"The Great Midway Crapshoot"
(See L. Gaillard, pp. 64-67, june 2004 Proceedings)
Captain Chris Johnson, U.S. Navy (Retired)-The account of the Battle of Midway has been a favorite of mine, but the way Mr. Gaillard tells the story, I hardly recognize it anymore. Luck? Crapshoot? It might look that way from a cold, academic point of view, but for those who have seen much of their life through binoculars on the bridge of a ship, laying the credit for victory at the foot of fortune is an exceedingly shallow way of explaining something much more heroic.
For much of my career as a surface line officer and aspiring tactician, I read and reread the major accounts of this battle and associated biographies with great professional interest. I have thought extensively about Wade McClusky's actions that day, and the concept of luck never crossed my mind. I see courage, fortitude, perseverance, and the willingness to listen to that inner voice that speaks to us in times of doubt and confusion. If McClusky had been an MBA, he would surely have analyzed his fuel state and returned home to fight later that day. And to believe that he simply saw a Japanese destroyer racing through the water and decided to follow is too trivial an explanation: Navy men know that these ships race through the water for a hundred different reasons, only one of which is to regain station. Something more simply had to be guiding him that day.
This is not an easy case to make in an overrationalized society that worships fact-based reasoning and spreadsheets. I believe, however, that those who have served at sea know that intuition and instinct are powerful mental resources that frequently leap over logic and reasoning to provide compelling answers, often when things seem most desperate and confused. Sometimes we call that luck, probably because we don't know how to describe it to those who have not been in our footsteps.
The events surrounding Midway are indeed full of miscues, coincidences, and apparently random events-good and bad-but no more than occur in any fleet exercise. They were neither crucial nor extraordinary; they were the characteristic vicissitudes we have come to expect and to deal with. But what was extraordinary were the many acts of undaunted courage and unswerving determination to win that characterized the entire campaign, including Admiral Chester Nimitz's willingness to believe his cryptologists' analysis; his decision to give a cruiser sailor command of the carrier force; Admiral Raymond Spruance's decision to launch his raid early and at maximum range; and McClusky's unwillingness to give up when all seemed murky and very confused.
At the darkest hour of the Pacific War, at the very point of a spear that absolutely could not fail, McClusky refused to give in; he pressed on until he got a clue that in turn prompted the intuition to turn north. If you call that luck, then you don't begin to understand what the U.S. Navy does for a living, or how it has achieved such greatness with everyday American men and women like Wade McClusky.
Richard Leonard-With regard to the caption accompanying the photograph of Wade McClusky, the airplane on which then commander McClusky is perched is clearly an F4F, not an SBD as noted. Also, McClusky and the Enterprise SBDs he led were not "lost"; they simply did not find the Japanese carriers where they expected them to be. Arashi's return run to the Japanese carriers was spotted while McClusky was executing a box search, (an outwardly spiralling box-shaped search).
"The Nation Needs a Different Navy"
(See J. Byron, p. 2, june 2004 Proceedings')
"We Have Met Our Own Worst Enemy"
(See S. Ukeiley, pp. 26-27, june 2004 Proceedings)
lieutenant Commander Bill Goss, U.S. Navy (Retired)-Congratulations to Captain Byron. he is a very perceptive and forward-thinking naval officer who should be listened to by all those who are in a position to make the changes he recommends.
To further raise our military efficiency, our enemy should no longer be known as al Qaeda. It is a much bigger organization than al Qaeda's approximately 18,000 members and is much easier to define. Our enemy is Muslim extremism. Muslim extremism is a form of religious extremism whereby you are not only willing to die for your religious beliefs, but you are willing and even compelled to kill for them. Radical interpretation of the Koran guides Muslim extremists' actions because many of the 400 pages of the Koran-which I have read in detailpreach submitting to the will of Allah, which, according to the Koran, means the unrelenting killing of Jews, Christians, and nonbelievers; all believers must proceed forward with total resolve toward the singularity of this purpose. Americans should pick up an English translation of the Koran and read this book thoroughly to understand why we are so hated by those who take it literally. We are also hated because we believe in freedom for all religions to practice peacefully in coexistence, and we believe in equality of the sexes. The Koran is strongly against these two specific beliefs. All you have to do is read the first couple of chapters to see why they are motivated to hate individual and societal freedoms.
