"The Court Has Adjourned"
(See M. Vimislik, p. 88, October 2004 Proceedings)
Chief Yeoman Bernard Michael Burawski, U.S. Navy (Retired)-I found true the author's assessment of the current chief petty officer (CPO) initiation process. After 25 years of active duty in August 2003, I have seen the CPO esprit de corps vanish. Most of today's senior enlisted personnel only are interested in political gamesmanship with a goal of getting promoted to the next higher pay grade. There is no concern for mentoring or helping fellow CPOs, and there is no camaraderie. The CPO initiation is a thing of the past and was sacrificed as a result of political correctness and the failure of the CPO community to fight the tide of the Navy's lack of trust in our abilities to manage a meaningful initiation. What has evolved is a "leadership school" something like what the Army or Air Force uses.
Captain James L. Burke, U.S. Navy (Retired)-Master Chief Vimislik has it all wrong. Throughout my 31-year career, I wondered why the Navy found it desirable to mark a significant promotion with childish and, especially in my early years, dangerous pranks. I am not aware that any other service has a parallel practice. Some chiefs will tell you that makes them unique. Perhaps they are only out of step.
Through three commands at sea, I have had chiefs try to explain to me that humiliation somehow made them better chiefs, as if there were a connection between hazing, which is what our initiations have done, and future performance. It is a hypothesis that has no proof.
Master Chief Vimislik alleges that the old initiation process, with all its childish routines, provides the selectees "a brief glimpse of what is in store for them as chiefs." I certainly hope not. I prefer to think the new chiefs will be treated with the respect they deserve after having passed exams, been selected by a selection board, and given the insignia, uniform, and rank of a chief petty officer.
When chief petty officers are transferred to a new mess, their new messmates take them at face value. The newcomers do not need "to demonstrate to their brethren chiefs what they are made of." Their previous selection and promotion are good enough-and should be always. This moronic hazing routine should be rooted out and discarded.
"Who's Responsible for Losing the Media War in Iraq?"
(See J. Lacey, p. 37-41, October 2004 Proceedings)
Colonel Wes Weiner, U.S. Army-Thanks for offering a superb article on the state of the military and the media today. Mr. Lacey's suggestions are like a laser-precisely on target.
Lieutenant Colonel Richard Seaman, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Retired), Former Assistant Managing Editor, Time-According to Mr. Lacey, the American media not only set national policy, its reporters are engaged in a conspiracy to trash the U.S. military. Politicians from both parties will be puzzled by the first claim; most journalists vehemently will deny the second. No matter. Lacey has no doubts. The root of the problem, he says, is mindboggling ineptitude on the part of military public affairs officers.
It is true enough that many PAOs are not very good at their thankless jobs, but Lacey's complaints about them are ludicrous. When Lacey tried to organize a trip to Iraq in the post-assault phase and pointed out that he planned to write a favorable report, no PAO rolled out a red carpet. To him, that kind of treatment for someone who worked for a national newsmagazine and a television network to boot was tantamount to treason. He goes on to argue that journalists from major newsmagazines or national newspapers or television networks should have special access to news sources. Why should they have to wait in line behind a reporter from the "Podunk Gazette"! he whines. His combination of arrogance and condescension knows no bounds.
Lacey says journalists ought to be "cultivated" by the military. That would "bind them closer than ever." Would it harm their efforts at objectivity? Not at all, he says. "How is it the White House Press Corps, which gets all kinds of privileged access and perks, is never accused of being too cozy with the President?" Never? What has the man been smoking?
To be fair, Lacey does have some reasonable ideas for improving military-press relations. Reporters should be offered opportunities to learn more about the military than they can while embedded on the battlefield. PAOs should spend time with the press at home to understand how it really operates. All such suggestions are commendable, but they are not new. And they pale into insignificance beside Lacey's hare-brained theory that the military should pay for various media operations. As if the military already doesn't do enough for reporters by protecting them, feeding them in the field, doling out equipment, and carting them around.
