Space Based Weapons

The security and economic well-being of the United States and its allies and friends depend on the nation's ability to operate successfully in space . . . specifically, the U.S. must have the capability to use space as an integral part of its ability to manage crises, deter conflicts, and, if deterrence fails, to prevail in conflict.

-Report of the Commission to Assess U.S. National Security Space Management and Organization

Traditionally, space support to joint warfare has focused on force enhancement—"operations that multiply . . . effectiveness by enhancing battlespace awareness and providing general warfighter support."¹ The 1991 Gulf War brought space force enhancement to the fore in the joint warfighting community. Its contributions were felt in areas from maneuver, to mission planning and weather data, to communications.

There is emerging, however, a concurrent focus on space for force application, using weapons operating in or through space to attack targets at or near the earth's surface. Donald Rumsfeld, as Chairman of the 1996 Commission to Assess U.S. National Security Space Management and Organization, posited that "it is possible to project power through and from space in response to events anywhere in the world" and that "having this advantage would give the U.S. a much stronger deterrent and . . . an extraordinary military advantage."² The adoption of spacebased weapons would indeed provide potent deterrence and warfighting capabilities to the joint force commander (JFC) by enhancing crisis response capability and operational flexibility.

Required Characteristics

Considering the security challenges of the early 21st century and the global orientation of U.S. military forces, space-based weapons must be:

* Highly responsive—to maintain operational tempo and achieve battlefield domination

* Persistent—to provide a continuously exploitable military capability

* Globally focused—to be available regardless of the theater in which military operations are being conducted

To achieve the strategic and operational objectives associated with any conflict across the range of military operations, the effects generated by the use of space-based weapons—be they directed energy, kinetic, or other—also must be scalable. If the first option used is no longer appropriate because of the dynamic nature of the military situation, it must be able to be reinforced, degraded, or abandoned in favor of a more appropriate option. This system must be able to provide a range of effects—suppression, varying levels of damage, or destruction—simultaneously or sequentially over a given period, with a level of precision that minimizes collateral damage.

Essentially, an effective space-based weapons system must allow for the destruction of a target in one area, the simultaneous or sequential suppression of another target in a different location, and the neutralization of a threat in a third location. Obvious limitations exist in the ability of space-based weapons to reload in an effort to prolong the support provided to ground, air, and naval forces. This issue, along with other weaponeering-related ones, must be addressed and conquered during the developmental phases of such a system.

Finally, an ability to protect these platforms is an absolute requirement. Nations hostile to the United States have several options-the attack of satellites in space, key nodes on the ground or in space, or ground nodes that command the satellites.³ Failure to counter these threats and implement effective space force protection measures would negate any operational advantages gained from this capability.

A space-based weapons capability with these characteristics would support military operations aimed at deterrence, as well as military operations along the continuum from stability and support through major combat operations.

Operational Flexibility

Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, provides planners with a notional model for arranging military operations—Deter/Engage, Seize the Initiative, Decisive Operations, Transition—achieve desired strategic end states.⁴ A space-based weapons system, fully interoperable with each military service, provides the JFC with superior operational flexibility during all phases.

Deter and Engage: Space Weapons and Flexible Deterrence. Space-based weapons reinforce existing flexible deterrent options (FDOs), whether they be diplomatic, military, or economic. FDOs can include demonstrations of resolve, trade sanctions, naval presence off the coast of a potential foe, or the actual use of U.S. military capability.

Space-based weapons can threaten adversary nations with destruction or damage of key elements of their nuclear programs, weapons of mass destruction development sites, or other infrastructure. Perhaps of greatest benefit, they relieve the JFC of the immediate need to have large-scale forces in theater or to request the movement of forces to the theater to respond, although both actions would be required if the crisis was not diffused.

Finally, space-based weapons facilitate escalation to decisive force should deterrence not prove successful. As fire support platforms in their own right, space-based weapons are immediately employable, either alone or in conjunction with deploying terrestrial forces. Conversely, they can be quickly "turned off should efforts aimed at deterrence prove successful.⁵

Seize the Initiative: Building Blocks to Decisive Operations. When deterrence fails, space-based weapons provide the JFC advantages in seizing the initiative from the adversary. They are perpetually forward deployed, occupying the "ultimate high ground," and positioned for immediate employment.⁶ This allows the JFC to initiate offensive operations at the time of his choosing; there is no requirement to wait while forces transition to or reposition in the theater. If repositioning forces becomes a requirement, space-based weapons could provide an "on-scene" capability to ensure control of the military situation until force ratios are achieved. The employment of space-based weapons in the future might mirror the integration of UAVs and AC-130 gunships during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Space weapons might assume the highly destructive role of the AC-130 to reinforce the fires of terrestrial assets or support the maneuver of terrestrial formations against key objectives.

