Naval Coastal Warfare: The Fleet's Eyes in the Littorals
Lieutenant Commander Christopher Rawley, U.S. Navy
During the 1991 Gulf War and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the U.S. military was virtually unopposed in the littorals and able to support its land operations by establishing and maintaining an extensive sea-based logistics chain. In future conflicts, however, access to coastal regions may be impeded and our naval forces may face the unpleasant prospect of fighting without the benefit of resupply from the sea.
Naval Coastal Warfare (NCW) forces played a critical role in protecting commercial and military sealift during OIF. Active and reserve sailors from NCW detachments-mobile inshore undersea warfare units (MIUWUs), inshore boat units (IBUs), harbor defense commands (HDCs), and Coast Guard port security units (PSUs)-provided force protection at ports in Iraq, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates, and on Iraqi oil platforms in the Northern Arabian Gulf. With the proper investments in training and equipment, NCW can contribute far more effectively to the Navy's future mastery of the littorals.
Capabilities and Limitations
Sensors for littoral warfare generally are expeditionary in nature and range from space-based observation satellites to seafloor listening devices. In a network-centric environment, sensors must be tactically agile and responsive to on-scene commanders. Recent system updates give MIUWUs strong sensor capabilities, which include radar, electronic support measures (ESM), and acoustic data from sonobuoys and bottom arrays. With the exception of time-delayed information from the Global Command and Control System (GCCS)-Maritime, however, NCW units cannot link to the joint and Navy common operating pictures to access and contribute to the wealth of data they provide.
Mobile targets are of major concern in the littorals. In the case of North Korean special operations forces, their submersible and semisubmersible vessels are becoming increasingly sophisticated and difficult to detect. Defenders will have an extremely difficult time identifying and tracking them-much less engaging them. NCW assets linked in a network of tactically responsive sensors would enable U.S. units to engage such time-sensitive threats. Sensors must have an update rate of seconds, as opposed to the current rate of minutes or hours.
Over the past 20 years, the combat power of Navy forces has increased while their survivability has decreased. Until the next generation of surface combatants overcomes this tactical instability, NCW forces will have to furnish surveillance and force protection wherever naval forces are in port or operating close to shore. If employed properly, coastal warfare sensors can help compensate for a shortage of ships and increase situational awareness in the littorals.
Sea Power 21's sea-basing concept calls for logistically self-sustaining expeditionary forces that can be relocated, thereby increasing survivability of all force elements, especially traditional land-based units.1 The expeditionary nature of NCW units makes them exceptionally compatible with the sea-basing concept. Ideally, they would not be dependent on overflight and basing rights. Although the sea-basing concept is not entirely achievable for NCW units currently, certain areas can be improved now. For example, efforts continue on decreasing the MIUWU logistical footprint with rapidly deployable sensor suites. Together with ensuring that NCW forces are supplied with full allowances of equipment (prepositioned as required), this effort is essential.
Given the current threat environment and the types of missions conducted by NCW forces, visual sensors are critical to developing and maintaining strong situational awareness. With current equipment, by the time a contact of interest is detected on radar, cameras are slewed, and the contact is correlated visually by boats or lookouts, the situation is near the critical stage.
A Vision
To maintain operational relevance in highly uncertain environments, NCW units must develop the force structure, technology, and tactics for the network-centric environment as a matter of priority. Based on lessons learned in OIF, their capabilities should be enhanced as follows:
* IBU and PSU boats need a means for transmitting Global Positioning System information to the MIUWU operations center or harbor defense command. A wireless network system using commercial off-the-shelf parts was tested successfully on the Fletcher (DD-992) to keep track of her rigid-hull inflatable boats during visit, board, search, and seizure operations.2 A similar low-cost system for IBUs would provide greater crew safety and situational awareness during over-the-horizon operations-in addition to providing better identification and tracking of potential targets.
