U. S. Navy: State of the Fleet

In 2004, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld directed a new strategic doctrine for the armed forces: Combat forces were to respond to crisis or combat situations anywhere in the world within 10 days. The crisis or conflict was to be resolved within 30 days, after which the committed forces should be reconstituted within 10 days and ready for transfer to another crisis or combat area. This 10-30-30 strategy replaced the two-and-half conflict, one-plus-one, and other recent strategic concepts that sought to guide the development, structure, and operations of U.S. armed forces.

In response to those and earlier requirements, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Vern Clark has produced a series of initiatives or "pillars" under the umbrella of "Sea Power 21":*

* Sea Strike: Expanded power projection that employs networked sensors, combat systems, and warriors to amplify the offensive impact of naval forces. This includes increased operational tempo, reach, and effectiveness.

* Sea Shield: Naval capabilities related to homeland defense, sea control in specific areas, the defense of naval forces in littoral areas, and the projection of air and missile defenses overland.

* Sea Basing: Enhanced operational independence and support for joint forces provided by networked, mobile, and secure platforms operating in the maritime domain.

* ForceNet: Overarching integration of warriors, sensors, and weapons into a fully netted combat force, fully integrated with the planned Global Information Grid of the Department of Defense.

In all these areas, Admiral Clark is seeking to reduce manning and increase the use of unmanned vehicles-air, surface, and undersea.

Almost all aspects of the Navy are being affected by these new Department of Defense and Navy strategies. The service's leaders believe they will arrest and then reverse the post-Cold War trend of fleet decline. The Navy in early 2005 was to have just under 300 ships, compared to approximately 545 when the Cold War ended in 1991-a 45% decline in less than 15 years.

Admiral Clark has stated a goal of 375 surface ships and submarines, although there are unofficial reports he has backed off that total. The number 310 often is mentioned in Pentagon hallways. Add to that the 65 Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) being advocated by Admiral Clark and the total comes to 375. But it is unlikely that in the current budget environment the Navy can attain a fleet of 375.

For example, to maintain 300 ships, the Navy must build an average of ten ships per year. The fiscal year (FY) 2001-2005 shipbuilding programs have averaged just 51A ships. And although the 30-year shipbuilding program presented to Congress by the Navy in 2003 calls for a future building rate of from 7 to 14 ships per year (the latter for FY 2009-2018), this rate is unobtainable given the probable fiscal conditions of the foreseeable future, even with a significant number of those ships being of the LCS type. Indeed, even the nearterm ship program presented to Congress as part of the FY 2005 budget may be unattainable, especially with the delay in the DD(X) program announced shortly after the budget was presented and the desirability of delaying procurement of the future maritime prepositioning ship.

Clearly, a realistic and White House/Congress-supported, long-range shipbuilding plan is needed.

Sea Basing

The Navy's response to Secretary Rumsfeld's 10-30-30 strategy will be centered in large part on Admiral Clark's sea-basing concept. Derived in part from the Maritime Prepositioning Squadron (MPS) ships initiated in the early 1980s, the plan provides for a large operating base that can be established rapidly (within ten days) in a forward area, some 25-100 miles offshore of the objective.

This sea base will consist of Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) ships and, most likely, amphibious and replenishment ships. It will not be centered on "floating islands" or the mobile offshore base systems (MOBSs), although some proponents in the Department of Defense and industry continue to propose the latter. Indeed, there are promoters of a sea base large enough to support C-130 Hercules cargo aircraft.

The MPF ships will differ greatly from current MPS ships in that they will be larger and will have facilities for troops to come aboard at sea, be berthed, and "marry up" with their equipment; be able to put those troops ashore in a combat environment; provide command and control, medical, and resupply functions; reembark troops after the operation for rehabilitation and the reconditioning or replacement of their equipment, with additional supplies and equipment brought on board; and move with the sea base to another location, with the embarked forces ready for combat within 30 days. Thus, the MPF ships will be more complex (and more expensive) than the MPS ships.

