Seeing through the Fog of War

Is the fog of war an inevitable feature of conflict or can modern technology progressively reduce uncertainty to the point where it is not militarily significant?

The debate about uncertainty in war might appear academic, but the answer will drive decisions about operational concepts, force structure, equipment, and, perhaps most important, public expectations about what U.S. forces can accomplish.

Admiral William Owens, former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has made the clearest argument that the "hoary dictums" of Clausewitzian friction and the fog of war soon will be things of the past:

Technology can give us the ability to see a "battlefield" as large as Iraq or Kuwait-an area 200 miles on a side-with unprecedented fidelity, comprehension, and timeliness, by night or day, in any kind of weather, all the time. . . . The commander will know the precise location and activity of enemy units—even those attempting to cloak their movements by operating at night or in poor weather, or by hiding behind mountains or under trees. He will have instant access to information about the U.S. military force and its movements, enabling him to direct nearly instantaneous air strikes, artillery fire, and infantry assaults, thwarting any attempt by the enemy to launch his own attack.¹

Emerging Navy doctrine leans toward the Owens vision. "Sea Power 21" extols the capabilities of network warfare, though it does not quite claim that naval forces will see and strike everything:

Information gathering and management are at the heart of this revolution in striking power. Networked, long-dwell naval sensors will be integrated with national and joint systems to penetrate all types of cover and weather, assembling vast amounts of information. Data provided by Navy assets will be vital to establishing a comprehensive understanding of enemy military, economic, and political vulnerabilities. Rapid planning processes will then use this knowledge to tailor joint strike packages that deliver calibrated effects at precise times and places.²

The Marine Corps, however, has made the opposite argument. Its capstone doctrine publication, Warfighting (MCDP-1), argues that uncertainty is an inherent element of warfare:

Another attribute of war is uncertainty. All actions in war take place in an atmosphere of uncertainty, or the "fog of war." . . . While we try to reduce these unknowns by gathering information, we must realize that we cannot eliminate them-or even come close. The very nature of war makes certainty impossible; all actions in war will be based on incomplete, inaccurate, or even contradictory information.³

The Marine Corps' concept document Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare makes the same argument: "The fundamental nature of war—a violent struggle between hostile, independent, irreconcilable wills characterized by chaos, friction, and uncertainty—will remain unchanged as it transcends advancements in technology."

Many commentators line up behind one school of thought or the other. Supporting the Owens vision:

* Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski: "As information moves toward 100% relevant content, 100% accuracy, and zero time delay. . . . the force achieves information superiority, having a dramatically better awareness or understanding of the battlespace rather than simply more raw data."⁴

* James FitzSimonds: "Information networks will potentially enable soldiers and seamen at the lowest levels to know as much as the most senior commanders about the combat situation throughout an entire theater of operations. They will know about lucrative enemy targets, potential threats to their own survival, and the location and status of their own forces and strike assets."⁵

* James Blaker: "The U.S. will have much faster, more comprehensive awareness of what is happening in large areas. . . . U.S. military forces will be able to apply military force with dramatically greater efficiency than an opponent, and can do so with little risk to U.S. forces."⁶

Others, however, support the Marine Corps vision:

* Marine Lieutenant General Paul Van Riper and Army Major General Robert Scales: "Political limitations, friction, and fog are not artifacts of history, but rather conditions embedded in the fabric of war. To suppose that technology could eliminate them from the battlefield thus flies in the face of the natural world as it is."⁷

* Maneuver Warfare Handbook: "Friction is the inherent condition of war. . . . Be prepared to be surprised."⁸

* Dr. Milan Vego: "The outcome of any war cannot be predicted with any certainty because so many intangible elements are an integral part of it. . . . Friction and fog of war, chance, and luck make any war highly unpredictable and full of unforeseen events."⁹

Joint doctrine might be expected to resolve this dichotomy, but it steers a middle course. "Joint Vision 2020," for example, identifies information as a key enabler, enhancer, or supporter of modern warfare. It rejects the Owens vision of absolute knowledge but does not explore the implications of fighting under uncertainty:

The continued development and proliferation of information technologies will substantially change the conduct of military operations. These changes in the information environment make information superiority a key enabler of the transformation of the operational capabilities of the joint force and the evolution of joint command and control. . . . We must also remember that information superiority neither equates to perfect information, nor does it mean the elimination of the fog of war.¹⁰

Real-World Implications

This may sound like an academic debate, but it will have a great deal of effect in the real world. For the Navy, the key area will be littoral warfare. "Forward . . . From the Sea" identified the purpose of naval operations as "the projection of American power from the sea to influence events ashore in the littoral regions of the world across the operational spectrum." Elements of the fleet must operate in shallow, cluttered coastal areas fraught with asymmetric threats such as mines, submarines, and coastal missile batteries. These well-hidden threats can wait passively for a target to appear. They represent an entirely different threat from an enemy fleet in blue water. If the fleet is to operate near the littorals, these threats must be hunted individually, discovered, identified, and neutralized. Missing even one threat could have major consequences.

For example, in Operation Desert Storm the fleet thought it had identified and neutralized the mine threat in the Persian Gulf. Then the USS Tripoli (LPH-10) and Princeton (CG-59) struck mines and the fleet pulled back, severely restricting surface operations in the northern Gulf. The Navy has since developed an aggressive countermine program, which, it hopes, will provide a mine-sweeping capability in which we could have confidence. In other areas of concern, the success of advanced submarine warfare against coastal submarines and a naval fires network against coastal missile batteries depends on being able to see, identify, and strike all targets in a given area. All this is predicated on an Owens vision of complete situational awareness.

The Army has embraced the Owens vision in its transformation plans. It has built its "Objective Force" concept around the 18-ton Future Combat System. The Objective Force will "see first, understand first, act first, and finish decisively."¹¹ The Army theorizes that with superb situational awareness a light vehicle can strike enemy forces at long ranges, develop a tactical situation out of contact, and avoid being hit. To implement this vision, the Army must rely heavily-indeed, decisively-on its information network. Situational awareness, therefore, will extend to the level of the individual vehicle.

The joke in the Army about this extraordinarily bold venture is that the Objective Force substitutes electrons for rolled homogeneous armor. If the long-range sensors, the network, or the close-in protection systems fail, these light, thin-skinned vehicles will be chewed up by enemy armor and antitank systems.

From Billy Mitchell in the 1920s to John Warden in the 1990s, the Air Force always has looked forward to an era of accurate intelligence and precision strike to implement its vision of strategic attack. Strategic attack offers a means to defeat adversaries without engaging in costly ground combat. At many points in the 20th century the Air Force believed the necessary technology was at hand, only to be disappointed in actual conflict. In a world reflecting Owens's vision, the Air Force finally might be able to identify and attack "centers of gravity" and achieve decisive strategic effects.

If such a world does not evolve, however, the Air Force may have a philosophical crisis. Strategic attack still might be an important element of a joint campaign, but it would be a supporting attack based on attrition-taking out key nodes, each of which slightly reduces the adversary's warfighting capability. Emphasis of the air campaign would then shift to operational targets that benefit a ground campaign.

The Marine Corps, consistent with its vision about warfare, has taken a different approach. By emphasizing procurement of the V-22 and the advanced assault amphibian vehicle (AAAV) in its future plans, it has focused on maneuver instead of strike: "The Marine Corps' expeditionary advantage is derived from combining our maneuver warfare philosophy, expeditionary culture; and the manner in which we organize, deploy, and employ our forces." Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare discusses maneuver at great length but barely mentions precision fires and sensors-the key capabilities in the Owens world. The Marine Corps extends digitized situational awareness only to the battalion level.¹²

If the vision of Owens and the Army proves correct, the Marine Corps is moving in the wrong direction. The AAAV, for example, makes many design tradeoffs and incurs high cost to attain its swift water speed. High water speed allows an amphibious assault to be launched from farther off shore and makes the vehicles less vulnerable as they transit to the beach. These capabilities help it fight in an uncertain warfighting environment, but would be unnecessary in a world where we see everything on the battlefield. In an Owens world, the amphibious task force will destroy enemy littoral defenses and move around any residual threats. In that environment, the Marine Corps needs battlefield sensors and precision attack-neither of which the AAAV provides. Buying the AAAV would represent a missed transformational opportunity.