Thankfully, more than two billion modern and moderate Muslims do not follow these ancient precepts. Unfortunately, a small percentage of Muslims who are also extremists do follow the Koran to the letter, but this small percentage represents a very large number of people who want the world's population of modern thinking and freedom-loving people dead, and the sooner the better.
Clearly defining the enemy will further raise our military's level of effectiveness in war fighting and smart asset management. Political correctness-along with the inner service rivalries that Captain Byron describes in his commentaryshould go by the wayside when our national security and hard-fought freedoms are at risk.
C. Henry Depew-Both articles address a common failing of any bureaucracy. Policy is what is implemented, not what is spoken (or written). Captain Bryon pushes for a more effective, efficient naval force. Major Ukeiley notes why such a force will be long in coming.
Captain Byron calls for a navy with fewer ships to do the current job and additional ships to do the new job (support of land operations). In addition, he wants to "reform" the naval establishment (threatening insecure officers with change). Major Ukeiley bemoans those who are threatened (or retaliated against) for expressing an opinion different from their insecure superior officers. Both will get nowhere until those insecure offices identified by the incidents noted by Major Ukeiley are disciplined by "their superior officers." Without negative results from coercion, there will be no change.
"Between Scylla and Charybdis: Discussion & Dissent in the Navy"
(See R. Bowdish, pp. 42-45, May 2004 Proceedings)
lieutenant Commander David L. Teska, U.S. Coast Guard Reserve-I thoroughly enjoyed Captain Bowdish's article. I look forward to Proceedings each month for the frank, open and, yes, sometimes, controversial discussions that grace its pages. His ideas of limiting flag/general officers and senior defense officials is worth considering, as is the concept of having those officers pose issues for debate rather than pen the party line. There is a need for a forum where reasonable people can discuss ideas publicly and, on occasion, disagree.
Historical events have shown that political and military leaders, especially senior ones, must sometimes make tough decisions for the good of their service or the nation. An obvious example is how secretary of Defense Robert McNamara stated publicly that he had early misgivings about U.S. policy in Vietnam and whether the country would realize a successful outcome-advice that wasn't passed on to President Johnson.
When in uniform (either on drill status or active duty), National Guardsmen (and reservists like me) fall under the rules that govern political activity adhered to by our active-duty comrades. Yet when released or not on drill status we can participate fully, including running for and holding elected offices. Several reservists around the country are also state or local officials, such as Missouri secretary of State Matt Blunt, a U.S. Naval Reserve officer and Naval Academy graduate currently running for Missouri governor.
Having reserve officers also serving as elected officials can sometimes cause problems. In September 2003, while a Missouri National Guard officer on active duty in Guantanamo Bay, Missouri State Senator (and Major) Jon Dolan took six days of leave and returned home to vote in a veto session of the Missouri State Senate. Regulations prohibit the exercising of political office if the person is recalled for federal service for more than 270 days. There are rules dealing with the Dolan issue related to how long a person can be recalled before having to give up their elected position, but I think there is a bigger issue. Do we want elected officials serving in the military? Are there conflict-of-interest issues here? What about the need for the officer corps to remain impartial set against a person's First Amendment rights guaranteeing free speech? Who is being served best: the military (and by definition the nation) an officer has sworn to defend, or the constituents who have a reasonable expectation that their elected official is working in their best interests?
"Unwrapping the ROE Axle"
(See M. Palmer, pp. 58-62, May 2004 Proceedings)
Captain Mark C. Nesselrode, U.S. Navy-It would be unfair to characterize Commander Palmer's article as either simplistic, unwarranted, or unwanted. He makes some very excellent and insightful comments. There is great value in using rules of engagement (ROE) as a basis for training, and flexing training scenarios to the point of "breaking" ROE to test all levels of either a unit or a Strike Group's capabilities. Unfortunately, there are a couple of points that I believe most deckplate operators would disagree with vehemently.
I am a surface warfare officer who has had the tremendous privilege to have had command at sea twice. Until your eagles/oak leaves and command pin are on the line, you don't understand. In stark contrast from the cartoon or the examples of aviation shared in the article, the average person in the combat information center, on the bridge, or especially those executing antiterrorism/force protection in various venues is not a college educated, tremendously experienced, or specifically trained person. Usually, these are sailors and/or junior officers ranging in age from 18-34. Many have never been in these situations before, and their actions can have enormous consequences.
