The threat of maritime terrorism is global and growing. To counter it, naval forces and agencies will need to combine active and passive countermeasures with a strong program of cooperation and intelligence sharing.
In the past 20 years, more than 100 hostile actions have been carried out against maritime shipping. Many ships were attacked and captured at sea, especially in Southeast Asian waters. Some shipping and oil companies have paid enormous sums of money to criminal syndicates and organizations to safeguard their commercial interests. Considering the economic importance of the maritime sector—30% of the world's economy depends on trade, and 99.7% of all intercontinental trade travels by sea-this phenomena demands immediate attention.
There are two distinct types of hostile actions against ships at sea. Economically motivated terrorists—simply modern pirates—aim at the ship herself and/or her cargo, while politically, religious, or ideologically driven terrorists want to score more decisively, and are ready to kill people and themselves. Pirates target only commercial and pleasure shipping; terrorists may also attack military or strategic assets, such as naval vessels, or other maritime targets, such as seaports and coastal industrial installations. In addition, pirates rarely use firearms when intercepted, but try to outrun the policing craft in the open sea or dash into rugged coastal areas, where heavier patrol boats cannot maneuver freely. For military and law enforcement organizations, this distinction is important, not only for mission classification, but also to define rules of engagement, mission profiles, and assets to be employed.
Thus, different from modern piracy, which terrifies commercial navigation by looting and plundering, maritime terrorism seems to have become a tool to influence the behavior of a nation.
The Maritime Terrorist Threat
At both the strategic and tactical levels, maritime terrorism has emerged as a multifaceted and complex security threat. Its rise can be attributed to several general reasons: (1) poor coastal surveillance, (2) a profusion of targets, (3) the trend toward reduced crews on both naval and merchant ships, and (4) less stringent security in ports compared with airports. Indeed, antiterrorism measures implemented on land and in the air actually may have forced terrorists to alternative venues for mass casualty attacks-warships alongside or lying at anchor, gas and oil carriers and terminals, petrochemical installations, cruise ships and passenger liners, sea resorts, etc. There may be few terrorist groups with maritime capabilities today, but it is clear that most are capable of transferring their attack capabilities from the ground to the sea.
The maritime asymmetric terrorist threat includes at least three families of assets:
* Small surface vessels. In this category are fast inshore attack craft (powerboats, interceptors, rigid hull inflatable boats, jet skis, etc.) variously equipped with short-range missiles, rockets, rocket-propelled grenades, heavy machine guns or—as suicide craft-explosive charges. Normally approaching solo but sometimes in "swarms," these craft may not have the capability to sink a warship, especially a modern surface combatant, but they can kill people, hamper ship operations, damage ship systems and sensors, and effectively disable a vessel. The same is true for unmanned undersea vehicles and midget submarines.
* Mines. Mines are cheap, easy to acquire or to produce, and achieve a dramatic surprise effect. Terrorist groups can plan long-term and coordinated minelaying campaigns because time is on their side. A few groups have been proficient in the use of mines, generally through the sponsorship of a foreign nation, while fewer groups have either procured or manufactured naval mines.
* Air vehicles. Air asymmetric threats against naval and merchant ships could emerge as light aircraft, ultralight air vehicles, or even suicide hang gliders acting as modern kamikazes. There is no evidence of groups using such methodology, but gliders and light aircraft are not difficult to acquire or use.
In the era of global commerce, other possible maritime terrorism methodologies also must be considered. Terrorists could infiltrate their nations of interest disguised among the enormous flow of illegal migrants crossing the seas in search of a better future. A hijacked liquefied natural gas merchant vessel could be used as a floating bomb against ports, oil rigs, and coastal installations. Terrorists could use shipping containers to transport weapons and dangerous materials, or use the containers themselves as weapons of mass destruction.
Although terrorist attacks against maritime targets accounted for only 2% of all international incidents over the past 30 years, their impact on public opinion and society is higher than for many hostile actions. The attack on the Cole (DDG-67), for example, generated enormous political capital and dramatically underscored the vulnerability of vessels in port. And vessels are at risk under other conditions, as well. These include while under way at low speed and during transit through channels, straits, and other choke points.1 Attacks carried out by the Iranian Islamic Revolution Guard's Boghammer-type speed boats against tankers transiting the Strait of Hormuz during the 1980-1989 Iraq-Iran war illustrate this kind of vulnerability.
