The Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security spoke recently with Gordon I. Peterson—on assignment for the Naval Institute—in Washington, D.C., the week after President George W. Bush nominated him to serve a second time as Secretary of the Navy. He had vacated that post in January 2003 to help Secretary Tom Ridge organize the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS). He joins one other individual to be re-nominated as secretary of the Navy; the first, John Y. Mason, served twice during the 1840s.
Proceedings: How much are you looking forward to your return to the Navy-Marine Corps team?
England: I am looking forward to my return, but there is some reluctance at leaving a very responsible and important job in DHS. On the other hand, having now served in senior executive positions in industry, my prior experience in DoD [Department of Defense] and now this department, I return with a unique outlook. I have many friends and associates in the Pentagon, and we built great bonds of friendship, mutual trust, and respect. That experience is very important. The leadership team is largely intact, so I am looking forward to being part of it again.
One aspect I have particularly enjoyed in DHS is working with the U.S. Coast Guard. I had the opportunity to be with its men and women on board ship and on their bases. The Coast Guard is a superb military organization.
I now look forward again to being with our sailors and Marines. My experience provides an interesting perspective, because I have now been on the leadership team with three of the nation's sea services.
Proceedings: Does that experience suggest an opportunity to enhance the already strong relationship between the U.S. Navy and the Coast Guard?
England: It has been a very strong relationship, particularly since 9/11, thanks in large measure to the leadership of [Chief of Naval Operations] Admiral [Vern] Clark, [former Commandant of the Coast Guard] Admiral [James M.] Loy, and now [Commandant of the Coast Guard] Admiral Tom Collins. On the other hand, the services' roles and missions need to be defined in terms of specific authorities, responsibilities in the chain of command, and the response during any given emergency. There are still command-and-control issues and equipment interoperability requirements that need to be defined better. The relationship between the Navy and the Coast Guard will continue to be closer. And there is more we can do to assist that relationship.
Proceedings: How important is the redefinition of the Coast Guard's responsibilities in its national defense role, to reflect its realignment under DHS?
England: That is very important. The Coast Guard has a large portfolio of missions. For example, it plays a leading role in port and waterway security. Perhaps less obvious is its role in other critical pieces of the infrastructure, such as nuclear power plants. These plants all are located along the water. This is also an example of the significant level of coordination necessary for homeland security—in this case with the Department of Energy, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, state and local government, private industry, and of course, with DHS.
Proceedings: At a time when many of your former associates in industry are enjoying a well-earned retirement, what motivates you to stay in the ring?
England: I chose to serve under Secretary Ridge because the President and the nation needed the job done. I do think about retirement now and then; I'm older than most of the people still in the business of government. But it was important for me to help organize the new department and ready it for the future.
We are a nation at war, and it is a totally different kind of war. I believe this war against terrorism will in one respect be similar to the war we fought against communism, which lasted 40 years. That is, I expect this war also will be a long one. The outlook certainly influences my decision to make whatever contribution I can.
Proceedings: What were your top goals over these formative months at DHS?
England: I have been working hard to put an operating structure in place that can grow well into the future. It is important not only to protect and defend the nation every day, but also to improve our capability to do so. Homeland security is strengthened by our being a collaborative, coordinating, and team-building organization. Our objective is to help coordinate and integrate programs across our department and the federal government. I view the DHS as a leadership agency to bring together the assets of the federal and local governments, private enterprise, our international partners, and the American people in this battle against terrorism.
It is crucial that we delegate authority and responsibility to the very lowest point in the DHS organization, because terrorists do not have a bureaucracy. We must be agile, quick, and responsive. If we are not, we will lose. Keep in mind there is not a federal solution to this war; it is a national solution.
Proceedings: How do you assess the agency's stand-up during this transition?
England: I don't think there is any question that we have improved security. We integrated 22 disparate agencies into a centralized organization and a fully functioning department.
We must solidify its structure, develop the proper performance metrics, and get its new personnel system in place. Once these three things are executed, you then can wrap an enterprise architecture around the organization.
We are facing an ongoing battle in a long war, but we will continue to improve and evolve. We need a better analysis basis; it takes time to develop those capabilities. The President was wise to develop the TTIC, the Terrorist Threat Integration Center. It may be little publicized, but it is vastly important, because the foundation of this department is intelligence.
Proceedings: What is the department's approach for implementing the National Strategy for Homeland Security?
England: The new strategy provides the outline, and we are pursuing its objectives aggressively. Our agencies also are developing their strategic plans based on its overarching guidance. The Coast Guard, for example, developed and promulgated a comprehensive strategy for maritime homeland security last December.
We also hope to see a broader base of analysis, intellectual discussion, and debate to aid our decision-making process. This intellectual foundation could take many forms, including think tanks working with the government and universities providing courses and degrees—much as they do today for national security in the United States. But the President understands what must be done, and this is the vision he has laid out in his national strategy.
Our analysis must help us understand the threat, the probability of that threat, the vulnerabilities of the threat, and the consequences of those vulnerabilities. Although everyone seems to have an opinion about what we should do in homeland security, the problem is, they're all correct, unless you have decision criteria to determine what is right and are able to measure output and assess risk. Risk-based management is what this department is all about. As time goes on, we must build this capability.
Our job is to protect the United States, and that includes the civil liberties, rights, and privacy that form the foundation on which this nation is built. We could take Draconian measures to improve security in some areas, but it would not result in a lifestyle we want to have. That is not what we want to do. We want to preserve the nation, not just its assets.
Proceedings: How will the department manage its major acquisition programs?
England: I chair a new review board for major acquisitions. We also established a joint requirements council to look at our joint requirements across the department to advance integration and the requirements-generation process. Our approach is to concentrate on missions, not organizations. How do we accomplish our missions from a joint point of view?
Recently, we established a policy to guide our investment review process so we can integrate capital planning and investment control, budgeting, and acquisition. This approach will ensure we are spending on investments that support and advance our mission. We hope to identify duplicative sources for consolidation and mission alignment when it makes sense or when we can achieve economies of scale.
Proceedings: Will performance-based capability requirements be assessed at the outset of the acquisition process?
England: We will look at mission-oriented requirements across the department jointly so we do not duplicate systems. This department has a very wide breadth of responsibility, and it was established to integrate the activities of 22 agencies. The measure of success is to meet the President's objective to integrate effectively and to demonstrate that we achieved better performance as a department than we would have as separate agencies.
One important consideration, similar to DoD, is how to measure the output of the department. In this town, typically, money is always a measure. But that is an input. The theory is, if you are spending more, you are doing better. But you do not want to measure yourself by your number of programs; you want to measure yourself by your effectiveness.
It is not easy to develop the right performance measures. Just like DoD, how do you know you will win a war until you fight it? We must develop surrogate output measures and metrics that validate the fact we are protecting the country and also demonstrate to the people that we are spending their money wisely.
To some extent, however, our problem is one of prevention. It is very hard to measure what you have prevented. You probably will never know. We know when we fail, but we do not always know when we succeed. This makes it very difficult.
Proceedings: Critics say the administration's current and planned actions are not adequate to remedy the nation's maritime-security vulnerabilities. How do you feel about that?
England: Maritime security is one of several critical security issues facing the country today, and we do not underestimate the challenge. With 95% of the nation's cargo carried by ship, port security is critical to both homeland security and the economy. Many initiatives are under way, however, and the situation is radically different today from what it was before 9/11.
We work closely with Secretary Norman Mineta and the Department of Transportation. Our largest directorate in DHS is Border and Transportation Security. The prior Customs Service and most of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service have been combined and merged with the Transportation Security Administration. This new organization plays a major role in maritime and border security. Of course, the Coast Guard is the key team player in all maritime security activities.
During the past two years, significant increases in the Coast Guard's budget have allowed it to take many actions to improve the security of U.S. ports, waterways, and coastal areas. Many have legal dimensions associated with the Maritime Transportation Security Act. New port-security zones have been established. Ships and cargo do not just arrive randomly; advance notification is required, and sea marshals board inbound merchant ships before they arrive in U.S. ports. We have much improved visibility into their cargo and its destination. New procedures and improved information sharing allow us to monitor the movement of merchant vessels and crews.
Many improvements to port security have been put in place in a short time, and much of it is based locally. More than $1 billion has been provided to fund port security needs this year. Grants have been targeted to key ports. A new container security initiative is under way, and we are teaming with port authorities overseas.
Key to our success will be the ability of the Coast Guard to press our borders out to sea with its defense-in-depth strategy. We require this layered-defense approach so we intercept and neutralize threats as far from our shores as possible.
Proceedings: How important is the Integrated Deepwater System program to the Coast Guard's future operational readiness?
England: Recapitalization of the Coast Guard's aging and technologically obsolete platforms and systems is absolutely essential. Homeland security is the President's highest priority, and he is committed to providing the Coast Guard with the modern cutters, patrol boats, and aircraft it must have to perform its many missions. The Deepwater program is a critical element in enabling the Coast Guard to implement our strategy for maritime homeland security. It will allow the Coast Guard to manage risk wisely and be far more effective in safeguarding the sovereignty, security, and safety of the nation. We must see the Deepwater program through or even accelerate it.
Proceedings: Deepwater's pre-9/11 plan called for a 20- to 30-year program. Why not bring it on line sooner?
England: It worries me that the program is spread over so many technology lifetimes. Frankly, in addition to security considerations, I would like to shorten the program just from the technology point of view. Deepwater will recapitalize the Coast Guard's obsolete assets and offer a new C4ISR [command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] system that will tie in with the Navy's architecture. We know that improved network-centric C4ISR systems are where the payoff is in today's world. It is important to bring these systems on line, but it is also important to bring them on line correctly so they integrate appropriately with the rest of DHS and other agencies in the federal government. The administration is highly supportive of the Coast Guard and its Deepwater recapitalization program.
Proceedings: Do you see possibilities for expanding Deepwater's systems across other DHS agencies to satisfy joint requirements?
England: I don't know, because I have not had the chance to look at all of its applications. At a minimum, all DHS assets must be compatible and interoperable. As to what degree of integration that might entail as we go forward, that remains to be determined.
I am interested in exploring key enabling technologies that will allow the department to perform its mission more effectively and efficiently across all agencies. Deepwater will employ unmanned aerial vehicles [UAVs], and that is an area where we are working with the DoD, which has been very helpful operating some UAVs with us on the southern border. This gives us an opportunity to operate these systems, understand their value, and determine how they might integrate into our operations.
Proceedings: What message, in particular, would you send to the readers of Proceedings?
England: Today's war on terror involves everyone in the United States and, frankly, around the world, who loves freedom and liberty. This country has protected freedom and liberty around the world for 227 years. It takes commitment, dedication, and resolve. The war on terror will not be fought quickly, and it will take a common commitment from the President on down to every citizen. The war on terror is a different kind of war, but we will prevail.
Retired Navy Captain Peterson is a life member of the U.S. Naval Institute and a technical director for the Anteon Corporation’s Center for Strategic Studies and Operations.