* NCW units should be able to transmit acoustic and ESM data from their sensors to other units; they could become nodes in the Navy's Cooperative Engagement Capability. This type of system would allow target-quality data from NCW sensors to be engaged by assets external to the harbor defense organization. Thermal imaging was used successfully by IBUs during OIF, but external units could not access the information. A thermal imaging system (and possibly ESM sensors) on IBU boats would permit data to be digitally transmitted to operations centers and then disseminated to the fleet via broadband satellite links.
* MIUWUs and HDCs require the ability to view, relay, and disseminate real-time sensor data from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned combat aerial vehicles to other NCW units and external forces. UAVs have been employed extensively for reconnaissance, targeting, and engaging enemy forces in the war on terrorism. The ability to use and distribute this data will be key to controlling littoral areas.
* The NCW community should provide input to Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and Navy Warfare Development Command efforts to build an expeditionary sensor grid.3 NCW units could play a major role in deploying inexpensive remote, unmanned active and passive coastal electronic, acoustic, and electro-optical sensors. These sensors could be disposable and deployed in the same fashion as sonobuoys; they should be compatible with similar systems being developed for the littoral combat ship.
* MIUWUs need a secret internet protocol router network (SIPRNet) chat capability through the GCCS. Secure chat quickly is becoming the primary means of communications in the fleet. Without it, NCW risks experiencing a significant delay in transmitting and receiving time-critical information necessary to operational decisions. During OIF, SIPRNet chat proved to be an invaluable tool for communicating and coordinating with fleet assets. On several occasions, NCW units stationed on the Khawr'Abd Allah River near Umm Qasr identified potential smugglers headed downriver and alerted Task Force 55 boarding teams positioned at the river's mouth.
* The mobile sensor platform (MSP) is one of the MIUWU's primary sensors. It is essentially a high-mobility multi-wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) with infrared (IR) and television cameras and radar mounted atop a telescopic mast. Video and radar data is transmitted back to the operations center using a line-of-sight microwave antenna. But the current MSP is too expensive (about $1 million), maintenance intensive, and prone to failure during operations. It should be replaced with updated commercial sensors that can be towed and more easily placed. Small, relatively inexpensive visual and IR sensors could be dispersed over a large area and connected to the operations center by way of a wireless local area network. They would be powered with a solar panel-battery system and would require only occasional checks-as opposed to the MSP, which requires nearly continuous manning and refueling. Rather than using microwave communications to transmit data, lower cost and widely available commercial technologies should be explored. One of these technologies is the new WiMAX standard, which transmits data over Internet protocol as far as 30 miles and permits a simpler interface with other computer systems." The sensor platforms also could be deployed to form perimeter defense systems.
* Landward port security was a mission assigned to MIUWUs during OIF-but it was one they were not fully equipped to perform. NCW forces in Iraq held the port of Umm Qasr after the departure of I Marine Expeditionary Force and used MSPs to provide night surveillance for the naval special clearance and coalition teams that cleared mines in the Khawr' Abd Allah River. Equipping MIUWUs with armored HMMWVs that have thermal imagers and crew-served weapons would solve the problem of repeatedly establishing and moving fighting positions in ports and littoral areas. In addition, they are needed as convoy escorts in high-threat environments such as Iraq. A tethered surveillance aerostat (balloon) with IR and visual sensors would provide wide-area coverage of a port facility. Because altitude is essential to situational awareness, one lookout in a 150-foot tower at Ash Shua'aybah, Kuwait, could see more of the harbor and identify threats faster than all the MIUWU equipment on the pier.
Train Like We Fight
In the past, most NCW activity has revolved around localized force protection activities at individual ports. Although NCW units have participated in many major exercises, there has been little integration with fleet units. A war zone should not be the first time NCW units operate closely with major naval forces.
To enhance interoperability with the fleet, NCW units must train consistently with deploying carrier strike groups and expeditionary strike groups and-at minimum-participate in advanced-phase joint task force exercises. They need not be aligned with strike groups, but should have the opportunity to exercise with deploying groups some time during the NCW training cycle. Active participation in even a three-day event during the force protection or amphibious phases of fleet and joint exercises would increase operational readiness greatly.