Because globalization demands open sea lines of communication and commerce, there is a clear requirement for combating and defeating terrorism at and from the sea. Another high-risk situation for warships is when operating in peacekeeping missions in the vicinity of potentially hostile nations.
A Strategy to Combat Maritime Terrorism
A comprehensive strategy to combat and defeat maritime terrorism can be developed using two parallel approaches—passive and active—based on a common foundation of cooperation between naval and maritime police organizations and all concerned nations. The main venue for such a cooperation is exchange and evaluation of intelligence about terrorist groups and their possible intentions, especially because in the current information age, terrorist groups are widely dispersed, can operate more covertly than in the past, and are well funded.
* Passive countermeaures. These include (1) mapping and updating all targets considered at risk to analyze their most vulnerable points; (2) defining specific antiterrorism plans for warships and merchant vessels for various conditions (in port, under way in risky waters, transiting choke points, etc); (3) enhancing surveillance and monitoring of all merchant vessels, using maritime assets, coastal surveillance radars, and shipping control systems; (4) developing specific equipment-or upgrading existing equipment—to deter attacks (personal armament, guard stations' protection, surveillance devices, etc.); and (5) establishing maritime cooperation through multinational operations and exercises in major areas of interest.
In addition to these efforts by intelligence and police agencies, some countermeasures relate directly to warships. After the attack on the Cole, most navies took steps to increase their antiterrorism and force protection (AT/FP) preparedness, through a combination of improved training, revised posture procedures, better intelligent, and new equipment. However, the most effective tool in preventing a future attack is the crew. Whatever his or her specialization, each sailor must be proficient in using small-caliber guns, machine guns, and side arms. Each warship must conduct extensive AT/FP training, during both in-port and at-anchor situations and under way, using their own special forces acting as maritime terrorists.
The maritime terrorist threat also requires continuous surveillance of sensitive harbor areas for both surface and subsurface threats. In the first case, navies must improve search and detection capabilities against fast inshore attack craft and unmanned vehicles through advanced electro-optical/infrared devices and rapid reaction small-caliber guns. Dealing with subsurface threats means adopting underwater surveillance systems designed for detection, localization, and tracking of small targets. These systems should have surveillance capability against threats with low signature and/or small target strength, such as divers, unmanned undersea vehicles, and midget submarines.
* Active countermeasures. We need a strategy to strike terrorists in their safe havens. Such a strategy is applicable to all kinds of terrorism, is based largely on preemption of hostile intent, and must be implemented with deadly force. After the terrorists' hideouts are located by intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities, strikes by special forces, tactical aviation, and cruise missiles can be called in, using precision-guided munitions. In this scenario, maritime forces play a central role because they can provide a base from which to launch any type of strike. In fact, special forces can be inserted covertly by submarine; cruise missiles can be launched by surface and subsurface platforms; and tactical aviation can fly from aircraft carriers.
Maritime forces also can act against maritime terrorism by cooperating in a range of surveillance and prevention operations, such as detecting terrorists trying to insert in a specific country through illegal immigration and keeping close watch on maritime choke points. Operations Sea Cutlass in the South China Sea and Active Endeavor in the Mediterranean are two examples of many regional coalition operations under way today to subdue terrorism.
As U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Vern Clark recently stated, "the next step in the fight against terrorism is to join forces and form a worldwide coalition of military and law enforcement organizations to keep our oceans free and safe. This coalition would share information to track shipping around the world to end the illegal exploitation of our sea lines of communication and to stop terrorism at its root."2
The threat from terrorism is global, volatile, and assymetric. Our response must be global, timely, and preemptive. We can deter, prevent, and defeat terrorism. And we can do it from the sea.
1 The Malacca Strait, for example, is 500 miles long and extremely narrow, especially along its southern half, where it ranges from 20 to 9 miles. This stretch is the world's busiest waterway, with 50,000 to 300,000 vessels passing each year.
2 Statement by Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Vern Clark, USN, at the 16th International Seapower Symposium, Naval War College, 26-29 October, 2003.
Captain Cosentino graduated from the Italian Naval Academy in 1978 and served as chief engineering officer on submarines and surface ships. He subsequently was assigned to NATO headquarters and other joint and Navy staff posts. Currently, he serves as Head, Submarine Division, at Italy's Ministry of Defense's Directorate of Naval Armaments.