Professional Notes

Naval Aviation Must Balance Current and Future Readiness
Vice Admiral M. D. Malone, Rear Admiral J. M. Zortman, and Commander S. J. Paparo, U.S. Navy

Current and future readiness remain two of the most critical priorities set by Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Vern Clark and his predecessors. Current readiness means fighting today's global war on terror by preparing and equipping naval forces with today's assets. Future readiness means buying the capabilities and quantities of equipment that will enable the Navy to prevail in future battles. Thus, service and departmental planners must seek the proper balance between current and future needs.

If the Navy buys too much current readiness and does not recapitalize (change its capital structure), it can jeopardize the future by spending tomorrow's dollars on readiness that is not needed today. If the Navy fails to buy enough readiness and puts too much emphasis on recapitalization, it risks putting inadequately trained and equipped sailors and Marines in harm's way.

The Recapitalization Challenge

Because the Navy procured fewer aircraft than required for recapitalization during the 1990s, the average age of naval aircraft has increased from 17.7 years in fiscal year (FY) 2000 to 18.6 in FY 2004. Left unchecked, this number will continue to grow—and there will be corresponding increases in the already heavy costs of aviation depot-level repairs and consumables that come with increasing age. This is the dilemma of deferring procurement: much of the money not spent on procurement is consumed by operating older aircraft and equipment.

Another element of deferred procurement is deferred future capability. The inherent capability advances accomplished with newer equipment are a powerful rationale for making recapitalization investments. At the same time, the warfighting obsolescence of older equipment further necessitates the investment. But how much is enough?

The way ahead in meeting the recapitalization challenge is to balance current and future combat capabilities. The Navy strives to operate with efficiency in procurement and readiness. In addition, it must be willing to accept some risk in aligning readiness bought today with capabilities needed in the future.

Procurement Efficiency

The looming bill for recapitalization of tactical aircraft based on legacy infrastructure presents enormous difficulties. Procurement of the F/A-18E/F and Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) created a bow wave that overwhelmed even the most optimistic budget projections. In Program Objective Memorandum (POM) 2004, the first means of reducing the bow wave was to reduce overall requirements. Because current strike fighters are more capable and able to attack more targets than legacy aircraft, their numbers can be reduced. The initial step in this direction reduced aircraft assigned to FA-18C/D squadrons from 12 to 10 aircraft; F/A-18 E/F squadrons remained at 12 to support the new tanking mission.

Another POM 2004 initiative was to integrate Navy and Marine Corps tactical aircraft, which permits both services to meet potential combat requirements. A Marine strike-fighter squadron will be integrated into each Navy carrier air wing; Navy squadrons will participate in the Marine unit deployment program and fill shore-based overseas deployment requirements. A key tenet of tactical aircraft integration will be more efficient depotlevel maintenance. Less time in the preplanned repair cycle means the Navy and Marine Corps will need 30% fewer F/A-lSE/Fs and JSFs.

Finally, the Navy opted to transfer missions to newer airframes-tanking to the F/A-18E/F, antisurface warfare to the H-60, and electronic attack to the EA-18G-thereby allowing the F-14, S-3, and F/A-18A-D to retire. Retirement of 440 legacy aircraft in FYs 2003-2009, which includes moving rapidly out of older types, models, and series, will yield substantial savings.

Readiness Efficiency:

Although these procurement actions bring the Navy closer to meeting future aviation requirements with finite dollars, the current readiness bill looms large. In May 2003, the CNO embarked on a process to reduce the large gap in the readiness accounts between the Navy's requirement as detailed in Program Review 2005 and the President's Budget 2004 funding. The result was the Integrated Readiness Capabilities Assessment (IRCA), a comprehensive process for defining and producing the correct level of readiness in every part of the Navy. Naval aviation's task in this process was to use the flying-hour program to produce the right level of readiness by searching for efficiencies and defining readiness levels more precisely.

In August 2002, Commander, Naval Air Forces (CNAF), introduced a sortie-based training and readiness instruction. It is a flexible and powerful tool for shaping and measuring the training and readiness of naval aviators, naval flight officers, and naval aircrews. In keeping with the CNO's direction to produce current readiness from every dollar, it details how much readiness can be produced with given amounts of flight hours, ordnance, and simulators. The instruction's matrix puts high value on commanding officers' judgments and their ability to efficiently turn resources into readiness measured by objective standards of performance: "dollars in" equals "readiness out."