Although the MPF ships will not be capable of operating C-130 conventional aircraft, a variety of fixed-wing vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) aircraft, including AV-8B Harriers and MV-22 Ospreys, as well as helicopters, will operate from the sea base. Hopefully, the potential for eventual operation of larger, vertical or short take-off and landing (VSTOL) aircraft, including a Bell quad-rotor aircraft that could be the size of a later Hercules, will be incorporated in the MPF design.

Several ship designs for the MPF program were being developed. Among them are several with large aviation facilities (i.e., full or near-full flight decks). One of the more interesting concepts is the Maersk S-class container ship, extensively modified to operate VSTOL aircraft and helicopters. That modification was developed as an offshore aviation base under a government contract following the success of the carrier Kitty Hawk (CV-63) as a Special Operations Force (SOF) helicopter platform during the Afghan invasion of 2002.

Sailors and Marines

The "global war on terrorism" has been strenuous for all the armed forces. The Navy, already forward deployed on a 1-in-3 basis when the buildup for the invasion of Afghanistan began in 2002, started deploying on a wartime basis. Thousands of reservists were called to active duty, both to support the fleet and to provide security for the massive Navy base structure. The latter proved particularly difficult because of the collocation of major naval facilities and civilian areas, especially locations such as San Diego, where the base complexes are open to civilian water traffic.

At the same time, Admiral Clark began looking for ways to reduce Navy manpower. Some of the numerous experiments in crew reductions have been successful, but certainly not all. Other ploys, such as Sea Swap, have reported initial success, but the long-term problems of such methods have yet to be determined.

Navy recruitment and retention remain high, meeting most goals, even in the always difficult category of submarine enlisted men and junior officers. The long-term effects of the demanding aviation and surface ship deployment schedule also have yet to be determined.

The Marine Corps has been at the forefront of the assaults on Afghanistan and Iraq, and Marine security forces have had a key role in the security of naval bases in the United States and abroad and of U.S. naval ships, including forward-operating MPS shipping. Indeed, during those operations, Marines were employed virtually interchangeably with Army units.

While Marines have performed as expected and admirably, they have lacked some of the equipment for long-duration ground operations, such as heavy trucks and tanks. Possibly more significant, this employment again has raised the question of whether Marines should be maintained as a "separate army," with almost one-third the number of active divisions as the U.S. Army (although Army strength is being significantly increased). This situation will be further confused under the sea base concept, which is intended to support amphibious and land operations by Army units as well as by Marines.

At this time, the Marine Corps is being increased in size, while the Navy is undergoing a personnel reduction.

Shipbuilding Industry

The Navy is the primary customer for ship construction and repair in the United States. In fact, two of the largest U.S. shipyards, the General Dynamics/Electric Boat yard in Groton, Connecticut, and Newport News Shipbuilding in Virginia build only naval ships.

The existing U.S. ship-building industry can build, overhaul, and repair a fleet of 375 ships without too much difficulty. The only significant problem is ensuring qualified labor is available at the right time at the proper place. The inability of the U.S. government to commit to long-term, steady rate ship construction both exacerbates the labor problem and greatly increases shipbuilding costs.

Submarine construction costs appear to be particularly high ($2-plus billion per unit of the Virginia [SSN-774]-class nuclear-powered attack submarine, developed as a lower-cost alternative to the Seawolf [SSN 21]-class nuclearpowered attack submarine program). One of the "artificial" factors contributing to the high SSN costs is the joint construction of the Virginia class by Newport News and Electric Boat, with the resulting transfer of people, submarine components, and data between the yards. Data compatibility was the most significant (albeit not most expensive) aspect of the joint effort. More economical and competitive approaches were possible, but the Navy's submarine community sought and obtained this awkward arrangement for political reasons.

During the post-Cold War era, the Navy's shipbuilding program has osculated significantly. While some $20 billion per year is planned for ship construction in the later years of this decade, for a number of reasons such expenditures seem unlikely.

EDITOR'S NOTE: The Naval Institute publishes the 18th edition of its Guide to the Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet this month. This abridged and edited version of the opening chapter sets the stage for the premier reference on the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard.