As shown in Iraq, shock and awe—and its current incarnation, Rapid Decisive Operations—promises startling effects with light forces and few casualties. But if it ignores the fact that the difficulties of "old" warfare have not disappeared, it risks future operations.
In Operation Iraqi Freedom we saw the beginning of a new form of warfare. Two aspects of the campaign stand out: the speed with which the combat phase was conducted, and the low numbers of casualties on all sides. And all this was achieved with far fewer forces than used in the first Gulf War. High technology allowed the armed forces to achieve startling effects without relying on mass. This is the revolution in military affairs we have been waiting for. Or is it?
In many regards, the Rumsfeld doctrine of Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) resembles other hopeful theories, particularly those in the business field. The past decade was full of optimism, with economists declaring the end of the boom-and-bust business cycle and management gurus (and stockbrokers) hailing the arrival of the virtual firm. Out with the old, restrictive rules, and in with the fast and loose world of e-commerce and the New Economy. Of course, it was not to be. Companies went broke; stock markets crashed. The thinking that at first appeared visionary turned out to be naïve.
Are we in danger of falling into the same trap in the wake of the Iraqi campaign? A close examination of the concepts behind the Rumsfeld doctrine, coupled with an appreciation of the events of Operation Iraqi Freedom, reveals this to be the case. By adopting a strategy that reduces the range of options open to a commander, we increase the risk of failure across the range of operations.
Rapid Decisive Operations Explained
It is not entirely clear that a definitive framework exists for Rapid Decisive Operations doctrine, but it is possible to identify key characteristics. At its most basic, RDO doctrine is a recipe to "fight light, fight fast": "It concentrates on the use of special forces, air power, and high technology so that conflicts can be won more swiftly and with fewer troops."1 Rather than relying on the mass of large numbers of troops and weapon systems, RDO relies on creating devastating effects that debilitate the enemy, often without having to engage in long (and costly) destruction engagements. Perhaps the easiest way to contrast this new way of doing things and business as usual is to use the table set out in Harlan Ullman and James Wade's Shock and Awe (see Table 1).2
Clearly, doctrines based on shock and awe aim to allow militaries to be leaner; their effects-based outcomes favor fast and potentially smaller numbers of forces working to throw an enemy off balance. Mass is valued less than agility; large concentrations of forces present bigger targets and are susceptible to casualties. By selecting the most critical targets, the attacker can pare down the total number of weapons, concentrating fires on key command-and-control nodes. This is in opposition to older approaches that focus on the piecemeal destruction of an opponent's military forces.
Table 1: Key Differences between New and Old Doctrine
| Rapid Dominance (New Doctrine) | Decisive Force (Old Doctrine) | |
| Objective | Control the adversary's will, perceptions, and understanding | Prevail militarily and decisively against a set of opposing capabilities |
| Use of Force | Control the adversary's will, perceptions, and understanding and literally make an adversary impotent to act or react | Unquestioned ability to prevail militarily over an opponent's forces and based against the adversary's capabilities |
| Force Size | Could be smaller than opposition, but with decisive edge in technology, training, and technique | Large, highly trained, and well equipped; materially overwhelming |
| Scope | All encompassing | Force against force and supporting capability |
| Speed | Essential | Desirable |
| Casualties | Could be relatively few on both sides | Potentially higher on both sides |
| Technique | Paralyze, shock, unnerve, deny, destroy | Systematic destruction of military capability; attrition applicable in some situations |
Much of the commentary during the Iraq war referred to "tipping," throwing the enemy off balance through consecutive, or ideally simultaneous, attacks. By presenting the enemy with more problems than he can handle, the attacker effectively can shut down any resistance. To achieve this level of coordination, attackers rely on high technology for communication, targeting, and to produce the weapons' effects. In short, the military becomes increasingly networked and focuses on the desired effect rather than the heavy hardware traditionally required to achieve it. If light is good, then virtual is better.
Ullman and Wade lean toward this preference. One of the characteristics that guides shock and awe is the Royal Canadian Mounted Police principle: "Never put a man where you can put a bullet."3 It is not being there that counts, but being able to make something happen. Technology is making that easier all the time.
Shock and awe and its current incarnation as RDO doctrine are a break with convention. They fly in the face of Napoleon's dictum giving pride of place to big battalions. Technology has made it possible to overcome the old restraints, to ignore the old rules. Who says you can't be in two places at once? Multiple stand-off weapon systems can make it seem as if you are. If the old rule is "concentration of forces," the new rule is "dispersion of forces and concentration of their effects."
Much of what lies ahead—transformation, the codification of RDO doctrine, allied force developments—will depend on the insights drawn from Iraqi Freedom.7 It is hoped that lessons drawn from the seductive but illusory appeal of the New Economy can be borne in mind as well. Similarly, the previous transformation of the military under Secretary McNamara should remind us that changes should increase and improve the options open to a commander, not limit them. Concentrating too much on the potential that shock and awe doctrines possess, while ignoring the sobering fact that the difficulties associated with old warfare have not disappeared, does nothing but increase the risk of future operations. A balanced, diversified strategy that can handle the full range of requirements—high- as well as low-tech—is the way ahead. Wishing away reality is not an option.
Mr. Ankersen is studying for a doctorate at the London School of Economics. From 1988 to 2000 he was an infantry officer in the Canadian Army, serving in Croatia and Kosovo. He has written widely on military and defense matters. Mr. Tethong is a managing strategy consultant in London. He served as a navigating officer in the Canadian Navy from 1989 to 1998. He is a graduate of Georgetown University's master of science in foreign service program and specializes in Asian affairs and energy security.
1. Toby Harden, "'Fight Light, Fight Fast' Theory Advances," Daily Telegraph ( London), online ed., 14 April 2003. back to article
2. Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade, Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996). Online version www.ndu.edu/inss/books; accessed 12 April 2003. While RDO doctrine and the original Rapid Dominance doctrine are not completely synonymous, such a comparison is instructive. back to article
3. Ullman and Wade, Shock and Awe. back to article
4. Holman W. Jenkins Jr., "The New Economy's Sore Losers," Policy Review, April 2003, online ed. back to article
5. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1962, p. 401. back to article
6. Richard Hart Sinnreich, "Relearning Old Battlefield Lessons," The Washington Post, 24 April 2003, p. A25. back to article
7. The British armed forces are watching the outcome of the Iraq war with close attention, and some feel they will "transform" along similar lines as the United States. See Jonathan Carr-Brown and Peter Almond, "Armed Forces to Be Slashed for Hi-tech War," Sunday Times (London), online ed., 20 April 2003. back to article