The IRCA process originated at the office of the CNO; the ideas for efficiency came from the Washington arena. By 2004, however, the IRCA was a fleet-driven process that delivered a 5% reduction in the cost of the flying-hour program while achieving the same level of readiness as before.

The Business of Naval Aviation

The Navy's business initiative, Sea Enterprise, focuses leadership on outputs and execution, and creates ideas that will improve productivity and reduce overhead costs.1 Naval Air Forces is undertaking several initiatives to support Sea Enterprise, including the Naval Aviation Readiness Integrated Improvement Program (NAVRIIP). The program's original goal was to improve the readiness of nondeployed squadrons.

In the past decade, the Navy has given funding priority to deployed units at the expense of nondeployed units. The NAVRIIP puts requirements for every aspect of producing readiness in plain language that every part of naval aviation—suppliers, maintainers, and operators—can understand. It measures success by a single fleet metric: aircraft ready for tasking at reduced cost.

To become more efficient while meeting readiness standards, the Navy first must educate leaders at the wing and squadron levels, and then provide them with the necessary tools. The "Airspeed" professional education program for naval aviation officers is the best way to achieve cost-wise readiness. This program presents industry business practices-for example, theory of constraints, lean manufacturing, and other out-of-the-box thinking-to produce combat effectiveness with the resources available.

Through its Aviation Financial Analysis Tool (AFAST), CNAF is more accurately defining cost levels and cost assignments. This tool has revealed widely varying levels of efficiency. A dramatic case is the threefold difference in cost per flight hour for different F/A-18C squadrons that fly with the same equipment and armament at the same stage of the readiness cycle. With NAVRIIP and AFAST, planners can determine the causes for variations of this kind.

An emphasis on business rules does not negate the greatest resource in preparing sailors for war: leadership. In the past, the Navy asked leaders to concentrate on the quality of the fighting forces they commanded without regard to the costs. Now the Navy asks them also to concentrate on quantities of resources—cost-wise readiness versus readiness at any cost.

Although commanding officers are the guarantors of success for warfighting and efficiency initiatives, all members of every command are key to ensuring the Navy gets the maximum readiness for its dollars. From the commander who makes the hard decisions on training resources, to the sailor who uses the best practices in maintaining equipment, all hands must apply rigorous critiques to "the way we've always done it." Persistent emphasis on readiness efficiencies is the way the Navy will be able to fight the war of today and buy the force of tomorrow.

Conclusions

Naval aviation cannot avoid the numerous issues in its path: demands for ready forces to support the global war on terrorism, the need to ensure the future of naval aviation, and finite funds available to accomplish both of these difficult tasks. With the same discipline, strength, and sense of innovation that generated the combat excellence that has characterized naval aviation since its ear liest days, the efforts of its men and women will provide ready forces to the nation.

 

Expeditionary Security for Naval Forces
Major Scott E. Packard, U.S. Marine Corps

Since the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, antiterrorism (AT) has become a growth industry. The Navy Department's principal AT capability resides in the Marine Corps security Force (MCSF) Battalion, with forces arrayed across the United States and overseas under the operational control of naval commanders. These well-trained and agile armed forces furnish Marines for duties involving the use of deadly force to protect designated installations and units. In addition to the MCSF companies, the battalion maintains three fleet antiterrorism security team (FAST) companies for deployments.

The MCSF Battalion evolved to more defined missions from the legacy missions of naval infantry and seizure of advanced naval bases. Once serving to repel boarders and secure coaling stations, Marines now guard key naval installations, provide security for vital national assets, such as special weapons and diplomatic missions, and augment security for naval assets, such as vessels in high-threat areas and nuclear-powered submarines during refueling.

Most naval bases have been weaned from MCSF Battalion protection. The last overseas Marine Barracks was disestablished in October 2000 and redesignated as Marine Corps security Force Company, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Today, installation security by Marines is assigned to MCSF companies. Although there have been many positive changes in the mission, organization, and employment of the MCSF Battalion, significant improvements remain to be made.

From Watch Standing to Expeditionary security

A more dangerous operational climate required the MCSF Battalion to shift from static post security augmentation of naval installations to the wider concept of expeditionary security. The October 2000 terrorist attack on the Cole (DDG-67) brought this point home sharply and galvanized the Navy's AT and force protection efforts in the same way the October 1983 Beirut bombing energized the Marine Corps. Recent deployments of FAST platoons to Liberia and Haiti validated the need for this capability.