The time is ripe for naval coastal warfare units to play an integral role in the Navy's efforts to dominate the littoral regions. By striving to increase sensor capabilities and achieve greater integration with Navy networks, their capabilities can be leveraged to help ensure the world's coastal regions do not become sanctuaries for aggressors.
1 Adm. Vern Clark, USN, "Sea Power 21: Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, October 2002, pp. 36-37.
2 Jerome A. Polios, USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) Public Affairs, Navy News Service, 16 August 2000.
3 Catherine MacRae, "Services, DARPA Doing Early Research On 'Expeditionary Sensor Grid,'" Inside the Pentagon, 21 June 2001, p. 1.
4 Bill Wolf, "New Long-Range Standard May Heat Up Wireless Internet," Louisville, Kentucky Courier-Journal, 22 February 2004.
Lieutenant Commander Rawley, a surface warfare officer, served with Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare Unit 114 in Iraq and Kuwait during Operation Iraqi Freedom. He previously commanded Inshore Boat Unit 15 and currently commands a reserve staff detachment that supports Cruiser-Destroyer Group One.
Foreign Consequence Management: Another MEU (SOC) Mission
Captain Robert P. Kozloski, U.S. Marine Corps
Foreign consequence management is defined as measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) situations outside the United States.1 The lead federal agency for such contingencies is the Department of State supported by the Department of Defense (DoD).
Thanks to the formation of the Department of Homeland security and the increased awareness of all federal agencies, terrorist attacks in the United States have become more difficult. At the same time, our interests abroad remain vulnerable-as do the assets and infrastructures of allies who support the war on terrorism. Because most federal assets are dedicated to responding to domestic terrorism, the rest of the world is woefully unprepared for CBRNE attacks.
Evolution of the Mission
As a result of Presidential Decision Directive 39 in 1995, two distinct phases of combating terrorism evolved: crisis management and consequence management. Although many federal assets were assigned to the former phase, few were devoted to the latter. Noting the sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway in 1995, Commandant of the Marine Corps General Charles Krulak was convinced a similar attack would happen on U.S. soil. Thus, he established the Corps' Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) in 1996, envisioning it as a temporary solution until large municipalities could develop organizations for responding to CBRNE incidents.
With the exception of those who formed and supported the CBIRF, few in the military made consequence management a priority mission until the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Soon after its creation, the CBIRF trained primarily with large metropolitan fire, special operations, and emergency response units, and it adapted many of the tactics, techniques, and procedures of hazardous material teams. As the force matured, it participated in large-scale exercises with the fire departments of New York City, Seattle, Los Angeles, and other major metropolitan cities, and it conducted intense live-agent training at Dugway Proving Grounds, Utah, Nevada Test Site, Mercury, Nevada, and the Defence Research Development Centre in Canada. Today, the CBRIF has evolved to a nationally respected unit for technical rescue-ranging from high-angle rope rescues to rescuing people from collapsed structures-in contaminated areas, mass casualty decontamination, and other aspects of lifesaving in the aftermath of attacks.
The force deployed a detachment to the Atlanta Olympics in 1996. Thereafter, it participated in numerous national special security events. The CBRIF responded to the biological attacks on the U.S. Capitol in 2001 and 2004, thus affirming the Marine Corps' role in the consequence management mission. In 2004, it covered the presidential state-of-theunion address, the World War II Memorial dedication ceremony, the G-8 Summit in Savannah, Georgia, and former President Ronald Reagan's state funeral.
Current Status
Following the 11 September attacks, the idea of terrorist attacks on domestic U.S. targets became a reality and many federal agencies created units to respond. But few of these agencies provide the manpower and resources to turn victims into patients after an event occurs. Although they give expert advice, logistic support, and furnish liaison teams, they do not have enough qualified personnel to enter the "hot zone" and realistically assist local first responders.
