Keep Men in the Loop

Third Prize Winner, Armed Forces Joint Warfighting Essay Contest

Sponsored by a grant from Boeing

Since 1997, U.S. Navy maritime patrol aircraft have been employed in an ever-widening range of ground and aerial combat operations. This experimentation, coupled with close cooperation with supported forces, has afforded ground component battalion staffs, company commanders, raid force commanders, and rotary-wing flight leaders in Operation Iraqi Freedom a new level of responsive electronic warfare and surveillance and reconnaissance support.

With experienced ground personnel on board, maritime patrol aircraft offer proven and unmatched abilities in detecting, targeting, and attacking both conventional and unconventional forces, particularly for those ground leaders operating with limited access to digital bandwidth. The experiences of the past year, however, suggest a gap in current and future tactical surveillance and electronic warfare capabilities within the joint force. Current acquisition plans address this gap, but perhaps not effectively. Department of Defense components—the Marine Corps in particular—may benefit from a review of recent experience with the maritime patrol aircraft and the effect the retirement and replacement of the P-3 Orion will have on leaders at the lowest tactical levels. These plans may degrade the critical element in this story-the contribution of the man in the loop to the exchange of information between tactical leaders, ground communications systems, aerial sensors, and platform operators.

Though equipped for warfare on, under, and above the sea, the maritime patrol community operates several P-3 variants with survivability and communications equipment for roles over land. Many are familiar with the EP-3 and its electronic warfare capabilities. Most numerous of the variants used over land during Operation Iraqi Freedom was the antisurface warfare improvement program (AIP) variant. The P-3C (AIP) offers an electro-optical surveillance capability that can provide digital images or full-motion video to several types of ground stations.

The aircraft can deploy a variety of strike weapons. More important, the P-3C (AIP) has the cabin capacity to carry several Marines, soldiers, or sailors from a supported unit, and also has the antenna capacity for line-of-sight ultra-high-frequency and very-high-frequency communications between the airborne team and any ground unit with a similar radio. During 2003, the Navy operated roughly 60 AIP variants distributed between 12 active and 7 reserve P-3 squadrons.¹

Filling a Gap: The Balkans and Afghanistan

During 1997, the Marine Corps and Navy collaborated to introduce the maritime patrol community to a routine of overland missions to fill gaps in unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) coverage. The Marine Corps deployed several UAV mobile remote receiver stations to Bosnia. These stations communicate with sensors on board P-3s, and multinational ground forces used them to view live sensor imagery.^₂ In nearby Albania, during the noncombatant evacuation operation Silver Wake, P-3s provided live video imagery of the evacuation to the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU[SOC]) landing force operations center on board the Nassau (LHA-4).³ In both instances, Orions covered gaps in tactical surveillance and reconnaissance for ground forces staffs that were in contact with enemy ground forces.

During Operation Allied Force—the 1999 liberation of Kosovo—commanders initially found it difficult to conduct precision strike and battle damage assessment against elusive mobile land targets. The long loiter times and powerful sensors of P-3s made them ideal platforms for these missions. Orions fired 14 air-to-surface missiles at Serb ground targets.⁴ Experiences in the Balkans demonstrated that these aircraft could provide relevant and responsive surveillance, targeting, and fire support to operational and tactical staffs.

Three years later, in Afghanistan, Marine and Navy tactical commanders demonstrated that P-3s could provide support to ground forces. The 15th MEU(SOC) employed an Orion with Marines on board in a tactical reconnaissance role during the seizure of what later would be named Camp Rhino. A P-3 reconnoitered ahead of the heliborne assault force. A Marine aviator was on board, where the officer could facilitate coordination between the aircrew, sensor operators, and supported mission commander, and could monitor and guide the crew with an eye experienced in the types of operations unfolding below.⁵ Later in the campaign, the 15th MEU employed Orions in other roles, with ground liaison teams comprised of Marine officers and radio operators. With Marines on board, ground commanders or operations officers guided the aircrew to patrol ahead of and to the flanks of ground maneuver elements. The aircrews, assisted by the liaison teams, located potential targets and then cued ground units or strike-capable platforms to them. In one instance, an airborne liaison team coordinated the efforts of a ground unit's forward air controller and laser-equipped strike aircraft, destroying an enemy convoy.⁶ Patrol aircraft performed missions for forces unable to lug the equipment and power necessary to access scarce digital bandwidth efficiently.