What Lacey expects from improved PAOs comes close to fantasy. A properly trained officer, he insists, would have helped a Washington Post reporter put a story about U.S. Army misconduct toward Iraqis into proper context. He would have had at his fingertips information about New York City Police Department (NYPD) misconduct, complaints about NYPD patrols, the number of NYPD investigations compared to military investigations in Iraq ... the list goes on, and statistics are quoted to the hundredth of a percent. That would be above and beyond the call of duty even for an astonishingly well-informed PAO.
I don't know how Lacey's editors at Time would have reacted had he filed a story from a war zone with that kind of context. I am sure each of the managing editors I worked for during 25 years at the same magazine would have brought him home for rest and medication.
"The Big Network Could Save Your Life"
(See C. Munns, pp. 56-58, September 2004 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral Robert F. Dunn, U.S. Navy (Retired), President, Naval Historical Foundation-Then-Rear Admiral Munns's article is one of the most illuminating I have read on the subject. I congratulate the admiral and I congratulate the Naval Institute Editorial Board and the editors of Proceedings for seeing its value and publishing it.
Over the past 15 or 20 years, much has been spoken and written about military initiatives, but most often descriptions have been couched in arcane expressions fathomable only to the uninitiated. Now comes Admiral Munns, who can write so even the unversed can understand what networking is all about.
Notwithstanding my praise for Admiral Munns's approach, I believe he falls short in describing some important aspects of maximizing the efficiency of a networked organization. He does describe the improvements in security with the advent of the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet, but leaves out any description of the necessity of establishing either common data links or a set of data links that can talk with one another. When discussing the Navy this probably gets into the realm of classification, but it is a fact that the nation's air control system, for one, suffers and adds to the airspace capacity problem because of a lack of common data links. I would hope progress toward smoothing out intraNavy and joint and combined data links is as far along as is, he writes, the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet.
Admiral Munns does mention the Navy's Transformation and Training Initiative, but he fails to emphasize training in how to determine the pertinence of information to a given operation. All the information in the world approaches not being useful if the recipient cannot sort the important from the unimportant. Operators who say, "Give me all the information and I'll sort it out," will soon drown in that information. In the past, with limited information available, experience usually sufficed to give the recipient the necessary sorting skills. Now, with information of all sorts accessible almost everywhere, and to even the most junior and most inexperienced in the chain of command, there has to be training in how to sort the wheat from the chaff.
Admiral Munns described the evolution of earlier networks, but the use of history in today's operations can go much beyond that. On the other hand, he wrote, "Ships' officers must be able to reach back for information on harbor operations in foreign ports." In the instant usage that statement surprises because for many years every ship carried a series of volumes of port directories that contained histories, port operating procedures, piloting instructions, availability of chandler services, and more. Beyond that, there's more to be gleaned from history than information about ports. Past histories of relations with countries and alliances, reviews of previous, even very old, operations in unfrequented geographical areas, ways, methods and means used by predecessor commanders, and lessons learned over the years all come to mind. All of that does require digitization of historical records far beyond what has been accomplished to date, an effort Admiral Munns was in great position to champion should he have so chosen.
The Navy has made quantum improvements in devising and adapting to network operations over the past 20 years. Indeed, the Navy has been at the forefront of such operations, and today other government and civilian entities are adopting its practice, terminologies, and structures, albeit at an exceedingly slow pace. Perhaps we can get more of them to read Admiral Munns's article.
"Swift Boats: Hard Day on the Bo De"
(See P. Yost, pp. 66-69, October 2004 Proceedings)
Robert B. Shirley, "Webmaster, PCF-45"-I was the officer in charge of a Swift boat in Vietnam. Although my tour was not concurrent with Admiral Yost's tenure as CTG 115.4 in the southern part of Vietnam, I have, for the past two years, been researching and assembling narratives and images of all the periods of Swift boat operations from 1965-1970 for my Web site on Swift boat history.
