The recent troop shift in Iraq—one of the largest such moves in military history—is an important milestone in the effort to rebuild that nation. Of note, nearly one-fourth of the incoming forces are U.S. Marines. Having returned from Iraq last summer to reconstitute, they now resume an equitable share of the burden for postconflict operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom II.
The Marines’ return triggers some interesting questions. Having assumed an important mission in the geographic hotbed of Iraqi agitation, will they offer more of the carrot and less of the stick? Will they be tempted to adopt a hard line, or will they use a flexible approach tailored to meet the facts on the ground?
To be sure, the Marines confront a different situation from the one they faced last year in predominantly Shiite provinces. The new area of operations in the Sunni Triangle contains a witch’s brew of regime loyalists, foreign fighters, criminals, and any number of frustrated and discontented Sunnis. This potent mix represents a major obstacle to fostering civility and long-term peace.
Marines harbor no illusions about the challenge. Media coverage provides constant, sobering reminders of the explosive devices, suicide bombings, and sensational attacks they might face. In addition, U.S. Army units operating in the region have provided valuable intelligence and many lessons learned. Incoming Marine units no doubt will exploit this information and apply techniques rooted in traditional counterinsurgency approaches.
A common theme of counterinsurgency operations is the importance of the support of the local population—and to which side it goes. Thus, as critical as it will be for Marines to hunt down enemy combatants, it will be equally if not more critical that they demonstrate respect for Arab customs, treat Sunnis firmly but fairly, forge bonds with Iraqi security elements and key leaders, and ensure their actions do not alienate Iraqi citizens.
Though taxing, we tried to look at problems through the lens of the Iraqi experience, which in time produced a sort of mutual empathy between locals and Marines. In one instance, local citizens were digging randomly outside the former Iraqi Special Police headquarters, searching for bodies. When one day they uncovered remains, several hundred angry Iraqis converged on the scene. Marines responded and immediately cordoned off the area. I instructed the company commander to secure the site and wait for forensic analysis teams from higher headquarters to arrive. Unfortunately, as more bodies were exhumed, the crowd grew increasingly agitated. Assessing the situation, the company commander ordered his men to “sling arms” and adopt a less combative pose. Finally, when Iraqis began jumping over a wire obstacle placed around the gravesites, the company commander instructed his men to slowly give way to the grieving members of this impassioned Iraqi throng. His decision was both pragmatic and compassionate. Ultimately, he believed there was more to be gained from backing away than obeying orders, which if followed to the letter, likely would have resulted in a bloody confrontation.
Today, most of Iraq—especially the Sunni Triangle—is well beyond the stage described in these anecdotes, but these and other examples highlight the elements of a successful approach and how the immediate actions of Marine units on the ground nested within the larger operational and strategic setting. Having just wielded a big stick during major combat operations, Marines quickly extended the olive branch of reconciliation during the transition to postconflict operations. Doing so restored Iraqi leaders’ confidence in U.S. motives and thwarted a cycle of alienation between “liberator” and “liberated.”
In spite of some obvious differences, the Sunni region merits similar consideration. Without a doubt, incoming U.S. forces, including Marines, face an uphill struggle to build genuine trust with all Sunnis, especially those elites and “dead-enders” whose loss of prestige and power leaves little choice but continued resistance. It will not be easy, but Marines can make the uphill road smoother by establishing rapport with the majority, or perhaps large minority, of Sunnis whose loyalty lies somewhere in the middle—neither for nor against coalition forces, but hoping for some sense of normalcy.
To that end, the use of heavy force may be counterproductive. Isolating large groups of Sunni civilians, dealing rudely with their family members, damaging personal or private property, or conducting operations that indirectly cause civilian casualties will generate resentment even when the immediate impact of these actions is useful. Of course, “being nice” will not always work either. But as a matter of routine, the tactical cure must not be worse than the ill.
Sharing danger and demonstrating commitment alongside Iraqi security forces also might be beneficial. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the presence of Marines working with Iraqi police reduced cultural barriers and forged bonds of mutual respect. It also stiffened the resolve of local policemen, which further undercut local support for Baath loyalists. This technique will not work in every area of the Sunni Triangle, especially where the appearance of U.S. leadership could deepen resentment and humiliation. However, the tailored objective of developing closer ties with selected Iraqi security forces, such as the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps or Iraqi Army, and working together with cooperative Iraqi leaders may improve prospects for long-term success.
Patience, persistence, and a measure of restraint are important features of a successful counterinsurgency campaign. Likewise, resolve and the willingness to use force also are necessary. For insurgents or suicidal terrorists bent on random killing, a conventional military response might be the only option. As a reminder of this, prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom Major General Mattis coined the division’s motto. When Iraqis encounter Marines, he said, they should find “no better friend, no worse enemy.” This slogan framed our outlook during combat operations and complemented the emphasis on doing no harm in the aftermath. It correctly brackets the Marine counterinsurgency approach and serves as a notice to thugs and fanatics—those who misinterpret the nature of Marine intentions or want to test Marine mettle quickly will see the velvet glove removed to reveal a clenched fist.
The challenge in any counterinsurgency conflict is to embrace people to win hearts and minds on the one hand while using lethal force to kill insurgents on the other. Balancing these competing goals requires a clear understanding that the people are central to success, as well as sound judgment in the application of force and the flexibility to deal with changing circumstances. Given their adaptive culture, experience, organization, and training, Marines are a prime choice to strike this balance in Iraq.
Lieutenant Colonel Mundy commanded 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, during Iraqi Freedom and served during the transition to postconflict operations in the Al Qadissiyah Province. He is a Federal Executive Fellow at the Brookings Institute.