Military Off-the-Shelf Has Promise and Pitfalls

Grafting missions onto existing platforms—such as adapting the F/A-18 for airborne electronic attack as the EA-18G "Growler"—can offer both money and time savings, but it also means accepting limitations.

Over the past decade, the acquisition community has become very aware of the benefits of using commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products in U.S. military systems. COTS has offered real savings and advantages—affordability, rapid acquisition, newer technology, and minimal required testing. However, it also has been shown to have sometimes serious implications for the design, development, integration, and support of new weapon systems. As the use of COTS has grown in the Department of Defense, so have the technical challenges, including legacy-system incompatibility, poor reliability, inefficiency (mainly software related, such as extraneous code), and insufficient upgradeability and supportability.¹

Today, a new issue has arisen, with all of the promise and, perhaps, pitfalls of COTS. It involves the use of military systems and subsystems in expanding roles, crossing platforms and adding missions for which these items were not necessarily designed or intended. As a government developmental test pilot, I have observed several of these programs firsthand, and refer to these types of system solutions as military off-the-shelf (MOTS).

Military Off-the-Shelf

MOTS theory seems to avoid nearly all the liabilities of COTS:

* Military upgrades typically address legacy compatibility requirements.

* Systems usually are built to exacting military specifications and have undergone rigorous acceptance and performance testing

* In-house software development targets mission capability instead of commercial flexibility.

* Future upgrades typically are planned for at the outset.

* DoD retains control over the system life cycle, ensuring future support structure.

In a recent MOTS success, the Embedded Global Positioning System/Inertial Navigation System (EGI) program—a plan to upgrade military aircraft navigation avionics across multiple platforms—replaced one of two obsolete navigation boxes in the EA-6B Prowler during the Block 89A upgrade.² The Navy Program Management Authority (PMA) then identified an opportunity to replace the remaining obsolete navigation source in the EA-6B using excess EGI hardware procured for the F/A-18A-D. Developmental test flights were completed in December 2002, and EA-6B fleet introduction of this second EGI is ongoing. By leveraging sunk costs for available, high-technology military inventory items, the Navy:³

* Improved performance (navigation accuracy went from 5 nautical miles to approximately 52 feet)

* Reduced life-cycle cost of operation and support by an estimated $3 million per year

* Decreased maintenance man-hours (I-level maintenance eliminated, contractor five-year warranty)

* Increased reliability (readiness improvement in partially mission capable aircraft of 3.9%)

* Reduced power and weight requirements (30% less power, 50% less weight)

* Will realize full program cost payback by fiscal year 2006

MOTS solutions have proved their worth, but early successes have led to more aggressive implementation plans, perhaps without full knowledge of potential limitations:⁴

* Traditional "stovepiped" system acquisition does not adequately address all marketplace (COTS) or DoD acquisition (MOTS) exigencies that now directly bear on the product.

* Neither the program manager nor the systems engineer drives the development of COTS/MOTS items, so system requirements for a program must be adapted to not conflict with the capabilities of the COTS/MOTS components. Risk resides in these trade-offs, requiring confirmation that the capabilities of these components are indeed congruent with the system mission requirements.

* Differences between integration of COTS/MOTS items and custom-developed items are fundamental to the program systems engineer. Especially in the case of software, unavailability or incomplete understanding of the vendor's assumptions presents a major challenge, and can affect the integration effort in unsuspected ways.

* With COTS/MOTS items, the system developmental process is never completed. The program manager no longer has complete control over future upgrades because of the multiple users of COTS/MOTS items, driving a more iterative deployment and support model.

The EA-18G Growler

Electronic attack (EA), a large subset of the electronic warfare (EW) mission, is vital to battlefield success. Congressman Joe Pitts (R-PA) recently wrote that "dominance in EW is essential for America to maintain its military superiority," and that "with an increasing emphasis on air campaigns and non-attrition warfare . . . the necessity for EW superiority is becoming crystal clear."⁵ Currently, EA is performed for DoD by the EA-6B. The Prowler is the only asset dedicated to suppression of enemy air defenses, and has been designated a low-density, high-demand national asset.

Unfortunately, the EA-6B is rapidly approaching the end of its expected service life, in spite of recent infusions of capital to keep it and its EA systems viable. Upgrades to the aircraft's software-intensive weapon system have been frequent and ongoing-the newest is the Improved Capabilities III (ICAP III), encompassing new displays, controls, electronic receiver hardware, and new mission software⁶—but the physical airframe is suffering from the rigors of years of carrier-based, tactical naval aviation.

The EA-18G Growler is the U.S. Navy's proposed replacement to the EA-6B Prowler. It is a contemporary example of the ever more aggressive use of MOTS in the defense industry. On the most external level, the EA-18G is a program of integration and MOTS: the electronic capabilities of the ICAP III are married to the F/A-18F Super Hornet airframe. On internal, more technical levels, the software and hardware interfaces multiply exponentially. Some of the top-level technical and political challenges facing this program that must be addressed are:

* Company differences. Boeing and Northrop Grumman are the major players in EA-18G development. Northrop Grumman's Integrated Systems Division also is developing the ICAP III electronic suite for the EA-6B, but in the early stages of EA-18G design, it was unable to share all predicted performance data to assist Boeing's EA-18G simulation because of proprietary and contractual restrictions. In addition, despite a strong working relationship, the companies' developmental philosophies differ: while Boeing aggressively addresses crew-vehicle interface (CVI) issues early in development, Northrop Grumman historically has focused on mission-oriented hardware and software performance first. These differences, while undocumented, are readily perceived in the CVI differences between the EA-6B and the F/A-18 Hornet, for example.⁷

* Mission Accomplishment. The Operational Requirements Document for airborne electronic attack (AEA), unlike many of the past, outlines the system requirements for future AEA missions but avoids delineating a specific implementation method (such as defining a platform). While the EA-18G addresses the short-term need for AEA, long-range planning remains open to interpretation, and conceptual exploration has included electronic variants of the B-52 bomber and unmanned combat aerial vehicles, among others. However, in addressing the short-term need, there has been a tendency for acquisition leaders to want to fit the mission to available platforms, rather than fit a platform to the mission. This keeps with the current view of the E/A-18 Hornet and Super Hornet as jacks-of-all-trades.⁸

* Manufacturability. Boeing and Northrop Grumman have a close working relationship on Super Hornet production-the center and aft fuselage and twin vertical tails are produced by Northrop Grumman; the wings and forward fuselage are manufactured by Boeing then mated to the aft section at Boeing's St. Louis facility.⁹ Production of the EA-18G, however, poses different problems: because of the physical differences between the E/A-18F and the EA-6B, numerous weapon-replaceable assemblies will have to be resized and repackaged. In addition, the receivers for the ALQ-218, the ICAP III EA suite, are spread around the aircraft to improve signal direction of arrival measurement and geographic emitter location. The risks associated with integrating weapon system components through geographically and corporately separate assembly lines demand attention. Boeing and Northrop Grumman will have to coordinate closely to determine where, when, and how to integrate the ALQ-218 system or its "hooks" into the physical airframe during the assembly process.

* Operator Workload. Moving from a four-seat (EA-6B) to a two-seat (EA-18G) cockpit, while increasing the information processed and presented to the crew through new and as-yet-unintegrated systems such as the Multi-functional Information Distribution System, is sure to place a significantly increased burden on the operators. To their credit, EA-18G program leaders identified this risk early, and Aircrew Systems Advisory Panel meetings have been held at Boeing to determine required levels of automation. However, the extent to which this overload risk is mitigated depends on the quality and accuracy of the simulation and modeling being done. As previously mentioned, proprietary and contractual restrictions may challenge the free sharing of data regarding ICAP III performance and hardware specifications, and until these issues are resolved, an accurate and high-fidelity simulation of the electromagnetic environment, LR-700 (ALQ-218 system receivers) performance, EA-18G displays, and operator interaction with the system are incomplete.¹⁰

* System Performance. The EA-18G program leverages on the potential success of the ALQ-218 system, but it also depends on it. The ALQ-218, however, began the formal technical evaluation stage of its test program more than a year ago. Many hurdles in the development of ICAP III have been overcome, but the process has been arduous; frequent software rebuilds to address critical system failures consumed incredible amounts of money, time, and effort. Each build required ground test and then flight test, including regression testing of previous noncritical discrepancies. Notably, this came after a rebaseline of the ICAP III program in May 2000 as a result of "cost growth due to underestimating the complexity of the LR-700 receiver design, software, and development requirements."¹¹ Once software challenges for LR-700 integration on the EA-6B are overcome, integration on the EA-18G must begin. However, different aircraft geometries, including antenna and jammer pod locations, will require redefining software algorithms for direction of arrival, emitter location, and reactive signal processing and measurement. The extent to which this very complex software must be adjusted has yet to be determined. Regardless, failure of the ALQ-218 system, while out of the control of the F/A-18 program management office, would stop the EA-18G program dead in its tracks.

* Testing. Assumptions based on the proven military performance of various weapon-replaceable assemblies from the ICAP III system-not to mention the performance of the Super Hornet airframe itself-must be discounted. Because of the resizing and repackaging requirements associated with the new platform, structural tests, including loads, noise, and vibration, must be performed again, in addition to new electromagnetic compatibility and safety of flight tests, incurring additional cost and schedule penalties. Even those assemblies not being modified cannot simply be transferred to the new airframe in "plug & play" fashion because of differences in loads and electromagnetic environments. Fiscal pressures are driving a movement within the EA-18G program to limit actual flight testing; serious consideration has been given to only proving airframe performance of the AEA configuration to equal that of the EA-6B. If this becomes program policy, the new platform will have no airframe performance improvement over the legacy platform and the EA mission will be subject to all the limitations of the new platform.

* Airframe Limitations. There have been significant trade-offs in the design of the F/A-18E/F, which, at the time they were made, had no relevance to the EA mission. The most notable was the decision to modify the wing pylon of the inboard stations. Using wind tunnel predictions and flow-field modeling, program leaders judged that the "miss distance" between certain weapons (specifically, Mk-84 bomb bodies) released from the inboard stations 1 and stores carried on the cheek stations would be unacceptable.¹² The resulting engineering decision was to "toe," or angle, each of the six wing pylon stations 3° outboard (when the inboard pylons were toed, the mid-station pylons had to be toed, and so on).

An unintended result of this decision is the impact it will have on the EA-18G, an aircraft that most likely will never carry the troublesome store combinations in prosecution of its electronic attack mission. Because the EA-18G will carry large, high-drag ALQ-99 jamming pods both to the target and back, what is an inconvenience to the E/A-18 E/F community today may become a crippling limitation to the EA-18G aircrews of the future in terms of on-station time, fuel requirements, and drag/performance. To remove the wing pylon toe, however, would require expensive redesign of the wings, which in turn would require another structural bench and flight test program, If the toe is to be removed, it can be done most efficiently now, in the design phase. A detailed study should be conducted to ascertain the short- and long-term costs and benefits of keeping or removing the pylon toe.

* Acquisition Strategy Effects. Achieving an initial operational capability in 2009 will require a very early Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) decision. This decision depends on successful operational testing, but operational testing can do little more than cursory evaluation until successful developmental testing—and the production decision thus becomes bogged down in an acquisition Catch-22. If the program moves forward and deficiencies are found that require fixes before the EA-18G can be deployed to the fleet, the additional costs to repair, upgrade, or even remanufacture already purchased aircraft will be significant. This risk must be accepted by the Milestone Decision Authority—it certainly cannot be avoided.

Pressure also has been applied to the EA-18G program because of the Department of the Navy's F/A-18E/F Multi-Year Procurement Plan, a five-year plan that requires renewal in fiscal year 2005." According to Boeing, increasing the order of Super Hornet aircraft in this plan by including EA-18G purchases would decrease the perunit cost by up to $3 million.¹⁴ The risk to the EA-18G program will not decrease as a result of this decision.

The Ripple Effect

Systems acquisition in DoD is changing, driven by increasingly constrained budgets and schedules that require high-technology systems to cross platforms and missions. Use of MOTS is the wave of the future, but it is not always the best solution. Using MOTS equipment in a new acquisition program means acceptance of all the limitations that come with it, many of which are direct results of engineering compromise and tradeoffs made in the component's original design and development. While these compromises probably were made for reasons not applicable to the current program, they can create a ripple effect that must be considered and addressed.