The incident that is the subject of Admiral Yost's article is well known to most Swift boat sailors and has been documented in an article for the UDT-13 Cruise Book by Peter Upton and a documentary film by Tracy Droz Tragos (Be Good, Smile Pretty), who was the infant daughter of the officer in charge killed in the PCF-43 on 12 April 1969.
Based on the after-action reports filed by then-Captain Yost and then-Commander Roy Hoffmann, plus inputs of information and images by Swift boat and underwater demolition team sailors who were present that day, I have generated a Web page presentation of this engagement and the aftermath of that tragedy:
http://pcf45.com/sealords/silvermace/ silvermace.html
The almost obsessive theme of Admiral Yost's article is that his boss, Roy Hoffmann, somehow subverted his tactical command of this operation by purposely failing to provide helicopter gunship support in a timely manner as requested by Yost. The implication is that Hoffmann was incompetent and was at the root cause of the disaster that day.
This allegation is most assuredly incorrect, as evidenced by Yost's own report of the action filed contemporaneously. In his report, certified by lieutenant (junior grade) D. E. Wright, Yost states the helicopter gunships, one with Hoffmann on board, were overhead and providing gunfire support as Yost in the PCF-31 and the PCF-5 were rescuing survivors of the PCF-43, which was beached, damaged, and under attack. Yost's report praises the crews of the Swift boats, the crews and pilots of the Seawolf gunships, and even Hoffmann himself for actions involved with the successful rescue attempt.
There are other errors in Yost's article: The action took place on the Rach Duong Keo, not the Bo De. There were 13 Swift boats involved in the operation, not 9. It was the PCF-38 that notified Yost that the PCF-43 Swift had been disabled after the PCF-38 had also been damaged trying to provide assistance, rather than his contention that it was noticed a boat was missing from the formation.
But it is the tone of the article, with its attitude that the majority of people on this operation somehow were incompetent ("My .50-caliber gunner had quite a gut on him") or cowardly (The Vietnamese colonel is quoted as saying, "I can't move because we're up against at least a company"), that is most disturbing. According to Yost, only his own skill and professionalism kept the operation intact and allowed him to report, "It was a relatively successful operation. We had a large body count-a lot of sampans sunk, a lot of pigs and chickens killed." His own errors in describing this engagement make his judgment about his own actions suspect.
No one involved in this operation would have characterized it as anywhere near successful, especially in view of the destruction of the PCF-43 and the U.S. and Vietnamese soldiers and sailors wounded or killed. This operation was one of the most significant disasters involving Swift boats during the war-and Yost was the officer in tactical command of it, at his own request, according to his article.
The combination of tone, the incorrect assertions, and the timing of publication in Proceedings are what make this article particularly troubling to me. Does the fact that Rear Admiral Roy Hoffmann is leading a group of Swift boat veterans in bringing forth the truth about Swift boat operations in early 1969 have anything to do with Admiral Yost's attempt to denigrate the reputation of an officer who served honorably and well in the U.S. Navy? I certainly hope this is not the case.
EDITOR'S NOTE: Admiral Yost consented to a request by this staff to publish an abridged and edited excerpt from his recently completed oral history as an article in our October issue. Two Naval Institute Press books cover the operation in question: Commander R. L. Schreadley, U.S. Navy (Retired), From the Rivers to the Sea (1992), p. 219; and lieutenant Commander Thomas J. Cutler, U.S. Navy (Retired), Brown Water, Black Berets (1988), p. 308.
"Let Them Eat Democracy"
(See S. Pressfield, p. 30, October 2004 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Michael Tomlinson, Chaplain Corps, U.S. Naval Reserve-It was significant that Mr. Pressfield began his commentary with a quote from Stanley Kubrick's film Full Metal Jacket, a movie based on Gus Hasford's antiwar novel The Short Timers. Like any good novelist, he doesn't let the facts stand in the way of his story.