Many large cities are organizing units capable of initially responding to a CBRNE attacks in their jurisdictions. The National Guard Bureau is continuing to increase the number of operational civil support teams and develop ten CBIRF-like units to correspond to each Federal Emergency Management Agency region. To some extent, General Krulak's vision is coming to fruition as the mission of the Corps' tailored force is assumed slowly by local and state first responders in the continental United States. Because of the importance of government officials and facilities in the National Capital Region, however, the CBIRF likely will remain the response force of choice.
As more large cities and the National Guard Bureau assume domestic consequence responsibilities, a logical next step is to start committing DoD forces to the foreign aspects of this mission to ensure we can support U.S. interests overseas adequately and be in a position to support our allies as well.
In recognition of CBRNE threats, the Marine Corps provides an enhanced nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) equipment package to each deploying special-operations capable Marine expeditionary unit (MEU (SOCl). Marine and Navy experts and Batelle Memorial Institute provide a 14-day training package for each MEU:
* Medical treatment for CBRNE victims
* Triage in CBRNE environments
* Nuclear-biological-chemical reconnaissance
* Improvised explosive device (IED) recognition and mitigation
* Mass casualty decontamination
* Victim extraction
* Use of various levels of personal protective equipment
This training is costly, yet there is little return on the Marine Corps' investment. Because foreign consequence management is not a MEU (SOC) qualification requirement, insufficient time is devoted to it in predeployment workups. To properly test and evaluate its numerous tasks, the Corps must designate foreign consequence management as a MEU (SOC) mission and assign it a priority among the 14 missions and their qualification criteria. Combining the MEU humanitarian assistance and medical mass casualty response missions into the foreign consequence management mission would be one approach to reducing mission "overload."
The Way Ahead
Preparing MEUs to perform the foreign consequence management mission can be accomplished in approximately three years by task organizing current assets or assigning CBRIF detachments to MEUs. Any force responsible for this mission must be proficient in:
* Agent detection
* Casualty extraction
* Mass casualty decontamination
* Technical rescue
* Medical triage and basic life support
* Command and control
* IED recognition and mitigation
* Security
If supplemented, the MEU (SOC) has units that could be formed into an effective team for responding to CBRNE attacks. Marines with the NBC military occupational specialty (MOS) 5711 can be trained to operate chemical and biological detection equipment and shown how to use different levels of personal protective equipment at incident sites.
One rifle company from the battalion landing team could be trained in casualty extraction and mass decontamination of personnel, which facilitates the rapid movement of incapacitated victims from an incident site to medical treatment centers. These are not technical skills and they can be learned in a relatively short time.
Medical personnel from the MEU and the amphibious ready group can be trained in triage and basic life support in contaminated areas; they can be deployed to incident sites as required. IED recognition and disarming procedures are performed by MEU explosive ordnance demolition technicians. A variety of ground combat and logistic support element forces can provide security at the incident site.
In this course of action, the only additions to the current MEU table of organization and equipment would be an emergency services officer (MOS 7002) and 16 crash, fire, and rescue specialists (MOS 7051) to provide technical rescue capabilities. During workups, these personnel would receive advanced training in technical rescue and urban search and rescue.
Crash, fire, and rescue personnel are highly skilled professionals whose capabilities are underused in preparing responses to terrorist incidents. The 7051s should be the lead element in responding to high-yield explosive events and mitigating a chemical attack involving a chemical warfare agent or toxic industrial chemical. (To meet the MEUs' demands, Marine Corps air stations would have to substantially increase the number of 7051 personnel assigned.)
Command and control arrangements would vary depending on the type of incident. Similarly, the type of incident will determine whether the medical officer, emergency services officer, or NBC defense officer serves as the principal advisor to the MEU commander.
