Time for a Military Space Service

As U.S. capabilities to exploit space have declined-for example, the shrinking inventory of Titan IV vehicles undercuts our ability to put large payloads into orbit—those of other nations have been increasing. Without a separate, empowered Space Service, the United States risks relinquishing military dominance of this ultimate high ground.

U.S. supremacy in space is in jeopardy. New entrants to space —China, India, Japan, and others—rich in both intellectual capital and superpower ambitions, are pressing irresistibly forward. If the stakes were related only to commercial advantage or national scientific pride, these independent initiatives would be welcome in the spirit of peaceful globalization. But the taming of the land, sea, air, and undersea environments invariably has included their exploitation for war. The comprehensive militarization of space, too, seems inevitable. Though the human exploitation of space is still in its infancy, we are at risk of relinquishing our military space dominance to competitors.

The Dilemma

The case for reinvigorating U.S. military and civil space programs has often been made. As a consequence of recommendations from the Commission to Assess U.S. National Security Space Management and Organization, the Air Force has been designated as executive agent for National Security Space (NSS). This has been a crucial initial step toward greater unity of effort, leadership, and space advocacy. Implementation of the commission's recommendations with regard to Joint Space Cadre solidification and NSS martial identity also have been successful, but the dilemma for a single service trying to simultaneously advocate and fund two environmentally disparate sets of technologies and warfighting responsibilities is becoming increasingly evident.

Space-enabled national security contributions are expensive, and threat-based NSS budget requirements will exert increasing pressure on the Air Force. At the same time, the Air Force's determination to execute its traditional roles and missions—as well as to modernize—will exert at least equal pressure on those same leaders. There is no doubt Air Force leaders understand and appreciate the critical role space supremacy plays in U.S. security. However, they also understand that when the President tasks a mission to a combatant commander, he expects that weapons delivery and other traditional missions will be the service's top priorities.

Understandably, there will be less willingness to resource space capabilities that only indirectly contribute to the Air Force's primary mission, especially if those resources come at the expense of that primary mission. Nor will there be urgent concern for the warfighting opportunities and strategic advantages to be gained in space that require long-term, strong investment when those tangible benefits cannot be perceived now.

Therefore, while investment in continued space supremacy is in the nation's best interest, it is not, by itself, in the Air Force's best interest. The Air Force budget likely will not keep pace with two distinct sets of costly aerospace needs. As a result, the aggravation and competition between the air and space communities can be expected to become even more severe. Faced with what could amount to zero-sum game, space is likely to suffer.

It would be folly to sacrifice the strategic and tactical qualities that make our Air Force the world's most advanced and capable, but it would be equal folly to lose our nation's tenuous hold on military space superiority. A next step in NSS organization and management may be in order—establishment of a separate, Title 10 empowered Space Service.

Objections

* Space is merely an information medium, restricted by past treaties and pressure from the United Nations to ban all weapons in space. This is counter to current geopolitical movements and world events. As the gentlemanly regard for the United Nations and other treaties deteriorates, so will the self-imposed restraint of many nations. In addition, treaties could be used by today's morally unconstrained adversaries as tools of deceit to hinder U.S. military space capabilities while proceeding with their own. (The old Soviet Union's signing of the 1972 treaty banning biological weapons production and stockpiling while it covertly advanced its programs comes to mind.) Combined with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the ease of access to space could make it a preferred medium for weapons delivery.

* No competitor or adversary is close to our level of sophistication in space capabilities. U.S. military space exploitation capabilities have been decreasing, while those of other nations have been ramping up. For example, our ability to cost-effectively place large payloads into orbit is steadily declining. Our inventory of Titan IV vehicles is dwindling. Our only heavy-lift alternative in advance of the troubled Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program is the currently grounded and aging shuttle fleet. At the same time, Russian Proton, Chinese Long-March, and European Arianne lift capabilities are relatively inexpensive and going strong, and they are becoming the most attractive means of orbiting larger commercial and military systems worldwide. We also are dependent on Russian engines for one of our own homegrown medium-lift vehicles—Atlas. This represents loss of both a U.S. launch market and a critical sovereign national asset.

* There is no identifiable martial mission for a Space. Service comparable to weapons employment from manned and unmanned platforms of the other traditional services. It is difficult to present a case for a future space capability when most are familiar with space only as an information medium. However, as with aviation, access and technology will drive forward to exploit any and all warfighting relevance, application, and advantage from space, quite independent of any nation's will to prevent it. Space is an exposed U.S. flank, and an immediate martial mission exists for its defense. Other missions relating to space control, global strike, missile defense, transport, assault support, and such will necessarily follow.

