Our Naval Heritage Is in Danger

Contrary to current official under-valuation of history, real lessons can be learned from the ‘‘political, economic, and bureaucratic forces" that historically affected the Sea Services. Instead, emphasis is placed on simplistic and misleading “birthplaces" and “fathers” of the U.S. Navy. In fact, the Navy at least figuratively was “born" in June 1775 in the first naval battle of the Revolutionary War near Round Island off Machias, Maine. To the chagrin of Massachusetts, the Maine Bureau of Parks & Lands calls this the “birthplace of the U.S. Navy." But more important, why did the battle start in the first place, and what were its consequences?

For Sea Service professionals, a better understanding of naval history provides deeper insights into current and future naval problems. Despite historians’ best efforts, however, the leadership has placed such little value on naval history that most of the Navy’s historical activities are under-funded, and now some of its official museums are threatened with closure. Only three of the Navy’s dozen museums have reached accreditation status. Even our official records are not being kept properly. Present historians have a difficult time learning what our service is doing today, and our achievements may never be known to future generations.

Our naval heritage is in danger, and our service historians have reported this repeatedly over the past five years to the Secretary of the Navy and to the Chief of Naval Operations. Most recent warnings have come through the Secretary of the Navy’s Advisory Subcommittee on Naval History in April 2004 and the Naval History Stakeholders Meeting held in Washington in October 2004.[1]

Sadly, schools frequently give the false impression of history as a boring exercise that involves memorizing useless dates and learning irrelevant things. In those instances when we have accepted history, we often have seen it as just “a nice thing” and, as a result, sometimes accepted simplistic and inaccurate traditional stories about our past that lead us astray in our professional thinking.[2]

There are no alternative means for relating history except in terms of the names, dates, places, ships, planes, equipment, and people of the past. Yet, those specifics are only building blocks. A key factor for understanding history is to be aware that events take place in a particular framework of time and place. The chronological order of development has a bearing on the ultimate outcome.

One commonly hears references to early naval officers—John Paul Jones or John Barry, for example—as the “Father of the Navy.” Others have suggested George Washington, John Adams, Robert Morris, Silas Deane, or Thomas Truxtun. Similarly, Marblehead, Salem, or Beverly in Massachusetts have been arguing among themselves for decades, as each has lobbied to be designated the “official” birthplace of the Navy. It should be a matter of great concern that many naval professionals widely accept such an approach to history. To use metaphorical words such as “father,” “birth,” and “birthplace” in describing the origins of the U.S. Navy is overly simplistic and ultimately misleading.

Most important, an accurate understanding of the long and difficult process that led to the creation of the Navy is an illuminating lesson in basic national values and how the U.S. government works. This story is not merely interesting information about a by-gone age, but a reminder to the modern professional that continuing support for the Navy, as well as its origin, reflects the complex interplay among political, economic, and bureaucratic forces. Far more than to any single individual or port town, the U.S. Navy owes its existence to Congress and the legislative process.

The Origins of the U.S. Navy

At the time of the American Revolution, the colonists were well aware of the sea as a highway of communication, a source of food, and a place for battle, if necessary.[3] Many people shared in the natural impulse to arm ships at public expense so they could further their own protection and promote their own cause in the face of British maritime power. Typical of this, the first armed action of the war at sea occurred in June 1775, when Jeremiah O’Brien and a group of fellow militiamen engaged and captured a small British armed vessel off Machias, Maine.

Meanwhile, representatives from all 13 colonies gathered in Congress. From 1775 through the 1790s, they examined and debated nearly every fundamental aspect of representative democracy and the institutions appropriate to a republic. At that time, powers and resources of the Continental Congress were limited. In one of its first discussions about naval affairs on 18 July 1775, the Congress asked “that each colony, at its own expense, make such provision by armed vessels or otherwise ... for the protection of their harbours and navigation on their sea coasts, against all unlawful invasions, attacks and depredations, from cutters and ships of war.”[4]

Shortly afterward, Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Virginia each had established a separate, tiny navy of its own, some comprising only a few flatboats and row galleys, others with substantial sea-going vessels.

