"Al Qaeda Defeated-On to Its Demise"
(See S. Plan and J. Na, p. 2, January 2004 Proceedings)
Commander Earl J. Higgins, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)-Admiral Platt and Mr. Na present an interesting comparison of Al Qaeda and Hannibal-interesting but attenuated and strained. Although Hannibal was driven by hatred of Rome, which had defeated his father, Hamilcar Barca, in the First Punic War, his failure to defeat the Romans after his spectacular victory at Cannae was not due to his "ignoran[ce] of Roman politics, culture, and-more important-the people's fortitude." Hannibal could not follow up his great victory and could not win his protracted war against Rome because he lacked sea power.
The Roman navy, rudimentary and not yet technically superior, nevertheless had sufficient control of the sea lanes of the Mediterranean to prevent the Carthaginians from attacking from the sea, even across the short distance from Carthage (now Tunisia) to Sicily and the tip of the Italian peninsula. Therefore, as described in detail by the historian Polybius, Hannibal was forced to conduct a years-long campaign through Iberia and Gaul, transporting thousands of men, horses, and 39 elephants eastward along the northern coast of the Mediterranean. (All the elephants were lost before the Battle of Cannae.) Despite their losses in battle after battle, the Romans kept control of the ports, denying Hannibal the necessary seaborne impedimenta to resupply his forces and capitalize on his military successes.
All evidence shows that, unlike Hannibal's Carthaginians with central command and conventional order of battle, al Qaeda is decentralized, loosely connected, occasionally coordinated, and linked by a culture of hate and violence with a veneer of religion. Antiterrorism planners will come to grief by comparing al Qaeda to Hannibal and presuming that destruction of its bases in Afghanistan, as Scipio Africanus destroyed Carthage, will ensure its demise. A better classical comparison would be to the Hydra, the multiheaded creature that Heracles was required to kill as one of his Twelve Labors. All heads, all parts, and the whole body of the monster had to be destroyed before the beast ceased to exist. Al Qaeda's Hydra extends throughout the world, into the Philippines, Indonesia, Africa, Europe, England, probably even into North America. It most likely has assets hidden behind shell corporations and bankers bribed to remain ignorant. We can cry, as Cato the Elder might have done, "Delenda est al Qaeda," but this modern Hydra will not be destroyed by military might alone, even were Scipio Africanus still on the scene. False presumptions and misinformation about al Qaeda can create a whirlpool into the vortex of which we can be drawn and then destroyed, one after another, by the many-headed Scylla of the enemy.
Destroying or at least neutralizing al Qaeda will not be easy or quick and will not be marked by dramatic victories. We are not fighting another Punic War.
"Arm all Navy Helicopters"
(See W. Tunick and M. Weaver, pp. 36-39, December 2003; J. Barta, pp. 10-12, January 2004 Proceedings)
"Revitalize ASW"
(See R. Farrell, pp. 40-43, December 2003; M. F. Morrison, pp. 20-29, January 2004 Proceedings)
Commander Dave Bean, U.S. Navy-The December issue offers an interesting juxtaposition of articles relating to naval strike aviation. Specifically, when viewed as a pair, "Arm all Navy Helicopters" and "Revitalize ASW" gave an incisive look at an identity crisis the H-60 community has faced for some time. Are the strike group's rotary-wing assets a fundamental part of the strike element, or the premier platform for protection of that same strike group?
On one hand, Captain Tunick and Lieutenant Weaver's piece rings true for the current generation of squadron commanders, which has seen the tremendous growth in the role of helicopters in strike aviation. Whether flying combat search and rescue or antisurface warfare, today's HS and HSL commanding officers are at the same time encouraged by the inclusion of their platforms in the strike mission, and frustrated by insufficient measures taken to equip those platforms appropriately. Captain Tunick and Lieutenant Weaver are spot-on in their identification of the false economies of the "kit" concept, and the limitations in the surface warfare role of the Hellfire missile. Their assertion that an armed helicopter should be the "baseline" is a potent thought, and for the near term we aggressively should pursue arming the 80 MH-60S airframes that remain without weapons. For the longer term, this position might be an overreach if it means that every rotary-wing aircraft (MH-60S and MH-60R) should be equipped to perform each and every mission.