Another feasible course of action is to assign CBIRF detachments to MEUs. While not as large as an initial response force (120 Marines and sailors), these platoon-sized elements of specialists with appropriate rescue equipment and command-and-control personnel would reinforce the MEU staff in the event of CBRNE attacks. They would not be stand-alone forces, but would provide the leadership and technical backbone of company-sized elements formed by the MEU. The CBIRF detachment would consist of team leaders-noncommissioned officers for each functional element or squad-and a staff noncommissioned officer to control forces in the contaminated area and supervise patient evacuation to medical facilities. In the event of an attack, previously identified personnel would chop to this task organized element. Because today's CBIRF organization cannot support this course of action, planners would have to decide whether to create two more CBIRFs (one per Marine expeditionary force) or significantly expand the size of the unit based in Indian Head, Maryland.
A major benefit of either of these courses of action is the expanded consequence management capability that would be available to respond to large-scale CBRNE attacks in the United States. They could augment CBIRF personnel at one incident site or be deployed separately in the event of multiple, simultaneous attacks.
Conclusions
Since the creation of the CBIRF in 1996, some Marines have argued that consequence management is not in concert with the Corps' warfighting ethos. Over the past 75 years, however, the Marine Corps has encouraged change and innovation: for example, development of amphibious warfare, tactical use of helicopters, and maritime prepositioning. In an increasingly uncertain and complex world, dedicated foreign consequence management units would add an important capability to the quivers of forward-deployed MEUs (SOC).
The Marine Corps should continue to lead the way in domestic and foreign consequence management. Just as Iraqi Army units discovered what 1st Marine Division Commander Major General James Mattis meant when he termed his Marines "no better friend, no worse enemy," victims of CBRNE attacks will understand the phrase when Marines efficiently convert them to treatable patients.
1 See http://www.deienselink.mil/policy/solic/cn/fcm. html.
Captain Kozloski, a formel company commander at the Chemical Biological Incident Response Force in Indian Head, Maryland, is awaiting assignment at the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing in Cherry Point, North Carolina.
Preparations for WMD Attacks Are Lacking
Rear Admiral Clint Adams, Medical Corps, U.S. Navy, Captain John Schrinner, U.S. Coast Guard (Ret.), Chris Doane, Joe DiRenzo Ill, and Lieutenant Cipriano Pineda, U.S. Navy
How can multiple federal, state and local agencies merge their capabilities to effectively respond to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attacks and minimize deaths and injuries? Whether a terrorist attack or an accident, it does not matter to non-law enforcement respondcrs. For them, it is a hazardous material (HazMat) incident with mass casualties and a metropolitan area is at risk.
A city like Norfolk, Virginia, for example, includes the largest naval base in the United States. Because many incidents now are assumed to be terrorist-related, military consequence management personnel must interact with civilian law enforcement agencies. This extra dimension significantly complicates already difficult situations.
The Obstacles
Not surprisingly, federal, state, and local agencies have overlapping jurisdictions and authority. In addition to state and local contingency plans, several federal plans provide guidance for responding to domestic acts of terror, major accidents, and natural disasters. Principal among them are the Terrorism Contingency Plan, the National Contingency Plan, the Federal Response Plan, and the National Response Plan, each of which designates a variety of lead federal agencies and officials to manage incidents, depending on type, location, and cause. The latter plan combines many of these federal plans into one and eliminates the distinction between crisis management (law enforcement action to stop or apprehend perpetrators) and consequence management (action to mitigate the effects of the incident on public safety and recover from the incident).
The Terrorist Contingency and Federal Response plans divide the response to terrorist incidents between crisis and consequence management. The Federal Bureau of Investigation is the lead federal agency for crisis management and the Federal Emergency Management Agency has the lead in consequence management. The Federal Response Plan further subdivides disaster response functions into emergency support functions and assigns leadership and support roles to various federal agencies.
Unfortunately, the construct of these plans creates numerous gaps and seams. The Terrorist Contingency and Federal Response plans must be enacted by a presidential decision, which creates delays-especially when the cause of an incident is unclear. They do not adequately specify requirements, preparedness activities, and readiness measures. Further, separate leadership for crisis and consequence management creates conflicts in response priorities, and the plans do not adequately cover relationships with state and local authorities. Finally, the two lead federal agencies are not first-response organizations; they require hours to arrive in force.