Commander Palmer does point out the crux of the problem. It is not determination of a hostile act; that is quite easy. The difficulty and all the dilemmas stem from hostile intent. Because we, as a Navy, do not approach this issue with the academic rigor that many of our counterparts in other navies, especially the Royal Navy, do (as I observed during the Joint Maritime Course in july 2002), we do indeed get "wrapped around the axle." We are constantly advised that determination of hostile intent is not a checklist, cannot be simply a gut feel, and requires an analytical and thorough accumulation of all facts. Easily done (or maybe not) for the commanding officer, but how does one translate that to the officer of the deck, antiair warfare officer, or security watch on a pier or in a boat? Our sister services, especially the Marine Corps and Army, have been dealing with this issue for many years, but especially since Lebanon. I have never heard anyone in those services state that the determination of hostile intent is easy or simply an academic process.
While I would agree that "master this cartoon and you have mastered the fundamentals of our standing rules of engagement" is probably true, how do we translate that to our junior officers, senior enlisted, and especially junior enlisted personnel? They will have little time, if the example of the terrorists' attack on the USS Cole (DDG-67) is what we should aspire to prevent, and an extraordinary responsibility to act correctly. We do know that they will react as they are trained, thus our training must follow the counsel of Vince Lombardi, "It isn't practice that makes perfect. It is perfect practice that makes perfect." They are the greatest sailors in the world, but they are still our most junior people. We must not fail our sailors.
"Interview: Douglas Brinkley"
(See p. 56, May 2004 Proceedings)
Captain James F. Kelly, U.S. Navy (Retired)-Every candidate for public office probably has some excess baggage to carry that he'd rather not have. With Senator John Kerry, it's undoubtedly his anti-Vietnam War activism that followed his heroic naval service in Vietnam.
John Kerry and I were shipmates in the guided-missile cruiser USS Gridley (CG-21) in 1967 and 1968. he served as first lieutenant, lhe officer in charge of the deck division, and I was executive officer. I remember him as a serious and intelligent young ensign, seemingly mature beyond his years. The skipper and I were mightily impressed with him in spite of his inexperience. he had excellent verbal skills and great poise so we assigned him a collateral duty as public affairs officer. Because of these duties and his basic responsibilities for seamanship evolutions and the overall external appearance of the ship, I had close, daily contact with him. (In other words, 1 would be all over his case if the ship wasn't shipshape.) Turns out he didn't need too much supervision in that regard. he was a fine division officer, and his men obviously respected him.
We deployed from San Diego to the Vietnam theater in early 1968 after only a six-month turnaround, and spent most of a four-month deployment on rescue station in the Gulf of Tonkin, standing by to pick up downed aviators. It was a fairly grueling tour of duty. Our helicopter was hit trying to rescue a downed pilot, and the door gunner was killed. The crew performed well, and John Kerry's performance in all aspects of his duty was outstanding. Drafting his fitness reports was an exercise in the use of superlatives. In fact, of the 30 or so officers, I counted him in the top half dozen, no mean feat for an ensign.
I tried to interest him in a naval career. Silly me! It was obvious he had bigger fish to fry. I drafted the favorable endorsement on his request for swift boat duty on the rivers of Vietnam, where he distinguished himself in combat. Before he left, he gave me his bridge coat and several other uniform items, saying that he wouldn't be needing them in the "brown water" Navy. Aside from a Christmas card and an aborted telephone call, I didn't hear further from John until I read about his antiwar antics, including his appearance with Jane Fonda and the famous episode of throwing medals onto the steps of the Capitol during a protest. While he was protesting against the war, many of us were still fighting in it. Many of us felt betrayed that one of our own, a decorated hero, would give comfort to the enemy by such actions. Think what you want about the wisdom of getting involved in that war. Two presidents, both Democrats, committed the armed forces they commanded to fight it. Make no mistake; actions by people such as Fonda and Kerry were damaging to our morale, gave aid and comfort to the forces we were fighting, and altered the eventual outcome in a manner less favorable to the United States than if they had kept their mouths shut.
The time for antiwar protests is before the war starts.
"Assassination and Abduction: Viable Foreign Policy Tools?"