On the other hand, that same generation of commanding officers cut its collective teeth as junior officers flying innumerable sorties in the venerable H-3, and drank heavy draughts from the ASW cup. They tend to share the frustration so evident in Commander Farrell's piece regarding the lack of focus on sub hunting. Though our list of required capabilities still includes the ASW mission, we find fewer quality training evolutions available for the mission; chasing an automated target on a range offers a good introduction to ASW, but the most effective training is accomplished against actual submarines, and such opportunities are rare indeed. Commander Farrell's lament regarding institutional lethargy may be answered by the 1 January 2004 establishment of the Fleet ASW Command. This is certainly a step forward, but it is too soon to make any qualitative judgment.
What both articles fail to fully recognize are the tremendous opportunities accompanying the helicopter concept of operations, the road ahead for naval rotary-wing aviation. The number of airframes and capabilities brought to the fleet by this plan are impressive, but those advantages will lie fallow absent an effective and aggressive plan for testing and doctrinal development. Carrier Group Two's concept of demonstrating "improved helicopter lethality" through a Sea Trial event (noted in a sidebar to the Tunick/Weaver article) shows promise in this regard. Testing improved availability and capabilities of an armed helo will assist in development of essential employment doctrine for a strike group equipped with nearly a dozen of these airframes; the Navy should begin immediately to construct a similar test for employment of the MH-60R, which will populate strike groups of 2008 and beyond in similar numbers. We could wait until the air wings are so equipped, but that would be a terrific lost opportunity.
The use of Sea Trial events will not answer all our concerns regarding employment of the new MH-60S, but it will better prepare future squadron, air wing, and strike group commanders for the challenges ahead. Naval aviation historically has prided itself on its innate ability to balance assets and missions, and the helicopter concept of operations certainly brings more flexibility to accomplish that task. The authors of both of these articles have raised valid concerns regarding employment of our fleet's rotary-wing assets; what is missing is a discussion of how we leverage a growing community to resolve those issues.
"Sea Enterprise: Resourcing Tomorrow's Fleet"
(See M. Mullen, pp. 60-63, January 2004 Proceedings)
Master Chief Petty Officer David Furey, U.S. Navy, from Naval Surface Force Atlantic-If I read this article correctly, we should be thinking of ways to trim cost without affecting operations and readiness and reinvest the savings into the Navy; everyone should be thinking "big Navy." With that said, I get conflicting views on how we should spend and improve. With the current money situation and the limited funds allotted to conduct maintenance and alterations, how can improvements and innovative ideas fit in?
Commander, Naval Surface Force Atlantic, has just completed a study on main propulsion boilers that showed the Navy can save maintenance and operational dollars on fuel oil. Who will pay for these improvements? It is not easy to find someone who is willing to discuss boilers and improvements. I have been told for the last several years that steam is out-you don't have to be college graduate to see that it is dying a slow death. But not only do we need to look further into the future, we also need to continue the push toward smarter ships and sailors with the best training and more reliable systems. However, we cannot sacrifice the present to plan for the future.
The study on boilers came up with several innovative solutions to improve our steam plants. "Big Navy" should foot the bill. These improvements will provide a return on investment (ROI) within 6 to 24 months. Admiral Mullen states the "industry standard for cost reduction is generally 5-10%"; each proposed boiler improvement has an ROI of at least 2% in fuel-oil savings alone. The savings in maintenance dollars is harder to calculate, but over the remaining life of our steam ships, the reduction in cost falls well within 5-10%. Improvements to the boiler burners on LPDs, for example, will reduce the amount of soot accumulation on the boiler fireside and will prevent the premature failure of boiler tubes. It also will improve a ship's ability to achieve full power. The ROI for this is only 6 months; over the remaining life of the LPDs this amounts to approximately $4.05 million after an investment of $41,000 per ship. I understand that the LPDs will not be around for more than ten years. But why should we continue to operate a ship knowing each time it is under way, the ship does not perform at top efficiency?
One big way to save and a way to improve our ships, increase our readiness, and keep in step with technology is automation. Automating our steam ships, particularly the LHA/LHD boilers, using the automated propulsion system can reduce manning levels and increase overall efficiency of the engineering plant. As stated in the article, nearly two-thirds of our total budget goes to people. The automated propulsion system currently being worked by the Naval Surface Weapons Center's Ships System Engineering Station (not funded by "big Navy" dollars) can reduce the manning by at least six sailors per ship over 13 ships. If you use the current fiscal year defense plan, removing six sailors from 13 ships over 20 years will yield a savings of $86.1 million (based on a current cost per sailor of $55,199). For an investment of $1.05 million, that seems to be a significant savings over the life of the ship. Admiral Mullen also states, "Leverage technology to improve performance and minimize manpower costs." Does this apply only for the newer vessels? Or can that same statement be used to improve our legacy plants? The technology is here now to automate the boilers, but if the seniors in the Navy do not realize this, it never will be accomplished.