* A new, separate service will require severe offsets from the other services, and the total cost may not be politically acceptable. The key proto-Space Service organizations and personnel positions already are in existence. For example, positionally, the Under Secretary of the Air Force is a Space Service Secretary candidate, and the Commander of Air Force Space Command is a service chief candidate. Similarly, the Air Force Professional Space Community could form the core of a Space Service, augmented by members of the civilian and military space cadres of the other services. Organizationally, the National Aerospace Initiative (NAI)-an effort to coordinate and influence the activities of DoD, NASA, and industry in high speed/hypersonics, space access, and space technology-could be programmatically empowered, absorbed (along with selected space resources and civilian cadres of the service labs), and renamed as the service science and technology organization. Non-NASA space science and technology then would be solely owned by the new Space Service, and not subject to starvation by other stakeholders. The Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center could be absorbed as the new service's acquisition arm. The National Reconnaissance Office likewise could be absorbed as is, along with its specialized functions and personnel.

There are several alternatives for the initial service organization: a separate Space Service, the Department of the Navy model (i.e., an Air Force and a Space Corps beneath a Secretary of Aerospace), and the Special Operations Command model. All have advantages and disadvantages, but the final solution must ensure that the service is Title 10 and Title 50 empowered, and that it has full membership on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Joint Requirements Oversight Council. The service would grow in accordance with newly assigned roles and missions. It would submit its budget separately, and its requests would compete equally with those of the other services and be balanced against all national defense priorities.

Finally, the Space Service would serve as a nonduplicative and fully complementary entity to a reinvigorated NASA. The technologies developed in their distinctive mission areas would crossover through such mechanisms as the NAI without violating the exclusive military and scientific charters of each. It also would enable the successful transition from NASA demonstration to national security operationalization of space transportation and other pivotal capabilities.

* The creation of a Space Service may drive other nations to militarize space. Most likely, capable competitors and adversaries will militarize space to their own advantage, with or without U.S. prompting. However, potential U.S. military capabilities in space could drive competitors to negotiation rather than action. A prime example is the Strategic Defense Initiative. Instead of leading to a renewed arms race, the dedication of U.S. resources to the concept brought the Soviet Union to negotiations and relative inaction, bowed by the projected costs of responding. Furthermore, when the United States puts its mind to reinvigorating national security, it is a formidable opponent. That too can be an effective deterrent, but only if our capabilities are real.

A Way Ahead

Since its implementation, the NSS initiative has served as a revealing test of the capacity of the Department of the Air Force to balance its traditional responsibilities with those of space. The strain of two distinctive missions and technology identities, both with equally distinctive investment strategies, beneath the same service chief and secretariat is evident. In the past, Air Force-managed space programs frequently were mortgaged to finance terrestrial Air Force programs. Since the Space Commission, the competition between air and space warfighting resource regimes is even starker.

Recent discussions related to the NAI and the military's interest in manned space flight highlight the mutual exclusivity of air and space interests within the Air Force. The favorable outcome of both topics was a tribute to the desire of some within the service to fully assume and execute the role of NSS executive agent. At the same time, these examples forewarn that the incompatibility of space within the Air Force will grow, with a need to establish a separate Space Service sooner rather than later. The Space Commissioners, Congress, and the secretary of Defense did not dismiss the possibility that evolution to a Space Service might be required for effective national defense, and the time for such evolution appears to be now.

As a relevant example, in recent congressional testimony, the Marine Corps presented a compelling emerging need to overcome the constraints of thick-air travel and nonpermissive airspace for responsive expeditionary transport and insertion. As an emerging joint requirement, it recognizes that Marine, Special Operations Command, and other joint forces will require heretofore unimaginable assault support speed, range, and altitude to achieve strategic surprise in the future. The link to space is clear.

Conclusion

The existing cultural dilemma is unfair to the Department of the Air Force and will delay our national preparations for the comprehensive role space will play in future warfare. Unlike the United States' energetic recovery after Pearl Harbor, strategic surprise in the realm of National security Space could cause damage to our national security from which we could not recover. We would be wise to learn history's lessons and take the initiative while we still can. Establishment of a Space Service is a sound preparation for an uncertain, yet imaginable, future.