Consistent with the precepts of "Sea Power 21" and expeditionary maneuver warfare, expeditionary security capitalizes on the mobility, operational quickness, and sustainability of MCSF units. It is conducted primarily by FAST elements that are immediately deployable and positioned to quickly respond when needed. These units arrive with the command-and-control capabilities and logistic support to initiate and maintain security operations until follow-on forces can replace them-normally within 90 days. The recent establishment of 3d FAST Company added two platoons to the deployment slate.

Naval and Mobile security Forces

The convergence of capabilities among the MCSF Battalion, Naval security Forces (NSF), and Mobile security Forces (MSF) has resulted in an inefficient redundancy of missions and capabilities. Although redundancy and depth are not necessarily undesireable, current arrangements fail to maximize the relative strengths of each unit. Recent maturation in NSF training brings greater skills than those of law enforcement organizations alone; its units regularly accomplish deliberate (preplanned) and random AT measures. In addition, NSF manning has increased significantly to meet the high-level security standards imposed since 11 September 2001.

The Navy's newly formed MSF can deploy an armed unit to a port or ship to provide entry control and conduct vehicle and personnel searches. It can establish a point defense against waterborne and vehicle threats, with appropriate observation and identification of potential threats. In many ways, the MSF mirrors the capabilities of a FAST platoon, although the unit is intended for shorter duration operations of ten days.

Fleet Antiterrorism security Team Missions and Training

The FASTs support naval tasks, such as the refueling of naval vessels, visit, board, search, and seizure operations, protection of installations against rear-area threats, and reinforcement of installations when the threat exceeds NSF capabilities. Their units train to accomplish the following mission-essential tasks:

* Site security

* Physical security for special nuclear material

* Maritime security

* Reinforcement of security at naval and national installations

* Convoy operations

Trained to high standards in marksmanship, weapons employment, fire and movement, and tactics, the infantry Marine is the foundation of the MCSF's extensive capabilities. Augmenting this foundation, each security force Marine receives six weeks of initial training in physical security, advanced marksmanship, AT operations, and riot control.

Assignment to a security force unit brings further training in advanced sensors, nonlethal weapons, precision marksmanship, and close-quarter battle. The result is a highly trained, well-equipped Marine who operates as part of a cohesive unit that can maneuver at the squad and platoon levels, and provide tactical capabilities for a wide range of missions. Using him as a static post slander is akin to using a blowtorch to light a cigarette—it works, but it is inefficient.

While the current FAST deployment program establishes scheduled platoon deployments to naval forces in Central Command, Pacific Command, and European Command, tailored force packages could provide more responsive, scalable security to commanders. Ranging from squad- to company-sized units, with command-and-control and combat service support augmentation, these forces could execute short-notice deployments in response to emergency requests.

Organizing for Success

In October 2002, the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (Anti-Terrorism) (4th MEB [AT]) acquired the MCSF Battalion, adding to the capabilities of the Chemical-Biological Incidence Response Force (CBIRF), Marine security Guard (MSG) Battalion, and Anti-terrorism (AT) Battalion. The 4th MBB's mission is to provide combatant commanders with rapidly deployable and sustainable specialized forces to deter, detect, and defend designated facilities against terrorism, and to conduct initial incidence response to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear terrorist attacks worldwide. Reactivated shortly after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, it is the only active-component standing MEB.

Subordination to the 4th MEB (AT), however, potentially distances the MCSF from the Navy forces it is designed to support and detracts from the battalion's effectiveness. Under the administrative umbrella of the 4th MEB, closer ties to the Navy could be fostered through establishment of regional MCSF companies. With MCSF Company, Europe, as the model, establishment of MCSF companies in the Pacific, Central, and Southern Commands under the naval component (or fleet) commanders would enhance relationships with the Navy and increase operational effectiveness. The requisite manpower and infrastructure already reside in the MCSF companies in Europe, Patuxent River, Maryland, Bahrain, and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. If reassigned to expeditionary security missions, these units would be better situated to serve as standing headquarters for the FAST platoons, which rotate in and out of theater.

Moving the command structure of MCSF Company, Patuxent River, to Pacific Command frees more than 60 Marines now involved in static security and provides a standing headquarters for the deployed FAST platoons. Currently, Southern Command does not enjoy the operational flexibility afforded by the FASTs. And official concern over terrorist cells in that region indicates the need for assigning it a forward-deployed MCSF force.