An additional need soon grew to have a naval force that could operate on broader terms than just the needs of an individual colony. This became apparent when George Washington’s Continental Army began to arm vessels at Beverley, Salem, and Marblehead to support land operations against British forces in Massachusetts in September 1775.

The Continental Navy

Shortly thereafter, the Rhode Island General Assembly passed a resolution “that the building and equipping of an American fleet, as soon as possible, would greatly conduce to the preservation of lives, liberty and property of the good people of these colonies.”[5] The Continental Congress debated this resolution on 3 October 1775 without specific result, because some delegates felt establishment of a navy would preclude reconciliation with Britain. Two days later, Congress received intelligence that two unarmed English brigs carrying supplies to the British Army had set sail from England for Quebec with no convoy protection. On hearing this news, a congressional committee immediately recommended that Congress equip two armed vessels and order them to intercept any such supply ships. Congress delayed action until 13 October, when a letter from General Washington reported he had already acquired three schooners at Continental expense. By taking this initiative, Washington had pre-empted Congress, allowing members who had been hesitant to agree more easily to add two ships to the total.

That day, the second Continental Congress authorized the purchase and arming of two vessels “to cruize eastward, for intercepting such transports as may be laden with warlike stores and other supplies for our enemies.”[6] This act created the Continental Navy. Today, the U.S. Navy recognizes 13 October as its official founding date, even though it marks only the formal beginning of its immediate predecessor, not the service that exists today.

The history of the Continental Navy was short, lasting only until 1785, when its last ship was sold. In that short period, the service had reached a reasonable size. Nearly 60 vessels served at one time or another, 18 of them frigates of 24 to 32 guns, numerous smaller craft, and at the high end, a 74-gun ship of the line.[7] As it was acquiring ships, Congress also was creating a naval administrative structure, directly copying and adapting some basic British regulations and administrative models.

Washington had famously observed to Benjamin Franklin in 1780: “naval superiority . . . was the pivot upon which everything turned.”[8] The naval superiority he had in mind was French, however, not American. With a navy appropriate to a major European power, France was the only one that could and eventually did achieve the local naval superiority that was decisive in preventing relief of the British Army at the key Battle of Yorktown.

Under this broader strategic umbrella, which had developed at sea only since the creation of the Franco-American alliance in 1778, the tiny Continental Navy accomplished far more modest objectives. Its famous captains—such men as Esek Hopkins, Barry, Abraham Whipple, Lambert Wickes, Gustavus Conyngham, and Jones—are well remembered in U.S. naval history, but they won their achievements largely by attacking the British at the periphery of their power as well as by raiding in home waters to force the Royal Navy to divert its resources from North America. The Continental Congress did not have the resources to create either a strong naval organization or an effective naval administration. Construction and repair were slow and inefficient, manning was difficult, supplies were scarce, and on occasion, even the authorities neglected to send timely orders for sailing. For these logistical reasons, the small naval force lost opportunities, and even war-ready ships lay idle in port for months.

The Continental Congress did not have the resources to create either a strong naval organization or an effective naval administration. Construction and repair were slow and inefficient ....

Arguably, the Continental Navy’s most important achievement was to maintain direct and regular diplomatic correspondence with Europe. The tiny service also proved successful in carrying another much-needed cargo: coins for currency. The fact that warships of the newly formed United States could show their flag in allied and friendly European ports demonstrated that Americans were willing and able to wield the symbols and instruments of national sovereignty. In addition, the Continental Navy joined in a larger enterprise in which more than 1,697 U.S. privateers attacked enemy trade in a way that had a much broader effect than any single action. While the direct impact was relatively small, the cumulative effect forced up the costs of shipping and maritime insurance. The occasional dramatic raid on the British coast and in European waters, such as the famous operations of John Paul Jones, underscored trends already under way, creating incidents that joined other political forces to help coalesce British public opinion against the war.[9]