Currently, there are no plans for major boiler improvements. Naval Sea Systems Command did not seem very interested in steam until recently. Who has been working on this? Only few "old steam guys," with very little support. I read this article and I asked my seniors why senior Navy leaders keep saying we need to improve the way we do business, but no one will pay for it. I was always told you have to spend money to make money. If we are going to run this Navy like a major corporation, maybe we should start to spend a little cash!
To put things in perspective, you can dig up old pictures where engineers are lighting off a boiler in the early 1900s using a torch and compare them to modern Navy ships (steam); the only difference is we are now in fire-retardant coveralls and have an operating procedure (see "Eye on the Fleet," all Hands, December 2003, p. 43). How can we satisfy the need for advanced systems and increase reliability if we fail to improve what we have? "Sea Enterprise promotes an open process to encourage innovative ideas from the bottom up as well as the top down," says Admiral Mullen. Does this mean that if there is a good, costeffective idea, we should invest the money?
Admiral Mullen's article is looking for ways to improve, increase savings, and reinvest that savings in the Navy. Improvement to our aging steam plants is one way we can make money. It is our duty to optimize the resources entrusted to us. If we are going to operate our steam ships for another 45 years, we owe it to the next-generation sailors to ensure they are operating a plant that has the best possible equipment with the highest level of technology.
"Fair Is Fair. . . Even after 70 Years"
(See V. H. Krulak, p. 78, November 2003 Proceedings)
Colonel Jon T. Huffman, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, Deputy Director, History and Museums Division-I found the short piece by General Krulak intriguing. General Krulak states that he wants his lineal position to be put straight. Imagine my surprise when, a couple of weeks later, as I was doing research for my biography of Lew Walt, I came across a Marine Corps order from 22 April 1936 that was directly related to the article!
The order establishes the lineal precedence (based on a two-year probationary exam) of all officers commissioned on 31 May 1934. Ranked seventh in the list of 25 Marine lieutenants commissioned from the Naval Academy is Victor H. Krulak. While the government might owe him the month of pay he lost by being commissioned on 1 June 1934, clearly the Marine Corps order rectified any potential loss of lineal precedence.
"Integrate Your Reserves: A How-to Primer"
(See R. Wray, pp. 60-63, December 2003 Proceedings)
Captain David J. Misisco, U.S. Naval Reserve-Captain Wray's article was an outstanding and long overdue introduction to the Naval Reserves, one that I quickly shared with my supported commander and his executive officer. I suggest that the Command Leadership School offer this article as required reading at prospective commanding officer and prospective executive officer schools.
As one of eight reserve naval hospital commanding officers, and one of two who were recalled to active duty to provide return of casualty care during Operation Iraqi Freedom, I can attest to the fact that much of what Captain Wray instructs is well under way within naval medicine, with a few exceptions.
In February 2003, more than 300 medical and nonmedical support personnel were deployed from the Pacific Northwest to stand up Fleet Hospital Eight in Rota, Spain. Approximately 190 reservists from our 20 detachments and other sister commands around the country were recalled to pick up where our active-duty shipmates left off. We did so with minimal interruption to patient care because of two factors: (1) highly skilled, professional personnel who were ready and willing to serve, and (2) a well thought out plan and system for recalling those reservists, the Medical Reserve Utilization Program Management Information System (MEDRUPMIS). Several years ago the Navy's Bureau of Medicine and Surgery took operational custody from Commander, Naval Reserve Forces, of all reservists who occupy medical treatment facility and fleet hospital reserve billets. This transfer led to the development of the MEDRUPMIS and a top-driven control of reserve medical assets.
The system worked well, we did our jobs, the fleet hospital returned home, and we left, everyone the prouder for what they gave in the service of their country. We continue on. But that's not the end of the story because we continue to do business with our supported commands. An overwhelming majority of our drilling reservists living in the Puget Sound area provide operational support to Naval Hospital Bremerton or one of its branch medical clinics on a routine basis.
Another example is that my active-duty supported commander signs my fitness report. And yet there is still something missing in our relationship. We will not be a seamless team until my commanding officer has fiscal and administrative responsibility for his reservists. Not until activeduty commanding officers have to report to their bosses on the use of annual training funds, medical and dental readiness, and the training readiness of their reservists will there be a sincere interest in our employment and, ultimately, our career development.
With this in mind, why do we still have reserve centers in fleet concentration areas? Why the redundancy in services and support staff? If I drill at my supported command, why do I then need to drive 11 miles to pick up my medical record for a physical or to liquidate a set of orders? My supported command should be responsible for those activities just as they are for their active-duty staff. When that happens and when my supported commander is intimately interested in how and where I train my reservists, then we truly will be seamless.
"President Bush Deserved Better"
(See J. Cushman, p. 96, November 2003 Proceedings)
G. A. Gattis-Holding General Tommy Franks responsible for the failure of the postwar situation in Iraq is akin to blaming a construction site supervisor for the collapse of the structure when his superiors ordered the substandard materials. Yes, he carries some of the burden, but his objections would not necessarily have prevented the event.
Expecting General Franks to tell secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld how he was going to run Iraq postwar would have accomplished only one thing: his dismissal. Just ask General Eric Shinseki about contradicting this administration; it doesn't bode well for your career or person.
While General Franks is not totally blameless, he is not even mostly at fault. Could he have anticipated the looting? There were sufficient examples to suggest what to expect, but how to respond without stepping on big toes? Also, to expect General John Abizaid, even if instructed, to accomplish without funding or personnel something that General Jay Garner, U.S. Army (Ret.), head of the Pentagon's Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, could not do with funding, is either extraordinarily naive or maybe even intentionally partisan in its accusation.
I applaud General Franks for standing like a trooper and not attacking the administration's plan in public to defend his good name and honor. I am sure there are many things he could disclose about the preparations for this war that would truly embarrass this administration, but he is a better man than they.
As for the title of General Cushman's commentary, President Bush deserved what he got for ignoring the advice of the professionals from the military, the Department of State, and the CIA. The armed forces deserve better, and the officers and enlisted personnel on the front lines deserve an administration that does not beat its chest and tout "bring 'em on" and then insufficiently protect them because it made errors in estimating what it would cost to execute its policies.
"ASW Requires Practice"
(See N. Polmar, pp. 96-97, December 2003 Proceedings)
Commander Dennis K. Fargo, U.S. Navy (Retired)-Mr. Polmar's excellent suggestion to establish a submarine aggressor capability deserves further consideration. In the mid-1980s, the idea of an aggressor squadron was discussed but went without formal proposal or vetting. Then, such a squadron might have included the USS Darter (SS-576), Barbel (SS-580), Blueback (SS-581), and Bonefish (SS-582). Problem was, those ships were still front-line units then, and two of them, the Barbel and the Darter, were forward-deployed to Japan. In fact, the Barbel's 112 days in home port in 1987 yielded the highest operational tempo of any unit in the Pacific submarine force, in part because she and the Darter were providing aggressor services to the naval forces of Japan, the Republic of Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, and Australia, in addition to conducting exercises with U.S. Seventh Fleet units and operating against the Soviet Navy. Now, as then, it seems many commanding officers want an aggressor to work with, so if we were to become serious about implementing the concept, several platforms would be needed. But I agree the aggressor concept remains sound: if it pays dividends in air combat maneuvering, why not in antisubmarine warfare (ASW)?
Mr. Polmar has correctly identified the two greatest areas of decision, if we are to establish an aggressor capability as a uniquely conventional one, namely, where to get platforms, and where to get people.
What aggressor platforms should we use? Mr. Polmar suggests use of the Trout (SS-566). While no single platform will provide much aggressor capability, the Trout has limitations that make her less than the optimum first choice. First and most important, she cannot measure up to the performance metrics against which we must train. In spite of her design specifications, and assuming everything works, she will be faster on the surface, and capable of probably no more than 12-13 knots at maximum speed and with limited endurance submerged. Her high length-tobeam ratio provides great seakeeping on the surface but limited maneuverability submerged. Today's conventional submarine often is faster for longer periods and more agile in the chase.
Fritz Krafft's fine service and good efforts toward her mechanical conditioning notwithstanding, and by her age alone, the Trout would require significant material care. If experience with the sister ships of her day is valid, her unique maintenance challenges will include brittle electrical wiring, unreliable tank-level indicators, and chronically leaking vintage Conax hydraulic actuators. These material concerns either would become operational platform safety issues or would require a healthy front-end material upgrade. Other potential platforms may be healthier for longer.
Further, the Trout's existing BQG-4 sonar suite provides marginal capability for detecting today's surface and submarine combatants at today's tactical ranges. Should we go for an aggressor platform that can acquire targets and evade prosecution as a present-day aggressor would, or one best suited to short-range encounters? Other potential platforms are more acoustically capable.
I agree with the gentleman attributed by Mr. Polmar who suggests Russian Kilo class or German Type 209 vessels, if these can be procured, because of their proliferation in Third World navies. Another platform to consider is the Harushio-class boat of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, as these come available. Because of its constitution and statutes (Constitution of Japan, 3 November 1946, Article 9), Japan maintains a fleet of only 16 conventional submarines, but they are among the finest in the world. Unlike the traditional U.S. submarine life cycle of 30 years, however, Japan decommissions and scraps its submarines after only ten years of service. If I am reading my Combat Fleets of the World correctly, the last four boats of this class are due to be scrapped across the next four years. Although terms would need to be negotiated, the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States opens the door for their export to us. (Japan agreed to transfer of military technology in 1983. see Norio Iwata, Japan Defense Agency, "Procurement Policy and Defense Industry in Japan," in The DISAM [Defense Institute of security Assistance Management] Journal, Summer 1999, p. 90.) I do not advocate here the building of conventional submarines for our Navy. Let's acquire a foreign platform(s) with the best available capability, at a good used-car price, and allow the Trout her deserved rest.
Where will we get the crews? Mr. Polmar suggests the use of contractors as ship's company. This could be done, certainly. But there are inherent advantages in using submarine-qualified personnel of the U.S. Naval Reserve, if these personnel can be made available and activeduty personnel are not. Further, I think aggressor duty is the ideal way for submarine reservists to maintain their warfare skills. Is it not our present summer paradigm that reservist flyers primarily go somewhere to fly, while reservist submariners go somewhere to think? Further, consider the following issues in aggressor crew manning:
* Sensitive information requirements: Aggressor crews would have access to sensitive call signs and cryptologic equipment for the purpose of secure communications during operations. They would be exposed to and become aware of specific platform vulnerabilities associated with various operations. Contractors would require careful screening as to their business affiliations, and through no fault of their own, we would want them to sign nondisclosure agreements or other legally binding documents. These are not concerns nor are they required with reservists.
* Training requirements: The crews would require ongoing training in submerged navigation, ship control, damage control, submarine escape, ship capabilities and recognition, and even torpedo fire control. Do we want them to attack as an aggressor and be able to report the geometry of their encounters, or just run in a straight line while we shoot them? Reservists could be expected to be more current in these areas, unless the contractors are transitioning directly from a Navy career. In addition, using reservists would keep them peaked up for use in their warfare specialty as fill-crew assets in armed conflict, as required.
* Logistic requirements: A contractor crew would require regular diving physical examinations, additional medical insurance, and significantly higher salaries than reservists, and may require indemnification against accidents. Medical aspects already are in place with reservists.
* Rotational requirements: We would require two crews per boat or settle for halftime platform availability. There are additional manpower costs for contractors versus reservists.
We should have a conventional submarine aggressor capability. Establishment of a similar capability in the air community has contributed in large measure to improvements in U.S. air superiority that are well worth the capital outlay. Almost 20 years ago, some seniors believed our needs in this area would be met by the submarines of our allies. It is now apparent that this is not the case. Perhaps allied submarines are committed as heavily as our own. Should we have to wait for annual UNITAS or Pacific Rim exercises to allow a few ships to work with conventional aggressor submarines? Should we, in those exercises, make apparent our vulnerabilities, or rather, work at least some of them out during refresher training, prior to deployment, by operating against our own conventional aggressors? The submarine aggressor concept can answer the Chief of Naval Operations' mail in any or all of the areas of increased integration of the naval reserve, enhanced coalition building, interoperability of air-surface-submarine ASW forces, and enhanced capability. Would it not be transformational to develop training requirements for and conduct regular training against actual, opposing conventional submarine platforms as well as against computers? We cannot afford less than the best ASW in the littorals-unless we want to be surprised. Use of conventional aggressor submarines may be the only operational means by which to gain a quantum improvement in that capability.
Michael Wheeler-Mr. Polmar's column brings to the attention of all (to the dismay of many) the possibility of providing a badly needed United States-owned dieselelectric submarine platform for antisubmarine warfare (ASW) training and test and evaluation (T&E) at a very reasonable cost. His statement that the Trout (SS-566) is a "nonthreatening target option," however, is far from the truth. The mere existence of the Trout has been well concealed for a number of years, and in the past, all inquiries and proposals concerning her use as an active platform quickly have been quashed. The primary unofficial reason given consistently has been: "The nucs will never let it happen." This is a strange situation when you take into account the current submarine fleet size and its current high operational tempo. I have provided briefings and supplied support and maintenance on board the Trout over the past four years and believe that I have more current knowledge of this platform than anyone within the U.S. Navy.
There is little argument within the Navy that a constantly available diesel-electric submarine would be extremely useful because of the current high operational tempo of our all-nuclear-powered submarine force and the unreliable sourcing of foreign countries' diesel-electric submarines for our training and T&E. Other options have been raised: use of privately owned, foreign-manufactured submarines or the USS Dolphin (AGSS-555). Unfortunately, those submarines are very small, are not representative underwater signatures of actual threats, have no torpedo tubes, and have no rescue capabilities should a casualty occur. Some in the Navy recommend the purchase of several Russian Kilos (a very expensive undertaking for restoration and upkeep) or German Type 209s to provide us with dieselelectric platforms. Both of these options are possible, but far more expensive than returning the Trout to full capability.
Even though the Trout is longer than the current diesel-electric submarines that pose potential threats, her total mass is not large and she has considerable existing space available for the placement of on-board experiments and equipment. The question that remains is: How quiet is she or can she become? Her overall usefulness to research, development, test, and evaluation would be assured if the signature parameter could be achieved. In addition, should she receive clearance to be the target for exercise-test torpedo firings, she would become a very soughtafter asset throughout the fleet.
The Navy needs a truly threat-representative diesel-electric submarine for ASW training and for test and evaluation, but there is no funding available for such an expensive endeavor. In the opinion of many, the Trout would be a desirable, useful platform and a very cost-effective alternative. Why not use an existing platform that meets some of the characteristics of our potential threats? Politics is why. Perhaps Mr. Polmar's contribution will cause people at high places to open their eyes before the Trout is towed away to the bone yard this spring and is no longer of value to anyone except as a museum display.
"Take the Roll of the Dice Out of the Selection Process"
(See C. Graham, p. 59, December 2003; M. Yates, pp. 18-19, January 2004 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Director of Naval Intelligence-When I was a junior officer, some 40-plus years ago, a World War II submariner rear admiral for whom I worked observed to me: "If you make commander, you have had a successful career; if you make captain, you have had an extraordinarily successful career; if you make rear admiral, you are just damned lucky!"
Commander Graham might want to ponder those words.
If he stopped to reflect on the statistics of the Navy promotion system, he would come to recognize that of 100 officers who began with him and stayed in the Navy, fewer than half would have made it to commander. By definition, he has done better than most. Only about a quarter would make it to captain, and perhaps one might make flag. I cannot concur that he is a "professional failure." The statistics say otherwise.
I further would offer that the Navy's selection board system, flawed though it may be by virtue of being populated by fallible human beings, is probably about the most fair system you could design for a large institution. When Commander Graham gets out into the business world, he will come to recognize that favoritism and chance are much larger factors in determining promotion on the outside than they are in the Navy. In the business world, there are no systems that guarantee you will be considered for promotion at a certain time in your career; nor typically are there efforts to put together impartial boards to determine who gets selected. The Navy system, I have found, is fair and equitable and works because it is secretive, and selection board members cannot easily be subjected to influence before the selection board, or fear of after-the-fact criticism, or even revenge. Often, deserving officers are passed over because number limitations dictate that the line be drawn. Each time I served on a selection board, I came away saying: "If we only had a few more numbers, we would not have been forced to pass over those last 20 deserving officers." Perhaps Commander Graham fell into that category. But whether he did or not, his promotability was determined by 12 conscientious officers dedicated to doing a tough job as fairly as possible. It was not a "roll of the dice."
Commander Graham should not-indeed he cannot-consider himself a professional failure if he retires as a commander in the U.S. Navy!
"Is the War on Terrorism Sustainable?"
(See J. Record, pp. 44-46, December 2003 Proceedings)
Thomas H. Terry III-Mr. Record decries disdain for treaties and for alliances and allies that inhibit our freedom of action. What treaties has the United States abrogated? We walked away from the Kyoto Accord. We walked away from the International Criminal Court (ICC). Neither of these treaties had been presented to the Senate or ratified. The Kyoto Accord is based on questionable science, and in any event, even the signatories cannot meet its terms. Good intentions (no matter how questionable their basis) do not make good international law. The ICC is a nightmare waiting to happen. The Belgian interlude as the world's moral conscience is well thought out in comparison.