A proposed command alternative is to put MCSF units under Marine component commanders. But this would make them less responsive to the priorities of Navy commands. The MCSF provides the Navy with capabilities it does not have-capabilities prohibitively expensive to replicate.

Reinforcement & Redesignation

Defense against terrorism is a pillar of the MCSF mission. Transferring the 4th MEB's AT Battalion—a specially organized infantry battalion—would give a strong offensive capability to the MCSF and maximize its antiterrorist role. In addition, the larger AT companies would lend depth to the FASTs and could assume missions that extend beyond the 90-day mark.

Even as organized currently, the MCSF Battalion is more accurately a regiment. It consists of 2,400 Marines commanded by a colonel; the battalion's span of control and organizational complexity rival that of an infantry regiment (3,000 Marines under a colonel). The MCSF units and their widely varying missions extend over eight permanent locations and support five regional combatant commanders. Scheduled strength increases will add 100 Marines to the battalion headquarters. Thus, the MCSF Battalion should be redesignated as the Marine Corps security Force Regiment.

Conclusions

With the proper mission focus and organizational structure, Marine Corps forces will be poised to continue their long tradition of protecting the Navy's vital assets. The measures proposed here will expand the capabilities of the Marine Corps security Force Battalion and give operational commanders the flexibility that forward-deployed fleet antiterrorism security teams provide in today's increasingly demanding security climate.

 

Gathering Combat Lessons Is Complex and Time-Consuming
Milan Vego

The lessons-learned process is a critical factor in developing new tactical and operational concepts, modifying or altering doctrine and training, and designing new weapons and equipment. In terms of scale and importance, assessing practical experience can lead to four primary types of lessons:

* Technological lessons are derived from assessing the use of weapons and sensors and their platforms and equipment. They have great value in improving existing systems or designing new ones.

* Tactical lessons are deduced from the study of planning, preparation, and execution of battles and other engagements.

* Operational lessons result from examining all aspects of major operations and campaigns in combat, war games, and peacetime exercises.

* Strategic lessons are gained from overall analysis of an entire conflict or war, together with its political and economic factors and related aspects, such as culture and religion.

Strategic lessons are more important than operational lessons, and the latter have greater significance than the tactical and technological varieties. At the bottom of the scale, technology-based lessons inherently are less durable than those derived from the unquantifiable elements of combat.

Sources of lessons extend from peace-time exercises, battle experiments, and war games, to personal and institutional experiences obtained in combat, to the study of military history. Lessons from combat experiences are perhaps the most important in providing direction to the development of the armed forces, individual services, and specific combat arms because they are the most likely to be accepted. They influence technological innovations and force structure and composition, officer education, and force employment across the entire range of military operations.

An often-neglected source of lessons comes from the experiences of allies and potential opponents. The Arab-Israeli War of 1973 provided an impetus for change in the U.S. Army's doctrine. Lessons drawn from that conflict and other analytical studies led Army thinkers to reach certain conclusions about strategy, operational concepts, tactics, organization and equipment, and training. The outcome of the effort was Field Manual (FM) 100-5 Operations in 1976.¹

Combat lessons are derived during the course of war and in its aftermath. They are based primarily on personal experiences and reminiscences of direct participants (especially high-ranking officers), after-action reports, and official or semiofficial reports. The principal framework for applying combat experiences is the doctrinal document.² Such experiences, however, may be highly individualized and not easily convertible to knowledge and, finally, sound lessons. Personal wartime experiences alone cannot provide a clear and comprehensive understanding of combat events.³

The Process and Pitfalls

The process of deriving lessons learned is complex because a vast amount of information on both tangible and intangible facets of the situation must be collected, processed, and evaluated. To properly evaluate experiences and derive lessons, it is necessary to have all the facts and the overall view, which requires some passage of time after the conflict has ended.⁴ The U.S. study and evaluation of lessons learned in the Vietnam War did not mature fully until about 20 years after the end of that conflict in 1975.⁵ Nonetheless, some key lessons from Vietnam were incorporated in the Army's FM 100-5 by 1982. Similarly, the lessons learned by U.S. forces immediately following the Gulf War in 1991 were quite different from those derived several years later.