Beyond these broad effects, some individual actions did have an immediate result. The ability to capture a British ship and to bring home any war supplies she was carrying benefited the meagre resources of the Continental Army and Navy. On some occasions, even a makeshift naval force, such as that created on Lake Champlain in 1776, could have a surprisingly large impact. Although British forces defeated Benedict Arnold’s naval forces off Valcour Island in Lake Champlain, the defeat was a tactical one. In the broader perspective, the Americans had succeeded in delaying for many months the British Army’s advance down the lake and prevented British forces from gaining control of the vital Hudson River, an element that contributed to the British defeat in the Battle at Saratoga in 1777. In Alfred Thayer Mahan’s memorable phrase, the naval action on Lake Champlain was “a strife of pigmies for the prize of a continent.”[10]

During its 10-year existence, the Continental Navy played a very limited, albeit important role, the maritime equivalent of peoples’ and partisan warfare ashore. With the Peace of Paris and American independence secured in 1783, the Continental Navy was no longer needed. With the additional problems of finance and supply, it is not surprising the little navy was almost immediately disbanded, and few were interested in trying to revive it.

A Decade Without A Navy

In the immediate postwar period, maritime commerce was clearly a fundamental interest to the new republic. In 1784, Congress developed a plan for the key issues that were to be incorporated into all the treaties of friendship and commerce the new country would soon be negotiating. Among those issues were the rights of neutrals in wartime. The main concern centered around the ideas that “free ships made free goods” and involved establishing a clear definition of what a neutral vessel was allowed to trade, what items were contraband, and what made an “effective blockade” that would prevent neutral trade in wartime.[11]

Americans only belatedly realized political independence from Britain did not bring unfettered commercial freedom at sea. In fact, the United States found it suddenly had lost the advantages and benefits of normal avenues of British imperial trade. Thus, U.S. merchants had to create new markets and work around British economic dominance at sea. In 1785, one of the Founding Fathers, James Madison, even questioned the very advantages of independence: “Our trade was never more compleately monopolized by Great Britain when it was under the direction of the British Parliament than it is at this moment.”[12] That fact remained commercial and strategic reality for the United States, however, throughout the next century. On one hand, this meant looking for new markets for merchant shipping, and on the other, it meant that a small U.S. Navy did not need to be concerned about the broad problems of naval supremacy or of naval competition.

The awkwardness of the Articles of Confederation, which in 1781 had created a legislative government dominated by the separate interests of its individual states and without an executive branch, soon became apparent. In 1787-88, the Constitutional Convention set about creating an improved and permanent basis for government. Whether or not the country should have a navy was not a critical issue in the debate over the Constitution, but it did arise. The discussion surrounding it began a continuing debate over what kind of a navy was most appropriate and what the roles and purposes of such a navy should be. The political sentiments revealed in this discussion have persisted throughout the nation’s history. Having survived the transition to superpower status, they may even still be found on the domestic political landscape in the 21st century.[13]

The wide range of views could be seen among such key figures as Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, and Alexander Hamilton. While Jefferson preferred to have a navy operating only in wartime, Adams saw its value dealing with pirates and protecting trade. Hamilton even more strongly saw a navy that would allow the United States to be “the arbiter of Europe in America, and to be able to incline the balance of European competitions in this part of the world as our interest may dictate.”[14]

The Establishment of the U.S. Navy

Discussions in The Federalist Papers and in Congress were exceptionally important, as they were among the few occasions in the naval history of any country when the broad functions of a navy were examined and debated without an existing naval infrastructure and institutional bias. At the same time, however, this was all theory and debate, not action. It suggested the future and permanent scope of the nation’s political views about a navy, but the country still did not have a naval force afloat. The first step toward that occurred only in December 1793, when, in response to Britain’s persuasive need to develop a coalition against revolutionary France, Portugal had signed a peace treaty with Algiers. Up until that time, U.S. merchant shipping had tacitly depended on Portugal’s ability to contain the activities of the Algerian corsairs. With Portugal no longer playing that role, U.S. merchants wanted protection. As if to prove the point, within a short time Algerian corsairs attacked U.S. ships.[15]