Filling a Gap: Iraq

Aware of earlier successes, various coalition staffs brought these capabilities into all phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom I in 2003. Prior to the assault on Iraq, the 1st Marine Division, 1st U.K. Division, and other units routinely fielded teams to ride maritime patrol aircraft. Led by experienced ground commanders or intelligence officers, these teams often included scout-observers, aviators, and radio operators. During the conflict, the maritime patrol aircraft task force (CTF-57) and the maritime component command staff monitored the friendly ground situation and enemy air defense activity and executed effective procedures for addressing overland support requests. Despite antiaircraft fire, patrol aircraft successfully performed a variety of tactical and operational missions over land. Ground force leaders, through the airborne-ground liaison teams, guided efforts that supported assaults, raids, patrols, convoys, and rotary-wing movements. During one such event, a Royal Marine artillery officer on board a patrol aircraft directed effective artillery missions.⁷ Target lists e-mailed to the liaison teams from supported staffs guided other missions, such as imagery-collection efforts, route reconnaissance, and point surveillance. Such efforts supported the planning of raids and ambushes and the displacement of command posts and artillery units. During the entire campaign, the coalition benefited from the deployability, endurance, payloads, and responsiveness of maritime patrol aircraft with embarked ground teams.

Maritime and overland operations required the support equivalent of four P-3 squadrons with at least five ground teams trained and dedicated to supporting these missions.⁸ On 19 March 2003, the beginning of hostilities, 21 U.S. Navy P-3s were based in the U.S. Central and European Command areas of operation with range sufficient to operate in Iraqi airspace; 15 were committed specifically to Operation Iraqi Freedom.⁹ An additional 13 non-U.S. maritime patrol aircraft operated elsewhere in the U.S. Central Command area, and one U.S. Navy P-3 operated out of Diego Garcia, bringing total support to coalition operations to 29 aircraft. This commitment sustained a level of 9 overland sorties per day with a surge to 13 sorties per day, while still meeting Operation Enduring Freedom maritime patrol requirements and overland support requirements in Afghanistan. This surge contrasts with a sustained peacetime level of 40 P-3 aircraft normally deployed globally in support of combatant fleet commanders.¹⁰

During operations in Iraq, I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) required the efforts of nearly an entire squadron and at least three teams of embarked Marines. With average sortie durations between 9 and 12 hours and mission-capable rates between 72% and 82%, the coalition maritime component sustained continuous overland support to Marines and special operations forces operating in both western and northern Iraq." During the Marines' offensive between G-Day and the relief of Task Force Tripoli near Tikrit, the maritime component and embarked teams dedicated four sorties per day, on average, to missions over the Marines' area of operations. These sorties were flown primarily in support of maneuver units within 1st Marine Division, but nearly every day overland P-3s accomplished additional tasking in support of U.S. Central Command's forward headquarters, the maritime and land component commanders, various intelligence staffs, and the 1st U.K. Division. For the coalition maritime component commander, for instance, patrol aircraft routinely searched for antishipping activity in the waterways leading into the Arabian Gulf while traveling to a station farther north in response to a 1st Marine Division task.

By 18 April 2003, support to I MEF shifted from continuous to on-call missions. During the first week of May, for example, P-3s flew nightly missions to cue ground forces to potential unconventional activity and to reconnoiter routes in support of a light armored vehicle task force screening the expeditionary force's flank. At the end of May, the commanding general of 1st Marine Division, Major General James Mattis, took the time to thank assembled maritime patrol personnel personally for their unwavering support.

The men and women of the maritime patrol community and established ground liaison teams continue to support tactical ground forces with unmatched detection and targeting of unconventional forces opposing coalition forces fighting the war on terrorism.

Future Solutions

Experiences during these conflicts suggest that ground forces will continue to benefit from manned aerial tactical support. Using maritime patrol aircraft over land, however, does have one drawback not associated with unmanned aerial vehicles or more agile attack aircraft: the loss of a P-3 would pose a significant combat searchand-rescue challenge. Future conflicts also may occur in more challenging environments, and thus reduce or eliminate maritime patrol support to forces ashore. And unlike tactical UAVs, maritime patrol aircraft never will be attached directly to ground forces, nor will they ever be designed, deployed, or funded specifically to perform overland missions. Much of the cabin space within the P-3 remains occupied by maritime-specific equipment.

Nonetheless, it is unlikely that other surveillance and reconnaissance platforms-particularly UAVs-will be able to perform these missions as capably. Patrol aircraft are able to self-deploy to combat regions, can launch in conditions that ground UAVs, and easily exceed the loiter times of most UAVs and tactical aircraft with sensors or electronic warfare capabilities. Maritime patrol aircraft will continue to carry a superior array of sensors and weapons. When future conflicts arise, these aircraft likely will be forward deployed within range of leading ground forces.