Drawing lessons too quickly is fraught with danger because not all the facts are known. Many of the individuals directly and indirectly involved in the decisions made during the conflict rise to positions of power and influence later. Moreover, the public statements of high-ranking officials might prejudice analysts—intentionally or not—as to the outcome of the process.

The most recent conflict can reconfirm lessons learned in previous conflicts. New lessons derived during the course of a conflict or shortly after its end usually are tentative, not definitive—especially in the case of a war in which the victor enjoyed overwhelming superiority. The greatest danger is in accepting tentative lessons as valid for all future situations and then applying them to a war fought against a different enemy at another place and time.

Tactical or operational lessons learned cannot be reached accurately without analyzing the broader framework of conflict provided by policy and strategy. Too heavy an emphasis on the physical aspects of war and disregard of its human dimensions—such as leadership, morale, discipline, and soundness of doctrine—may lead to grave, if not fatal, errors. Lessons can be mislearned by focusing too narrowly on the technological aspects of war. In such a case, broader and more important lessons can be either obscured or missed entirely.

Lessons learned are likely to be unsound if personal or institutional bias is allowed to dominate the process. Military professionals must have the moral courage to draw the correct lessons, regardless of the consequences for their arms, services, and their own careers. Ideally, they should not be set forth to promote service interests, justify a certain course of action, reinforce the views of higher authority, or—worst of all—to serve policies driving the future of the armed forces.

After a war, each former belligerent comes to different conclusions and, therefore, different lessons. The side that is more realistic in seeking the truth usually is more successful in arriving at the correct conclusions. History suggests that losers of wars usually learn more than victors. But the victors can derive the proper lessons if they are willing to accept frank and honest criticism of their performance.

With the exception of the era of Field Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen prior to World War I, the German Army was brutal in rooting out deficiencies in its training and combat performance. Improvements initiated after its victory over Poland in 1939 provide a classic example. The Polish Campaign did not go as smoothly as portrayed in Nazi propaganda. Many German troops were poorly trained and many of their officers were not up to their responsibilities.⁶ In the aftermath, the German General Staff was unflinchingly honest and devoted major efforts to improving training for commanders and noncommissioned officers. A special division (Lehrdivision) was established at Koenigsberg for systematic leadership training. In May 1940, when the Germans launched their campaign in the west, their army was far better prepared than in September 1939.⁷

Failures to derive correct lessons from combat often have owed to an inability to understand local conditions and accept the opposing army and society on their own terms.⁸ Another cause can be a "triumphalist" attitude that leads the victor into a trap of underestimating both his weaknesses and the former enemy's strengths.⁹ Too often, victors rely on their experiences, which, no matter how great, are limited. Victors prepare for future wars based on their past victories. They tend to attribute their successes in the last war to better organization, technology, training, and leadership, and search too slowly for what really happened. Conceit and complacency can get the upper hand.¹⁰

In contrast, the vanquished side prepares for the next conflict with considerable humility. Yet losers sometimes are prone to overemphasize the significance of events that characterized the last conflict and, in the process, overestimate the performance of the victors. This means that more important lessons in other parts of the theater of war might be ignored or dismissed as insignificant. It is not adviseable to neglect certain conflicts because of cultural arrogance. For example, before World War I, the German Army dismissed the value of lessons learned in the U.S. Civil War.

Potential and former enemies can learn from U.S. performance in combat and peacetime exercises. In deducing lessons from a conflict in which they were bystanders, they usually are able to avoid service parochialism and political interference from the top, which gives them the advantage.

In modern times, a common mistake made by civilian policy makers and the military has been to overestimate the effect and capabilities of a single weapon system or service. For example, since the advent of aircraft, air power has been considered a panacea for practically all problems associated with bloody ground conflicts. Although properly applied air power exerts vital influence on the course and outcome of conflicts, its champions have overrated its role consistently.

Another trap in deriving lessons lays in concentrating on a single defining moment and then magnifying its significance to the detriment of all others. In studying military history, we should avoid applying a historical example of one era to new contemporary conditions. Generally, it is difficult for a military service to learn from the war experiences of foreign nations, owing to the perception that those experiences have little utility, or owing to underestimation of the belligerents in a particular conflict. Sometimes it is possible to arrive at proper solutions by choosing to ignore the negative lessons of others instead of being influenced by them. Here, the Marine Corps' view of the British amphibious experience at Gallipoli in World War I is noteworthy.

Are Lessons Learned Transferable?