(See 5. Collins, pp. 66-67, April 2004; W. H. Parks, pp. 8-12, J. Collins, p. 12, J. Sanford, p. 14, B. Killebrew, pp. 14-16, May 2004; D. Winters, pp. 16-18, june 2004 Proceedings)
Colonel Hays Parks, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)- lieutenant Commander Winters's comments err in fact and law.
Contrary to his assertion, the 5 November 2002 Predator attack on al Qaeda terrorists in Yemen was under military command and control. second, there are fundamental legal distinctions between al Qaeda members detained at Guantanamo and civilians who lawfully accompany the armed forces in the field in time of war. Private citizens who wage war without government authority (such as al Qaeda) are and always have been illegal combatants, subject to attack and prosecution, while civilians accompanying the armed forces of a government are expressly provided prisoner of war status under the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. An excellent historical example is offered in Gregory J. W. Urwin's "The Wake Island Militia" (Naval History, November/December 1997), describing civilian contractor personnel who took up arms with Marines and sailors in the unsuccessful defense of Wake Island in December 1941. Captured, they were entitled to and received prisoner of war status.
Finally, a fundamental difference between civilians who lawfully accompany armed forces in the field and al Qaeda is the basis for the global war on terrorism: While the former must comply with the law of war, the latter have as their objective the murder of civilians-as they manifested in New York and Washington so clearly on 11 September 2001, in Madrid on 11 March 2004, and on many other occasions. To equate civilians from government agencies other than the Department of Defense who are fully engaged in the global war on terrorism with members of a terrorist organization like al Qaeda is an insult to the extraordinary and heroic service of the former. Q
"Naval Intel Must (Re)Acquire Core Skills"
(See W. Wheeler, pp. 42-47, February 2004 Proceedings)
Commander William R. Bray, Commander, Carrier Task Force Six; Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, USS John F. Kennedy (CV-67)-Commander Wheeler's prize-winning essay, while thoughtful, passionate, and well written, is based on two fundamentally false premises:
* Naval intelligence went joint. Few active-duty naval intelligence officers understand the programmatic realities the Navy faced in the debate leading up to Defense secretary Cheney's decision to order the consolidation of defense intelligence (articulated in a 15 March 1991 memorandum by Assistant secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence Duane Andrews). Naval intelligence didn't so much decide to go joint as the Navy itself was forced to support the creation of the joint intelligence centers (JICs) because it never really owned Ocean Surveillance Information System (OSIS) billets or infrastructure. In fact, all the OSIS nodes (fleet ocean surveillance centers and fleet ocean surveillance facilities) were in the Navy's share of the General Defense Intelligence Program, not in the service budget. As the defense intelligence consolidation camp gained strength, the Navy soon found itself in the untenable position of pleading to retain an asset it didn't resource. The Army and Air Force, by contrast, funded a great deal of intelligence and were better positioned to retain a large share of it in their force structure. After serving on the USS Cole (DDG-67) Commission in 2000/2001, I learned that even many of the Navy's most senior leaders do not understand this.
That said, Commander Wheeler's point that the joint intelligence centers are not supporting the fleet as well as the OSIS nodes did is fair enough, and has been debated fiercely for 13 years and counting. When I was chief of the Targets Division at Joint Analysis Center (JAC), Royal Air Force Molesworth (United Kingdom), we worked very hard to support European Command's Navy component, all the way down to the tactical level, and are always looking for constructive feedback to do better. But unless the Navy is serious about programming millions to reconstitute OSIS nodes, we should resist the temptation to continually indulge in nostalgia, especially when things were maybe not quite as good as we think they were, and get in the business of improving what we must live with today.
It is curious, too, that after taking such a strong stand against the joint consolidation, Commander Wheeler would later in the essay argue that naval intelligence needs more "joint warfare-savvy intelligence planners intimately familiar with the targeting process." It is hard to imagine where this joint savviness is supposed to be developed except in joint assignments at JICs and on joint staffs.
* Intelligence manpower is a supply-driven enterprise. In arguing that the Naval Intelligence Officer Corps is not more thoroughly embedded with its operational masters, especially at the control grades, Commander Wheeler repeatedly says or implies that we (meaning, I assume, the naval intelligence leadership to include the Director of Naval Intelligence [DNI]) are not distributing our officers properly, resulting in a "diminished presence on board ships and on Navy staffs, where war fighters get down to business." This is a fine sentiment, but it has nothing to do with reality. The presence of intelligence officers on board ships or staffs is neither diminished nor enhanced. It is simply what the war fighter is demanding in the way of resourcing billets, and it is actually a larger proportion of the afloat officer corps than it was 20 or 30 years ago in the golden years of OSIS.
Intelligence manpower is not supply driven (the DNI resources only a small portion of the community, mostly at ONI and on the Navy staff), but demand driven. And intelligence is not free-if the operational Navy wants more intelligence officers, the major resource sponsors need to fund the billets. Naval intelligence does not "send" officers anywhere. The billet owners "pull" the officers naval intelligence assesses, grows, and trains. The DNI and his community manager have a great responsibility in growing a strong, competent officer corps to meet these requirements, but when it comes to creating more requirements in the fleet, the best he can do is educate and ask other resource sponsors to dedicate more of their budget to intelligence. In some cases in the past, the DNI has used his resources to fund billets in the fleet. This discretion, however, should be exercised carefully and on a limited basis, because when resource sponsors get free billets they quickly take them as an entitlement and subsequent DNIs will eventually be forced into deciding whether to continue that grace while leaving legitimate naval intelligence requirements unfunded.
There are other problems with this essay, such as a very unconvincing argument for making targeting a core competency when, as research I did while serving in intelligence community management revealed, at any one time only 8-10% of the naval intelligence officer corps is serving in what can even be loosely described as targeting billets. We successfully brought to the DNI a proposal to dedicate our small limited duty officer/chief warrant officer corps to the imagery/targeting discipline. But you can't make targeting a core competency for an entire community of 1,300 officers when the consumers are investing primarily in general intel support billets.
Consider one more thing. After the first Gulf War in 1991, the combatant commander and others on his staff identified intelligence as being one of the major problems: too stovepiped, poor interoperability, overly redundant. Twelve years later this was not the case. The combatant commander and his components largely praised intelligence as a great success leading up to and during the major combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. When these facts are viewed objectively, it is hard to argue that consolidation of defense intelligence was "transformation gone awry." The Navy got plenty of good tactical intelligence, and not just from Bahrain, but from right here at JAC Molesworth. Commander Wheeler should take the time to read the Truman Battle Group's postdeployment intelligence report on the support they received from the JAC during the war.
Commander Wheeler and others need to come to accept that joint works. We are better than we were 20 years ago, not worse. If we are worse, then why is the Navy funding more intelligence officer billets today than it did 20 years ago, while the overall Navy is nearly half the size it was? We are more competent and more relevant than ever. The proof is in the pudding.
"Our Enemy Is Not Terrorism"
(See }. Lehman, pp. 52-54, May 2004 Proceedings)
Richard Steinis-I read the New York Post 10 May 2004 article by John Lehman on the Kean (9/11) Commission, which appeared first in your magazine. I would like to take exception to his attempt to blame immigration inspectors for the 11 September 2001 attack. he calls Jose Melendez-Perez a customs officer. Mr. Melende/.-Perez was at that time an immigration inspector. This is a common mistake; most people inside or outside the U.S. government never have known the different jobs they do. This is why U.S. Immigration, Customs, and Department of Agriculture Inspectors have been lumped together as U.S. Customs and Border Protection under the Department of Homeland security. The old U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service administered laws and regulations made by Congress. Immigration did not issue visas. This was and is done by the State Department. Mr. Lehman wants to hold accountable the 19 inspectors who admitted the 19 hijackers. Each hijacker had a valid passport containing a valid State Department-issued visa. If these people came in today, their documents would still be correct.
The 9/11 Commission is too political to accomplish anything. The only honest thing I have heard in the sessions of the 9/11 Commission is Peter Gadiel's statement that the nonenforcement of immigration laws led to the 9/11 attacks.
Storekeeper second Class Kenneth G. Hagner, U.S. Naval Reserve-Bravo Zulu to Mr. Lehman on an excellent and timely article. he spells out clearly and concisely lessons that all Americans need to understand and accept. These facts are:
* Terrorism will continue for a long time.
* We must change from linear to systemic thinking in how we deal with this threat.
* Improving leadership and accountability is long overdue within our government.
All of us in government service need to understand these lessons and effect the appropriate changes.