Perhaps the greatest benefit of this relationship, however, comes from placing a familiar and experienced voice in easy contact with busy frontline unit leaders. From mission planning to after-action review, the ground liaison teams assigned to patrol aircraft during these conflicts remained in direct and continuous consultation with mission commanders, flight officers, and sensor operators directly supporting ground forces under fire. This procedure provided ground commanders at the lowest tactical levels a direct link to sensor payload data and experienced interpretation of the data, immediate advice and feedback, and the ability to direct the sensors and the vehicle. This support was accomplished with existing equipment, neither stressing digital bandwidth nor increasing the physical and mental loads borne by frontline leaders. The embarked teams on board patrol aircraft used their experience with ground combat to anticipate requirements, thus alleviating the supported leaders of the hassles and worries that come with reliance on platforms with briefer loiter times and longer control and coordination chains. After leading forces in Afghanistan, General Mattis concluded:

With its AIP enhancements, my own intel or [aviation combat element] rep on board, and the P-3 squadron's total commitment to our mission, I trusted those sailors more than a brittle request system for the Predator that did not provide feedback or the downlink that I got with the P-3.¹²

General Mattis also noted that the superior value of maritime patrol aircraft rests with their ability to keep experienced and familiar members of supported units in the loop of sensors, platform operators, and the supported tactical leader.

In the near term, the joint ground and special operations community can institutionalize patrol aircraft ground liaison team duties within naval expeditionary strike groups, and possibly within deployed security forces or fleet Marine officer staffs. During short-notice contingencies, such Marines might be closer to deployed patrol aircraft detachments than an arriving force, able to ride initial missions until designated teams are integrated with the aircraft detachment. Fleet antiterrorism security teams based around the world are equipped with compatible communications gear, Marines experienced with ground combat, and radio operators. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the fleet Marine officer of Fifth Fleet established a P-3 ground liaison team using individual augments of Marines attached to the maritime component staff, equipped with antiterrorism security team assets. Collocated with the deployed patrol reconnaissance wing headquarters and a significant number of aircraft, the team proved able to support land component units when teams elsewhere in the region could not take a mission.

Within the next decade, the Navy will retire the P-3 fleet and replace it with the multimission maritime aircraft (MMA) and the aerial common sensor (ACS). The Navy describes the former as an aircraft that will "assure battle force access across the broad littoral and play a critical role in the Navy's ability to project power ashore."¹³ Program documentation describes capabilities to operate over land and to communicate with friendly ground units through voice and data links.¹⁴ The program should enter system development and demonstration this year. Thus, the Navy intends to operate manned patrol aircraft well into this century. These aircraft, however, will be optimized for maritime rather than overland missions, and they probably will not be fielded at a level capable of meeting the requirements encountered during operations in Iraq.¹⁵ In addition, the Navy has accelerated the retirement schedule for the P-3.

Thus, this capability gap may worsen. For a solution, joint ground and special operations leaders can trust that UAVs and ground communications will evolve to the point where both systems can perform as capably as maritime patrol aircraft with embarked ground teams, get by with less, or look to current Navy and Army procurement decisions. The Army, based on its experience in Bosnia, equipped some of its RC-12 aircraft to perform electrooptical surveillance, and now operates manned tactical surveillance/electronic warfare squadrons with RC-12s as well as RC-7Bs.16 The aircraft are in such demand that the Army now will procure the ACS to replace both.

The ACS and MMA may be configurable to keep the man in the loop-but will they be available in sufficient quantity? For a decade, the joint force has worked hard to obtain this capability for our youngest and most engaged leaders. In the global war on terrorism, this relationship between maritime patrol and embarked ground teams has remained in demand for locating, targeting, and successfully engaging hostile unconventional forces. Neither the Air Force nor the Marine Corps operates comparable platforms, and they do not appear to be planning to acquire any. Both the Navy and Army are acquiring a new generation of these platforms, but smaller acquisition objectives and the expanding reliance on UAVs might inadvertently displace the critical human element and responsiveness that have made maritime patrol aircraft and their ground liaison teams so valuable through a decade of conflict.

In the meantime, the joint force can institutionalize the lesson of Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq to ensure this overland tactical support capability is well understood, and joint forces deploy with a solid, well-advertised capability to use it.