After several months of committee work and debate, Congress passed with an 11-vote margin, “An Act to Provide a Naval Armament.” Becoming law on 27 March 1794, it provided for procurement of six frigates. Taking the law one step further. President Washington decided, on the advice of naval experts such as Joshua Humphreys, not to buy ships and to convert them, but to construct three 44-gun ships and three 36-gun ships, using a new design. A contingency clause in the act provided that if peace were made with Algiers, then the plans would be put on hold. Political opponents of the act pointed out that such a force was entirely inadequate. As work proceeded, progress on construction of the ships fell behind, as their costs rose steadily.

In 1796, a diplomatic arrangement with Algiers stopped work momentarily on the unfinished ships. In a political compromise, Congress eventually allowed construction to continue on three of the six ships. The first to be launched was the USS United States in May 1797, followed by the Constellation in September and the Constitution in October. Although completed, they were to be placed in reserve under the administration of the War Department until some emergency arose. At the time, many Americans believed the ships should never be allowed to be at sea in peacetime, because they might force the United States to become unnecessarily involved with a war in Europe or elsewhere.

The President at this time, John Adams, had consistently strong views in support of a navy. Eventually, he was able to oversee a change in the political climate regarding the U.S. Navy that led to its permanent establishment. “A mercantile marine and a military marine must grow up together,” Adams explained at the opening of his administration; “one can not long exist without the other.”[16] Adams was a man who believed in peaceful, free trade. But in the contemporary state of the world, a naval force was necessary for the protection of such trade. His point particularly was underscored by the succession of events that had occurred after Britain and France went to war in 1793, when the United States found itself caught between the two rival nations fighting in the wake of the French Revolution.

When U.S. diplomatic overtures failed to resolve issues, particularly French violations of U.S. neutral rights and attacks on trade, Adams sent a request to Congress in May 1797, asking that it create a navy that could protect commerce at sea during this crisis, along with becoming a permanent system of naval defense. As tensions increased and France even refused to recognize U.S. diplomats, Congress responded with a series of legislative acts. In April 1798, it authorized both the acquisition of a dozen small, armed vessels and the creation of the Navy Department. Shortly thereafter, the 26-gun USS Ganges commanded by Captain Richard Dale became the first U.S. Navy ship to get under way. Later congressional acts in May and June provided for additional galleys and sloops, and finally in July, Congress voted to complete the other three frigates, construction of which had been halted at the time of the peace treaty with Algiers three years earlier. On his own executive authority, Adams soon established the country’s first navy yard at the capital in Washington, D.C., and others soon followed at Boston and at Norfolk.

By the time the Quasi War with France was over in 1800, the new U.S. Navy had commissioned 45 ships. Adams eloquently explained to the nation in his last address to Congress:

While our best endeavours for the preservation of harmony with all nations will continue to be used, the experience of the world and our own experience admonish us of the insecurity of trusting too confidently to their success. We cannot, without committing a dangerous imprudence, abandon those measures of self-protection which are adapted to our situation, and to which, notwithstanding our pacific policy, the violence or injustice of others may again compel us to resort.[17]

Adams’s words expressed clearly the initial basis on which Congress and the American people accepted and agreed to maintain a permanent navy. The quarter-century-long process that led to this conclusion also set the stage for the continuing discussion about the appropriate size and employment of the Navy over the coming centuries.

Simplistic vs. Full Explanations in Naval History

The contrast between the overly simplistic explanations of naval history used in naming someone such as John Paul Jones as the “father of the Navy” or a place such as Marblehead or Salem as the “birthplace of the Navy” distorts beyond recognition what actually happened. In the end, such attributions are only empty titles that quickly become meaningless to the modern professional. In contrast, the complete story is full of insight into our national character, our political and governmental process, and an example of the essential inter-relationships in political, military, and naval affairs. Such insights in the course of a well-rounded professional education provide an invaluable basis for understanding the process by which our Navy must necessarily work today.

Dr. Hattendorf is one of the most widely known and well respected naval historians in the world. He is Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island.