In this alternative world, the Marine Corps would buy a force that emphasizes sensors, long-range precision strike, and situational awareness. Such a force would be smaller than today's, but would increase the number of unmanned aerial vehicles, add unmanned ground vehicles, put digitized situational awareness into each vehicle (instead of at the battalion level), and arm the artillery with a broad array of precision missiles and munitions.¹³

Mixed Results

Our experience in the real world gives us mixed results. On the one hand, we have a superb ability to find and attack fixed targets—buildings, bridges, and other infrastructure. Such attacks can cripple an enemy's transportation system, industry, or command-and-control system. When we have personnel on the ground, our air power can strike even small tactical targets. In Afghanistan, for example, helped by our Northern Alliance allies, our forces could locate and target Taliban positions, picking them apart one by one. The Taliban could not simultaneously hide and fight.

The problem lies with intelligent, dynamic, and reactive enemies. As we try to find them, they try to hide. Rather than awaiting engagement, they actively and intelligently attempt to thwart our plans. The Gulf War Airpower Survey summarized the situation by noting "an inverse relationship of effectiveness to the elusiveness and adaptability of targets."¹⁴ Some recent operational experiences illuminate this dichotomy:

* Operation Iraqi Freedom. Combat results are just beginning to be assessed, but a few insights are clear. Whenever Iraqi vehicles moved, they were struck. Even if stationary, they were vulnerable. Light infantry units, however, proved much harder to find and attack.

* Serbian armored vehicles in Kosovo. During the Kosovo conflict of 1999, the lack of a credible ground threat allowed the Serbians to disperse and hide their forces. NATO believed that, despite this effort, Serbian armored vehicles were being located and destroyed. A Pentagon briefing at the end of the conflict reported that NATO bombing had destroyed 122 tanks and 222 armored personnel carriers.¹⁵ Although the official postwar report acknowledged that "mobile forces presented a targeting and damage assessment challenge" and expressed much greater confidence about strikes against fixed targets, the report reiterated the damage assessment against armored vehicles, which it based on intelligence inputs—imagery, signal intelligence, interviews, and air crew reports.¹⁶ Ground surveys after the war, however, found only 3 destroyed vehicles, and the Serbs claimed they lost only 13.¹⁷ It turned out the Serbians had made extensive use of simple, but effective, decoys.

* The great Scud hunt. During Desert Storm, coalition aircraft effectively struck stationary Iraqi tactical targets such as tanks and bunkers. Striking the mobile ballistic missiles known as Scuds was far more difficult. In an effort that became known as the great Scud hunt, Central Command launched 1,460 air sorties and employed Special Forces extensively. Despite reports of some successes, postwar analysis indicated that no Scuds could be confirmed as destroyed. Iraqi decoys, the difficulty in getting accurate damage assessments, the short exposure times, and the large geographic spaces involved combined to make the task difficult. After the war, the Department of Defense expended great effort trying to improve surveillance capabilities and reduce sensor-to-shooter times.¹⁸ In Operation Iraqi Freedom, rapid targeting procedures enabled faster strikes against fleeting targets. This capability, however, still is not fast enough for targets as fleeting and mobile as Scuds.