As to allies, where are the French now that we have won? Have they offered to negotiate the debt resulting from loans they made to Saddam Hussein to free Iraq's wealth for use in Iraq? Have the Russians? Alliances run both ways. The French always have accepted help, but the last time they offered it, a Bourbon sat on the throne. The Russians were our allies for one war and then only because the five-year plan had not taken invasion by the Germans into account. As for the Germans, we conquered them the last time, but Adenauer surrendered to the French in the first treaty of Rome.
Regarding the Bush doctrine of preemption, what is wrong with striking first? Do we have to wait until a few thousand more die? Do we need to coordinate with the United Nations when terrorists from Saudi Arabia, Syria, Libya, or Iran kill our citizens? The U.S. government has published lists of states that supported terrorism for years, until they became "states of concern." I cannot fathom a reason known predators should be allowed to strike before they are attacked. Even idiots shake the scorpions out of their shoes when they are in the desert.
Mr. Record discusses the fiscal questions involved in supporting the war in Iraq, and by extension that in Afghanistan. The budget numbers and deficit projections are most likely correct, but skewed in their presentation.
The increases in domestic spending take into account large sums now spent on homeland security, an increase in the range of 80% over the past two years. It is hard to argue that this expense is not needed. Further, throughout the fiscal portion of the article, Mr. Record fails to take into account the fact that while the deficit numbers may be larger than in the past, they represent a smaller percentage of gross domestic product. Finally, Mr. Record has chosen a time period to support his position on the inevitable fiscal collapse of the nation, similar to that which supports the man-made global warming theory. (The proponents of this theory overlook a general global warming that began in the fourth century and continued until the Little Ice Age, which began in the mid-16th century). Mr. Record refers to deficits through the 2004-2013 period. This coincides with the Social Security crunch, which may yet be avoided. The tenor of his article implies that the deficit is a result of the wars. It is not.
Mr. Record assumes all political and military decisions are driven by polls. In this he is exceptionally wrong. There once was, and still is, a concept called leadership. From time to time this country produces political leaders who inspire, even in the face of daunting odds. The idea that Americans cannot be persuaded of the benefit of defending themselves borders on the inane. This is not Vietnam, this is not the 1960s, and it is not the 1990s either. It is the present. There are more than enough daily reminders of the existence and persistence of those who would destroy us to make all but the most delusional agree that defense must be done at any price.
I cannot quibble with Mr. Record about the shortage of troops or the potential cost. I am not a military scholar and have only been in the Merchant Marine. I would suggest, however, that the program overseen by Al Gore for "reinventing government" is the core of the problem. The downsizing of the military in the face of an increase in unconventional warfare across the globe would seem to a layman to be the cause of the current staffing and funding problems. Had time and money been spent to analyze the world situation instead of a rush to cash in on the "peace dividend," a lot of today's problems may well have been averted.
"Rethinking the Principles of War"
(See G. Morgan and A. McIvor, pp. 34-38, October 2003; J. Collins, p. 24, November 2003; K. Orr, pp. 22-24, December 2003 Proceedings)
Commander B. L. Gravatt, U.S. Navy (Retired)-Every era develops a language for its time. As venerated words of the past are found no longer to well convey their meaning, they are replaced with a vocabulary befitting the present. Thus, in this postindustrial 21st century, we should change the wording of the long-standing nine principles of war with the intent of better communicating their meaning to the warriors of this new age. As advocated by Rear Admiral Morgan and Dr. McIvor, however, we also should consider expanding or contracting the old list of nine as well as ponder replacing some of them to aid those who must plan and make war in the 21st century.
The following baker's dozen of the basics of warfare makes no pretense of originality, though there has been an earnest attempt to attain simplicity of expression. The statement of a principle should be so clear in its meaning that little explanation is required. Another requirement is that a principle must be applicable to all levels of warfare, from the grandest strategy to the simplest tactic.