When the Contingency and Federal Response plans are not enacted, the National Contingency Plan takes precedence for oil spills and HazMat releases, and assigns leadership responsibilities to the Environmental Protection Agency for inland incidents and to the Coast Guard for coastal incidents. In addition to lead agencies, there are numerous supporting agencies with the capabilities needed to save lives. Some of them can assist in responding readily. Others-especially Department of Defense (DoD) forces-may be hamstrung by legal and bureaucratic obstacles. And these are only a few of the problems. Until response plans delineate each agency's role and are exercised by all concerned, chaos will ensue and the scope of the disaster will be increased rather than eased.
In considering appropriate response plans, important issues must be weighed:
* Command structures for multiple agencies with overlapping jurisdictions
* Agency interoperability
* Compatibility of equipment and communications systems
* Accommodation of internal training programs and tactics to other agencies
* Collective extent of response capabilities to HazMat and mass casualty incidents among various agencies
* Availability and response time of other resources, including DoD's
Command and Control
The means for mounting coordinated responses to incidents are being discussed widely, in and out of government. A mountain of policy and guidance is directed at WMD response in our homeland. Despite these efforts, the critical questions remain: Who is in charge? What command-and-control structure is to be used?
Homeland security Presidential Directive-5 mandates a single comprehensive approach to domestic incident management based on the Incident Command System (ICS), an extremely challenging requirement for the many agencies charged with responding to WMD incidents. The directive designates the Secretary for the Department of Homeland Security as the principal federal official for domestic incident management. He is responsible for coordinating federal operations and developing the National Response Plan and National Incident Management System (NIMS) as the bases for command and control.
The primary purpose of the National Response Plan is to integrate myriad federal domestic prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery plans into one plan. (The integration includes merging consequence and crisis management.) Once promulgated, the NIMS will use ICS to enhance interoperability among local, state, regional, and national components. The concepts and principles in this document will guide the many interwoven elements of all-hazard incident management. The Coast Guard, many maritime agencies, and industry have moved forward with ICS to respond to oil and HazMat spills.
According to Coast Guard doctrine, the ICS is a standardized on-scene emergency management concept specifically designed to allow users to adopt an integrated organizational structure that meets the complexity and demands of single or multiple incidents without being hindered by jurisdictional boundaries. It is organized around the critical response functions of command, operations, planning, logistics, finance, and administration. In the case of multijurisdictional incidents, the lead agencies from all levels assign empowered representatives (incident commanders) to form a unified command to respond using ICS. This achieves a unified effort. Designation of incident commanders is not based on seniority, but on the individuals' regular governmental positions-for example, a Coast Guard captain of the port. They are fully empowered by their agencies to manage response activities and have the authority to make decisions and obligate their agencies' resources. Leadership by committee appears untidy and potentially indecisive, but it is necessary and has proved surprisingly effective in practice.
The size of an ICS organization depends on the scope and complexity of the incident and may fluctuate during the course of the response. A response may range from one person handling a simple response (a police officer at a minor traffic accident) to hundreds of personnel organized to handle a major incident. One of the key concepts of ICS is span of control: the number of organizational elements that can be managed effectively by one person (typically, three to five elements).
Treatment of Mass Casualties
In the Hampton Roads, Virginia, region, civilian hospitals are at 90% capacity or higher daily. A WMD event would overload those facilities and quickly overwhelm regional civilian medical resources. This is where the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) and Naval Medical Center Portsmouth, Virginia, would mobilize under a DoD program that has been in effect for more than 20 years. NDMS is a joint federal, state, and local mutual aid organization for coordinated medical response, patient movement, and definitive inpatient care in time of war, national emergency, or domestic disaster. The Naval Medical Center, a federal coordinating center, has memoranda of understanding with 18 hospitals for beds in five critical patient categories. The program also covers forward movement of patients from emergent incident areas-for example, DoD has the lead in transporting victims from patient reception areas.