Pressfield begins disparaging and demeaning out-of-hand the Iraqis' desire for freedom and democracy. He then patronizingly utters the query so dear to the hearts of Western snobs and xenophobes: Is Islam compatible with democracy and individual liberty? Democracy and liberty are not the possessions of any faith, people, or nation. Democracy is a principle compatible to all nations and cultures if allowed to flourish and adapt to its host. Pressfield and his ilk pay lip service to democracy, but are proponents of an international form of Jim Crow.
Comparing the United States to the Athenian empire is a subterfuge to criticize the ongoing democratization of Iraq. Considering the plot he has chosen to weave, it is not surprising that Pressfield fails to grasp that when the United States has "imposed" democracy on people it has been for the sake of freedom and not corporate capitalism and/or U.S. domination. Despite his plea to learn from the past, Pressfield has failed to learn from that same textbook.
Rather than using the arcane logic of conspiracy theorists (e.g., Michael Moore) or Athenian history as a model to understand what the United States is doing in Iraq, we need look no further than our own country's past. The U.S. commitment to spreading and ensuring democracy began with the Monroe Doctrine, adopted in 1823. From that day the United States has become a dedicated "evangelist" for democracy and liberty in the world. Granted, we have not always lived up to our highest ideals when interacting with other nations, but it is reprehensible to imply that this country's commitment to democracy is anything but genuine.
The pièce de résistance of the United States "imposing" democracy on a country is best illustrated by post-World War II Germany. When the Allies triumphed in 1945, the job was not finished-a new Germany needed to be created from the ashes of defeated totalitarianism. The history of U.S. democratization of Germany best explains our mission in Iraq.
Despite universal recognition that Germany needed reconstruction, in 1946 The New York Times was trumpeting the debacle of U.S. failure to win the peace in Germany. Sound familiar? Thankfully, President Harry Truman and the American people ignored the prognosticators of doom, and today Germany stands as a bastion of democracy in the modern world. Why? The United States had the leadership and vision not only to liberate Germany, but to do the hard work of creating a democratic nation from scratch.
A Vietnam-type scenario will play out in Iraq only if we turn back to the failed political machinations of the past. If we are resolute to see democracy triumph in Iraq, then not only will the future of that country be brighter, but the political landscape of the troubled Middle East will be altered for the better. On the other hand, if the political thinking that abounded in the late 1960s, 1970s, and 1990s takes hold and Iraq is abandoned to chaos and tyranny, then the consequences will be far more cataclysmic than our loss in Indochina.
Militant Islam's war against the United States began when President Jimmy Carter played midwife to Iran's theocratic despotism that now threatens to go nuclear. President Bill Clinton's bungling things in Somalia helped to embolden Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda in their attacks on the United States. One can only imagine the hell that will be unleashed on the United States if we turn tail and run before the job is done in Iraq.
"Experimentation Is the Way to Transformation"
(See C. Myers, p. 68-70, September 2004 Proceedings)
James E. Colvard, former Deputy Chief, Naval Material Command-Mr. Myers was certainly on target in describing the problem of current-day defense acquisition as a legacy of the McNamara era.
In addition to bringing about a vast review and approval structure, that era also diminished the role and impact of experienced military officers in the weapon acquisition process. McNamara's intellectually brilliant "whiz kids" dazzled Congress with weapon performance predictions that treated war as a precise science rather than the art and craft that it really is. Nevermind that in combat the predictions proved to be wrong and the weapons performed much poorer than predicted-the damage had been done. To Congress, analytic abstraction became reality and actual warfighting experience became a mark of parochialism rather than a means of turning knowledge into wisdom. The Department of Defense (DoD) has never recovered from the McNamara era.
Today, DoD, and the Navy in particular, is moving further away from understanding how to prepare for and fight wars. DoD is now seen as merely a big business which can be run as such, and the MBA has become the preferred academic ticket to be punched.