Lessons learned from a single conflict cannot be applied rigidly to another conflict. Each war is unique in its confluence of physical environment, weather and climate, and human dimensions. The Gulf War of 1990-1991 was unique: open desert terrain favored the attacker's use of air power; several months were available to deploy and assemble U.S.-led coalition forces; and the enemy was passive and cooperative.

Sometimes, the wrong lessons from one conflict are applied to a new conflict with the same (or similar) opponents in the same general area. The United States and NATO did so in Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999 by exaggerating the effectiveness of air power. The wrong military lessons were implemented and key aspects of the situation—political, historical, cultural, religious, and psychological—were neglected or willfully ignored.

Likewise, the lessons of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan seem to have been missed in part and applied to Operation Iraqi Freedom. While it is true that special operations forces (SOFs) in combination with air power made a significant contribution to the relatively quick collapse of the Taliban regime in Kabul, the success of the operation also owed much to proxies supported by the United States. The SOFs were able to roam freely in many parts of Afghanistan because the Taliban exercised only loose control over large parts of the country. In Iraq, it has proved extremely dangerous to apply erroneous OEF lessons to a radically different scenario and physical environment, and against far more determined and skillful opponents.

Conclusions

The lessons-learned process should feature evaluation of all possible sources: warfare, peacetime exercises, war gaming, and military history. Evaluating the experiences of major military forces is complex and wrought with potential missteps that collectively can lead to serious problems in establishing service and joint doctrine and applying it to operations. Lessons can be learned, but they also can be misperceived. Victors often are less inclined than losers to search for lessons.

Military planners should strive to gather proper information from as many sources as possible. Otherwise, it is impossible to write new doctrine—and refine current doctrine—that points the way to improved tactical and operational concepts, force transformation, and professional military education and training. A single-minded focus on technological lessons to the exclusion of strategy, operations, and tactics is to be avoided at all costs—as are the cultural biases and feelings of superiority that detract from rational assessment.

Finally, the learning process should not be politicized or personalized. Programmatic decisions that determine the longterm direction of U.S. military forces must be made with the greatest care and with due consideration to their future impact on the nation's defense.

 

Navy Needs Martial Arts Training

Lieutenant John Lehmann, U.S. Navy

Today's sailor has the greatest arsenal in the history of naval combat. Computers, nuclear propulsion, and high-technology alloys have replaced wood, tar, and canvas in the fleet. Information warfare, precision strike, and expeditionary maneuver operations are the new missions that use these tools. In our quest for modernity, however, we largely abandoned more than the obsolete materials of the past-we neglected the martial spirit that made the U.S. Navy the greatest fleet in history.

Today's sailor is not a warrior. Although he or she might take part in combat operations, the average sailor will never see battle or face a threat greater than petty theft in port. Aside from special operations forces (SOFs), visitation, boarding, search, and seizure personnel, medical cadre attached to Marine Corps units, and combat aircrew, most sailors support combat operations with transportation and long-range fires. This has nurtured a false sense of security that dulls the Navy warrior's edge—which we can ill afford to neglect in the 21st century's asymmetric combat environment.

From 1776 until the mid-20th century, a sailor's training included basic hand-to-hand combat training, rifle marksmanship, and bayonet training. Indeed, squads of blue jackets accompanied their Marine brothers in many of the Corps' battles and raids in the 19th century. But with the advent of high-technology weaponry, responsibility for close-in fighting has been largely relegated to the Marines; as the terrorist threat grew, sailors were trained to present as inconsequential a target as possible. Recall the tragic murder of Navy diver Robert Stethem at the hands of Hezbollah terrorists on a TWA flight to Beirut in 1987. Focusing on the attack on the USS Cole (DDG-67) in 2000, it is easy to imagine the potential for other terrorist actions. What would the Cole's crewmembers have done if terrorists chose to board the vessel in Aden rather than detonate an improvised explosive device against the hull? They undoubtedly would have followed Commodore Perry's motto, "Don't give up the ship." But well-trained, ideologically committed terrorists have a clear advantage over sailors trained to present a low profile rather than employ personal self-defense techniques.¹

A Modified Marine Corps Martial Arts Program (MCMAP)

In 2000, former Commandant of the Marine Coips General James L. Jones initiated the MCMAP to prepare Marines for the challenges of the 21st-century battlefield, including acquisition of the skills necessary to conduct peacekeeping and other operations not involving sustained combat and deadly hand-to-hand encounters.² The Navy should adopt a modified, scaled-down version of this program to instill the warrior spirit in its sailors. Enlistees are challenged during recruit training in a series of battle exercises designed to simulate expected combat conditions based on historical precedents and anticipated threats. Martial arts training is no different; it adds a logical dimension to existing battle instruction, ensuring that 21st-century sailors have the tools necessary to defend their ships and themselves in unpredictable hostile environments.