"U.S. Navy, Inc."
(Sec J. Byron, pp. 48-51, May 2004 Proceedings)
Kick Lewis-I thoroughly enjoyed Captain Byron's essay, but I have a few comments.
* If we're thinking of the Navy in business terms, its products and services are protection of the homeland and allies, protection of U.S. and friendly shipping, protection of U.S. citizens overseas, and political influence (before, after, and sometimes in lieu of a confrontation). These are what we have to measure because they are what the taxpayers are buying with their investment in the Navy. Metrics might be tonnage of shipping lost to piracy or terrorism or time and cost to complete missions. Dollars are not the only way to measure such things, which is made more difficult because the Navy is rarely the only, or even the primary influence on such events. We have to remember that the mission is required; fiscal efficiency is a desire.
* The Navy needs to identify and focus on its core business. They are not naval architects, aircraft manufacturers, employment agents, a construction company, a communications company, or an ad agency. They observe, protect, influence, and when necessary fight in the ocean and littoral environment. The Navy needs to outsource those things (to other agencies or private industry) that are not directly tied to their core business.
* When comparing the Navy to business, consider only like businesses: security firms, shipping companies, and the like. Saying the Navy has a higher percentage of their budget going to infrastructure than a consumer products company or a software firm is hardly useful.
* The Army, Air Force, Marines, Coast Guard, and other government agencies are not the competition. They are strategic partners, allied businesses that can aid in accomplishing the Navy's missions. The federal budget is not a zero-sum game, so a dollar given to the Air Force does not necessarily mean a dollar taken from the Navy. The competition is entities such as other countries' armed forces, terrorist groups, and pirates.
* Standardization should be an integral part of the concept of jointness. Standardizing trucks on all naval air stations is good; standardizing with all U.S. services and agencies that use similar vehicles is better. Does the Navy need to design special trucks to move material between facilities, or could it use the same kind of trucks the U.S. Postal Service uses? For that matter could it do a joint buy to save more money? When the uses for equipment are comparable across agencies and/or services, government buying power should be used to get the best deal. The same goes for contracted services. Why do four different firms provide food services to the Army, Navy, and Air Force and various U.S. government facilities in a given metropolitan area? What kind of a deal could we get if we had companies bid to service all those facilities on one contract?
* The Navy (all of government, really) should pay bonuses to anyone who comes up with a better, more efficient, or less expensive way to do something. Many businesses have done that and reaped considerable rewards from the process. Efficiency applies not only to dollars, but also to equipment, bandwidth, person-hours, cargo space, and other things. Many of them eventually end up being dollar efficient, but not always. There is often a trade-off between faster, better, and cheaper-as NASA has found out.
* Although management skills are necessary to accomplish the goals noted in the essay, not all officers need to be managers and not all managers need to be officers. The person managing a Navy facility does not need to have gone to boot camp and doesn't need to be on track for admiral.
* We should compensate people for the job they do, regardless of rank. A satellite imagery expert does not need to be an officer. The skills required for that expertise do not necessarily lend themselves to leadership. If you're a techie who loves serving your country by working with the latest computers, you probably don't want to move up the chain of command, as it would remove you from the work. Give such people a rank if you want, but pay them a stipend for their specialty, and have their retirement based on the pay, not the rank.
World War Il Memorial Lets Freedom Ring
Vice Admiral Jerry Miller, U.S. Navy (Retired)-Memorials are supposed to trigger recollections of the past and foster thoughts for the future. The new World War II Memorial in Washington, D.C., meets the requirement. The location is superb. The structure is in proper proportion. The stories of the Pacific and Atlantic campaigns are depicted so veterans can identify their phase and theater of action. Most significant is the depiction of the unity created within the United States. One can sit on the granite benches and ponder the past, considering its impact on the future.
One inescapable comparison is the unity of World War II versus the current division in our nation as we struggle with a clash of cultures. This struggle has generated hate among some of our leaders, with expressions unthinkable during World War II. The current war is tougher than World War II in some ways. It brings with it the tactic of terrorism fueled by religious fanaticism, an enemy never faced by our nation. The monstrous tasks faced by our leaders require the unity that was present in World War II. Let us hope this new memorial will provide incentives for our citizens, particularly our leaders, to strive for unity as we pursue the objective of keeping our nation free.