Strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence are the eyes and ears of the Department of Defense, Without a steady supply of reliable, actionable intelligence, all our weapon systems and warriors essentially are rendered deaf, dumb, and blind. Within the Marine Corps and Navy, however, there is a chronic scarcity of proficient, highly trained intelligence analysts to support an increasing operational tempo around the world.
Most naval intelligence officers and senior enlisted can regurgitate doctrinal intelligence roles and functions, communications architecture, intelligence tasks, bandwidth management, IT systems procurement and dissemination schemes. Yet, shockingly, too few of these leaders are well-trained and experienced intelligence analysts.1 An intelligence estimate, be it formal or ad hoc, is a living document regarding enemy order of battle based on the mission and the commander's essential elements of information, requests for information, and other intelligence requirements. No one reads it—certainly not in any tactical situation-because it generally is the size of a small telephone book. Therefore, it is incumbent on all intelligence personnel to brief (repeatedly) the commander and his staff. Such a continuous analytical presentation requires a specific well-honed geopolitical, historical, religious, and ethnic expertise. Without a well-reasoned analytical end product the intelligence estimate is for naught.
Fleet & Force Realities
Initial, mid-level, and advanced job training (academic and practical), education, and professional development throughout one's military career are the norm within the Department of the Navy (DoN). In fact, military occupational speciality (MOS) or rate proficiency is key to promotion in the up-or-out military. But compare the expensive, time-consuming, and continuous training every naval aviator, nuclear engineer, electronics technician, cook, baker and candlestick maker undergoes to traditional DoN intelligence career training. The disparity in quality, length, scope, and refresher training, particularly relative to realworld analytical intelligence training, is tremendous.
It is critical that organic tactical intelligence analysts be better trained and billets fully manned per the existing unit tables of organization.2
Unbelievably, DoN has only a single accredited MOS intelligence training facility to support all the assorted 21st-century intelligence demands. The Navy Marine Intelligence Training Center (NMITC) at Dam Neck, Virginia, is the principal school for all basic and intermediate tactical intelligence training for all Marine Corps and Navy intelligence personnel, both active duty and reserve. Analytical training is minimal, haphazard, and personality dependent. In support of NMITC, regional Marine Corps and Navy commands may have lesser non-MOS producing schools or support mobile training teams, but developmental analytical intelligence training is negligible. Similar analytical training shortcomings exist for all official correspondence courses as well.
External to DoN, myriad Defense, Army, Air Force, and civilian intelligence schools complement NMITC. Logically, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) would seem a good place for enhanced DoN analytical training. In fact, DIA maintains the largest military intelligence school in the world. The Joint Military Intelligence College at Boiling Air Force Base offers an array of short-term courses, seminars, and mobile training teams in addition to the world's only bachelor's and master's degrees in intelligence. Unfortunately, only a miniscule few uniformed DoN intelligence professionals ever get a chance for DIA education. Throughout the fleet and the Fleet Marine Force, on-the-job training is the norm.
There are a million excuses why these educational travesties persist, but in today's threat environment, none is credible. Our shadowy enemies, their preferred modus operandi, and their dubious allies are more intricate and complex than ever. The modern wizardry of intelligence communication offers us an unprecedented edge, yet, no matter the sophistication of the system, it still will be garbage-in, garbage-out without local analytical competence at both ends. Forward-deployed naval expeditionary forces require unique organic intelligence support and expertise to produce actionable intelligence. Technology is no substitute.