* Iraqi nuclear facilities. Before Desert Storm, U.S. intelligence identified two nuclear facilities. During the war this list grew to eight. Although uncertain, U.S. intelligence thought they had a nearly complete list. After the war, inspectors found another 31 facilities. The activities had been far more extensive than the coalition had imagined. Iraqi concealment, deception, and dispersal had been hard to penetrate.¹⁹

* Millennium Challenge. A joint exercise conducted in the summer of 2002, Millennium Challenge simulated a Middle East conflict in 2007. After its completion, Joint Forces Command expressed satisfaction at the testing of new operational concepts. Nevertheless, the exercise generated controversy about whether the organizers had "cheated" by reactivating "dead" blue forces and constraining red force's freedom of action. In the initial phase, the red force decisively defeated the blue force by using a variety of unconventional tactics unanticipated by blue. For example, expecting a preemptive strike, red struck first when blue was not fully prepared. Red used small boats and planes, many of them civilian, to approach and then strike the blue fleet. Red communicated by motorcycle messengers and coded messages in civilian channels, not by vulnerable electronics. Blue allegedly lost 16 ships, including an aircraft carrier and two helicopter carriers. The lesson was that, even though faced with comprehensive surveillance, a clever enemy can hide both intentions and capabilities.²⁰

Future Courses

First, no matter which prediction becomes true, we still will try to compress the target engagement cycle, improve interoperability, enhance blue and red force tracking, and expand usage of precision weaponry. These ongoing efforts will increase our battlefield effectiveness.

Some choices, however, depend on one's view of uncertainty. Older generations of military leaders, schooled in Clausewitzian notions of friction and having experienced the fog of war on real battlefields, tend to discount the possibility of their elimination. Younger generations and civilian observers, accustomed to ever-more-powerful computer networks and accepting the notion of transformation in the nature of warfare, tend to have more faith in what technology can accomplish.

Faced with this dichotomy, computer simulations may help solve the problem, especially in the early phases of developing a concept. Can technology, however, overcome friction? Computer models replicate friction poorly because they reflect only what the programmer inputs. Forecasting the unexpected is difficult by definition.

No substitute exists for field experience. In peacetime, these insights can come from force-on-force experiments, in which dynamic opponents actively try to thwart our plans. Without such an opponent, an "experiment" merely is a demonstration intended to show off a predetermined result. Force-on-force experiments consume a lot of resources, but they cost far less than making the wrong choices in equipment and doctrine.

The Marine Corps' Hunter Warrior and Urban Warrior experiments are excellent models in this regard. Both used instrumentation and free play to examine new warfighting concepts such as infestation tactics and urban operations. In both experiments, the results disappointed proponents who had hoped these new concepts would revolutionize operations. The institution was strong enough to accept the results and adjust its plans. The Army has a powerful tool in its instrumented training facilities, especially the National Training Center, and has used these facilities to give realism to its warfighting experiments. The Navy's Sea Trial initiative, led by the fleets and coordinated by the Naval Warfare Development Center, offers the potential to bring real-world experience into war gaming, experimentation, and exercises.

Actual conflict teaches the best lessons because it fully reveals the friction of complex operations, the difficult tradeoffs, the uncertainty, and the political connections that peacetime experiments and exercises replicate poorly. Therefore, capturing lessons learned in wartime is critical. Unfortunately, large institutions with existing plans, programs, and budgets often see what they want to see. The key to success lies in hard data and some outside perspectives. Hard data forces us to face sometimes inconvenient truths. Outside perspectives challenge loose reasoning and unsupported conclusions. The current conflict in Iraq offers a great opportunity to analyze our theories and concepts in light of wartime results.

Conclusion

Can technology overcome the effects of uncertainty and friction, or will these factors continue to drive military operations as they have since the beginning of time? The answer will shape organizational designs, warfighting concepts, and the acquisition of weapons and systems. Uncovering the fundamental nature of war, however, is a tough intellectual problem that is easy to theorize about but difficult to decide conclusively. Prompted by his experience in Millennium Challenge, General Van Riper calls for "concepts relying on intellectual content, not slogans and buzz words" and a disciplined process of investigation relying on historical analysis, experimentation, and free-play exercises.²¹ His advice is worth heeding.