But national defense is not a market-driven business; it is an obligation. There is no market, only a mission. There is no product to sell, only a duty to perform. There is no internal competition, only a requisite for victory. Defense is a monopoly that primarily must be effective, and only secondarily must be efficient. Losing a war at half price would be a disaster, not a bargain. There is no meaningful return on investment (ROI) in war. All the nuclear weapons we have paid for but never used are a dead loss from an ROI perspective. In the maintenance of our sovereignty and balance of power in the world, however, they are priceless.
The Goldwater/Nichols Act took the military out of the acquisition process and put the process in the hands of civilian political appointees. This, of necessity, leads to a short-term perspective. It is time to return the military officer, who has the understanding of the art and craft of war based on direct experience, to an integral role in weapons acquisition and to promote the rational risk-taking that Mr. Myers described.
"Our Enemy Is Not Terrorism"
(See J. Lehman, pp. 52-54, May 2004; R. Stennis, pp. 24-26, July 2004; M. Dossett, p. 20, August 2004; P. A. Williams, pp. 22-24, October 2004 Proceedings)
Commander James Nugent, U.S. Navy (Retired)-Commander Williams thanks Secretary Lehman "for unmasking Islam as the real enemy of all who resist it, especially Jews and friends of Israel." He then proceeds to conflate the Islamic faithful with jihadists, a word Williams appears to use synonymously with terrorists. This is off base for a couple of reasons:
* Secretary Lehman did not claim Islam was the enemy; he specifically stated, "Our enemy is violent, Islamic fundamentalists." He then differentiated fundamentalist Muslims from the vast majority of Islamic faithful who are overwhelmingly peaceful and in no way present a threat to this or any other country. President Bush made the same distinction immediately after 11 September 2001.
* If Commander Williams had any appreciation for Islamic history and norms, he would be aware that the Jews faired, by and large, far better historically with the Muslims than they did with the Christians, who brought the Jews pogroms, the Inquisition, blame for plague and pestilence in general, and the Holocaust. Present-day enmities between Judaism and Islam are largely created and exacerbated by the problems associated with how Israel was brought into existence and how it has managed its relations with the Palestinians. Both sides have ample reason for dislike, if not hatred, which has made the problems associated with this region appear intractable.
Religious fundamentalists, be they Islamic, Christian, Jewish, or any other faith, are inherently dangerous. Their interpretation of their faith tends to the extreme, predicated on a belief that they have a special understanding of the word of God that surpasses that of other believers of the same faith, who otherwise divine from the same words far less certain and destructive inclinations. Commander Williams apparently does not understand or appreciate this distinction, and thus manages to assign to the category of enemy the Turks, the Pakistanis, the Afghanis, all the countries of the Middle East, and the 1.3 billion adherents of the faith in general.
The Naval Institute Editorial Board also needs to get its sights aligned. Had someone written to the Comment and Discussion section that Jews were the enemy, or Buddhists were to be feared, I am inclined to think that there would have been second thoughts about publishing such a letter. How a letter could be published that clearly did not reflect the meaning or intent of the original writer, in this case Secretary Lehman, also begs an answer. Commander Williams's error may well be from a lack of understanding or overgeneralization; the Naval Institute should have known better.
"Save the Tico!"
(See S. Truver, p. 28, October 2004 Proceedings)
Frank Burger-From 1976-1994, I was Ingalls program manager for the USS Ticonderoga (CG-47). I agree with Mr. Truver. It is far too soon to relegate her to the scrap heap.
Ingalls performed a study to extend the life of the Baseline One ships and other CGs. The study with model basin tests was completed in 1996. Essentially, it doubled the hull. If implemented, it would eliminate the currently perceived problems:
* Hull girder strength is increased to approximately 14,500 tons, with 2,500 tons of growth.
* Provides two Mk 41 launchers, eliminating the labor-intensive Mk 26 launchers (128 from 80 missiles).
* Reduces radar cross-section.
* With "smart ship," reduces crew size to the original 209.
* Substantively increases endurance.
* Provides either afloat staff accommodations or an additional 32 Mk 41 VLS cells (for a total possible of 64 forward and 96 aft).