Decisive Operations: Attacking Enemy Centers of Gravity. In this phase, the JFC masses the effects of all lethal and nonlethal systems against the adversary's sources of strength to achieve his operational and strategic objectives. Here, space-based weapons would add enormous operational flexibility with their ability to target and sequentially or simultaneously destroy or neutralize key aspects of the enemy "system," making it more vulnerable to terrestrial military forces. The ability to attack an adversary's centers of gravity continuously from space (regardless of the domain in which they reside), especially when used in conjunction with conventional systems, would aid the JFC in realizing full-spectrurn dominance.

Transition Phase: Maintaining the Peace. A potent space-based weapons capability, especially when employed in conjunction with diplomatic and informational efforts aimed at conflict resolution, would be a deterrent to those who might attempt to resurrect opposition or revive conflict. Significantly, the combination of these efforts could preclude the redeployment of U.S. military forces. If a situation deteriorated to an unacceptable level after U.S. or coalition forces had withdrawn, space-based weapons would provide the JFC with a substantial monitoring and force application alternative short of ground force redeployment.

Expanding the JPC's Reach

Another facet of joint operational art enhanced by space-based weapons is operational reach—the geographical distance a military organization can project massed combat power to achieve desired effects. Reach is extended by basing forces and support as far forward as possible, aerial refueling, better lines of communication, and maximizing hostnation and contracted support. An additional way to expand operational reach is through leveraging space.⁷

Weapon platforms in space that can deliver effects against designated targets anywhere on the globe would ease the JFC's requirement for operating bases. With basing dilemmas similar to that experienced during Operation Iraqi Freedom and the heightened attention given to adversary antiaccess and area-denial strategies likely to continue, such space-based capabilities would provide enormous flexibility for the operational commander, in much the same manner as is envisioned with joint sea basing.⁸ Space assets are "forward deployed" to expedite response, use space as maneuver space to facilitate repositioning and employment, and are vital in supporting military operations in the absence of overseas bases, overflight rights, or port and airfield facilities. While space-based weapons will not totally replace forward-deployed or forward-based military forces, they will provide a responsive means, characterized by persistence and scalability of effects, to monitor and control tenuous situations worldwide prior to, during, and after the employment of military forces.

Integrating Space-Based Weapons

Developing a fire support system that can provide a variety of sustainable weapons effects against a wide range of critical targets is a clear technological challenge. Of equal significance, however, is the requirement for a sensor capability (human, airborne, space-based, or otherwise) that can both determine the type of target to be attacked and communicate to the system delivering the fire support (sensor to shooter linkage). This is both a technological and a doctrinal challenge. Options worthy of pursuit include: direct links between ground, air, and naval platforms to the space-based platforms; reach-back capabilities from a JFC's headquarters in theater to U.S. Strategic Command; and designation of selected space assets as under the operational or tactical control of a naval or operational-level commander to maximize responsiveness to situations within the joint operations area.

The complexity inherent in these challenges demands new methods of space support and the cultivation of greater "space-mindedness" within the joint community. Temporary space expertise arrangements similar to the Joint Space Support Team outlined in existing joint doctrine were appropriate for previous force enhancement planning and execution. As the focus shifts to force application from space, however, the expertise resident in space planners must expand dramatically.

This drive for space-mindedness will be symbolic of a larger trend in future warfare that will require space planners and all who plan and operate, regardless of the domain, to become even more joint-down to the tactical level. Space-based force application alone will demand it. Ultimately, the demand on planners and operators will be greater than ever to refine their comprehension of other aspects of joint warfare and expand their overall perspectives on joint war fighting. Special service and joint schools will be required to teach the intricacies of the space environment. All joint force commanders will require specially trained staff sections (organic to their commands) capable of planning and executing all force enhancement and force application functions.

Conclusion

Space-based weapons employed against terrestrial targets would significantly alter the way the United States conducts joint warfare. Only an educated and enlightened strategic assessment of the future international security environment, however, will determine whether this capability is warranted. One thing is certain: adopting such a system will require a commensurate effort by the joint community to develop more pervasive space-mindedness and clearly articulated joint doctrine that is focused on the integration of space-based weapons with existing assets at the operational and tactical levels of war. If these measures are taken, the operational flexibility of the 21st-century joint force commander will be immeasurably enhanced and the nation will possess a highly asymmetrical capability suitable for employment anywhere along the continuum from peace to war.