The thirteen proposed principles of war for our time are:
1. Principle of Purpose-State the end(s) sought.
2. Principle of the Possible-Conclude the available means are adequate to achieve the end(s) sought.
3. Principle of Moderation-Limit the number confronted and the number supported.
4. Principle of Information-Keep it, get it, use it.
5. Principle of Time-Use it or lose it.
6. Principle of Agility-Think and act faster than the enemy.
7. Principle of Depth-Sustain the effort.
8. Principle of the Advantage-Apply more against less, better against worse.
9. Principle of Holding and Hitting-Determine where at once to maintain and to attain.
10. Principle of the Offense-Strike the blow.
11. Principle of the Defense-Ward off the struck blow.
12. Principle of Deterrence-Prevent the striking of the blow.
13. Principle of Command-Make certain only one orders, all others obey.
"Even the Army Can Come . . . from the Sea"
(See J. Sanford, pp. 56-59, December 2003; R. Denny, p. 30, January 2004 Proceedings)
Major James Murphy, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)-Commander Denny should bone up on his history. While Marine Major Ellis scoured the South Pacific in the 1930s studying islands that were later subjects of amphibious landings, and the Marines made significant landings throughout that World War II sector, the U.S. Army made more amphibious landings of battalion-landing-team size and larger than the Marines. The Army's Engineer Amphibious Support Command is organized and equipped to provide shore party and helicopter support team operations for such operations. Also, the largest amphibious operation in history (Normandy) was an Army-coordinated event.
"Innovation Needs More Support, Less Bacon"
(See D. Barren, p. 91, December 2003 Proceedings)
Commander Louis D. Chirillo, U.S. Navy (Retired)-Commander Barrett's opinion that an "information-age Navy needs a culture that embraces new ideas, tests the status quo, and rewards creative thinking" captured my attention. During my Navy career as an engineering duty officer (EDO) and during my post-Navy career as a researcher of shipyard management methods, I observed that the typical EDO, while wearing the uniform of a warrior, complete with star insignia, avoided making calculated-risk decisions.
Often, rejections of new ideas were attributed to the not-invented-here syndrome, but I frequently attributed them to another and more devastating affliction, the why-me syndrome. Such officers, including those who are relatively senior, avoid meaningful challenges because when an opportunity for innovation arises, their immediate thought is, "Why should I stick my neck out?" Some of them retired with medals of merit that are the de facto equivalent of good-conduct medals in the absence of profound and unprecedented achievements arising from creative thinking.
No criticism is worth much without a suggested solution, so I propose that all officer fitness reports require answers to questions such as: What innovations has this officer conceived or sponsored? Are any the result of calculated-risk decisions? What papers has this officer written that have been published in professional journals? Do any such papers challenge the status quo?
"Make Networking Work for You"
(See C. Michel, p. 96, January 2004 Proceedings)
Captain Bob Bechill, Supply Corps, U.S. Naval Reserve, Dean of Evening Programs, Heald College-Stockton, CA-Bravo to Chris Michel and the Naval Institute for launching the new Charting Your Course column. The initial article on networking was especially appropriate. It is often not what you know but who you know that determines your success, whether in uniform or not. And I also would like to add that there comes a point at which networking comes naturally. You just do it, because you either like people or are just naturally curious about what they do.
"Invasion of the Transformers"
(See J. Huber, pp. 74-76, October 2003; T. Davis, pp. 16-17, November 2003; T. Hone, pp. 24-25, January 2004 Proceedings)
Commander Chuck Werchado, U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)-I respect the fact that Proceedings publishes all viewpoints, including those as misinformed and skewed as Captain Davis's. However, to lump political appointees-excuse me, "political hacks"-together with the "legions of civil service employees" in controlling the "art of sea warfare" tells me that Captain Davis either has spent little time in the Pentagon or was oblivious while he was there. Political appointees usually hold senior positions and enact the direction of the administration that placed them. Career employees (a better term than civil service) tend to have decades-long experience in their fields and more graduate-level experience than the military officers with whom they work, who rotate through on two- or three-year tours. In my division (Office of the Secretary of Defense, Program Analysis and Evaluation, Naval Forces Division), the senior civilians all have Ph.D.s, while my naval officers tend to have bachelor's- or master's-level education. Both are invaluable to the mission of our office; the military bring warfare expertise, military judgment, and recent fleet experience, while the civilians bring trained analytic judgment and in-depth programmatic knowledge. To play one against the other, as Captain Davis does in his letter, is to miss the whole point of military-civilian synergy in Pentagon operations.
One quick sea story illustrates my point. During my time at OpNav N81/Assessment, I ran annual campaign analyses, and noted D-Day surface combatant shortfalls for three successive years. I discussed this with a commander in our branch, Steve Richter, who then worked on finding ways to address this warfighting shortfall. The result was the global concept of operations, a linchpin of "Sea Power 21." An officer would not have had the time in his tour to run and study analysis for three years, and a civilian would not have been as conversant in surface ship operations as a former frigate commanding officer. Only working together produces innovative yet credible results.
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