional options. According to Sun Tzu, while deception is valid for seeking victory over the enemy, it is not warranted if used against a leader's own people.
The goodwill that the United States enjoyed following 11 September 2001 has given way to a domestic and international erosion of credibility in the wake of the invasion and occupation of Iraq. Our challenge is to rescue tomorrow from the angry condemnation of today. The combined doctrines of preemption and imposition of democratic forms of government raise serious questions about how we can shape the destiny of the world and deal with nations such as Cuba, North Korea, Syria, and China.
Accusations will continue to fly back and forth. But in the final analysis, credible intelligence will determine whether the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush administrations are vindicated-or have been vilified rightly.
1 Dr. Stephen Pelletiere, The New York Times, 31 January 2003.
Mr. Campbell, a former analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency, was Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Economic Development, 1981-84.