Is U.S. Intelligence Headed in the Wrong Direction?

The reshaping of national intelligence might be headed for disastrous results at a time when it could determine the outcome of the war on terror. The 9/11 Commission’s misguided intelligence recommendations and election-year pressures in a divided nation have intimidated politicians into supporting ill-conceived but politically popular measures.

Implementing the key recommendations—a new director or “czar” of national intelligence and a centralized national counterterrorism center—is likely to do more harm than good by distracting from the war on terror without providing even the slightest positive effect. Moreover, a rare opportunity could be squandered to erase the risk-averse culture that has plagued human intelligence collection for decades, and beef up the tough and dangerous field mission of penetrating terrorist organizations and uncovering their plans.

A czar would add yet another layer of bureaucracy to the already burdensome superstructure of review and approval; he would have to draw from an already over-stretched intelligence community to support his office. A new counterterrorism center will add to the confusion created by the operations centers that sprang up after the 11 September 2001 attacks and will supplant the Terrorist Threat Integration Center announced in the 2003 State of the Union address. And where would the necessary manpower come from?

The Commission fundamentally misread the intelligence lessons of the attacks. In an irresponsible display of arrogance, it used tax dollars and grieving families to mount a public relations effort to pressure Congress and the White House to ensure its flawed recommendations were enacted entirely. It succumbed to one of the most unfortunate legends of our time: failure to “connect the dots”—i.e., adequately collate available intelligence—blinded the nation to the attacks. In fact, the paramount intelligence shortfall was that we did not collect enough dots.

Stocked with old Washington hands, it is no wonder the Commission sought an organizational fix and gravitated to the favorite political remedy of forming a highly centralized bureaucracy. It compounded its errors by recommending fundamental changes in Department of Defense intelligence agencies that had nothing to do with the attacks and would weaken intelligence support to deployed war fighters. Further, it recommended that paramilitary forces of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) be put under the control of military special operations commanders, despite the magnificent performance of the current paramilitary structure in Afghanistan. At the same time, notwithstanding hours of critical testimony, the Federal Bureau of Investigation was left untouched.

Several distinguished former national security officials, including Henry Kissinger, urged a more thoughtful approach to changes in the intelligence community and recommended decoupling the stampede to reform from the electoral timetable. In addition, numerous retired senior CIA officials publicly criticized the Commission’s recommendations. Rarely have intelligence professionals, who normally remain respectfully silent, been so united in opposition to major policy directions for U.S. intelligence. More than most, they understand the urgency and severity of terrorist threats and the irreplaceable role of intelligence in countering them here and abroad. They see a golden opportunity to return to first principles and reverse decades of diminishing capabilities repeatedly wasted in a largely irrelevant and wasteful focus on the intelligence command structure.

Thankfully, the die is not cast on this matter. The White House (never wholeheartedly behind the Commission’s recommendations) and some in Congress are using breathing space created by this opposition to press for measures that will contain the damage. In August 2004, the President issued executive orders that beefed up the powers of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), which aligned with critics who see a stronger DCI rather than a new bureaucracy as the way to strengthen internal intelligence coordination.

Appointment of early 9/11 Commission skeptic Porter Goss as DCI plays into the delaying strategy. The White House has hinted he would be the leading candidate to fill a czar position should Congress create one. Unlike the 9/11 Commission, Goss knows how intelligence needs to be strengthened.

In his first message to CIA personnel, Goss focused on clandestine operations, promising more training, resources, longer and more stable tours of duty, and a less risk-averse environment. He hinted at steps to stifle nit-picking bureaucrats and intrusive lawyers—music to the ears of CIA operations officers at work against terrorist targets. Unlike an intelligence czar and new layers of bureaucracy, this kind of action will directly and immediately bolster United States security.

Mr. Coffman, a former Central Intelligence Agency operations officer, is an entrepreneur and consultant in Potomac, Maryland.