It is ludicrous to argue that sailors do not need to defend themselves. Service members must be trained to do the right thing in combat, not the "Rambo" thing. Discipline is essential to martial arts training. When and where to fight is as important as when to run and when to sit on your hands. Waiting until an operational weakness appears is not the time to institute a crash training program. Take, for example, reemergence of small arms qualifications. In the years following the demise of the Soviet Union and removal of special weapons from most naval vessels, the Navy deemphasized small-arms training. Only the sailors who needed the training to accomplish their duties received instruction. Following the Cole tragedy, there was a renaissance in Navy marksmanship training—although too late for previous incidents that had demonstrated risks to U.S. forces on and off base.

There are obvious time and space constraints aboard ship. But in spite of absolute requirements for maintenance, watch standing, drills, field days, and myriad other things necessary to keeping a ship afloat, the crews can make time for martial arts training. According to Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Vern Clark, sailors are to conduct physical training (PT) three times per week. Divisional (or work center) martial arts instruction can supplement one of these sessions as a practical alternative to aerobic training and as a team-building exercise. Any open space sufficient for calisthenics training is suitable. Marines embarked on the Mount Whitney (LCC-20) used the ship's flight deck to practice and qualify at the basic MCMAP level while en route to Djibouti.

Training sailors is important; maintaining unit integrity by preventing unnecessary injuries is also a paramount consideration. Thus, firm safety standards must be enforced in all aspects of martial arts training. Most precautions are the same as those observed during unit PT sessions. Adequate warm-up exercises, stretching, and proper hydration will prevent injuries. all members in potential contact situations will wear safety devices, such as mouthpieces, padded headgear, and gloves. In addition, all personnel—regardless of previous martial arts training—must regulate their blows to 20-30% of full strength. In this way, trainees learn the proper moves and develop the necessary techniques through repeated exercise. At the same time, they build confidence as they see their skills increase.

Pros Outnumber Cons

Although the wardroom does not necessarily hear of it because the chiefs and leading petty officers typically take care of such things, we understand that sailors fight. The possibility of increased disciplinary infractions, however, is not a good reason to neglect this aspect of force protection. The martial arts stress discipline and restraint. Civilian studies show that adolescents and young adults studying martial arts are less likely to engage in disruptive behavior.¹ Further, training in self-defense techniques will level the playing field between potential victims and attackers. Women receive additional benefits from this training because it can aid them in deterring spousal abuse and sexual assault.

The discipline derived from martial arts training will put sailors at less risk on liberty. A typical liberty-risk candidate is under 21, on his first deployment, and unaccustomed to consuming alcohol regularly. Restraint and control instilled by the martial arts program will help compensate for lack of maturity. The Marine Corps anticipated potential problems and chose to address them philosophically: The MCMAP fosters the development of a Marine as a whole person in order to develop the Marine as a responsible warrior. Above and beyond the physical skills being taught, the mental and character disciplines give the Marine the skills to understand how and when to use those physical skills.⁴

Along with fighting, the possibility of hazing must be considered. The MCMAP incorporates team-building exercises and antihazing instruction into the curriculum. Students are encouraged to bond with their comrades because they are the same ones they will rely on in combat. And the Marine Corps stresses its zero-tolerance policy regarding hazing in any form.

Adopting such an ambitious training program will cause much uneasiness. Relevance, scheduling and facilities, safety, potential disciplinary infractions, and possible hazing issues are valid concerns, but not insurmountable. The benefits of martial arts training will far outweigh the costs.

Conclusions

The role of naval forces in the 21st century is evolving and expanding at an alarming rate. The Navy is planning its strategy and developing ships and tactics for combat in the littorals-its main battlespace for the foreseeable future.

Given the congested surface and air traffic in littoral regions, the Navy may be unable to keep enemies at arm's length, whether in port or during maritime interception operations. The foe knows our strengths and weaknesses; he will attack asymmetrically as he did against the Cole. Equally important, in addition to practical physical training, martial arts training for the fleet can impart discipline and restore the warrior spirit.