The Hampton Roads area has established a Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) that is funded by the Department of Homeland security. This system has made tremendous progress since the 11 September 2001 attacks. It has formed strike teams for incident response, standardized secondary decontamination among 18 hospitals, established public health procedures for biological incidents, and participated in last year's Naval Mid-Atlantic Region WMD exercise, "Southern Spring." The MMRS is a key coordinator of first response to WMD. It is responsible for setting up a Webbased hospital diversion system that Naval Medical Center Portsmouth has modified for bed reporting. The system also has a mass-casualty module that was used successfully in Exercise Southern Spring.
Even with all the strategic attention and direction, however, there are gaps and seams at the tactical level. While locations like Hampton Roads have capable naval medical facilities, the ability to maintain a coordinated effort is lacking sorely. Local officials and their DoD counterparts require a new paradigm. Presidential mandates provide a cohesive approach, direct compulsory use of ICS, and lay the foundation for using federal assets (such as Navy medicine) to support state and local authorities. But more needs to be done.
Future Work
A number of problems areas should be corrected before the United States is faced with the same kind of attack it suffered in 2001 and Spain suffered in March.
* DoD commands with civil support missions must adopt the National Incident Management System's Incident Command System. In any domestic incident, by the time DoD civil support forces arrive, a multi-agency response will be under way and using NIMS and the ICS unified command. Supporting DoD forces must be able to merge seamlessly into that structure and be prepared to shift tactical control of their resources to the unified command. DoD participation does not automatically ordain that DoD is in charge. No forces entering a disaster area can operate independently. There must not be parallel military and civilian command structures.
* As a matter of priority, local emergency planners, in coordination with military planners, should determine the civilian and military medical resources available in their surrounding area. Today, if you contacted local emergency planners or response coordinators in cities and towns with large military medical facilities nearby, the vast majority could not tell you what resources were available at those facilities. Many would be equally uncertain of the total range of resources available at civilian medical facilities. In addition, local planners should evaluate their potential positions in the ICS structure and formalize future relationships through interagency memoranda of understanding to ensure rapid integration with other local, state, and federal agencies likely to be involved in such contingencies.
* Because conflicting leadership leads to incident management paralysis, NIMS doctrine and procedures can be applied to multi-agency planning. The system can assist in the development of local, state, and federal prevention and preparedness councils, and clarify chains of command under various circumstances.
* Clear incident action plan templates that are acceptable to all responding agencies should be established early in planning sessions. Their preparation will foster cooperation and pave the way for using similar templates in actual incidents.
* Military planners should streamline the request processes for DoD medical assistance. Processes for requesting military medicine and other military support in a WMD situation are cumbersome and slow.
* Responders must seek out and capitalize on every opportunity for joint civil-military WMD response training-from tabletop exercises and lectures to full-blown field exercises. This will increase mutual awareness and help develop mutual trust and confidence prior to an emergency.
* Local military commanders should take the initiative in launching aggressive professional exchange programs that allow their key personnel to familiarize themselves with local agencies. At the same time, medical personnel of each service need to understand how their fellow services can respond to WMD situations. The worst-case scenario for key responders is to meet each for the first time as a disaster unfolds.
The overall strategy for responding to WMD attacks has been established. Now is the time for the Department of Homeland security to lead the wide range of other federal response agencies-including DoD-in filling in the blanks at the tactical level.
Rear Admiral Adams is the Atlantic Fleet Surgeon; Captain Schrinner was the first chief of the Coast Guard Atlantic Area's Marine Safety Division; Mr. Doane, a retired Coast Guard officer, is chief of the Coast Guard Atlantic Area's Response and Port Security Branch; Mr. DiRenzo, a retired Coast Guard officer, is Coast Guard Atlantic Area's antiterrorism and force protection coordinator; Lieutenant Pineda, former command emergency manager at Naval Medical Center, Portsmouth, Virginia, is assigned to U.S. Transportation Command.