Naval Aviation Raises the Readiness Bar

With six carrier strike groups ready to respond in short order, naval aviation will be prepared for the way it really fights—in quantity, as a battle force.

For Operation Desert Storm, the U.S. Navy responded with six carrier strike groups (CSGs). Operation Enduring Freedom saw simultaneous employment of three CSGs in its first days. For Operation Iraqi Freedom, the U.S. Navy responded with six CSGs in theater, plus a seventh providing presence in the western Pacific. This recent history, as well as the Navy's legacy in Vietnam, Korea, and World War II, demonstrates the way naval aviation really fights—as a battle force versus single battle groups. Accordingly, our readiness construct must match; we must have sufficient forces ready to fight in quantity as well as quality.

In a 30 May 2002 meeting with reporters hosted by the Defense Writers Group, Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness) David Chu noted that "there is in the case of the Navy and the Marine Corps, a substantial portion of structure that is not available to the President on short notice, short of heroic measures."¹ But the response to Iraqi Freedom demonstrated that we can provide a substantial portion of our forces for combat. Our task ahead is to create a more employment-capable and responsive force that is available to surge and efficient to sustain. The force also must be able to reset quickly, that is, be able to perform the periodic maintenance of ships, aircraft, and equipment and then efficiently rebuild materiel readiness and refresh training to full combat readiness.

Traditional versus Transformed Employment

For most of the Cold War the U.S. Navy provided a forward presence. With the demise of the Soviet Union, the theater combatant commanders' presence requirements determined the number of carrier strike groups the Navy made ready and deployed. Force providers trained and equipped CSGs for just-in-time readiness. Though adequate to meet routine presence requirements, this construct was not suited for providing ready forces to fight as a force, but rather as single battle groups.

Forward presence determined the number of ready units-usually one Atlantic CSG, one Pacific CSG, and forward-deployed naval forces in Japan. These represented roughly one quarter of the 12 carriers and 10 air wings the U.S. Navy operates. The majority of Navy units were in a nonready status. As Undersecretary Chu stated, "heroic" measures were required to provide multiple CSGs. By tying readiness only to presence requirements, we set the bar too low, limiting the Navy's ability to respond to crises and provide combat power. Recognizing the realities of today's warfighting requirements, the transformed readiness construct of the Fleet Response Plan (FRP) makes more of the fleet ready to employ, more of the time.

Under the FRP, the Navy will provide "six-plus-two" ready carrier strike groups. The "six" represents combat-ready CSGs able to respond in slightly varying degrees of time. The "two" refers to CSGs not yet fully combat ready but able to be prepared to deploy on an accelerated timeline, notionally about 90 days. The result is a larger force capable of responding to demands versus only a small forward-deployed force. If we are needed, we always will have forces ready that reflect how we actually fight, in sufficient numbers. The model is to run the force more evenly, efficiently, and simultaneously.

Elements of the Plan

Previously, Deployment-minus (D-) milestones drove readiness goals for carrier strike groups. At certain D-months, force providers would ensure that CSGs enjoyed certain levels of materiel readiness and training. The result was that the most pressing resource needs of imminent deployers overshadowed those of other units not as close to deployment, so nondeployed readiness suffered in the push to get the next CSG to sea. If a deployment date shifted, earlier or later, it created great turbulence throughout the force. If we were called to fight as a force, with multiple CSGs, heroic measures were required to get the other forces ready.

Under the Fleet Response Plan, the mind-set is Reset-plus (R+). The focus shifts from just-in-time readiness to R+ months for an employability window of combat-ready forces-six-plus-two carrier strike groups. This change institutionalizes a culture of readiness for planned employability phases. Under R+, force providers focus on materiel and training goals in the context of the unit, versus the unit's planned deployment date. The overlay of meeting the readiness goals of all 12 carriers and 10 air wings, over the 27-month cycle, makes six plus two ready for use as required. The interdeployment training cycle becomes the interdeployment readiness cycle (IDRC), as the emphasis shifts from routine deployment to unit readiness.

The readiness cycle encompasses maintenance, training, and employability phases. The total of these phases makes up the 27 months of the IDRC. The maintenance phase lasts from approximately R+0 to R+6 months. This time is reserved for planned long-term maintenance-in-port and shipyard-based maintenance for carriers and ships and depot and intermediatelevel maintenance and modifications for aircraft.

The training phase spans from R+7 to R+12, and contains both a basic and intermediate element. During the basic element, the ship and air wing team complete flight deck certification, tailored ship's training activity I, II, and III, and the final evaluation period—all designed to build skills in the team's functional tasks. In addition, the air wing completes individual squadron advanced readiness programs, the tactical employment of aircraft at the unit level. In the intermediate element, the CSG completes the composite training underway exercise (COMPTUEX) and Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center air wing syllabus (CVW Fallon), training to fight the ship and air wing team against more complex threats. At the completion of the intermediate training phase, the CSG has reached C2 levels in all materiel and training areas-they are combat ready and surgeable.

The employ ability window lasts from R+13 through R+27. During these 15 months, the carrier strike group will maintain combat readiness. The joint training fleet exercise (JTFX) is a sustainment event within this large window, as well as an opportunity to train to the joint environment. It and other training sustainment exercises comprise advanced training for the CSG. The employability window might include deployment. For the near future, ready CSGs will continue to fill the presence requirements of theater combatant commanders, but those deployment requirements will not be the only factor that determines the readiness of the CSG.

The carrier strike group meets benchmarks throughout the IDRC. The first after the maintenance phase is emergency surge. The CSG has completed the basic element, and though it is not combat ready, it is trained to a level that would allow it to be ready for deployment in 60-90 days. In the six-plus-two construct, the emergency surge CSGs are the "two." Once the intermediate element (COMPTUEX and CVW Fallon) is completed, the CSG is surge ready. Having achieved a rating of C2 or higher, the CSG is combat ready and within the employability window. It can be deployed at any time during this period from R+13 to R+27. A CSG is routine deployable after JTFX is completed.

Figure 1 depicts the overlay of the available units presuming a 27-month IDRC for all. The actual schedule will vary according to the dictates of the Global Naval Force Presence Plan, but the figure demonstrates the feasibility of the six-plus-two concept. Note that refueling of nuclear-powered carriers and extended ship's repair activity for conventional carriers are included in the plan.

The Effect on the Force

The FRP model is not to run the force harder for longer, but to run it more evenly, efficiently, and simultaneously. Some might be skeptical that we can make this work, but several recent initiatives already have transformed readiness in the Navy. Programs such as the Naval Aviation Readiness Integrated Improvement Program, the Integrated Readiness Capabilities Assessment, and the sortie-based training and readiness instruction have helped naval aviation achieve Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Vern Clark's readiness vision.

The funding and flying profile for the carrier air wing is mature. Figure 2 depicts the training and readiness funding and the corresponding training levels across the IDRC. Note the readiness curve corresponds to the funding level.

The funding profile for the carriers and the other strike group ships and submarines is still maturing, as are the profiles for other aviation communities such as the P-3 and the non-carrier-based helicopter communities, but the vision is consistent for the entire force.

The FRP, in conjunction with the programs that support it, creates a more employment-capable and responsive force that is more available to surge and efficient to sustain, and that is quickly reset following deployment. It is the way ahead for training the way we fight and building a force that is ready to fight whenever it is needed.